THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO EUROPE

BY KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS

Selected and Edited by

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK and BERT F. HOSELITZ

THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO EUROPE

BY KARL MARX
AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS

SOVIET RUSSIA has done everything in its power to put a veil of oblivion over the writings contained in the present volume. Stalin himself has intervened so that it is virtually impossible for a communist anywhere to obtain these writings of Marx and Engels.

This condemnation of Marx and Engels to silence and the surrender to oblivion of their works on the very history of that country which pretends to be the guardian of their teaching is not difficult to explain. The reason is found in the fact that with the progressive consolidation of all power in Russia in the hands of the Soviet dictatorship, the present Stalinist regime has come to regard itself more and more as the successor to the policies of the Czars.

Marx and Engels considered Russia the greatest threat to freedom in Europe, and their criticism of Czarist imperialism is remarkably contemporary with our own time. If we were to actually change the dates of various events and policies of which they wrote, it would appear

(continued on back flap)

(continued from front flap)

to the reader that these were from this year's newspapers rather than the *New York Herald* of the middle nineteenth century. It is plain to see that the imperialist dreams of the Czars have become reality in the hands of the Soviet dictatorship.

It is no wonder that these writings are banned.

Engels wrote, "The immediate objective of Panslavism is the setting up under Russian domination of a Slavic empire from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathians to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas . . . to restore to the Slavs all originally Slavic territory, to convert Austria, with the exception of the Tyrol and Lombardy into a Slavic Empire . . . to declare null and void the historical development of the last thousand years . . . to cut off one-third of Germany and all of Hungary, to change Vienna and Budapest into Slavic cities."

Marx wrote, "The policy of Russia is changeless. Its methods, its tactics, its manoeuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."

The writings of Marx and Engels on Russia have significance for the present because they discuss and analyze problems and policies, which though historically past, have close parallels in the present. At worst they show the tremendous gap between Marxism and Stalinism, at best they provide a penetrating guide for an understanding of the Czarist—and by extension the Stalinist—menace to European freedom.

DESIGNED BY SIDNEY SOLOMON

The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois

THE RUSSIAN MENACE TO EUROPE

by Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels

A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES, SPEECHES, LETTERS AND NEWS DISPATCHES, SELECTED AND EDITED BY
Paul W. Blackstock
and Bert F. Hoselitz

THE FREE PRESS, GLENCOE, ILLINOIS

Copyright, 1952, by The Free Press, a Corporation

Printed in the United States of America

Designed by Sidney Solomon

CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 7

II. RUSSIA AND EUROPE

1. The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism (1890) 25

III. PANSLAVISM

2. Hungary and Panslavism (1849) 56
3. Democratic Panslavism (1849) 67
4. Panslavism and the Crimean War (1855) 84

IV. THE POLISH QUESTION

5. The Debate on Poland at Frankfurt (1848) 91
6. What Have the Working Classes to Do with Poland? (1866) 95
7. Poland's European Mission (1867) 104
8. A Polish Proclamation (1874) 109
9. Nationalism, Internationalism, and the Polish Question (1882) 116

V. THE CRIMEAN WAR

10. The Background of the Dispute (1853–1854) 121
11. Bluff and Counterbluff (1853) 153
12. Traditional Russian Policy (1853) 159
13. American Intervention and Neutral Rights (1853) 172
14. Military Stalemate and the Home Front (1854–1855) 178
15. Russian Blunders and the Death of the Czar (1854–1855) 190
16. Strategic Analyses of the War (1855) 195

VI. THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN RUSSIA

17. Russia and the Social Revolution (1873) 203
18. Letter on the Economic Development of Russia (1877) 216
19. Letter on the Russian Village Community (1881) 218
20. The Communist Manifesto in Russian (1882) 227
21. Russia and the Social Revolution Reconsidered (1894) 229

VII. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND EDITORS' COMMENTS 242

VIII. INDEX 285

I
INTRODUCTION

A considerable portion of the voluminous writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was devoted to political questions, and among these the analysis of the role and policies of Russia occupies an important place. The study of the social and political conditions in Russia and of its foreign policy had a double import for Marx and Engels. On the one hand, they regarded Czarism as the last and most powerful stronghold of European reaction and counter-revolution. On the other hand they were fascinated by the trends of social development discernible in Russia, this latecomer among capitalist nations. In the second half of the nineteenth century, before their very eyes, Russia was apparently undergoing a transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist society, and the events in this process were certain to evoke the undivided attention of Marx, whose lifework consisted in laying bare the laws of capitalist dynamics.

Marx's profound interest in the economic and social development of Russia subsequent to the Crimean War and the emancipation of the serfs is evidenced by the fact that in 1869 he began to learn Russian in order to be able to read Russian sources in the original. And his intense preoccupation with studying the flood of publications which he called "the last stocktaking of the old Russia before its death," coupled with his chronic suffering from ill health were probably the two main reasons why the second and third volumes of *Capital* remained unfinished at his death.

But long before Marx and Engels turned to a consideration of the internal social and economic development of Russia, they were deeply concerned with questions of Russian foreign policy. Since Catherine II the main territorial objective of Russian foreign policy in Europe had been expansion toward the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The largest portion of Poland had been swallowed up and incorporated into Russia, and Russian expansionist aims after having been directed westward now turned toward the south and southwest. Although the realization of this policy was seriously interrupted by the rise of Napoleon and the war between Russia and France, the Czar regained at the Congress of Vienna not only all the territories lost in the wars

against Napoleon, but also obtained in the constitution of the Holy Alliance a solemn undertaking by his two most powerful neighbors to maintain staunchly the principles of legitimacy and to combat with all the forces at their disposal any movement aimed at subverting the *status quo*. But this very alliance, freely entered into by Austria and Prussia, at the same time constituted a guarantee that Germany would remain weak and divided, and hence not capable of opposing vigorously Russian expansion toward the Straits and the Aegean archipelago.

The German revolution of 1848 was the first political event which threatened to break down the Central European equilibrium which had appeared so favorable to Russian designs. The Revolution was directed against the principles of authority and legitimacy; it favored, and for a short time seemed on the threshold of achieving, the unity of all the Germanies. Marx and Engels who participated in this Revolution (as editor-in-chief and foreign affairs writer of the most radical journal of German democracy), could not overlook the position which Russia was bound to take toward the events in Germany. When the Revolution had penetrated to the Russian borders, Russia's armed intervention in Hungary opened the eyes of all Europe to its vigorously counter-revolutionary policy. But even before that last flickering of the European Revolution was suppressed by the combined armed forces of the Russian Czar and the Austrian Emperor, Marx and Engels saw clearly that for reasons of internal political stability and the maintenance of its foreign policy, Russian Czarism had already become the severest and most intransigeant opponent of any revolutionary or national change in Central and Western Europe. Hence they favored and warmly advocated a revolutionary war against Russia.

Once they had arrived at the fundamental insight that Russian Czarism was the main menace to European democracy and European freedom, Marx and Engels attempted to analyze in greater detail the various facets of Czarist objectives and methods in the foreign policy field. The final summary of their combined views is contained in Engels' essay of 1890, which introduces the collection contained in this volume. The main theme of this article is that the chief objectives and strategy of Russian foreign policy have a permanent character, that such methods as bribery, deceit, the exploiting of disunity (often artificially incited or maintained) are traditional features of that policy, and that the changes in Russian foreign policy are only superficial tactical alterations which correspond to the shifting power complexes among Russia's partners or adversaries at different times.

The major objective of Russian foreign policy as Marx and Engels saw it is domination of the world, or at least domination of Europe. The first and most important step in this policy is the realization of the Panslavist aims, the second the permanent suppression of Poland and its incorporation into a greater Russian Empire. Any discussion by Marx and Engels of Panslavism and the Polish Question may thus be regarded as an examination of the two main policy areas in which the impact of the Russian menace on European freedom and democracy is felt.

Panslavism may have originally been only a dream expressing the cultural and literary aspirations of the Austrian Slavs, but it became a dynamic and vigorous political ideology after it was made an instrument of Russian foreign policy in Europe. Only then could Engels write that "the immediate objective of Panslavism is the setting up under Russian domination of a Slavic empire from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathians to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas" and further that this policy implied actions which would have as their goal "to restore to the Slavs all originally Slavic territory, to convert Austria, with the exception of the Tyrol and Lombardy into a Slavic Empire . . . to declare null and void the historical development of the last thousand years . . . to cut off one-third of Germany and all of Hungary, to change Vienna and Budapest into Slavic cities."[1]

That these actually were the aims of such Panslavist propagandists as the Danilevsky, the Katkoff and their kin can easily be ascertained by anyone who cares to consult their works. But, what is more significant for us today, is that the ambitious program of Panslavism has seen its achievement in the present. Have not the boundaries, which Engels roughly one hundred years ago considered to be the "natural" frontiers of the Great Slavic empire become incorporated in the imperialistic program of Stalin? Have not Hungary, one-third of Germany, Budapest and—at least partially—Vienna, actually become "Slavic," i.e., Russian territories?

We may be impressed by Engels' prophetic vision, who in 1855 foresaw the preliminary boundaries of Russian expansionism in its march toward domination of the world. But even more impressive is the fact that the very objective of Russian foreign policy, which Engels considered the chief threat to the freedom of Europe, has now been realized by a power which pretends to follow in the footsteps of his and Marx's teachings. Let no one pretend that the case which

[1] See below, pp. 62 and 87.

Engels had in mind and the actual policies of Stalinism are fundamentally different. For what Engels feared and fought against was not the subjugation or even the extermination of small nationalities and "ethnic ruins" or the extension of the frontiers of one country at the expense of another. What he fought against was the political growth of reaction, of a power which in the 1840's and 1850's as now, had inscribed on its banner the slogan of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality,—although the present orthodoxy serves different gods, and autocracy is exercised by a different class of men today than a hundred years ago. Let no one pretend, moreover, that the aims of the Panslavist agitators and the present policy of Stalin differ because the latter pretends to respect the cultural integrity of smaller nationalities. Consult the writings of those arch-priests of Panslavism, Anton Gurowski or Nicholas Danilevsky, and you will find that they also speak of Panslavism as an alliance of culturally and politically independent nationalities, and of the Russian mission to spread civilization among the peoples of the Balkans and Central Asia. Although on a more advanced level technologically than any envisaged by the Russian Panslavists of Czarist days, the policy of Stalinist Russia is the actual implementation and final attainment of the Panslavist objectives, and the arguments of Engels against the Czarist Panslavists of the nineteenth century have the same force against the Stalinist "liberators" of the twentieth.

The second principal aim of Russian foreign policy, the permanent suppression of Poland, was as clearly identified by Marx and Engels as that of Panslavism. Poland was a buffer. In the hands of Russia it forms, as Marx had already expressed in 1860, a formidable advance position for attack. In the tract, *Herr Vogt,* he had written that the Russians "had heavily equipped the fortresses of Warsaw, Modlin, and Ivangorod under the pretext that they were needed to keep Poland in check. Their true purpose was the complete strategic command of the Vistula region, the establishment of a base from which to carry an attack towards the North, the South, and the West . . . . The fortified position of the Russians on the Vistula threatens Germany more than all the French fortifications together, especially if and when Poland's national resistance should cease, and Russia would dispose of Poland's striking power for its own aggression."[2]

Seven years later, Marx stated the strategic and political problem

[2] Cited in D. Ryazanoff, "Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage" in *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung,* VI (1916), p. 189.

involved in the Polish Question in clearer and stronger language, when he said:

"The policy of Russia is changeless according to the admission of its official historian, the Muscovite Karamsin. Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star. In our times only a civilized government ruling over barbarian masses can hatch out such a plan and execute it. As the greatest Russian diplomat of modern times, Pozzo di Borgo, wrote to Alexander I at the time of the Congress of Vienna, Poland is the great instrument for the execution of Russian designs on the world, but it is also an invincible obstacle to them, until such time as the Poles, worn out by the accumulated betrayals of Europe, become a whip in the hands of the Muscovite."[3]

This assessment of the Polish problem explains why Marx and Engels considered the Poles a revolutionary nation, and why Engels could say that the Poles—and the Irish of his day—were the two nations in Europe "which do not only have the right but the duty to be nationalistic before they become internationalists." Marx's and Engels' position on the Polish question thus exhibits clearly the order in which they ranked political ends. International brotherhood and fraternization of the working class was a principle the attainment of which was assigned high priority by them. They attached similar importance to the principle of national self-determination. But both principles were subordinated to the dominant objective of giving support always and under all conditions to that party or group which stands for liberation from political and social fetters, which works for the emancipation of men from exploitation, suppression and slavery.

Marx was no liberal in the classical meaning of the word. He considered the freedoms extended by the liberal democracies of Western Europe a sham, because they were extended within the framework of a capitalist social system which he regarded as still founded on "wage slavery," on the exploitation of man by man. But his support of a war of a liberal-democratic Germany against Russia in 1848, his fervent hope for the success of a liberal-democratic revolution in Poland, are proof that he clearly preferred the capitalist democracies of Western Europe to the barbarian tyranny of Russian Czarism. This was not a policy of choosing the lesser of two evils, but a clear recognition that the chief aim which he favored, the ultimate abolition of human exploitation, was possible in the one but not possible in the other system.

[3] See below, p. 106.

We do not know, and it would be idle to speculate, what attitude Marx and Engels would take toward Stalin's Russia, the country which today pretends to be the guardian of their political message. But we do know that of all the systems of tyranny and human exploitation which exist in our time the Soviet is the most vicious and the most oppressive. Again the parallels with the middle of the nineteenth century are striking. Warsaw, Modlin and Ivangorod are still Russian fortresses which serve the double purpose of holding the Poles in check and of forming an advance base against the West. Today a ring of fortresses stretching from Stettin to the Danube and along the Danube to the Turkish frontier has been added to these strongholds. Russian governors ruled in Poland in the nineteenth century and Soviet emissaries or Soviet-appointed quislings hold power today in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and other cities. The *cordon sanitaire* by which the Czars prevented the intrusion of Western ideas into the territories under their sway has been replaced by the much more impregnable iron curtain; and just as under the Czarist regime, those works of Marx and Engels which are permitted to circulate are carefully censored, and any passages inconsistent with official dogma are just as carefully expurgated and suppressed. In fact with one or two exceptions, the essays contained in this volume are not only unavailable in Russia, but their publication and distribution could be achieved only by illegal means, with both distributor and reader under constant danger of exile or worse.

Not only the objectives of Russian foreign policy, also its basic methods were recognized by Marx and Engels as forming a lasting pattern. Here is what Marx said in an essay written in 1853:

"One merely needs to replace one series of names and dates by others and it becomes clear that the policies of Ivan III [who ruled from 1462 to 1505] and those of Russia today are not merely similar but identical. Ivan, in turn, only perfected the traditional Muscovite policy which he inherited from Ivan I, Kalita. Ivan Kalita, the slave of the Mongols achieved his greatness by deflecting the power of his greatest enemies, the Tatars, against his lesser enemies, the Russian princes. But he could guide this power only by falsehood and pretense. He was compelled to hide from his masters the strength which he really had attained and to confound his fellow-slaves with a power he did not possess. To resolve this task he virtually had to elevate the wiles of the meanest slave into a formal system and to carry that latter through with the tough patience of a slave. Even naked force was turned into intrigue. In such a system of intrigue, corruption, and secret usurpation, he had

to poison his victim before striking him down openly. The simplicity of the end became with him duplicity of action. To win an advantage by the deceptive use of a hostile power, to weaken the power precisely because of this very use, and, finally, to cause it to be destroyed because it permitted its having been used as a tool—this policy was made to order for Ivan Kalita because of the peculiar character of the ruling and the subjugated races. His policy also remained that of Ivan III. And it was the policy of Peter the Great, and is that of present-day Russia, however much the name, the territory and the character of the hostile power exploited by them may have changed.

"In fact, Peter the Great is the inventor of modern Russian [foreign] policy. But he attained this role only because he removed the purely local flavor of the old Muscovite method of unnoticed penetration and annexation, and deprived it of its chance admixtures, and, by forging it into an abstract formula, generalized its ends and unfolded its purpose so that the attempt to extend precisely given limits of power was raised to the attempt to gain unlimited power. He brought about this transformation of Muscovy through the generalization of his system and not the mere addition of a few provinces."[4]

In his essay "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism," Engels has described the later development of the methods of Russian foreign policy since Peter the Great. Since that policy centered around relations with Europe, it was adapted to the special conditions prevailing there, and, as Engels points out, the basis for this policy was laid under Catherine II and the staff of diplomats who flocked to Russia from other parts of Europe.

In their main features the foreign policy methods of Soviet Russia have remained similar to those originated by Ivan I, domesticated by Ivan III, generalized by Peter I, and westernized by Catherine II. As in earlier times they are partly the result of a feeling of inferiority and weakness, and partly the continuation of traditional Russian methods. To sow discord among actual or prospective enemies, to conquer them

[4] Karl Marx "Revelations of Diplomatic History of the 18th Century," [London] *Free Press,* 16 August 1856 to 1 April 1857. These articles were later edited by Elinor Marx Aveling in a book, *Secret Diplomatic History of the 18th Century,* London, 1899. This edition is defective and contains many errors and omissions. The passage cited here has been omitted from this edition and is quoted from N. Ryazanoff, *Marx über den Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russlands in Europa.* (Ergänzungshefte zur *Neuen Zeit,* Nr. 5, 6 March, 1909) p. 22. A new and exact edition of Marx's articles in the London *Free Press* will be published shortly by Professor Benoît P. Hepner in Paris.

from within by Trojan horse techniques, by fostering groups disloyal to the political principles of their own countries and subservient to those of the Kremlin,—these are measures which have become commonplace appurtenances of Soviet policy. Ivan Kalita's method of poisoning his victim before striking him openly, sets the pattern for today's Soviet system of organizing a corroding Stalinist underground movement in a country before taking over its government. And the "old Muscovite method of unnoticed penetration and annexation" was repeated successfully only yesterday in Czechoslovakia and attempted in Korea.

In summary, the aims and methods of Czarist foreign policy as described by Marx and Engels have striking parallels in the objectives and methods of Soviet foreign policy of the last few years. These parallels are so obvious that they could not and did not escape the Soviet leaders themselves, and this is the reason why the present regime in Russia has done everything in its power to ignor or obliterate these writings. As is shown in the bibliographic note to the first chapter, Stalin himself in 1934 prevented the reediting of Engels' key essay of 1890, and so far as we know, none of the other essays in this volume—except a few in the sixth section—has ever been given more than the most cursory attention even in foreign (but Soviet-inspired) publications of the works of Marx and Engels. It is true that the articles from the *New York Tribune* and the *Neue Rheimische Zeitung* appeared in the Russian edition of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels. But this set has been withdrawn from publication, and very few complete sets are available anywhere in the world, including Russia. The *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe* stops with the year 1848, and hence even the essays on Panslavism from the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* are not available in this edition. Moreover, the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute is in possession of several hitherto unpublished manuscripts by Marx and Engels (or photostatic copies of such manuscripts) which deal with Russian problems, and which never have been published—in the original language in which they were written, or in translation.[5]

This condemnation of Marx and Engels to silence and the surrender to oblivion of their works on the history of that very country which pretends to be the guardian of their teachings is not difficult to explain. With the progressive consolidation of its internal position and its increasing authoritarianism, the present Stalinist regime has come to regard itself more and more as the heir and the guardian of the

[5] For evidence see the excellent article by Maximilien Rubel, "Le sort de l'oeuvre de Marx et d'Engels en U.R.S.S.," *La Révue Socialiste,* April 1952.

imperialist policies of the Czars. External symptoms of this trend are the glorification, in moving pictures, of the lives of such men as Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible. On a more scientific level evidence for this can be found by surveying Russian historical writing of the last few years; here it can be shown that from 1932, but even more clearly from 1934 on, a complete reevaluation of the role of Czarism has taken place. We cannot enter here into an extended discussion of Soviet historiography in the period since 1934, and have to refer to the work of other scholars who have undertaken such an examination.[6] Yet the main aspects of recent trends in Soviet historical scholarship may be indicated in outline.

In the later 1930's there appeared tendencies in Russian historical writing which showed that events were evaluated from a more nationalistic point of view than had been the case earlier. In the reappraisal of medieval history the contribution of the (foreign) Varangians tended to be belittled, and that of local Russian chieftains to be emphasized strongly. The liberation of Russia from the Tatar yoke under Ivan III was extolled as a great feat of the Russian nationality, and the reigns of Ivan the Terrible, of Peter the Great and of Catherine II were reinterpreted as steps in the constitution of a strong and powerful nation in Eastern Europe. There is little doubt that a portion of this new work of historical scholarship was more accurate and more fruitful than the "formalistic" economic determinism of Prokrovsky and his school, which had dominated Soviet historiography in the 1920's. But the new insights were not reached purely because the old methods had been found to be erroneous or to lead to blind alleys. They were necessary because the leadership of the Russian Communist Party saw that in order to consolidate further its power it would be useful to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the masses. The glorification of the greatness of the Russian past had to be put in the service of current objectives of the Soviet Communist leadership. In order to make present hardships and shortages appear more bearable, the old splendor, and, implicitly, its potential reattainment, was described in vivid colors, and its specifically Russian quality given particular emphasis.

The byproduct of this process, however, was that the leadership of

[6] See, above all, the article by B. H. Sumner, "Soviet History," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XVI (1937), pp. 601-615 and XVII (1938), pp. 151-161; and the more recent and much more exhaustive article by Georg von Rauch, "Grundlinien der Sowjetischen Geschichtsforschung im Zeichen des Stalinismus," *Europa-Archiv*, V (1950) pp. 3383-3388, 3423-3432, and 3489-3494.

Stalinist Russia had to identify its position and role more and more with that of the Czars—this identification went so far, for example, that Ivan IV's suppression of the boyars in the period from 1564 to 1571 was described in terms which remind one strongly of the parallel suppression by Stalin of the "Trotskyite traitors and wreckers" in the famous trials of the middle 1930's.[7] Similarly the struggles between the peasant masses under the two "false Dimitris" against their bourgeois and petty aristocratic opponents were not interpreted as class struggles, but as national wars of the Russians against the Poles.

The similarity between the Napoleonic invasion of Russia and the recent German attack on the U.S.S.R. gave the opportunity to draw copious parallels between the heroic feats and the wise strategy of Kutuzov and his master, Alexander I, and those of the present military and political leaders of the Soviet Union. The fact that in the battle between Napoleonic France and Czarist Russia the former represented a revolutionary, progressive ideology and the latter a tyrannical authoritarianism was completely dropped in favor of presenting both the war against Napoleon and the war against Hitler as struggles for the national liberation of the Russian fatherland.

This trend may be traced in the pages of Russian historical publications of the last decade. It began in 1934 with a decree "Concerning the Teaching of Civic History in the Schools of the USSR" in which the relatively mild statement is made that "instead of the teaching of civic history in a lively manner, the narrating of the most important events and facts in their chronological sequence accompanied by characterizations of historical figures, the students are given abstract definitions of social-economic structures, thus substituting for the coherent narration of civic history, obscure schemas."[8] The endpoint of the trend may be found in the February 1949 number of *Voprosi Istorii,* where, after the condemnation of cosmopolitan tendencies in Russian historical writing (as *Prokrovschina,* designed "to rob the Russian people of its national tradition"), the statement is made that "armed with the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, led by the Bolshevik Party and its Central Committee, the Soviet historians march forward, an army of

[7] See, for example, R. J. Wipper, *Iwan Grosny,* German edition, Moscow, 1947.

[8] Decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 16 May 1934. The decree is signed by Molotov and Stalin. It is reprinted in English translation in Anatol G. Mazour, *An Outline of Modern Russian Historiography,* Berkeley, 1939, pp. 87-88.

propagandists for Marxian historical science in the midst of the great masses of the toilers."[9]

The teaching and writing of history in the Soviet Union are thus placed unconditionally in the service of the state. The historian must serve primarily as a propagandist among the people of the U.S.S.R. in a struggle against the "cosmopolitanism" of the West. Objectivity in historical science, the use of scientific method, even in the strict form of historical materialism as understood by Marx and Engels, have been relinquished in favor of subservience to dogma. And it is here that the Soviet interpreters of Russia's past clash head-on with Marx and Engels. Neither the method of Marx and Engels—if correctly interpreted[10]—nor their findings fit into the Stalinist dogma. Hence they must be purged, as anyone is purged who deviates, even for a moment or a hair's breadth from the party line.

The phenomenon (which to a superficial observer might appear strange) that the writings of Marx and Engels on Russia—with very few exceptions—cannot be published in Russia thus has a very simple explanation. Real Marxism, i.e., the Marxism of Marx and Engels was, above all, critical. It knew no gods, was free of party lines and dogmatic pronouncements from above, and did not recognize any final authority to which appeal could be made to discover the "truth." In Stalin's Russia these conditions have been reversed, and Marxism has been converted into the Communist religion, with all the hideous features of intolerance, cruelty and Jesuitic deception of a dogmatic, authoritarian creed, and which, in addition, has become the official ideology of the most complete tyranny of the modern world. Marx's entire life work was directed against tyranny and oppression, religious obscurantism and dogma, the misuse of learning as a tool of the special interests of a class or a nation, and the abuse of reason for the selfish ends of a politically powerful clique. The most categorical opponent of Stalin and all he stands for is therefore none other than Karl Marx.

For this reason the essays and letters contained in this volume are of special interest. Marx and Engels wrote about Czarist Russia, but Stalin's Russia has identified itself more and more closely with the aims and methods of the Czars, and hence many of the arguments of Marx and Engels apply with as much force to the policies of Communist Russia as they do to those of their Czarist counterparts. In this connection, one final comment is in order.

[9] Quoted in Rauch, *op. cit.*, pp. 3492-3493.

[10] See the bibliographical note to Chapter 18, page 275.

So long as the Russian people appeared as an inert mass, ruled by a small group of aristocrats and officials fully subservient to an autocratic Czar, Marx and Engels considered the policy of this élite as Russian policy in general. But they were aware of the profound influence exerted by the defeat in the Crimean War on Russia's internal social relations. The emancipation of the serfs, the slow but accelerating growth of the bourgeoisie, the increasing spread of capitalist institutions and practices were all parts of the same trend. With it there arose a widening cleft in Russian society and in Russian political parties. In the 1860's and later, a middle-class with a moderate liberal orientation, and a small but vigorous revolutionary movement which claimed to champion the cause of the peasants and workers were clearly discernible. These developments produced two new problem areas to the investigation of which Marx and Engels turned: In what way would the rising revolutionary movement opposing the Czar, influence Czarist foreign policy? And what similarities with and differences from the Western experience were exhibited by the course of social and economic developments in Russia?

The rise of what for a short time appeared to be a strong, vigorous, and successful revolutionary movement evoked on the part of Marx and Engels the immediate recognition that in the long run the aims and interests of the revolutionary party,—in spite of its partial decent from Slavophil origins—were opposed to the Panslavist ambitions of Alexander III and his advisors. The Russian revolutionary movement was therefore considered by them as an ally of the European democratic and socialist parties. Engels expressed this when he wrote in 1882 that "the Katkoff, Aksakoff, Ignatieff and Company know this one thing: that their rule is forever finished as soon as Czarism is overthrown and the Russian people [i.e., the Russian revolutionary party] takes the center of the stage."[11] Since Czarism suppressed the Poles, the only "anti-Panslavist Slavs," the Russian revolutionaries were Poland's allies, and would therefore scrupulously respect the Polish strivings for national independence. Marx and Engels expressed their opinion on this so plainly that the principle of national self-determination, notably of the peoples living to the West of Russia proper, became one of the fundamental tenets of Bolshevik ideology. That the Soviet adherence to the principle of national self-determination was merely a pretense, is proven by the forcible annexation of Georgia shortly after the first World War, and by the open expansionism of the Soviet Union after

[11] See below, p. 119.

the second World War. Although Poland and several of the other states bordering on the U.S.S.R. are nominally independent, they are, for all practical purposes Soviet provinces, and the policies of Stalin in this field also are a full recapitulation of those of the Czars, and thus diametrically opposed to those of the Russian revolutionaries of the nineteenth century who were favored by Marx and Engels. Hence, here again, Stalin and Marx are on opposite sides.

But the opposition of the revolutionary movement to the Czarist foreign policy was, in the view of Marx and Engels, only the result of the circumstance that the workers and peasants of Russia formed social classes whose true class interests were diametrically opposed to those of the bourgeoisie, the aristocracy and the bureaucracy. Hence Engels' remark that only the overthrow of Czarism will make an end to its Panslavist foreign policy is made with the consideration in mind that a revolution in Russia will "permit the Russian people to draw a thick line under the traditional policy of conquest of its Czars, and to *attend to their vital interests at home.*"[12] In other words, the crucial change was the internal restructuring of class relations in Russia which Marx and Engels believed would in turn change the objectives and methods of its foreign policy.

This theory of the basic dependence of the foreign policy of a country on its internal class structure is the chief argument used by the adherents of Stalinist communism against the applicability of any of Marx's and Engels' works on Czarism to parallels in Soviet foreign policy. They argue that since the class relations have been basically altered, all that correctly applied to policies and aims of Czarism is intrinsically inapplicable to policies and aims of a Socialist Soviet Republic which, it is claimed, is on the way towards the formation of a classless society. Here, the Stalinists argue, is a valid case for the applicability of Stalin's own doctrine, as expressed, for example, in his letter to A. Kholopov, that only "the exegetes and talmudists view Marxism and its individual conclusions and formulas as a collection of dogmas which 'never' change, in spite of the changed conditions of society's development."[13] But more than this, in pursuing this line, the protagonists of Stalinist communism can even point to the work of Marx and Engels, who envisaged the possibility that a Russian revolution might precede a revolution elsewhere in Europe, and who predicted that in such a case

[12] See page 53 below. Italics not in original.

[13] See *The Soviet Linguistic Controversy,* New York: Kings Crown Press, 1951, p. 98.

the powers of Western and Central Europe would combat the revolutionary developments in Russia and intervene with armed force to reconstitute the power of the Czar.[14]

This argument raises two important questions. First, is the present social structure of the Soviet Union identical with or even approaching a classless society as understood by Marx and Engels, or is it based on the exploitation of one social group by another? And, secondly, what were the views which Marx and Engels held of the potential regenerative function of the Russian village community as the backbone of a revolutionary upheaval in Russia?

The exhaustive analysis of the first problem would require a whole book. But such an analysis is not necessary in this place, for it has been made abundantly clear that Soviet society is far from classless—unless it is so by definition—and that, in fact, inequalities between different social groups are harsher and more pronounced than in most capitalist countries.[15] The argument that workers in Russia cannot be exploited because the factories "belong to the workers themselves" is merely a semantic trick. For the very apologists of Stalinism who deny the possibility of exploitation in the Soviet Union, when confronted with the statement that American workers are among the stockholders of corporations in which they are employed and hence would have to be regarded as exploiting themselves, answer that this statement is shallow, for what matters under developed monopoly capitalism is not ownership but control of corporate assets. Applied to conditions in the Soviet Union this means that the contention that the workers "own" the factories and peasants "own" the farms has no relevance for the examination of whether workers and peasants are or are not in fact exploited, or whether or not class divisions have in fact been abolished in the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that control of Soviet factories and farms is in the hands of centrally appointed managers (and ultimately the central government planning agencies), that the "owners" of all these things have nothing whatever to say, and that unless they watch carefully *what* they say, may find themselves one morning on the way to a forced labor camp, the precise ownership of which has

[14] See below, pp. 54 to 55.

[15] On class differentiation and class structure in Soviet Russia see, among others, A. Koestler, *The Yogi and the Commissar,* New York, 1945, pp. 148 ff; Barrington Moore, *Soviet Politics,* Cambridge, 1950; and Gregory Bienstock, Solomon M. Schwarz, and Aaron Yugow, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture,* New York, 1944, esp. pp. 32 ff, 91 ff, and 163 ff.

not yet been determined by Stalinist apologists, because they have so far staunchly denied their existence except as "labor correctional camps."

The social structure in Soviet Russia does not resemble, therefore, the classless society which Marx and Engels envisaged as the end result of the Revolution. The state (i.e., the enforcement apparatus of the ruling class over the exploited class—in Lenin's definition) has *not* withered away, and has not only shown no signs of doing so, but on the contrary, has flourished and grown like topsy. The Soviet Union is therefore not a workers' state nor a proletarian state; it is not even a "dictatorship of the proletariat" as Marx envisaged it, because all the autonomous organs of the proletariat or of the peasantry, the trade unions, the local Soviets, etc. have been transformed into hollow, powerless shadows. But this is also the reason why the old Russian village community has not found its regeneration but rather its death in the *kolkhoz,* and why the Soviet collectivization of Russian farms has not led to the regeneration of the village community.

It is, of course, true that the collective farms exhibit outwardly the adoption of cooperative methods of production—characteristic of capitalist agriculture—with communal ownership of the soil. This aspect was stressed by Marx, who saw in this combination of collective production methods and collective ownership of land the regeneration of the village community. But it is precisely in this connection that the meaning of "collective ownership" and, above all, the kind of human activity called forth by this combination of the more productive cooperative methods of agriculture with the higher form of collective property in land must be clarified and stated more precisely. It is difficult to find a precisely formulated statement in the works of Marx on the social organization of production under socialism or at least of the tendencies in the direction of which he expected this social organization to develop. But it can be safely inferred from numerous remarks he made—most clearly perhaps in some early works in connection with the alienation of labor[16]—that he envisaged the main effect of this reordering of social relations to lie in the freeing of labor from dependence on capital, on things, and in the elevation of labor, of human activity as spontaneously exercised by every individual, to a position of using things as a means of its free expression. Although this form of social relations many only be reached in an ultimate stage of human development—which even the most ardent advocates of Stalinist com-

[16] See, for example, Karl Marx, "Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte," in *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* Part I, vol. III, pp. 82-84.

munism do not claim has been reached in the Soviet Union—Marx envisaged, and Lenin interpreted him as having taught, that on the path to this ultimate form of pure communism "all [will] have learned to manage and independently are actually managing by themselves social production."[17]

Applied to the collective farm (and incidentally also to the Soviet factory), this means that the tendencies set in motion in Soviet Russia since the Revolution should exhibit an increasing degree of free and spontaneous planning of production and resource allocation by each productive unit, an increase in the genuine direction and control of things on the part of each productive individual, a democratization in the control of wealth and the planning of production. The regeneration of the village community consists, in Marx's view, thus not merely in a purely mechanical combination of cooperative methods of production with collective property in land, but in the simultaneous creation of conditions for the free development of the socialized human individuals corresponding to this form of production and property. In the Soviet Union the purely external technical conditions for the regeneration of the village community may be present, but the freedom for the development of social relations and human individuality corresponding to them is forcibly impeded.

We can clearly infer this interpretation of Marx from the draft of his letter to Vera Zasulich, which is contained in Chapter 19 of this volume. Marx quite expressly states there that "only a Russian revolution can save the village community . . . if such a revolution . . . concentrates all its forces to assure the free development of the rural community this latter will soon become the regenerating element of Russian society, and the factor giving it superiority over the countries enslaved by the capitalist system."[18] But Marx also prescribed the opposite path by which the village community is killed, because "the State . . . is sucking the already thin blood of the village community," because "worn out by fiscal demands the community became an inert mass which could easily be exploited," and because "the State . . . has not stopped pressing down on the community with the social power concentrated in its hands." Put for the words "State" and "community" in these quotations the words "Stalinist regime" and "collective farm" and you have not only a picture of the present-day reality in Soviet agriculture, but also the explanation why the collective farm cannot be

[17] V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution,* New York, 1932, p. 84.

[18] See below, p. 226.

regarded as a regenerated form of the old Russian village community. But this means also that Marx's analysis of the role of the Russian village community under decaying Czarism applies with equal force to the role of the *kolkhoz* under Stalinism. It is abundantly clear, therefore, why even these texts of Marx could not be used as part and parcel of the Stalinist gospel, and why they lead only a very ephemeral existence, in the pages of the rare copies of the *Marx-Engels-Archiv* found only in a few libraries and private collections.

The conclusion therefore is warranted that the analysis made by Marx and Engels of the external as well as the internal policies and socio-political trends of Czarist Russia are fully applicable to similar aspects of Stalinist Russia. The main provisional and final objectives of Russian foreign policy have not been altered and only relatively small and incidental tactical features have changed. This is, of course, to be expected, as a consequence of technological and economic advancement inside and outside of Russia and of the altered power-constellations which have evolved in the last hundred years. What is truly significant, and perhaps surprising to some, is the very direct applicability of Marx's and Engels' analyses of Russian foreign policy during the nineteenth century to present day conditions. But this is due to a lesser extent to the excellence of Marx and Engels in the field of prophecy and more to the intrinsically unchanging nature of Russian foreign policy.

Similarly, with the increasing consolidation of the Stalinist tyranny and with the progressive crystallization of a new class structure, the internal social relations and forms of political intercourse have taken on features which exhibit similarities with the social structure under Czarism. To be sure, here the designations of the holders of different social roles have undergone greater change than in the field of foreign relations. Germany remains Germany, and Poland remains Poland, although the frontiers of each have changed considerably since Marx and Engels wrote. But the capitalists, usurers and landlords of Czarist days have been transformed into Soviet directors, managers, and officials of the Communist Party. But the central, all-powerful, tyrannical state apparatus has remained the same and, if anything, has become more centralized, more powerful and more skilled in the use of force internally. A comparison of Stalinist Russia, especially of the post-World-War-II period, with the Czarist Russia of Marx's and Engels' day may be summed up by the adage: *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*

The writings of Marx and Engels on Russia have significance for

the present because they discuss and analyze problems and policies which, although historically past, have close parallels today. At worst they show the tremendous gap between Marxism and Stalinism, at best they provide a penetrating guide for an understanding of the Czarist—and by extension the Stalinist—menace to European freedom.

II
RUSSIA AND EUROPE

1
The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism (1890)

I

We, the West-European labor parties, have a twofold interest in the victory of the Russian revolutionary party. First, because the Russian Czarist empire forms the greatest fortress, reserve position and at the same time reserve army of European reaction, because its mere passive existence already constitutes a threat and a danger to us. Second, however—and this point has still not been sufficiently emphasized on our part—because it blocks and disturbs our normal development through its ceaseless intervention in Western affairs, intervention aimed moreover at conquering geographical positions which will secure it the mastery of Europe, and thus make impossible the liberation of the European proletariat.

It has been the contribution of Karl Marx, first in 1848 and repeatedly since, to have emphasized that, for this last reason, the Western European labor parties must of necessity wage an implacable war against Russian Czarism. To the extent to which I argue in the same vein I am merely continuing the work of my dead friend, finishing what he was not permitted to do.

Also even among some of the Russian revolutionaries a relatively great ignorance of this side of Russian history prevails. This is due on the one hand to the fact that in Russia itself only the official myth is tolerated; on the other hand to the fact that many revolutionaries are so scornful of the Czarist government that partly due to its narrowness, partly due to its corruption they consider it incapable of doing anything

rational. So far as internal politics are concerned this is indeed correct; here the impotence of the Czarist regime lies exposed to the light of day. However, it is necessary to know not only the weaknesses of the enemy, but also his elements of strength. And foreign policy is unquestionably the side on which Czarism is strong, very strong. The Russian diplomatic corps forms, so to speak, a modern Jesuit order, powerful enough in case of necessity to overcome even the whims of the Czar and to become master of the corruption within Russia, in order to disseminate it abroad the more plentifully; a Jesuit order, recruited originally and preferably from foreigners—Corsicans such as Pozzo di Borgo, Germans such as Nesselrode, Baltic Germans such as Lieven, who like the originator, of the order Catherine II, were foreigners.

The old Russian high nobility still had too many worldly, private and family interests, it did not possess the absolute reliability which service in this new order demanded. And since the renunciation of personal property and the celibacy of the Catholic Jesuit priests could not be imposed upon it, it was considered sufficient to entrust to it at first only secondary and honorific posts, legations, etc., and so gradually to educate a school of native diplomats. Up to the present only *one* full-blooded Russian, Gortchakov, has held the highest post in this order, and his successor, von Giers, again bears a foreign name.

It is this secret society, recruited originally from foreign adventurers, which has raised the Russian empire to its present plenitude of power. With iron perseverance, eyes set fixedly on the goal, not shrinking from any breach of faith, any treason, any assassination, any servility, distributing bribes lavishly, never overconfident following victory, never discouraged by defeat, over the dead bodies of millions of soldiers and at least one Czar, it is this gang—as talented as it is without conscience —rather than all the Russian armies put together which has extended the Russian boundaries from the Dnieper and Dvina beyond the Vistula, to the Pruth, the Danube and the Black Sea, from the Don and Volga beyond the Caucasus and to the source of the Oxus and Iaxartes Rivers; it is this gang which has made Russia great, powerful and feared, and has opened up for it the way to world domination. However, it has thereby also strengthened the power of the Czar internally. For the vulgar patriotic public the glory of victory, the series of conquests, the power and glitter of Czarism fully overbalances all its sins, its despotism, all its injustices and arbitrary actions; the boastfulness of chauvinism fully compensates for all kicks received. All the more so

since in Russia the true causes and details of these successes are unknown and have been replaced by an official myth such as well-meaning historians everywhere (for example, in France and Prussia) are able to invent for the benefit of the populace and the promotion of patriotism. Thus any Russian who is a chauvinist will sooner or later fall on his knees before the Czar, as we have recently experienced in the case of Tikhomirov.

But how could such a gang of adventurers ever gain a position in which they could wield such a powerful influence over European history? Quite simply. They have not created something new out of nothing; they merely knew how to exploit correctly an already present factual situation. For all its successes Russian diplomacy has a palpable material basis.

Let us look at Russia in the middle of the last century. An already gigantic territory inhabited by a race of unusual homogeneity. A sparse, but rapidly increasing population thus assuring a steady increase of power by virtue of the mere passage of time. This population, intellectually stagnating, without initiative, but within the limits of its traditional mode of existence unconditionally available for any use; tough, brave, obedient, inured to all hardships, incomparable soldier material for the wars of that time, when closed masses decided the battle. The country itself, turned toward Europe on one side only, was thus open to attack only at that point; it was without a vital center, the conquest of which could force a peace. Because of its lack of roads, its expanse, its poverty of resources it was almost absolutely protected from conquest. Here was an unassailable power position made to order for those who understood how to take advantage of it, and who, from this position, could with impunity, permit themselves actions which would have drawn any other power into war after war.

Strong to the point of being unassailable on the defensive, Russia was correspondingly weak on the offensive. The mustering, organization, equipping and movement of its armies internally ran up against the greatest obstacles, and in addition to all these material difficulties was still added the boundless corruption of civil servants and officers. All attempts to prepare Russia for the offensive on a large scale have thus far miscarried, and the current attempt to introduce universal military service will probably also fail. One can say that in the case of Russia the obstacles increase almost as the square of the masses to be organized, quite apart from the impossibility of finding the enormous number of officers required in view of such a scant city population.

These weaknesses have never been a secret to the Russian diplomats; accordingly they have at all times avoided war wherever possible, have admitted it only as a last resort, and then only under the most favorable circumstances. The only wars which can suit their purpose are those in which Russia's allies bear the brunt of the burden, sacrifice their territory to the devastation of the battlefield, provide the great bulk of the fighting men—wars in which Russian troops, assigned the role of reserves, are spared from most engagements, but to whom in all great battles the honor of the final decision is reserved with relatively slight sacrifices entailed—as in the war of 1813-15. However a war under such favorable circumstances is not always to be had, and therefore Russian diplomacy prefers to utilize, for its own ends, the conflicting interests and greediness of the other powers, to set these powers against each other and exploit these enmities to the advantage of the Russian policy of conquest. Only against decidedly weaker powers such as Sweden, Turkey or Persia does Czarism wage war on its own account —and in these cases it also need not share the booty with anyone.

But let us return to the Russia of 1760. This homogeneous, unassailable country had for neighbors only countries which either apparently or actually were falling into ruin, which were nearing dissolution and hence were pure raw material for conquest. In the North was Sweden, whose power and prestige had fallen precisely because Charles XII had sought to invade Russia; he had thereby ruined Sweden and made evident the unassailability of Russia. In the South were the Turks and tributary to them the Crimean Tartars, ruins of past greatness. The Turkish power to attack had been broken for 100 years, their defensive power was still considerable, but likewise declining. The best sign of this growing weakness was the beginning of rebellious convulsions among the subject Christians, the Slavs, the Rumanians and the Greeks, who formed the majority of the population of the Balkan peninsula. These Christians, almost exclusively of the Greek faith, thus exercised a religion related to the Russian and the Slavs among them, the Serbs and Bulgars were even related to them ethnically. Russia therefore needed only to proclaim its mission to protect the oppressed Greek church and enslaved Slavdom and the terrain for conquest—under the cover of liberation—was already prepared. Similarly south of the Caucasus under Turkish sovereignty there were tiny Christian states and the Christian Armenians for whom Czarism could set itself up as "liberator." And then here in the South there beckoned to the greedy conqueror a prize of victory compared to which Europe could produce

no equal: the old capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, the metropolis of the whole Greek-Catholic world, the city whose Russian name already proclaimed mastery of the East and the prestige which in the eyes of Eastern Christianity surrounds its possessor—Constantinople-Czarigrad.

Czarigrad as the third Russian capital city beside Moscow and Petersburg—that would mean not only moral dominion over Eastern Christendom but would also be the decisive step toward domination over Europe. That would mean a single sovereign authority over the Black Sea, Asia Minor and the Balkan peninsula. That would mean, whenever the Czar wished it, the closing of the Black Sea to all except Russian merchant and war ships, its transformation into a Russian naval base and an exclusive maneuver area for the Russian fleet, which from this secure reserve position could sally forth through the fortified Bosphorus and retreat back to it as often as it pleased. Then Russia would need to achieve only the same control, direct or indirect, over the Sound and the Danish Belts and it would be unassailable also from the sea.

Domination over the Balkan peninsula would bring Russia to the edge of the Adriatic Sea. And this boundary in the Southwest would be untenable unless the whole Russian frontier, especially in the West, were advanced correspondingly and its power sphere significantly extended. Here, moreover, the circumstances were almost more favorable:

First, Poland, in complete disintegration, a republic of nobles founded on the fleecing and suppression of the peasants, with a Constitution which made any unified national action impossible and accordingly made the country into a prize to be taken with impunity by its neighbors. Since the beginning of the century it had lived, as the Poles themselves used to say, on disorder (*Polska nierzadem stoi*); the entire country was continually crossed and occupied by foreign troops whom it served as a guest-house and inn (*karczma zajezdna,* as the Poles expressed it), but who usually forgot to pay the check. Peter the Great had already systematically ruined Poland—here his successors needed only to stretch out their hands to seize it. And for this purpose they already had a pretext according to the "principle of nationality." Poland was by no means a homogeneous country. At the time when Great Russia fell under the Mongolian yoke, White Russia and the Ukraine found protection against the Asiatic invasion by uniting into the so-called Lithuanian Empire. This empire later united voluntarily with

Poland. Since then, due to the higher level of civilization of the Poles, the White Russian and Ukrainian nobility has become strongly polonised; also, at the time of the Jesuit supremacy in Poland, during the 16th century, the Greek-Catholic Russians of Poland were forced to join a union with the Roman Church. This gave the Great Russian Czar a welcome pretext to claim the former Lithuanian territory as a country inhabited by Russian nationals but suppressed by Poland, although, according to the greatest living expert in Slavic language, Miklosich, at least the Ukrainians did not really speak a Russian dialect but an entirely separate language. This also gave the Czar a further pretext, as protector of the Greek faith to intervene on behalf of the Uniate Greeks, although these had long since reconciled themselves to their position with respect to the Roman Church.

On the other side of Poland lay a second country which seemed to be falling irreparably to pieces—Germany. Since the Thirty-Years War the Holy Roman Empire had not been a state except in name. The territorial sovereignty of the princes was gradually approaching ever closer to full sovereignty; their power to defy the Emperor—the German equivalent of the Polish *liberum veto*—was expressly provided for in the Peace of Westphalia under French and Swedish guarantee. Any strengthening of the central government was thus made dependent on the consent of foreign powers, who had every reason to prevent this strengthening. Moreover, by virtue of its German conquests Sweden was a member of the German Empire with a seat and vote in the Imperial Diets. With each war the Emperor found German princes among the allies of his foreign enemies, thus each war was also a civil war. Almost all the greater and middling princes had been bought by Louis XIV and the land so ruined economically that without this yearly inflow of French bribes there would have been no possibility at all of maintaining metallic money as the circulating medium in the country.[1] For this reason the Emperor had long drawn his strength, not from his Empire, which cost him money and brought him nothing but cares and worries, but in his Austrian, German and non-German, hereditary territories. And beside the power of the Hapsburg dynasty, already the Prussian power had gradually begun to develop as a rival.

This was the situation in Germany at the time of Peter the Great. This truly great man—great in quite a different way than Frederick II,

[1] See G. V. Gülich, *Geschichtliche Darstellung des Handels*, etc., Jena 1830, vol. II, pp. 201-206.

the obedient friend of Peter's successor, Catherine II—was the first who fully understood the situation of Europe, so marvelously favorable for Russia. Just as at a glance he clearly perceived, decided upon and directed the application of the main lines of Russian policy with regard to Sweden, Turkey, Persia and Poland, so also with respect to Germany —and he saw them much more clearly than they appear in his so-called Testament, which seems to be the work of a wretched disciple. Germany occupied his attention more than any other country except Sweden. Sweden he had to crush; Poland he could have whenever he stretched out his hand for it; Turkey was still somewhat too far away; but to secure a firm footing in Germany, to hold the position which France so profitably exploited and which Sweden had become too weak to profit from—that was for him a major objective. He did everything possible to become a German prince through acquisition of German territory but in vain: he could only inaugurate the system of marital alliances with the German princes and the diplomatic exploitation of internal German dissensions.

Since the time of Peter this situation has developed considerably more in favor of Russia due to the rise of Prussia. With this development there grew up within the Empire itself a rival to the German Emperor of almost equal power who perpetuated and exacerbated the division of Germany. And at the same time this rival was always sufficiently weak that he had to rely on the support of either France or Russia—mostly on Russian support—with the result that to the extent to which he emancipated himself from vassallage to the German Empire he fell all the more surely under the bondage of Russia.

Thus there remained in Europe only three powers yet to be reckoned with: Austria, France and England. And to incite these against one another, or to bribe them with the bait of territorial acquisitions was not a difficult art. England and France were still rivals on the sea: France could be had through the prospect of falling heir to territory in Belgium and Germany; Austria was lured by alleged gains at the expense of France, of Prussia, and, since the time of Joseph II, of Bavaria. Here were to be had strong, indeed overwhelmingly strong allies for every diplomatic action of Russia provided their conflicting interests were clearly exploited. And now, confronting these disintegrating neighboring states, and confronting these three Great Powers which were embroiled in continuous quarrels due to tradition, conditions of economic survival, political and dynastic interests or greed for conquest, and occupied constantly with attempts to

outwit each other, stood the unified, homogeneous, youthful, rapidly growing Russia, hardly assailable and fully unconquerable; an unwrought, almost unresistant, plastic raw material—what an opportunity for men of talent and ambition who were striving for power, no matter where or how, provided only that it was real power, a real field for exercising their talent and ambition! And the "enlightened" eighteenth century produced quantities of such men, men who traversed all Europe in the service of "humanity," who visited the courts of all the enlightened princes—and what prince of the period didn't want to be enlightened—who established themselves wherever they found a suitable position—a noble-bourgeois rationalist International "without fatherland." This International fell on its knees before the Semiramis of the North, the likewise uprooted Sophia Augusta of Anhalt-Zerbst, called Catherine II of Russia, and it was from the rank of this International that the same Catherine drew the elements for her Jesuit order of the Russian diplomatic corps.

Karl Kautsky has shown in his book on Thomas More how the first form of bourgeois enlightenment, the "humanism" of the 15th and 16th centuries, spent itself in its further development in the Catholic Jesuit order. In precisely the same manner we see here its second fully ripe form spend itself in the modern Jesuit order, in the Russian diplomatic corps. This transformation into its opposite, this final landing at a point diametrically opposed to the starting point, is the necessary fate of all historical movements which are unaware of their causes and their conditions of existence and accordingly are directed toward merely illusory goals. They are inexorably corrected by the "irony of history."

Let us now see how this Jesuit order works, how it uses the continually changing goals of the competing Great Powers for the attainment of its own single, never-changing, never lost-sight-of objective: the domination of the world by Russia.

II

Never had the world situation been more favorable to Czarist plans for conquest than in 1762, when the dissolute Catherine II, following the murder of her husband, ascended the throne. All Europe was divided into two camps by the Seven-Years War. England had broken French power on the sea, in America, in India, and now left its continental ally, Frederick II of Prussia, in the lurch. The latter stood on the brink of disaster in 1762 when Peter III of Russia came to the

throne and withdrew from the war against Prussia. Since he had been abandoned by England, his one and only ally, had become a permanent enemy of Austria and France, and was fully exhausted by seven years of struggle for survival, he had no other choice but to beg the help of the newly-crowned Czarina. He thereby obtained not only powerful protection but also the expectancy of the part of Poland which kept East-Prussia divided from the main body of his realm, and the conquest of which now became his life's goal. On March 31 (April 11) 1764, Catherine and Frederick signed an alliance at Petersburg, a secret article of which bound both parties to defend with arms, against any attempt at reform, the then existing Polish Constitution—the best contrivance for the ruin of Poland. Therewith the future partition of Poland was decided.

I shall not go into the details of the first partition of Poland. However, it should be noted that it was carried out—against the will of the old-fashioned Maria Theresa—mainly by the three great pillars of European enlightenment, Catherine, Frederick and Joseph. The last two, proud of the shining political wisdom with which they cast aside the superstitious faith in established international law, were so short-sighted as not to see how they were binding themselves to Russian Czarism by their participation in the dismemberment of Poland.

Nothing could have been more advantageous to Catherine than these enlightened, princely neighbors. Enlightenment was the slogan of Czarism in Europe during the 18th century as was National Liberation in the nineteenth. There was no land-grab, no outrage, no repression on the part of Czarism which was not carried out under the pretext of enlightenment, of liberalism, of the liberation of nations. And the childish Western European liberals believed it right down to Gladstone, while the equally simple conservatives believed just as tenaciously in phrases about the protection of legitimacy, the maintenance of order, of religion, of the European balance of power, of the sanctity of treaties—slogans which official Russia simultaneously utters. Russian diplomacy had managed to take in both the great bourgeois parties of Europe. Russian diplomacy alone was allowed to be legitimist and revolutionary, conservative and liberal, orthodox and enlightened in the same breath. One can understand the contempt with which a Russian diplomat looks down on the "educated" West.

After Poland it was Germany's turn. Austria and Prussia came to blows in the war over the Bavarian succession in 1778, again to no one's benefit but Catherine's. Russia had become too big to speculate,

as Peter still did, on membership in the German Diet; it was now striving for the position which it already held in Poland, and which France held in the German Empire: that of a guarantor of German disorder against any attempt at reform. And it achieved this position. In the Peace of Teschen of 1779, Russia, in addition to France, undertook to guarantee this peace treaty and all former peace treaties confirmed by it, particularly the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. German impotence was thereby sealed, and Germany declared to be a future object of partition between France and Russia.

Turkey was not forgotten. Russian wars against the Turks always fall in periods when Russia has peace on its Western borders, and, if possible, when Europe is occupied in other quarters. Catherine led two such wars. The first brought the conquest along the Sea of Azov and the independence of the Crimea, which four years later was converted into a Russian province. The second advanced the borders of Russia from the Bug to the Dniester. In both wars Russian agents had incited the Greeks to revolt against the Turks. Naturally, the insurgents were finally left in the lurch by the Russian government.

During the War of American Independence, Catherine first devised for herself and her allies the formula of "armed neutrality" (1780), that demand for the limitation of the rights claimed by England for its warships on the high seas which has since remained a permanent objective of Russian foreign policy and was later acknowledged by Europe and even by England itself in its essential point in the Peace of Paris of 1856. Only the United States of America still will not hear anything of it even today.

The outbreak of the French Revolution was a new stroke of luck for Catherine. Far from fearing the spread of revolutionary ideas toward Russia, she saw in it only a new opportunity to spread discord among the European states in order that Russia might thereby obtain a free hand. After the death of her two enlightened friends and neighbors, Frederick William II in Prussia and Leopold in Austria had been trying an independent policy. The Revolution gave Catherine the opportunity—under the pretext of fighting Republican France—of chaining both of them to Russia again; and at the same time, while they were occupied at the French frontiers, of making new conquests in Poland. Both of them, Austria and Prussia, fell into the trap. And even though Prussia, which from 1787 to 1791 had played the role of Poland's ally against Catherine, changed its mind in good time, claiming a larger share of Poland, and although Austria likewise had

to be paid off with a part of Poland, Catherine was still able once again to collect the biggest prize: almost all of White Russia and the Ukraine were now united with Great Russia.

But this time the medal had a reverse side. Since the Polish uprising claimed the strength of the Coalition from 1792-94, it weakened its offensive power against France, until the latter was strong enough to win victory alone. Poland fell, but its resistance had saved the French Revolution, and with the French Revolution began a movement against which even Czarism is impotent. And for this we in the West will always remember Poland. Moreover, as we shall see, this is not the only occasion on which the Poles have saved the day for European progress.

In Catherine's policy we already find sharply drawn all the essential lines of the Russian foreign policy of today: the incorporation of Poland —even though to begin with, a part of the booty had to be left to the neighbors; the transformation of Germany into the next object to be partitioned; Constantinople the great main objective—never to be forgotten, however slowly it must be conquered; the conquest of Finland to cover the defense of St. Petersburg, and the compensation of Sweden at the expense of Norway, which Catherine offered to King Gustaf III at Frederikshavn; the weakening of British hegemony on the sea through limitations sanctioned by international law; the incitement of uprisings by the Christian rayahs in Turkey; finally the happy uniting of liberal and legitimist phrases, so that whenever necessary, the Western European "educated" philistine who believes in phrases, the so-called public opinion can be made a fool of.

At Catherine's death Russia already possessed more than even the most exaggerated national chauvinism could have desired. Everything which bore a Russian name—even including the few Ukrainians under Austrian rule—stood under the scepter of her successor, who with full justice could now call himself Autocrat of all the Russians. Not only had access to the sea been won, but on the Baltic as well as the Black Sea Russia possessed an extensive coastline and numerous harbors. Not only Finns, Tatars and Mongolians, but also Lithuanians, Swedes, Poles and Germans stood under Russian dominion. What more did he want? For any other nation that would have been the conclusion. For the Czarist diplomatic corps—the nation was not asked—that was only laying the foundation, in order now to get started in earnest.

The French Revolution had spent its fury and had created for itself a master—Napoleon. It had apparently proven the superior wisdom of

Russian diplomacy, which had not let itself be intimidated by the gigantic popular upheaval. Now the rise of Napoleon offered it an opportunity for a new success: Germany was ripening toward the same fate as Poland. But Catherine's successor, Paul, was headstrong, capricious, unpredictable. He crossed the action of the diplomats at every moment. He was unbearable; he had to be removed. To accomplish this end the necessary officers of the guard were easily found. The successor to the throne, Alexander, was in on the conspiracy and covered it up. Paul was strangled to death, and soon began a new campaign for the greater glory of the new Czar, who, because of the manner in which he ascended the throne, had become the life-long servant of the diplomatic Jesuit gang.

Thus it was left to Napoleon to shatter completely the German Empire and to drive the state of dismemberment to its zenith. However, when it came time to settle accounts Russia again stepped forward. In the peace of Lunéville (1801) the entire left bank of the Rhine was ceded to France with the stipulation that the German princes who were thereby dispossessed were to be compensated on the right bank of the Rhine from the possessions of the clerical lords—bishops, abbots, etc. Now Russia came knocking at the door with the guarantees won at Teschen in 1779: Russia along with France, both guarantors of the disintegration of Germany, was to have an important word to say concerning the distribution of compensations. And the disunity of the German princes was such that the word of Russia and France became decisive. So it came about that Russia and France drew up a plan for the division among the dispossessed of the clerical territories, and that this plan, drawn up abroad in the interest of foreigners, in all its essential parts was raised to the status of German Imperial law (Resolution of the Imperial Diet, 1803).

Actually the German Empire had been dissolved; Austria and Prussia were acting as independent European states—and exactly like Russia and France—treated the smaller princely states of the Reich as open territory for conquest. What was now to become of these little states? Prussia was still too small and too young to claim hegemony over them and Austria had just lost the last vestige of this overlordship. But Russia and France were both laying claim to the inheritance of the German crown. France had crushed the old Empire by force of arms, it pressed against the tiny states as a direct neighbor along the entire length of the Rhine; the glory of Napoleon's victories and the French army did the rest to cast the petty German princes at his feet.

And Russia? Now when it could almost seize the goal sought after for a century; now when Germany lay there helpless and perplexed in full disintegration, and exhausted to the point of death, at just this point was Russia to allow the Corsican upstart to snatch away the booty from under its nose?

Russian diplomacy at once began a campaign to gain supremacy over the petty German states. It was self-evident that this was impossible without a victory over Napoleon. Hence it was of the utmost importance to win over the German princes and so-called German public opinion, in so far as it could be said to exist at all at that time.

The princes were belabored with diplomacy, the philistine public with literature. While Russian cajolery, threats, lies and bribes were lavished on the courts, the public was deluged with mysterious pamphlets in which Russia was praised as the only power which could save and effectively protect Germany, and which had the right and duty to do so under the Treaty of Teschen of 1779. And when the war of 1805 broke out it must have been clear to anyone with his eyes even half-open that only one issue was at stake—whether the petty states were to be formed into a French or into a Russian Rhine Confederation. Fate protected Germany. The Russians and Austrians were defeated at Austerlitz and the new Rhine Confederation thus did not become an outpost of Czarism. The French yoke was at least a modern one, which forced the German petty states to do away with the most crying abuses of their former way of life.

After Austerlitz came the Prussian-Russian alliance, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, and the Peace Treaty of Tilsit in 1807. Here was again evident what a monstrous advantage Russia had from its strategically secure position. Defeated in two campaigns, it won new territory at the expense of its former ally and the alliance with Napoleon for the partition of the world—for Napoleon the West, for Alexander the East!

The first fruit of this alliance was the conquest of Finland. Without even so much as a declaration of war, but with the consent of Napoleon, the Russians marched in. The incompetence, disunity and venality of the Swedish generals assured an easy victory. The bold crossing of the frozen Baltic by Russian units forced a violent change on the throne in Stockholm, and the cession of Finland to Russia. But, three years later, as Alexander's break with Napoleon approached, the Czar invited Marshal Bernadotte, who had been elected to become the Swedish crown-prince, to Abo, and promised him Norway if he would join the alliance of England and Russia against Napoleon. Thus it came

about that in 1814 Catherine's plan—Finland for me, Norway for you—was fulfilled.

But Finland was only a prelude. What Alexander was after was, as always, Czarigrad. At Tilsit and at Erfurt, Moldavia and Wallachia were firmly promised to him by Napoleon, and a division of Turkey was envisaged in which, however, Constantinople was to have been excluded. Since 1806 Russia had been at war with Turkey. This time not only the Greeks but also the Serbs had revolted. But what was merely irony with reference to the Poles proved to be the actual truth in the case of the Turks—disorder held them together. The indestructible common soldier, the son of the imperturbable Turkish peasant, found precisely in this disorder an opportunity to repair the damage done by the corrupt pashas. The Turks could be defeated in a battle but not annihilated, and the Russian armies advanced but very slowly toward Czarigrad.

However, the price for this "free hand" in the East was adherence to Napoleon's Continental System, the breaking off of all trade with England. And at the time that meant commercial ruin for Russia. That was the period when Eugene Onegin (in Pushkin's work) was learning from Adam Smith how a state becomes rich, and how it does not need money if only it has a surplus of goods, while his father could not understand this, and had to mortgage away one property after another.

Russia could only obtain money through its overseas trade and the export of raw materials to the commercial capital of the day, England, and Russia was already much too westernized to be able to live without money. The commercial blockade became unbearable. Economics proved mightier than diplomacy and the Czar put together. Commerce with England was secretly resumed, the Tilsit agreements were violated, and war broke out in 1812.

Napoleon, with the combined armies of the entire West, crossed the Russian borders. The Poles, who were able to judge the situation, advised him to halt on the Dvina and Dnieper, to reorganize Poland, and to wait there for the attack of the Russians. A general of Napoleon's stature must have perceived that this plan was the right one. But Napoleon, on the dizzy heights and uncertain base on which he was standing, could not fight any more long drawnout campaigns. Quick successes, dazzling victories, peace won by storm were indispensable to him. He cast the Polish counsel to the winds, went to Moscow, and by this very action, brought the Russians to Paris.

The annihilation of the great Napoleonic army on the retreat from Moscow gave the signal for a general uprising against French domination in the West. In Prussia the entire population rose up and forced the king, Frederick William III, into war against Napoleon. As soon as Austria completed its arming it joined Prussia and the Russians. After the battle of Leipzig the Rhine Confederation deserted him, and scarcely eighteen months after Napoleon's entrance into Moscow, Alexander entered Paris—the lord and master of Europe.

Betrayed by France, Turkey had concluded the Peace of Bucharest in 1812, and had sacrificed Bessarabia to the Russians. The Congress of Vienna brought Russia the Kingdom of Poland, so that now almost nine-tenths of the former Polish territories were united with Russia. However, the position in Europe which the Czar now obtained was worth more than all that. He no longer had any competitors on the European continent. Austria and Prussia had been taken into his tow. The French Bourbon dynasty had been restored by him and was likewise obedient to him. Sweden had received Norway through him as security for a pro-Czarist policy. Even the Spanish dynasty had to thank for its return the victories of the Russians, Prussians and Austrians much more than those of Wellington, who had never been in a position to overthrow the French Empire.

Never before had Russia occupied such a powerful position. But it had also taken a further step beyond its natural boundaries. Although Russian chauvinism may still have had a few pretexts—I will not say justifications—for the conquests of Catherine II, this was certainly no longer true for the conquests of Alexander. Finland is Finnish and Swedish. Bessarabia is Rumanian, and Congress Poland is Polish. There is no longer any question of the uniting of scattered and related ethnic groups which can all be called "Russian"; here we are dealing with the naked conquest by force of foreign territories, with robbery pure and simple.

III

The victory over Napoleon was a victory of the European monarchies over the French Revolution, of which the last phase had been the Napoleonic Empire; this victory was celebrated by the restoration of "legitimacy." But while Talleyrand thought he could snare the Czar, Alexander, by means of this phrase which he had invented, it was rather Russian diplomacy which was leading all Europe around by the nose with this slogan. On the pretext of protecting legitimacy it

founded, under Russian chairmanship, the "Holy Alliance," that broadening of the Russian-Austrian-Prussian alliance into a conspiracy of all European princes against their peoples. The other princes believed in it; what the Czar and his diplomats thought of it we shall soon see.

For the latter, it was now a question of using the hegemony over Europe which they had achieved in order to advance a step nearer Czarigrad. To this end three levers could be applied: the Rumanians, the Serbs and the Greeks. The Greeks were the most useful element. They were a trading people, and the merchants suffered most from the oppression of the Turkish pashas. The Christian peasant under Turkish overlordship was materially better off than anywhere else. He had preserved his pre-Turkish institutions, his complete self-rule; so long as he paid his taxes, as a rule the Turks paid little attention to him; only rarely was he subjected to acts of violence such as the Western European peasant in the middle ages had to suffer from the nobles. It was an unworthy, merely tolerated but, materially, by no means an oppressed existence which at the time was not unsuited to the cultural level of these peoples, and accordingly it was a long time before the Slavic rayah discovered that this existence was unbearable. On the other hand Greek trade, after Turkish dominion freed it from the stifling competition of the Venetians and Genoans, expanded rapidly, and had already become so extensive that the Turkish overlordship could no longer be endured. In actual fact Turkish, like any other oriental domination, is incompatible with a capitalistic economy; the surplus value extorted is not safe from the hands of greedy satraps and pashas. The first basic condition of bourgeois acquisition is lacking: the security of the person and the property of the trader. It is no wonder then that the Greeks, after having already made two attempts at revolt since 1774, now rose up once again.

Thus the Greek uprising furnished a handle. But in order that Czarist diplomacy might be able to press it forcefully, the West had to be prevented from intervening; it had to be busily preoccupied at home. For this purpose the slogan of legitimacy paved the way brilliantly. The legitimate rulers had everywhere made themselves thoroughly hated. Throughout the entire West the attempts to restore the pre-revolutionary *status quo* again, put the bourgeoisie in a state of agitation; an uprising threatened in France and Germany; in Spain and Italy it broke out openly. In all these conspiracies and uprisings Czarist diplomacy had its hand in the game; not that it had engineered

them or had even contributed in any significant measure to their momentary success. But it did all it was able to do through its semi-official agents in order to stir up internal unrest in the countries of its legitimate allies. However, it directly protected rebellious elements as soon as they stepped forward under the mask of friendship for the Greeks, for who else were the Philhellenes, who collected money, and sent volunteers and even entire armed corps to Greece, if not the Carbonari and other liberals of the West?

All this did not prevent the enlightened Czar Alexander at the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, from calling upon his legitimate colleagues to take the most energetic measures against their rebellious subjects, nor from sending the Austrians to Italy in 1821 and the French to Spain in 1823 in order to suppress these revolutions; nor did it prevent him from apparently damning the uprising of the Greeks—while at the same time stirring up the rebellion and encouraging pro-Greek elements in the West to redoubled activity. Once again stupid Europe was made a fool of; Czarism preached legitimacy to the princes and reactionaries, to the liberal philistines it preached the liberation of oppressed peoples and enlightenment—and both believed it.

In Verona the French Minister, the romantic Chateaubriand, was completely taken in by the Czar, who gave the French the prospect of the left bank of the Rhine, if only they would go along nicely and obediently with Russia. With this hope, which later under Charles X was strengthened by binding commitments, Russian diplomacy lured France along and, with few interruptions, controlled French Eastern policy until 1830.

In spite of everything the philanthropic policy of the Czar, which under the pretext of liberating the Christian Greeks from the Moslem yoke sought to set itself in the place of the Mohammedans, did not make the desired progress. For, as the Russian Ambassador in London, Prince Lieven (Telegram of 18/30 October 1825) said: "All Europe looks with a shudder at this Russian colossus, whose giant's strength is only waiting for a signal to start in motion against it. Its interest is therefore to protect the Turkish power, this natural enemy of our Empire." The war in Greece continued with changing success, while Russia failed in all its attempts to invade the Danubian provinces with the consent of their European royal highnesses and thereby to bring the Turks to capitulation. Then in 1825 the Egyptians came to the aid of the Turks; the Greeks were defeated on all fronts and the uprising

almost suppressed. Russian policy faced either defeat or the necessity of a bold decision.

Chancellor Nesselrode asked the advice of his ambassadors. Pozzo di Borgo in Paris (Telegram of 4/16 October 1825) and Lieven in London (Telegram of 18/30 October 1825) spoke unconditionally in favor of a bold advance: the Danubian provinces must be occupied at once, and without regard to Europe, even at the risk of a European war. Apparently this was the general view of the Russian diplomatic corps. But Alexander was flabby, capricious, dull, mystically romantic: he had not only the slyness and deceit, but also the indecision and apathy of a *"Grec du Bas-Empire"* (as Napoleon called him). He began to take legitimacy seriously and at that point became fed up with the Greek rebels. Idly, and at that time, before the day of the railroad, almost out of reach of communications, he was traveling about in the South near Taganrog. Suddenly the news came that he had died. There were rumors of poison. Had the diplomatic corps eliminated the son as it once had the father? In any case he couldn't have died at a more favorable moment for it.

With Nicolas a Czar came to the throne who couldn't have been better suited to the wishes of the Russian diplomatic corps—a mediocre second-lieutenant's nature to whom the *semblance* of overlordship was all-important, and who therefore with this semblance could be managed for any end. Now affairs were carried on more decisively, and the war against the Turks was brought to an end, without Europe intervening. England and France, the one by liberal slogans, the other by the above-mentioned promises, were brought to the point that their fleets, combined with that of the Russians, in the midst of peace, on 20 October 1827, attacked and destroyed the Turkish-Egyptian fleet at Navarino. And even though England soon turned back, Bourbon France still remained true. While the Czar declared war on the Turks and his troops crossed the Pruth on May 6, 1828, 15,000 French troops were preparing to embark for Greece, where they landed in August and September. This was warning enough to Austria not to fall on the flank of the Russian advance on Constantinople: a war with France would have been the consequence; the Russian-French alliance would then be invoked—the conquest of Constantinople for the one, the left bank of the Rhine for the other.

Diebitch accordingly advanced as far as Adrianople, but found himself in such a situation there that he would have had to retreat in great haste through the Balkans if the Turks could only hold out just a fort-

night longer. He had only 20,000 men, of whom one-fourth were sick with plague. Then the Prussian ambassador at Constantinople mediated a peace by false reports over the threatening, in reality totally impossible Russian advance, and saved the Russian commander, in Moltke's words, "from a situation which, had it been continued perhaps only a few days, would have plunged him from the heights of victory into the abyss of destruction."[2] In any case the peace brought the Russian Empire the mouth of the Danube, a piece of territory in Asia, and more new pretexts for intervention in the affairs of the Danubian provinces. These became from now on until the Crimean War the *karczma zajezdna* of the Russian troops, of which during this period they were only seldom free.

I pass over Russian-Turkish relations in the period from 1830 to 1848. Their importance consists in that Russia, for the first time, appeared as the protector of Turkey against its rebellious vassal Mehmet Ali of Egypt. Russia sent 30,000 men to the Bosphorus in order to protect Constantinople, and succeeded in placing Turkey actually under Russian domination for a series of years in the Treaty of Hunkiar Iskelessi. It succeeded, moreover, to turn, in 1840, a threatening European coalition against Russia, through Palmerston's betrayal, overnight into a coalition against France. Finally, through its continued occupation of the Danubian provinces, the exploitation of the peasants and the baiting of the boyars by means of the *Réglement organique*[3] it laid the groundwork to their annexation. But in the main this period was devoted to the conquest and Russification of the Caucasus, an objective which after struggles of twenty years finally was accomplished.

But a serious mishap hit the Czarist diplomatic corps. When Grand Duke Constantine had to flee on 29 November 1830 from Warsaw before the Polish insurgents, his entire diplomatic archives fell into their hands. The archives contained original messages of the foreign minister, and official copies of all important reports of ambassadors. All the plots of the Russian diplomatic corps from 1825 to 1830 were uncovered. The Polish government sent these diplomatic papers through Count Zamoyski to England and France, and on the suggestion of William IV of England they were published in 1834 by David Urquhart in the *Portfolio*. This portfolio is still one of the main sources—and certainly the least impeachable one—for the history of the intrigues by

[2] H. K. B. Moltke, *Der russisch türkische Feldzug in der europäischen Türkei 1828 und 1829*, Berlin, 1877, p. 390.

[3] See Marx, *Capital*, volume 1, Ch. 8.

means of which Czarism tried to incite the nations of the West against one another, in order to dominate them all as a consequence of these discords.

Russian diplomacy had already survived, not only undamaged but with direct profit, so many Western European revolutions, that it was in a position to greet the outbreak of the February Revolution of 1848 as an exceedingly favorable occasion. That the revolution spread to Vienna and thereby not only removed Metternich, Russia's chief opponent, but also roused the Austrian Slavs—prospective allies of Czarism—out of their slumber; that it struck Berlin and thereby cured of his longing for independence from Russia Frederick William IV, whose aspirations were matched only by his incompetence—what could be more welcome? Russia was safe from all contagion and Poland was so heavily occupied that it could not budge. And when the revolution spread even to the Danubian provinces, Russian diplomacy had what it wanted: an excuse for a new invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia in order to restore order and to establish Russian domination there more and more firmly.

But this was not enough. Austria, Russia's toughest, most stubborn rival on the borders of the Balkan peninsula, was brought to the brink of ruin by the Hungarian and the Viennese uprising. But a victory of Hungary would have meant the renewed outbreak of the European revolution, and the numerous Poles in the Hungarian army were an assurance that this revolution would not stop again at the Polish frontier. Nicolas feigned magnanimity. He invaded with his armies Hungary, suppressed the Hungarian troops with superior forces, and thereby sealed the defeat of the European revolution. And when Prussia still continued to make attempts at utilizing the revolution to dissolve the German Confederation and at least to subject the North-German petty states to Prussian hegemony, Nicolas called Prussia and Austria before his tribunal in Warsaw and decided in favor of Austria. Prussia was thanked for its many years of submission to Russia, by being shamefully humiliated because momentarily it showed a feeble desire to resist. Nicolas also decided the Schleswig-Holstein question against Germany, and appointed Christian of the house of Glücksburg to succeed to the throne of Denmark after he had demonstrated his usefulness for Czarist objectives. Not only Hungary, all Europe lay at the feet of the Czar, and that as a direct consequence of the revolution. Was Russian diplomacy not right in being secretly enthusiastic about revolutions in the West?

But the February revolution was nevertheless the first death knell of Czarism. The little mind of the narrow Nicolas could not support such undeserved good fortune. He was too hasty with his advance toward Constantinople; the Crimean War broke out; England and France came to the aid of Turkey, and Austria was burning with the desire *d'étonner le monde par la grandeur de son ingratitude.* For Austria knew that as compensation for help in the Hungarian uprising and for the Warsaw award its neutrality or even assistance was expected in the Russian conquests on the Danube, which would have meant that Austria would have become surrounded by Russia from Cracow to Orsova and Semlin. And on this occasion, Austria had the courage of its convictions, something which had almost never happened before.

The Crimean War was one single colossal comedy of errors in which at every moment the question was asked: "Who's being swindled here?" But this comedy cost untold treasure and over a million human lives. The first allied troops had hardly landed in Bulgaria, when the Austrians occupied the Danubian provinces, and the Russians withdrew across the Pruth. By this move Austria interposed itself between both the warring parties on the Danube; a further continuation of the war in this region was possible only with its consent. But Austria was willing to participate in a war at the Western frontier of Russia. It knew that Russia would never forgive her this brutal ingratitude; accordingly it was willing to side with the allies, but only in return for a serious war, one which would restore Poland and push back the Western borders of Russia appreciably. Such a war would also have drawn into the alliance Prussia, through whose territory Russia drew all its supplies; a European coalition would have blocked Russia on land and water, and would have attacked with such overwhelming strength that victory would have been beyond doubt.

But this was by no means the intention of England and France. On the contrary, both were happy to be rid of all danger of a serious war by Austria's advance. What Russia was hoping for—that the allies would turn toward the Crimea and get stuck fast there—was suggested by Palmerston, and Louis Napoleon, overjoyed, grasped the proposal with both hands. To sally forth from the Crimea into the interior of Russia would have been strategic madness. Thus the war was happily transformed, into a sham war, and all the chief participants were satisfied. However, in the long run the Czar Nicolas could not tolerate a situation in which enemy troops entrenched themselves firmly on

Russian soil on the edge of his Empire; for him the sham war soon became serious again. However, what in the case of a sham war was for him most favorable ground was more dangerous for a real war. Russia's elements of defensive strength, the vast expanse of its thinly populated territory, lacking in roads and poor in raw materials—were turned to Russia's disadvantage as soon as Nicolas concentrated all his combat forces at Sebastopol, this single point on the periphery. The south-Russian steppes, which would have been the grave of any attacker, became the grave of the Russian armies which Nicolas drove one after the other, with a stupid, brutal recklessness peculiarly his own—at last in the dead of winter—into the Crimea. And when the last of these armies, hastily mobilized, barely supplied with necessities, and poorly fed had lost two-thirds of their effectives on the march—whole battalions perished in the blizzards—and the survivors were in no condition seriously to attack the enemy, the inflated empty-headed Nicolas collapsed pitifully, and he fled from the consequences of his own Caesarist megalomania by taking poison.

The peace which his successor now quite hastily concluded, turned out to be very indulgent. But the internal consequences of the war were all the more serious. In order to be able to govern absolutely at home Czarism had to appear outwardly more than invincible, it had to appear constantly victorious, in order to be in a position to reward unconditional obedience by the chauvinistic intoxication of victory, by ever new conquests. And now Czarism had collapsed miserably just in its externally most imposing aspect; it had compromised Russia before the world, and thereby compromised itself before Russia. There followed a terrible disillusionment. The Russian people were too much aroused by the colossal sacrifices of the war, the Czar had had to rely too much on their devotion, to be brought back without further ado to the passivity of unthinking obedience. For gradually even Russia had developed further both economically and intellectually; beside the nobility there now stood the beginnings of a second educated class, the bourgeoisie. In short the new Czar had to play the liberal, but this time *at home*. However, this gave a start to the internal history of Russia, to a movement of minds within the nation itself and its reflex, public opinion, which henceforth could be less lightly disregarded, which, although still feeble, was making itself felt more and more, and thus arose an enemy against which Czarist diplomacy was to founder. For this sort of diplomacy is possible only as long as the people remain unconditionally passive, have no will except that imposed

by the government, no function except to provide soldiers and taxes to achieve the objectives of the diplomats. Once Russian internal development, with its internal party struggles had begun, the winning of a constitutional framework within which this party struggle could be fought without forcible convulsions, was only a question of time. But in such a situation the former Russian policy of conquest is a thing of the past; the changeless constancy of diplomatic objectives is lost in the struggles of the parties for control; the ability unconditionally to dispose of the forces of the nation is lost—Russia remains difficult to attack and relatively weak on the offensive, but in other respects it becomes a European country like any other, and the peculiar strength of its former diplomacy is forever broken.

La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille [Russia does not sulk, it draws together], said Chancellor Gortchakov after the war. He did not know himself how truthfully he spoke. He spoke only for the diplomatic Russia. But the unofficial Russia also drew its forces together. And this gathering of strength *(recueillement)* was supported by the government itself. The war had shown that Russia needed railroads and heavy industry, if only for purely military considerations. Consequently the government set about raising a Russian capitalist class. But such a class can not exist without a proletariat, and to provide the elements of the latter, the so-called emancipation of the serfs had to occur. The peasant paid for his personal freedom by making over the best part of his landed property to the nobles. What remained to him was too little to live on and too much to die on. While the Russian peasant community was thus stricken at its root, the great new bourgeoisie developed at the same time as in a hot-house through railway privileges, protective tariffs and other favors; and thus in city and country a full-scale social revolution was ushered in, in which, once it had been set in motion, could no longer let the minds be at rest. The young bourgeoisie was reflected in a liberal-constitutional movement, the proletariat, which was just coming on the plain, in the movement which is usually called Nihilism. These were the real consequences of Russia's *recueillement.*

Meanwhile Russian diplomacy seemed to take no notice of the enemy which had arisen internally. On the contrary, externally it seemed to win victory after victory. At the Paris Conference of 1856 Orlov played the much courted leading role. Instead of bringing sacrifices, he won new successes: the rights of sea warfare which England had claimed and which had been disputed by Russia since Catherine,

were definitely abolished, and the basis was laid for a French-Russian alliance against Austria. This became a reality in 1859 when Louis Napoleon made it his business to revenge Russia against Austria. The consequences of the Russian-French understanding, which Mazzini exposed at the time, and according to which, in case of prolonged resistance, a Russian crown-prince was to have been put up as a candidate for the throne of an independent Hungary—these consequences Austria escaped by hastily signing a peace treaty. But after 1848 the peoples spoiled the handiwork of diplomacy. Italy became independent and united against the will of the Czar and of Louis Napoleon.

The war of 1859 had also roused Prussia. It almost doubled its army and put a man at the helm who in at least one respect was a match to Russian diplomacy: ruthlessness with regard to the means used. This man was Bismarck. During the Polish uprising of 1863 he took the side of Russia, opposing Austria, France and England, in a theatrical manner and did everything to bring about victory for Russia. That secured for him the defecting of the Czar from his usual policy in the Schleswig-Holstein question; in 1864 the Duchy was wrested from Denmark with Czarist permission. Then came the Prussian-Austrian War of 1886; here the Czar was again pleased over the chastisement of Austria and the growing power of Prussia, the only faithful —even after the kicks of 1849/50—still faithful vassal. The War of 1866 brought the Franco-Prussian War in its wake, and again the Czar stood by the side of his Prussian "Djadja Molodez." He held Austria directly in check, and thus robbed France of the one ally who could have saved it from total defeat. But like Louis Bonaparte in 1866, so Alexander in 1870 was cheated by the rapid success of German arms. Instead of a long drawn out war which would exhaust both contestants, there resulted the sudden blows which upset the Bonapartist Empire in five weeks and led its armies into German captivity.

At that time there was only a single place in Europe where the situation was correctly understood, and that was the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association. On 9 September 1870 the latter published a manifesto in which the parallel between 1866 and 1870 was drawn. The war of 1866 was waged with the consent of Louis Napoleon, but the victories and the expansion of Prussian power drove him immediately into the position of enmity against Prussia. Similarly the new successes of 1870 and the related further increase of the Prussian-German power would force the Czar into enmity against Germany, in spite of the fact that he had supported Prussia diplomati-

cally during the war. Russia's preponderant influence in Europe had as its necessary prerequisite its traditional power over Germany—a power which was now broken. At a moment when in Russia itself the revolutionary movement was beginning to take on threatening proportions, the Czar could not tolerate this loss of prestige abroad. And if in addition Germany were to drive France into the arms of Russia by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, Germany either had to yield by becoming the obvious tool of Russian plans for conquest, or, after a short rest period, prepare for war against Russia and France simultaneously, a war which could easily turn into a war of races against an alliance of the Slavs and the Latin races.

The new German Empire did Russia the favor of wresting Alsace-Lorraine away from France and thereby actually driving France into Russia's arms. Czarist diplomacy was now in the enviable position of being able to make both France and Germany, both deadly enemies because of this forced annexation, dependent on Russia. This favorable situation was again exploited for a thrust toward Czarigrad, the Turkish war of 1877. After long fighting the Russian troops arrived in January 1878 at the gates of the Turkish capital. At that moment four English warships appeared in the Bosphorous and compelled the Russians, who were within sight of the towers of the church of St. Sophia, to halt and to lap their peace plan of San Stefano before a European Congress for revision.

Nevertheless, an enormous apparent success was achieved. Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro were enlarged and made independent by—and therefore indebted to—Russia. The defensive quadrangle between the Danube and the Balkans, the strong bulwark of Turkey, was destroyed for the time being; the last protective wall of Constantinople, the Balkans was wrested from the Turks and disarmed; Bulgaria and East Rumelia were made into apparently Turkish but actually Russian vassal states; the loss of territory in Bessarabia was again made good; in Armenia new, important positions were conquered; through the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria was made an accomplice in the division of Turkey and into a necessary enemy of all endeavors by the Serbs for independence and unification; finally Turkey, through territorial losses, exhaustion and exorbitant reparations, was made fully dependent on Russia, in a position where according to the Russian, quite correct, conception, it was merely holding the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles temporarily in trust for Russia. Thus, so it seemed, Russia needed merely to choose the moment when it would

please her to seize possession of her great, final objective, Constantinople, *"la clef de notre maison."*

But in reality the situation was quite different. Although Alsace-Lorraine drove France into Russia's arms, the advance on Constantinople and the Peace of Berlin drove Austria into Bismarck's arms. And with this the entire situation changed again. The great military powers of the Continent divided into two armed camps threatening one another: Russia and France on one side, Germany and Austria on the other. Around these two the smaller states must group themselves. But that means that Russian Czarism can not take the last great step, that it can not really take possession of Constantinople without a world war, in which the odds are almost equal, and the final decision of which apparently will not depend on either of the two parties who open it, but rather on England. For a war in which Austria and Germany are fighting Russia and France will cut off the entire West from Russian grain supplies by land. But all countries of the West can live only by grain supplies from abroad. These could only come by sea, and England's naval superiority permits it also to cut off these supplies from France as well as Germany. Thus it can starve out one or the other according as it decides for this or that side. However, to win Constantinople in a world war, in which England can turn the scale—this is exactly the situation which Russian diplomacy has worked a hundred and fifty years to avoid—hence a defeat.

As a matter of fact the alliance with a republican France whose governmental personnel is constantly subject to change is also by no means secure for Czarism and even less in accord with its heart's desire. Only a restored French monarchy could offer sufficient guarantees as an ally in such a frightful war as is now possible. Therefore for the last five years Czarism has taken the Orleans family under its especial protection. They had to forge family ties with it by marrying into the Danish royal family, that Russian advance post on the Baltic Sound. And in order to prepare France for an Orleans restoration—now also a Russian advance post—General Boulanger was used, whose own supporters boast that the secret source of their funds, distributed so lavishly is none other than the Russian government, which has placed at their disposal *fifteen million francs* for their campaign. Thus Russia is again intervening in the internal affairs of the Western nations, this time as the open supporter of reaction, and backs the impatient chauvinism of the French bourgeois against the revolutionary spirit of the French workers.

In general, the events since 1878 show clearly how much the position of Russian diplomacy has worsened since the popular masses are indulging more and more in taking part in the debate—and with success. Even in the Balkan peninsula, the area where Russia, *ex professo,* poses as the liberator of oppressed nations, nothing seems to succeed any more. The Rumanians had to surrender again their piece of Bessarabia as compensation for having made possible the Russian victory at Plevna, and will not easily let themselves be baited with future promises of Transylvania and the Banat. The Bulgarians have become thoroughly fed up with the Czarist variety of liberation as a result of which Czarist agents were sent into their country. Only the Serbs and perhaps the Greeks—both because they lie outside the direct thrust-line to Constantinople—have not yet been made skittish. The Austrian Slavs, whom the Czar felt called upon to liberate from the Austrian oppression, were meanwhile, at least on this side of the Leitha River, practicing their own self-rule. The slogan about the liberation of oppressed peoples by the all-powerful Czar has played out; at best it could still be used in Crete and Armenia and this has no more effect in Europe even on the pious English Christian liberals. Even Gladstone the admirer of the Czar would not risk a European War for the sake of Crete and Armenia, since the American, Kennan, revealed to the entire world the beastly means by which Czarism represses every slightest stirring of resistance in its own Empire.

And here we come to the crux of the matter. The internal development of Russia since 1856 supported by governmental policy has had its effect; the social revolution has taken gigantic steps forward; Russia is becoming daily more westernized; heavy industry, railroads, the conversion of all charges in kind into money payments and the accompanying loosening of the old bases of society are developing with increasing rapidity. But the incompatibility of absolutist Czarism with the newly evolving society grows in the same proportion. Constitutional and revolutionary opposition parties are being formed and the regime can dominate them only through increased brutality. And the Russian diplomatic corps sees with consternation approach the day when the Russian people will take part in the debate and when the settling of its own internal affairs will not leave enough time or inclination, to keep it occupied with such trifles as the conquest of Constantinople, India, and world domination. The revolution which in 1848 halted at the Polish frontiers, is now knocking at Russia's gates,

and it already has enough allies in the interior, who are merely waiting for the occasion to open the gate.

To be sure, if one reads the Russian papers, one could believe that all Russia is enthusiastically supporting the Czarist policy of conquest; there all is chauvinism, Panslavism, emancipation of the Christians from the Turkish and of the Slavs from the German-Magyar yoke. But in the first place, everyone knows in what chains the Russian press lies bound; in the second place the regime has nourished this chauvinism and Panslavism for years in all the schools; and thirdly, those papers which express an independent opinion at all are voicing the sentiments of the city population, that is, the newly-formed bourgeoisie, which is naturally interested in new conquests as an expansion of the Russian market. But this city population forms a vanishing minority in the whole country. As soon as a national assembly gives the vast majority of the Russian people, the peasant population, an opportunity to raise its voice, very different things will be heard. The experiences which the government has had with the Zemstvos and which have forced it to nullify the Zemstvos again, assures us that a Russian National Assembly, if only to overcome the most urgent internal difficulties, will soon find itself forced to put a decisive barrier in the way of all drives toward new conquests.

The European situation today is governed by three facts: (1) the annexation by Germany of Alsace-Lorraine, (2) the drive of Russian Czarism toward Constantinople, (3) in all countries, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which is burning with an increasing intense heat, as measured by the thermometer of the socialist movement, which is on the upswing everywhere.

The first two factors determine the current grouping of Europe into two great armed camps. The German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine makes France an ally of Russia; the Czarist threat to Constantinople makes Austria and even Italy allies of Germany. Both camps are arming for a showdown fight, for a war such as the world has never seen, in which ten to fifteen million armed men will be pitted against each other. Up to now only two circumstances have prevented the outbreak of this terrible war. First, the unbelievably rapid progress of military technology which makes the model of each newly invented rifle obsolete, due to new discoveries, before it can be supplied even to one army only, and second, the absolute unpredictability of the odds, the total uncertainty as to who would finally emerge as the victor from this gigantic conflict.

This entire danger of a world war will vanish on the day when the situation in Russia permits the Russian people to draw a thick line under the traditional policy of conquest of the czars, and to attend to their own vital interests at home—interests which are threatened in the extreme—instead of phantasies of world conquest.

On that day Bismarck will lose all the anti-French allies which the Russian threat has driven into his arms. Neither Austria nor Italy will then take the slightest interest in pulling Bismarck's chestnuts out of the fire of a gigantic European war. The German Reich will fall back into the isolated position in which, as Moltke put it, it is feared by everyone and liked by no one, as that is the unavoidable result of its foreign policy. Then also the mutual rapprochement of Russia—struggling for its freedom—and republican France will not only correspond to the position of both countries, but will no longer endanger the general European situation. Then Bismarck, or whoever succeeds him, will also think three times before he starts a war with France in which neither Russia will cover his flank against Austria, nor Austria his flank against Russia, but in which both of them will rejoice in any defeat he may suffer, and in which it is highly questionable that he can finish with the French alone. Then all sympathies would be on the side of France, and if the worst came to pass, it would be assured against the further loss of territory. Thus rather than unleashing a war, Germany probably would find isolation so unbearable that it would seek an honest settlement with France, and then all the frightful danger of war would be removed; *Europe could disarm,* and of all countries Germany would have gained most.

On the same day Austria will lose its single, historical justification for existence—that of a barrier against the Russian drive toward Constantinople. Once the Bosphorus is no longer threatened by Russia, Europe loses all interest in the continuance of this motley complex of peoples. Then the whole so-called Eastern Question will be equally a matter of indifference—the continuation of Turkish hegemony over the Slavic, Greek and Albanian territories, and the fight for possession of the entrance to the Black Sea, which no one will then be able to monopolize against Europe. Magyars, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgars, Arnauts, Greeks, and Turks will then finally be in a position to settle their own mutual disputes without the intervention of foreign powers, to settle among themselves the boundaries of their individual national territories, to manage their internal affairs according to their own judgments. It can be seen at a glance that the great obstacle to the autonomy

and free grouping of the peoples and ethnic fragments between the Carpathian mountains and the Aegean sea has been nothing but the very Czarism which has used the alleged liberation of these peoples as a cloak for its own plans for world domination.

France will be freed from the unnatural, forced position in which the alliance with the Czar has bound it. If the alliance with a republic is repugnant to the Czar, the bond with the despot, the muzzler of Poland and Russia, is even more repugnant to the revolutionary French people. In a war on the side of the Czar, France would be forbidden in case of defeat to use its one great effective means of salvation, the remedy of 1793—Revolution—the summoning of all the popular forces through the terror and by revolutionary propaganda in enemy territory. In this situation the Czar would at once unite with the enemies of France, for the times have changed since 1848, and the Czar also has learned since that time to recognize the terror from his own observation in Russia. Thus the alliance with the Czar is not a factor strengthening France. On the contrary, at the moment of its greatest danger, it would hold its sword fast in its sheath. But if instead of the mighty Czar there were in Russia a National Assembly, then the alliance of the newly emancipated Russia with the French Republic would be a self-evident and natural one. Such an alliance would further instead of blocking the revolutionary movement in France, it would be a gain for the European proletariat struggling for its emancipation. Thus France would also profit by the fall of the Czarist autocracy.

At the same time all pretexts would vanish for the mad armaments race which is turning all Europe into an armed camp, and which makes war seem almost a relief. Even the German Reichstag would then soon block the incessantly increasing demands for military expenditures.

At this point, undisturbed by foreign diversions and intervention, the West would be in a position to occupy itself with its present historical mission: with the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the transforming of the capitalist into the socialist society.

But the fall of the Czarist autocracy in Russia would also directly accelerate this process. On the day when the Czarist power falls—this last, powerful fortress of the entire European reaction—on that day a totally different wind will blow throughout all of Europe. For the reactionary governments of Europe know one thing for sure: in spite of all their quarrels with the Czar over Constantinople, etc., the moment may come when they will toss in his lap everything he has so far

demanded—Constantinople, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and anything else he asks—if he will only protect them against the Revolution. Therefore, on the day when this main fortress itself passes into the hands of the Revolution, then the last spark of self-assurance and security will die in the reactionary governments of Europe. They will then be thrown back on their own resources, and will soon discover what a difference that makes. Perhaps they may be in a position to order out their armies to restore the authority of the Czar—what an irony of history!

These are the reasons why Western Europe generally, and the Western European labor parties specifically, are interested, very deeply interested in the victory of the Russian revolutionary party and the fall of the Czarist absolutism. As if on an inclined plane, Europe is sliding with increasing speed into the abyss of a world war, a war of as yet unheard-of extent and violence. Only one thing can now halt it: a change of the regime in Russia. This must come within a few years, of that there can be no doubt. Let us hope that it may yet come in time, before the otherwise, unavoidable happens.

III
PANSLAVISM

2
Hungary and Panslavism (1849)

COLOGNE, JANUARY.—While in Italy the first blows against the counter-revolution of last summer and autumn are already being struck, on the Hungarian plain the last battle to suppress the movement which arose directly out of the February revolution has ended. The new Italian development is the prologue to the movement of 1849, the war against the Magyars is the epilogue to the movement of 1848. Apparently the epilogue will carry over into the new drama which is quietly being prepared.

The epilogue is also heroic, like the first rapidly succeeding scenes of the revolutionary tragedy of 1848, like the fall of Paris and Vienna, comfortingly heroic after the partly insipid, partly trivial *entr'actes* between June and October. Through terrorism the last act of 1848 is continuing over into the first of 1849.

For the first time in the 1848 revolutionary movement, for the first time since 1793, a nation surrounded by superior counterrevolutionary power, has dared to oppose the cowardly counterrevolutionary passion, to oppose the *terreur blanche* by the *terreur rouge*. For the first time in years we find a truly revolutionary character, a man who dares to take up the challenge of a desperate war in the name of his people, who is for his nation a Danton and a Carnot in one and the same person—Louis Kossuth.

The superiority of power is frightening: All Austria—16 million fanatic Slavs at the head—against 4 million Magyars.

In Hungary, armed, organized and inspired by Kossuth we find

again the mass uprising, the national production of weapons, the assignats, the summary trials of all who block the revolutionary movement, revolution in permanence,—in short, all the main features of the glorious year of 1793. This revolutionary organization which had to be readied as it were within 24 hours on penalty of perishing, was lacking in Vienna, otherwise Windischgraetz would never have captured it. We shall be interested in seeing whether he succeeds in Hungary in spite of this revolutionary organization.

Let us look at the struggle and the contesting parties more closely.

The Austrian monarchy arose from the attempt to unite Germany into a single monarchy in the same manner in which the French kings, up to Louis XI, carried this out in France. The attempt failed due to the wretched, local narrow-mindedness of both the Germans and the Austrians, and to the correspondingly petty trifling mentality of the House of Hapsburg. Instead of all Germany the Hapsburgs obtained only those South-German lands which were engaged in a direct struggle with isolated Slavic tribes or in which a German feudal nobility and bourgeoisie jointly ruled over suppressed Slavic peoples. In either case the Germans of each province needed external support. This support was arrived at through association against the Slavs, and this association arose through the uniting of these provinces under the Hapsburg scepter.

Thus German Austria [*Deutsch-Oesterreich*] arose. In order to see how accurate this statement is one need only read in any textbook how the Austrian monarchy came into being, how it was broken up, and was again united in the struggle against the Slavs.

Hungary is bordering on Austria. The Magyars in Hungary were carrying on the same struggles as the Germans in Austria. The German wedge pushed between Slavic barbarians in the duchies of Austria and Styria was joined on the Leitha river with the Magyar wedge similarly pushed between Slavic barbarians. As in the South and the North, in Bohemia, Moravia, Carinthia and Carniola, the German nobility ruled over Slavic tribes, Germanized them and thus pulled them into the European movement, so the Magyar nobility likewise ruled the Slavic tribes in the South and North—in Croatia, Slavonia and the Carpathian regions. The interests of both were the same; the enemies of both were natural allies. The alliance of the Magyars and the Austrian Germans was a necessity. Only one important factor was still lacking, a powerful attack on both, in order to make this alliance indissoluble. This event came with the conquest by the Turks of the Byzantine Empire. The

Turks threatened Hungary and in the second instance Vienna, and Hungary for centuries was linked indissolubly to the House of Hapsburg.

But the common enemy of both gradually weakened. The Turkish Empire became powerless and the Slavs lost the strength for rising against the Magyars and the Germans. Indeed, a part of the German and Magyar nobility ruling in the Slavic lands adopted Slavic nationality, and thus the Slavic nations themselves became interested in maintaining a monarchy which increasingly had to protect the nobility against the developing German and Magyar bourgeoisie. The national antagonisms disappeared and the House of Hapsburg adopted another policy. The same House of Hapsburg which had risen to the German Imperial throne on the shoulders of the German bourgeoisie became more decisively than any other dynasty the champion of the feudal nobility against the bourgeoisie.

With this in view Austria took part in the partition of Poland. The great Galician county and provincial governors, the Potockis, Lubomirskis, and Czartoryskis betrayed Poland to Austria and became the staunchest supporters of the House of Hapsburg, which in return guaranteed their possessions against the attacks of the lesser nobility and the bourgeoisie.

But the city bourgeoisie won more and more wealth and influence, and the progress of agriculture, developing concurrently with industry, placed the peasants in a changed position opposing the landlords. The movement of the bourgeoisie and peasants against the nobles became ever more threatening. And since the movement of the peasants, who are everywhere the bearers of national and local narrow-mindedness, was necessarily local and nationalistic, the old national struggles arose again along with it.

In this state of affairs Metternich played his master stroke. With the exception of the most powerful feudal barons he removed all influence of the other nobles on the government. He sapped the strength of the bourgeoisie by winning over the most powerful financial barons —indeed he was forced to do this by the state of his finances. Thus relying on the high nobility and on high finance, as well as on the bureaucracy and the army, he achieved the ideal of absolute monarchy more fully than any of his rivals. He held in check the bourgeoisie and the peasants of each nationality through the nobles of the same nationality and the peasants of the other nationalities; he held the nobility of each nationality through fear of their own bourgeoisie and peasantry.

The different class interests, nationalistic hatreds and local prejudices, complicated as they were, held each other completely in check, and permitted the old swindler Metternich the greatest freedom of movement. How far he was able to incite the peoples against each other is demonstrated by the Galician murder incidents in which Metternich suppressed the democratic Polish movement, which was started in the interests of the peasants, by using the religious and national fanaticism of the Ruthenian peasants themselves.

The year 1848 produced at first the most frightful confusion in Austria, since it freed for a moment all these different ethnic groups which had formerly mutually enslaved each other under Metternich's rule. Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Moravians, Slovaks, Croats, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Illyrians and Serbs all fell to fighting one another, while in each of these nationalities the various classes likewise were in conflict. But soon order came out of this confusion. The conflicting elements divided into two great camps: on the side of the Revolution the Germans, Poles and Magyars; on the side of the counterrevolution all the others, the Slavs with the exception of the Poles, Rumanians and Transylvanian Saxons.

What is the reason for this division according to nationality? On what facts is it based?

This division corresponds to the entire previous history of these tribes. It marks the beginning of a life and death crisis of all these large and small nations.

The entire history of Austria up to this day has demonstrated it, and the year 1848 confirmed it. Among all the nations and petty ethnic groups of Austria there are only three which have been the carriers of progress, which have played an active role in history and which still retain their vitality—the Germans, the Poles and the Magyars. For this reason they are now revolutionary.

The chief mission of all the other races and peoples—large and small—is to perish in the revolutionary holocaust. Therefore they are counterrevolutionary.

As concerns the Poles, we refer the reader to our article on "The Debates on Poland at Frankfurt." In order to restrain the revolutionary spirit of the Poles Metternich had already called on the Ruthenians, a tribe differing from the Poles by a slightly different dialect, but particularly by their Greek religion, and who first learned from Metternich that the Poles were their oppressors. As if in old Poland the Ruthenians as well as the Poles themselves had not been oppressed, and as if under

Austrian domination Metternich had not been the oppressor of both!

So much for the Poles and Ruthenians who by their history and geographic location are so far removed from Austria proper that we must put them aside at the outset in order to see clearly through the confusion of the other nationalities.

Meanwhile let us note in advance that the Poles are displaying great political insight and a true revolutionary sense by uniting with their old enemies, the Germans and Magyars, against the Panslavist counter-revolution. A Slavic nation which prefers freedom to Slavdom, demonstrates its vitality by this fact alone, and thus already assures its future.

Now let us consider Austria itself. Austria, south of the Sudeten and the Carpathian mountains, the upper Elbe valley and the middle Danube region, forms a country inhabited in the early middle ages exclusively by Slavs. According to their customs and speech those Slavs belonged to the same ethnic group as the Slavs in Turkey, the Serbs, Bosnians, Bulgarians, the Thracian and Macedonian Slavs, the group of so-called South Slavs as opposed to the Poles and the Russians. Except for those related Slavic tribes the enormous region from the Black Sea to the Böhmerwald and the Tyrolese Alps was inhabited, in the south of the Balkan peninsula only by a few Greeks and in the lower Danubian basin by scattered Wallachians who spoke a Romance language.

Between these compact Slavic masses, the Germans wedged themselves in from the West, the Magyars from the East. The German element conquered the Western part of Bohemia and pressed forward on both sides of the Danube as far as the Leitha river. The Duchy of Austria, a part of Moravia and most of Styria became Germanized, and thus separated the Czechs and Moravians from the Carinthians and the Carniolians. Similarly Transylvania and Central Hungary as far as the German borders was cleared of Slavs and occupied by the Magyars, who separated the Slovaks and a few Ruthenian areas (in the North) from the Serbs, Croats and Slavonians, and who subjected all these peoples. Following the Byzantine precedent, the Turks finally subjected the Slavs south of the Danube and Save rivers, and the historical role of the South Slavs was finished forever.

The last attempt of the South Slavs to play an independent role in history was the Hussite War, a Czech national peasant war under a religious banner against the German nobility and German Imperial domination. The attempt failed, and ever since then the Czechs have remained bound to the sphere of influence of the German Empire.

On the other hand, their conquerors the Germans and Magyars seized the historical initiative in the Danubian basin. Without the Germans, but especially without the Magyars, the South Slavs would have become Turkish—as a part of them actually did—they would even have become Moslems, as the Slavic Bosnians still are today. And this is a service for which the Austrian South Slavs would not pay too dearly, even by changing their nationality to that of the Germans or Magyars.

The Turkish invasion of the 15th and 16th centuries was the second edition of the Arabic invasion of the 8th century. Under the walls of Vienna and on the Hungarian plains the victory of Charles Martel was fought again and again. Here, as before at Poitiers and later at Wahlstatt during the Mongolian invasion, the whole European development was again threatened. And when it was a question of saving European civilization, what mattered the fate of a few nationalities, which had long been dismembered and powerless, and which were saved along with it anyway?

The internal development corresponded to the external one. Everywhere the forward-looking class, the carrier of progress, the bourgeoisie, was German or Magyar. The Slavs found it difficult to develop a bourgeoisie, the South Slavs were only very partially able to do so. Along with the bourgeoisie, industrial strength, capital, was in German or Magyar hands. As German education developed, the Slavs also came under the intellectual tutelage of the Germans, even deep in Croatia. The same thing took place, only later and therefore on a smaller scale in Hungary, where the Magyars together with the Germans assumed intellectual and commercial leadership. However the Hungarian Germans, in spite of their having retained the German language, have become true Magyars so far as their disposition, character and customs are concerned. The only exceptions are the newly introduced agricultural settlers, the Jews and Saxons in Transylvania, which insist on clinging to an absurd nationality in the midst of a foreign land.

And although the Magyars have remained somewhat behind the German Austrians in civilization, in recent times they have caught up most brilliantly through their political activity. From 1830 to 1848 there was more political life in Hungary alone than in all Germany: the feudal forms of the old Hungarian constitution were better exploited in the interest of democracy than the more modern forms of the South German constitution. And who stood in the vanguard of this movement? The Magyars. Who supported the Austrian reaction? The Croatians and Slavonians.

Against this Magyar movement, as well as against the reawakening political movement in Germany the Austrian Slavs established a separate league—Panslavism.

Panslavism did not originate in Russia or Poland, but in Prague and Agram. Panslavism is the alliance of all the small Slavic nations and tribes of Austria, and in second place of Turkey, for the struggle against the Austrian Germans, the Magyars, and eventually the Turks. The Turks play only a purely accidental role, and need not be considered since they are also a thoroughly degenerate nation. In its fundamental tendency, Panslavism is directed against the revolutionary elements in Austria, and hence reactionary from the very beginning.

Panslavism immediately demonstrated this reactionary tendency by a double betrayal: for the sake of its petty, national narrow-mindedness it sacrificed the Poles, the one Slavic nation which till now has shown itself to be revolutionary, and it sold both itself and the Poles to the Russian Czar.

The immediate objective of Panslavism is the setting up under Russian domination of a Slavic empire from the Erzgebirge and the Carpathians to the Black, Aegean and Adriatic Seas, an empire that would embrace about a dozen Slavic languages and dialects in addition to the German, Italian, Magyar, Wallachian, Turkish, Greek and Albanian languages. The whole is to be held together not by those elements which formerly held together and developed Austria, but rather by the abstract property of Slavdom and the so-called Slavic language, which, to be sure, is common to the majority of the inhabitants. But where does this Slavdom exist except in the heads of a few ideologists, where is the "Slavic language" except in the phantasy of Messrs. Palacky, Gaj and company and to some extent in the old-Slavic ritual of the Russian church, which no Slav can understand any more? In reality all these peoples have the most different levels of civilization which vary from the fairly highly developed (by the Germans) industry and education of Bohemia down to the almost nomadic barbarism of the Croats and Bulgarians; and in reality all these nations thus have diametrically conflicting interests. In reality the Slavic language of these ten or twelve nations consists of as many mutually almost unintelligible dialects which can, in fact, be reduced to several main branches (Czech, Illyrian, Serbo-Bulgarian). Thanks to the total neglect of literature and the coarseness of most of the peoples these languages have become pure patois, and with few exceptions, have had a non-

Slavic language over them as a written language. Thus Panslavist unity is either pure visionariness or—more likely—the Russian knout.

And what nations are supposed to form the vanguard of this great Slavic Empire? Precisely those which, scattered and split for a thousand years have had pushed upon them from the outside their vital elements, capable of development, nations which were saved by the victorious arms of non-Slavic peoples from sinking into Turkish barbarity, tribes which are petty, powerless, widely scattered from each other and bereft of their national strength, nations made up of a few thousand to less than two million people! They have become so weak that, for example, the people which during the middle ages was the most powerful and most feared, the Bulgarians, is now known in Turkey for its gentleness and soft-heartedness, and prides itself on being called *dobre chrisztian,* a good Christian! Where is a single one of these peoples, not excepting either the Czechs or the Serbs, which possesses a national, historical tradition, which lives among the people and is of proportions exceeding the most petty local battles?

The age of Panslavism was in the 8th and 9th centuries, when the South Slavs still occupied all of Hungary and Austria, and threatened Byzantium. If at that time they were unable to stem the German and Magyar invasion, if they were unable to win independence and to build a viable empire then, even when both their enemies, the Magyars and Germans were hacking each other to pieces, how should they expect to do so now, after a thousand years of oppression and denationalization?

There is no country in Europe which does not contain in some corner one or several ruins of people, left-overs of earlier inhabitants, pushed back by and made subject to the nation which later became the carrier of historical development. These remains of nations which have been mercilessly trampled down by the passage of history, as Hegel expressed it, this ethnic trash always becomes and remains until its complete extermination or denationalization, the most fanatic carrier of counterrevolution, since its entire existence is nothing more than a protest against a great historical revolution.

Such in Scotland were the Gaels, the supporters of the Stuarts from 1640 to 1745. Such in France were the Bretons, the supporters of the Bourbons from 1792 to 1800. Such in Spain were the Basques, supporters of Don Carlos. Such in Austria are the Panslavist South Slavs, who are nothing more than the waste products of a highly confused

development which has gone on for a thousand years. It is most natural that this likewise highly intermixed ethnic trash should see its salvation only in the reversal of the entire European movement, which for it should not proceed from West to East but rather from East to West, that for it the liberating weapon, the bond of unity is the Russian knout.

Accordingly even before 1848 the South Slavs had clearly proclaimed their reactionary character. The year 1848 exposed it openly to the light of day.

When the February storm broke loose, who made the Austrian revolution? Vienna or Prague? Budapest or Agram? The Germans and Magyars or the Slavs?

It is true that among the educated South Slavs there existed a small democratic party, which, to be sure, did not work to renounce its nationality, but which did seek to put it at the disposal of freedom. This illusion by which it also succeeded in arousing the sympathies of Western European democrats, sympathies which were fully justified so long as the Slavic democrats were joining the fight against the common enemy—this illusion was broken by the bombardment of Prague. From this event on, following the example of the Croats, all the South Slav races put themselves at the disposal of the Austrian reaction. Those leaders of the South Slav movement who still continue to prattle about equal rights of nations, about a democratic Austria, etc., are either wooden-headed dreamers, as for example, many journalists, or scoundrels, such as Jellachich. Their democratic protestations mean just as little as the democratic protestations of the official Austrian counterrevolution. Enough—in practice the reestablishment of South Slav nationality has its beginning in the most brutal assault on the Austrian and Magyar revolution, the first great labor of love which it is rendering to the Russian Czar.

Except for the high nobility, the bureaucracy and the soldiery, the Austrian camarilla found support only among the Slavs. The Slavs decided the fall of Italy, the Slavs stormed Vienna; it is the Slavs who are now attacking the Magyars on all sides. At the head of them as spokesman for the Czechs stands Palacky, as swordbearer for the Croats, Jellachich.

That is the thanks which the German democratic press receives for having everywhere sympathized with the Czech democrats last June, when they were being shot to pieces by Windischgraetz, by the same Windischgraetz who is now their hero.

Let us summarize. Leaving aside any consideration of Poland and

Italy, the Germans and Magyars took the historical initiative in 1848 as they have done for the last thousand years. They represent the Revolution.

The South Slavs, who for a thousand years had been taken in tow by the Germans and Magyars, rose up in 1848 to establish their national independence only in order to suppress at the same time the German-Magyar revolution. They represent the counterrevolution. The Saxons and the Rumanians in Transylvania—two degenerate nations which have likewise long since lost all historical driving power—have joined them.

The house of Hapsburg which founded its power on the union of the Germans and Magyars in their struggle against the South Slavs is prolonging the last moments of its existence through the union of the South Slavs in a war against the Germans and the Magyars. That is the political side of the question. Now for the military aspects.

The area inhabited exclusively by Magyars comprises not quite a third of Hungary and Transylvania. Several million Slovaks and a few Ruthenians live in the area which extends from Pressburg north of the Danube and Theiss up to the ridge of the Carpathian mountains. In the South, between the Save, Danube and Drava live the Croats and Slavonians, farther to the East, along the Danube, there is a Serbian Colony of over half a million. The two Slavic areas are linked together by the Wallachians and the Saxons of Transylvania.

Thus on three sides the Magyars are surrounded by natural enemies. The Slovaks, who hold the mountain passes, would, thanks to this terrain eminently suited to partisan warfare, be dangerous opponents if only their morale was less indifferent.

Thus from the North the Magyars have merely to withstand the attacks of armies which have broken in from Galicia and Moravia. In the East on the other hand Rumanians and Saxons rose in a mass and joined the Austrian army corps stationed there. Their position is excellent, partly due to the mountainous character of the terrain, partly because they control most of the cities and fortresses.

Finally, in the South, the Serbs in the Banat are supported by German colonists, by Wallachians, and also by an Austrian corps; they are covered by the vast Alibunar swamp and are almost unassailable.

The Croats are covered by the Drava and Danube rivers, and since a strong Austrian army with all necessary equipment is associated with them, they already advanced into Magyar territory in October and now hold a defense line on the lower Drava river with little effort.

And finally from the fourth side, from Austria, Windischgraetz and Jellachich are advancing in closed columns. The Magyars are surrounded on all sides—surrounded by an enormous superiority of forces.

The struggle recalls the struggle against France in 1793, but with this difference, that the thinly populated and only half civilized Hungary has much fewer resources at its disposal than did the French Republic at that time.

The weapons and munitions made in Hungary must necessarily be of very poor quality. The manufacture of artillery cannot possibly get under way rapidly. The country is far less extensive than France and each inch of lost terrain is thus a much greater loss. There is nothing left for the Magyars except their revolutionary enthusiasm, their bravery, and the energetic, rapid organization which Kossuth could give them.

Nevertheless Austria has not won yet. "If we cannot strike the imperial forces on the Leitha river, then we shall strike them on the Rabnitz; if not on the Rabnitz then near Pest; if not near Pest then we shall strike them on the Theiss, but we shall strike them in any case." Thus spoke Kossuth and did everything possible to keep his word.

Even if Budapest falls the Magyars still have the lower Hungarian plain, a terrain which is ideally suited for partisan cavalry warfare, and which offers numerous almost invulnerable strong points between the swamps where the Magyars can entrench themselves securely. And the Magyars, nearly all of whom are horsemen, possess the qualities to fight this kind of war. If the Imperial Army goes into this wild region where it must bring in all its supplies from Galicia or Austria since nothing, absolutely nothing is at hand, then no one can foresee how it can hold. In closed corps formation it can accomplish nothing, and if it breaks up into flying squadrons it is lost. There where it should triumph its clumsiness would deliver it directly into the hands of the swift Magyar cavalry detachments without even the possibility of pursuit; and each imperial straggler would find a mortal enemy in every peasant, in every shepherd. War in these steppes is comparable to the Algerian war, and the clumsy Austrian army would require years to end it. And the Magyars are saved if only they can hold out for a few months.

The situation of the Magyars is by no means as unfavorable as the paid enthusiasm bearing the black and yellow colors of Hapsburg would like to have us believe. They have not yet been conquered. If they fall however, then they will go down gloriously as the last heroes

of the 1848 revolution, and only for a short time. Then for a moment the Slavic counterrevolution with all its barbarism will engulf the Austrian monarchy and the camarilla will find out what kind of allies it has. But with the first victorious uprising of the French proletariat, which Louis Napoleon is trying with all his power to conjure up, the Germans and Magyars in Austria will become free and will take bloody revenge on the Slavic barbarians. The general war which will then break out will explode this Slavic league and these petty, bull-headed nations will be destroyed so that nothing is left of them but their names.

The next world war will cause not only reactionary classes and dynasties but also entire reactionary peoples to disappear from the earth. And that too would be progress.

3
Democratic Panslavism (1849)

COLOGNE, FEBRUARY 14.—We have often enough called attention to the fact that the gentle dreams, which suddenly appeared after the February and March revolutions, such as the sentimental fantasies of a universal brotherhood of peoples, of a European Federative Republic and eternal world peace, were basically nothing more than disguises for the boundless perplexity and inactivity of the spokesmen of the time. They either did not see, or would not see what had to be done in order to secure the revolution; they could not or would not carry through any really revolutionary measures; the narrow-mindedness of some combined with the counterrevolutionary intrigues of others in such a way that instead of revolutionary deeds the people received only sentimental phrases. The nobly protesting scoundrel Lamartine was the classic hero of this epoch which hid the betrayal of the people under poetic flowers and rhetorical tinsel.

The revolutionized peoples know how dearly they had to pay for having believed, good-naturedly, in such big words and lofty assurances. Instead of safeguarding the revolution, they got everywhere reactionary governments which undermined the revolution; instead of carrying through the promises given on the barricades, they got the counter-revolutions of Naples, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, the fall of Milan, the war against Hungary; instead of the brotherhood of the peoples, the renewal of the Holy Alliance on a broader basis under the tutelage of England and Russia. And the same men who only last April and May were acclaiming the high-sounding slogans of the period, now merely reflect shamefacedly, on how at that time they let themselves be swindled by blockheads and scoundrels.

They have realized through painful experience that the "European brotherhood of peoples" will not come into being through empty phrases and pious wishes, but only through thoroughgoing revolutions and bloody struggles; it is not a question of a brotherhood of all European peoples under one Republican banner, but of the alliance of the revolutionary peoples against the counterrevolutionaries, an alliance which will not come into being on paper, but only on the field of battle.

In all Western Europe these bitter but necessary experiences have stripped all credit from the slogans of the Lamartines. In the East, on the other hand, there are still factions, allegedly democratic, revolutionary factions, which do not tire of echoing these slogans and sentimentalities and of preaching the gospel of a European brotherhood of peoples.

These factions—we exclude certain ignorant German enthusiasts such as Mr. A. Ruge, etc.—are the democratic Panslavists of the various Slavic nationalities.

We have before us the program of democratic Panslavism in form of a pamphlet entitled "Manifesto to the Slavs," by a Russian patriot, Michael Bakunin, member of the Slav Congress in Prague, published in Koethen, 1848.

Bakunin is our friend. This will not deter us from criticizing his pamphlet.

Let us see how Bakunin, at the very beginning of his proclamation, links up with the illusions of last March and April: "The very first sign of life of the Revolution was a cry of hate against the old repression, a cry of sympathy and love for all the suppressed nationalities. The peoples . . . at last felt the shame with which the old diplomacy had burdened mankind, and recognized that the well-being of nations will never be secured as long as anywhere in Europe a single people

lives under the yoke. . . . Away with oppressors! sounded as one voice; hail to the oppressed, the Poles, the Italians and all others! No more wars of conquest, but still one last war fought to the finish, the good fight of the Revolution for the final liberation of all peoples. Down with the artificial barriers which were forcibly erected by congresses of despots, according to so-called historic, geographic, commercial and strategic necessities! There shall be no more artificial boundaries, but those conforming to nature, boundaries drawn by justice and in a democratic way, boundaries which are traced by the sovereign will of the peoples themselves on the basis of their national characteristics. Thus the cry rang out among all the peoples." (Pp. 6-7.)

Already in this passage we find again the whole romantic exultation of the first months of the revolution. There is no mention of the very real obstacles in the way of such universal liberation, of the completely different levels of civilization of the various peoples, and of their equally different political needs conditioned by them. The word "freedom" takes the place of everything. There is no mention of reality, or insofar as it is considered at all, it is represented as something entirely reprehensible, something arbitrarily produced by "congresses of despots" and by "diplomats." Against this wicked reality is pitted the alleged will of the people with its categorical imperative, with the absolute demand for "freedom" as such.

We have seen which was the stronger. The alleged will of the people was so shamefully duped precisely because it permitted such a fantastic abstraction of the relationships present in reality.

"Out of the fullness of its powers the Revolution declared the despotic states dissolved—dissolved the Prussian state . . . Austria . . . the Ottoman Empire . . . and as the final goal of all—the general Federation of European Republics." (P. 8.)

To us here in the West it must indeed seem peculiar that after all these beautiful plans miscarried in the first attempt to execute them, they can still be counted as something deserving and great. The trouble was precisely that the revolution did indeed "declare [the old] dissolved out of the fullness of its own powers" but at the same time did not move a finger "out of the fullness of its own powers," in order to carry out its decree.

At that time the Slav Congress was called. The Congress took entirely the standpoint of these illusions.

Let us quote: "Feeling keenly our common bonds of history (?) and blood, we vowed never again to allow our destinies to be separated.

Execrating the policy of which we have so long been the victims, we installed ourselves in our own right of complete independence, and took a common oath that this right shall henceforth be common to all Slavic peoples. We recognized the independence of Bohemia and Moravia . . . we extended the right hand of fellowship to the German people, to democratic Germany. In the name of those of us who live in Hungary, we offered to the Magyars, the fierce enemies of our race . . . a brotherly alliance. We have also not forgotten in our Alliance of Liberation those of our brothers who are sighing under the Turkish yoke. We solemnly condemned that treacherous policy which has thrice torn Poland apart. . . . All these things we declared openly and demanded with all Democrats of all peoples (?) Liberty, Equality, Fraternity of all Nations." (P. 10.)

Democratic Panslavism makes these demands even today. "We felt sure of our cause at that time. . . . Justice and humanity were entirely on our side, and on the side of our enemies nothing but lawlessness and barbarity. This was no empty dream to which we surrendered, it was the design of the only true and necessary policy, the policy of Revolution."

"Justice," "Humanity," "Liberty," "Equality," "Fraternity," "Independence"—so far we have found nothing more in the Panslavist manifesto than these more or less moralistic categories, which, to be sure, are high-sounding but which prove absolutely nothing in historical and political questions. "Justice," "Humanity," "Freedom," etc., may demand this or that a thousand times; if the thing is impossible, it will not take place, and in spite of everything it will remain an "empty dream." Given the role played by the mass of the Slavs since the Prague Congress, the Panslavists might have dispelled their illusions, they might have comprehended that against hard reality nothing can be accomplished with all their pious wishes and beautiful dreams, that their policy was no more a "policy of Revolution" than that of the French Republic ever was one. And yet they still raise, in January 1849, the same old slogans, about the content of which Western Europe has been undeceived by the bloodiest counterrevolution!

Only a word about the "universal fraternization of peoples" and the drawing of "boundaries which are traced by the sovereign will of the peoples themselves on the basis of their national peculiarities." The United States and Mexico are two Republics; in both of them the people are sovereign.

How does it happen then, that between both these republics, which

according to the moralistic theory should be "brotherly" and "federated," a war broke out over Texas, that the "sovereign will" of the American people, supported by the bravery of American volunteers, for "geographic, commercial and strategic necessities" moves a boundary drawn by nature a few hundred miles further south? And will Bakunin reproach the American people for waging a war which to be sure deals a severe blow to his theories based on "Justice and Humanity," but which none the less was waged solely in the interests of civilization? Or is it perhaps a misfortune that the splendid land of California has been wrested from the lazy Mexicans who did not know what to do with it? Is it a misfortune that through rapid exploitation of the gold mines there the energetic Yankees have increased the medium of circulation, have concentrated in a few years a heavy population and an extensive trade on the most suitable part of the Pacific Coast, have built great cities, have opened up steamship lines, are laying railroads from New York to San Francisco, which will actually open the Pacific Ocean to civilization for the first time, and for the third time in history will give a new orientation to world trade? Because of this the "independence" of a few Spanish Californians and Texans may suffer, occasionally "Justice" and other moralistic principles may be injured, but what do they count compared to such world historic events?

We note moreover that this theory of the universal brotherhood of all peoples, which seeks nothing more than brotherhood at random without any consideration of the historic position, of the level of social development of the individual peoples, was fought long before the Revolution by the editors of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung,* in opposition even to their best friends, the English and French democrats. The English, French and Belgian democratic papers of that time contain the proofs of this.

So far as Panslavism itself is concerned, we have explained how, apart from the well-meaning self-deceptions of the democratic Panslavists, in reality it has no other objective than to give the scattered Austrian Slavs, who are historically, literarily, politically, commercially and industrially dependent on the Germans and Magyars, a focal point on the one side in Russia, on the other in the Austrian dual monarchy, which, since it contains a Slavic majority, depends on Russia. We have explained how these tiny nationalities which for centuries have been dragged along by history against their will must necessarily be counterrevolutionary, and how their overall position in the Revolution

of 1848 was in fact counterrevolutionary. In view of the democratic Panslavic Manifesto, which demands the independence of all Slavs without distinction, we must return to this point.

We note first that the political romanticism and sentimentality of the democrats at the Slav Congress is highly pardonable. With the exception of the Poles—the Poles are not Panslavist for very understandable reasons—they all belong to ethnic groups which, like the South Slavs, are either necessarily counterrevolutionary because of their whole historical position, or which like the Russians are still very distant from a revolution, and, therefore, at least for the present are still counterrevolutionary. These factions, democratic because of their education acquired abroad, seek to bring their democratic orientation into harmony with their nationalist sentiment, which, as is well known, is very pronounced among all Slavs; and since the actual world, the real circumstances of their countries, offer no or merely imaginary points of contact for this reconciliation, there is nothing left for them except the other-worldly realm in which they build "castles in the air," the realm of pious wishes, the politics of phantasy. How nice it would be if the Croats, the Pandurs and Cossacks were to form the advance guard of European democracy, if the ambassador of the Republic of Siberia were to present his credentials in Paris! To be sure these are gratifying prospects; but even the most enthusiastic Panslavist would not require that European democracy await their fulfillment—and for the present precisely those nations whose especial independence is demanded in the Manifesto are the especial enemies of democracy.

We repeat: Except for the Poles, the Russians and at best the Slavs in Turkey, no Slavic people has a future, for the simple reason that all the other Slavs lack the most basic historic, geographic, political and industrial prerequisites for independence and vitality.

Peoples which have never had a history of their own, which from the moment they reached the first, crudest stages of civilization already came under foreign domination or which were only forced into the first stages of civilization through a foreign yoke, have no vitality, they will never be able to attain any sort of independence.

And that has been the fate of the Austrian Slavs. The Czechs, even if we add to them the Moravians and Slovaks, although they are linguistically and historically separate, have never had a history. Since Charlemagne Bohemia has been chained to Germany. For a moment the Czech nation freed itself, and formed the Greater Moravian Empire, only to be suppressed immediately again, and to be tossed back and

forth for five hundred years as a plaything between Germany, Hungary and Poland. Then Bohemia and Moravia were attached definitively to Germany, and the Slovak territories remained with Hungary. And this "nation" which historically has never existed, lays claims to independence?

It is exactly the same with the so-called South Slavs. Where is the history of the Illyrian Slovenes, the Dalmatians, the Croats and the *Šokci?* Since the eleventh century they have lost the last semblance of political independence and have been partly under German, under Venetian, and Magyar domination. And can a powerful, independent, vital nation be patched together out of these tattered remnants?

Still more. If the Austrian Slavs formed a compact mass like the Poles, the Magyars, the Italians, they would be in a position to establish among themselves a state of 12 to 20 millions. In this event their claims would take on a more serious character. But exactly the opposite is the case. Like a broad wedge the Germans and Magyars pushed between them to the farthest end of the Carpathians, almost to the Black Sea; they have divided the Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks from the South Slavs by a zone 60 to 80 miles wide. North of this zone there are 5½ million and South of it 5½ million Slavs, separated by a compact mass of 10 to 11 million Germans and Magyars, who are bound together by history and necessity.

But why shouldn't the 5½ million Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks be able to form one state and the 5½ million South Slavs together with the Turkish Slavs another?

Look at any good language map showing the distribution of the Czechs and their linguistically related neighbors. They have pushed into Germany like a wedge, but a wedge corroded and pressed back by the German element on both sides. In a third of the territory of Bohemia German is spoken; for every 24 Czechs in Bohemia there are 17 Germans. And it is precisely the Czechs who are supposed to form the nucleus of the prospective Slav state for the Moravians are likewise strongly inmixed with Germans and Magyars, and in addition, completely demoralized with regard to their nationalism. And what a Slav state would that be in which in the end the urban German bourgeoisie would still be dominant!

It is the same with the South Slavs. The Slovenes and Croats cut off Germany and Hungary from the Adriatic Sea; and Germany and Hungary can not let themselves be cut off from the Adriatic Sea, because of "geographic and commercial necessities," which, to be

sure, are no obstacle to Bakunin's phantasy, but which nevertheless do exist, and which are just as vital questions for Germany and Hungary as is, for example, the question of a Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga for Poland. And when it is a question of the existence, of the free development of all the resources of great nations, then such sentimentalities as consideration for a few scattered Germans or Slavs will decide nothing. Quite apart from the fact that everywhere these South Slavs are likewise so intermixed with German, Magyar, and Italian elements, that also in this case a first glance at the linguistic map will explode the projected South Slav state into scattered pieces, and that at best the entire state will be delivered into the hands of the Italian bourgeoisie in Trieste, Fiume and Zara, or the German bourgeoisie in Agram, Laibach, Karlstadt, Semlin, Pancsova and Weisskirchen!

But could the Austrian South Slavs not unite with the Serbs, Bosnians, Morlaks and Bulgarians? Certainly, if in addition to the difficulties already mentioned, the ancient hatred of the Austrian border people for the Turkish Slavs on the other side of the Save and Unna rivers did not exist; but these people, who for centuries have reciprocally known each other as thieves and bandits, hate each other, in spite of all ethnic kinship, infinitely more than Slavs and Magyars.

Indeed, the position of the Germans and Magyars would be most agreeable, if the Austrian Slavs were to obtain their so-called "rights"! An independent Bohemian-Moravian State wedged in between Silesia and Austria; Austria and Styria cut off from its natural outlet on the Adriatic and Mediterranean Sea by the "South-Slavic Republic"; Eastern Germany torn to pieces like a loaf of bread which has been gnawn by rats! And all that as thanks to the Germans for having taken the trouble to civilize the stubborn Czechs and Slovenes, for having introduced trade, industry, profitable methods of agriculture and education to them!

But it is just this yoke, forced on the Slavs on the plea of civilization, which constitutes precisely one of the greatest crimes of the Germans as well as the Magyars. Just listen: "With justice your anger rises, with justice your wrath seeks revenge against that accursed German policy which has enslaved you for centuries, which seeks nothing but your ruin . . . (page 5) . . . The Magyars, the raging enemies of our race, who, although numbering scarcely four million, have the audacity to want to impose their yoke on eight million Slavs . . ." (page 9). "I know all that the Magyars have done against our Slavic

brothers, the crimes they have committed against our nationality, how they have trampled under foot our language and independence."

Now what are these great, frightful crimes of the Germans and Magyars against the Slavic nationality? We are not speaking of the partition of Poland, which should not be considered here, but of the "centuries-old injustice," which is supposed to have been committed against the Slavs.

In the North the Germans have reconquered from the Slavs the region, formerly German, later Slavic, which stretches from the Elbe to the Warthe rivers. This conquest was conditioned by "geographic and strategic necessities" proceeding from the division of the Carolingian Kingdom. These stretches of Slavic territory have been completely Germanized; the affair has been settled and cannot be redressed —unless the Panslavists rediscover the lost Sorabian, Wendish and Abodrite languages and force them upon the inhabitants of Leipzig, Berlin and Stettin. But that this conquest was in the interests of civilization has never been questioned up to now.

In the South the Slavic tribes were already scattered. The non-Slavic Avars, who occupied the territory later taken over by the Magyars, had already taken care of that. The Germans exacted tribute from these Slavs, and fought many battles against them. They fought similar battles with the Avars and Magyars, from whom they took all the territory from the Enns to the Leitha rivers. While they forcibly Germanized this region, the Germanization of the Slavic territories took place on a much more peaceful basis—through immigration, through the influence of the more highly developed nation on the undeveloped one. German industry, German trade, German education by themselves brought the German language into the land. So far as "oppression" is concerned, the Slavs were no more oppressed by the Germans than the mass of the Germans themselves.

So far as the Magyars are concerned, there are also a lot of Germans in Hungary, yet never have the Magyars had occasion to complain of the "accursed German policy," although there were "scarcely four million" of them! And if for eight centuries "eight million Slavs" had to stand to be kept under the yoke of four million Magyars, then that fact alone shows adequately which was the most vital and energetic, the many Slavs or the few Magyars!

But the greatest "crime" of the Germans and Magyars is, to be sure, that they prevented these twelve million Slavs from becoming

Turkish! What would have become of these tiny, scattered little nations which have played such a pitiable role in history, what would have become of them if they had not been held together and led against the armies of Mohammed and Soliman, if their so-called "oppressors" had not decided the battles which were fought for the protection of these weaker peoples! Does not the fate of the "twelve million Slavs, Wallachians and Greeks" who even in our day are "trampled under foot by seven hundred thousand Ottomans" (p. 8) answer clearly enough?

And finally, at a time when everywhere in Europe great monarchies were an "historical necessity," what a "crime," what an "accursed policy," that the Germans and Magyars bound these tiny, crippled, powerless little nations together in a great Empire, and thereby enabled them to take part in an historical development which, if left to themselves, would have remained entirely foreign to them! To be sure such a thing is not carried through without forcibly crushing many a delicate little national flower. But without force and without an iron ruthlessness nothing is accomplished in history; and if Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon had had the capacity for compassion to which Panslavism now appeals in favor of its rotten clients, what would have become of history? And are not the Persians, Celts and Christian Germans worth as much as the Czechs, Wogulians and Seressanians?

Now however, as a result of the formidable advances in industry, trade and communications, political centralization has become an even greater need than it was then in the 15th and 16th centuries. What still has to be centralized is becoming centralized. And now the Panslavists come and demand that we should "free" these half-Germanized Slavs, that we should suspend a centralization which is pressed upon these Slavs by all their material interests.

In short, it is clear that these "crimes" of the Germans and Magyars against the Slavs in question belong among the best and worthiest deeds of which our own and the Magyar people can boast in their history.

Moreover, so far as the Magyars are concerned, it should be especially noted here, that especially since the revolution they have behaved much too compliantly and weakly toward the arrogant Croats. It is a notorious fact that Kossuth gave them every possible concession except that their deputies might speak Croatian in the diet. And this compliance toward a people counterrvolutionary by nature, is the only thing that can be held against the Magyars.

* * *

COLOGNE, FEBRUARY 15.—We closed yesterday with the proof that the Austrian Slavs had never had a history of their own, that they are historically, literarily, politically, commercially and industrially dependent on the Germans and Magyars, that they are already partially Germanized, Magyarized or Italianized, that, if they were to set up independent states, not they, but the German and Italian urban bourgeoisie would dominate these states, and that finally neither Hungary nor Germany can tolerate the secession and independent constitution of such tiny buffer states which would be unfit for life.

However, all that would still not be decisive. If in any period of their oppression the Slavs had begun a new revolutionary history, they would have shown their vitality in this way alone. From that moment on the Revolution would have had an interest in their liberation, and the separate interests of the Germans and the Magyars would have disappeared before the greater interests of the European Revolution.

But precisely this was not the case. Indeed, the Slavs—we recall once again that we always exclude the Poles—have always been the principal tool of the counterrevolution. Oppressed at home, they have always been the oppressors of all revolutionary nations abroad, as far as the Slavic influence has reached.

Let no one counter that we are speaking here in the interests of German national prejudices. Proof may be found in German, French, Belgian and English newspapers, that long before the revolution, the editors of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* had already decisively opposed German national narrow-mindedness. To be sure they have not insulted the Germans thoughtlessly on the basis of the purest heresay as some others have done; on the other hand they demonstrated historically and exposed unmercifully the shabby role which Germany has indeed played in history, thanks to her nobility and bourgeoisie, thanks to her stunted industrial development; they have always recognized the Germans as backward compared to the rightful achievements of the great historic nations of the West, the English and the French. But for this very reason it befits us not to share in the sentimental illusions of the Slavs and to judge other peoples as sternly as we have judged our own nation.

Up to now the Germans have always been called the mercenaries of despotism throughout all Europe. We are far from denying the shameful part of the Germans in the disgraceful Wars from 1792-1815 against the French Revolution, in the suppression of Italy since 1815 and of Poland since 1772. Who, however stands behind the Germans, who

uses them as its mercenaries or its advance guard? England and Russia. Even today the Russians boast that they decided the fall of Napoleon by means of their countless armies, a contention which is in fact for the most part correct. At least this much is certain, that three-fourths of the armies which by their superior force pressed Napoleon back from the Oder to Paris, were made up of Slavs, Russians or Austrian Slavs.

And now how about the oppression of the Italians and Poles by the Germans? One wholly Slavic and one half-Slavic power competed with each other in the partition of Poland; the majority of the armies which suppressed Kosciuszko was Slav; the armies of Diebitsch and Paskievitch were exclusively Slavic armies. And in Italy the *"Tedeschi"* have for many years alone born the shame of being the oppressors, but once again, of what were the armies made up, which let themselves be used mainly for oppression, and, whose brutality was laid at the feet of the Germans? Again they were made of Slavs. Go to Italy and ask who suppressed the Revolution in Milan, the reply will no longer be, "the *Tedeschi*"—since the *Tedeschi* staged a revolution in Vienna they no longer hate them—but "the *Croati.*" That is the word with which the Italians now designate the whole Austrian army, that is, the group most deeply hated by them: *"i Croati."*

And yet these reproaches would be superfluous and unjust if the Slavs had anywhere taken a serious part in the movement of 1848, if they had hastened to enter the ranks of the revolutionary peoples. A single, courageous attempt at a democratic revolution, even if it were smothered, erases whole centuries of infamy and cowardice from the memory of the peoples, rehabilitates at once any nation, no matter how deeply despised. The Germans learned that fact last year. But while the French, Germans, Italians, Poles and Magyars raised the banners of Revolution, the Slavs, as one man stepped under the banners of the counterrevolution. First the South Slavs, who for many years had cherished their particular counterrevolutionary desires against the Magyars; then the Czechs and behind them, armed for combat and ready to appear on the battlefield at the moment of decision—the Russians.

It is common knowledge that in Italy the Magyar hussars deserted *en masse* to the Italians, that in Hungary whole Italian battalions put themselves at the disposition of the revolutionary Magyar government and are still fighting under the Magyar banner, that the German regiments stood with the people in Vienna and even were by no means reliable in Galicia. It is known that masses of the Austrian and non-

Austrian Poles fought against the Austrian armies in Italy, in Vienna and in Hungary, and are still fighting in the Carpathian mountains. But who has ever heard that Czech or South Slav troops revolted against the black and yellow Hapsburg banners? On the contrary, all that is known to the present, is that Austria, shaken to its foundations, was kept alive and made secure again for the moment by the black and yellow enthusiasm of the Slavs; that it was precisely the Croats, Slovenes, Dalmatians, Czechs, Moravians and Ruthenians who provided Windischgraetz and Jellachich with their contingents for the suppression of the Revolution in Vienna, Cracow, Lemberg, and Hungary, and, what we just now learn from Bakunin is that the Slav Congress in Prague was dispersed not by the Germans but by Galician, Czech and Slovakian Slavs and "nothing but Slavs" (page 33).

The Revolution of 1848 forced all European peoples to declare themselves either for or against it. Within a month all the peoples who were ready for revolution had staged their own; all the peoples who were not ready for revolution had allied themselves against the Revolution. At that time it was a question of disentangling the confusion of peoples in Eastern Europe. What mattered was which nation seized the revolutionary initiative, and developed the greatest revolutionary energy and thereby assured the future for itself. The Slavs remained silent. The Germans and Magyars, true to their previous historical position, stepped into the vanguard. And with this the Slavs were thrown completely into the arms of the counterrevolution.

But the Slav Congress at Prague?

We repeat: The so-called democrats among the Austrian Slavs are either scoundrels or visionaries, and the visionaries, who can find no fertile soil among their people for ideas imported from abroad, are constantly being led around by the nose by the scoundrels. At the Slav Congress in Prague the visionaries had the upper hand. When the vagaries seemed threatening to the aristocratic Panslavists, to the gentlemen, Count Thun, Palacky, and their consorts, they betrayed the visionaries to Windischgraetz and the black-and-yellow counterrevolution. What bitter, biting irony lies in the fact that this congress of dreamers, protected by the visionary youth of Prague, should have been broken up by soldiers of their own nation, that the day-dreaming Slav Congress should have been opposed, as it were, by a military Slav Congress. The Austrian armies which took Prague, Vienna, Lemberg, Cracow, Milan and Budapest—that was the real, the active Slav Congress.

How rootless and confused the day-dreaming of the Slav Congress was, is proven by its results. The bombardment of a city such as Prague would have filled any other nation with an inextinguishable hatred for the oppressors. What did the Czechs do? They kissed the rod that scourged them unmercifully; they swore enthusiastic allegiance to the banners under which their brothers had been massacred, their women violated. The street battles of Prague were the turning point for the Austrian, democratic Panslavists. In return for the expectation to obtain their miserable "national autonomy" they sold out democracy and the Revolution to the Austrian dual monarchy, to "the center" of "the systematic enforcement of despotism in the heart of Europe," as Bakunin himself describes it on page 29. And for this cowardly, abject betrayal of the revolution we shall some day take bloody revenge on the Slavs.

It has finally become evident to these traitors that they have nevertheless been swindled by the counterrevolution, that for the Austrian Slavs there can be no question of either a "Slavic Austria," or a "federal state of nations with equal rights," and, least of all, no question of democratic institutions. Jellachich, who is no worse a scoundrel than most of the other democrats among the Austrian Slavs, regrets bitterly that he lent himself to being exploited, and Stratomirovitch, in order not to let himself be further exploited, has proclaimed an open rebellion against Austria.

Everywhere the *Slovanska-Lipa* Associations oppose the government, and discover every day by new, painful experiences the trap into which they had let themselves be enticed. But it is too late now. Powerless in their own homeland against the Austrian soldiery, which they themselves reorganized, rejected by the Germans and Magyars whom they betrayed, rejected by revolutionary Europe, they will have to bear the same military despotism which they helped to impose on the Viennese and Magyars. "Subject yourselves to the Emperor, so that the Imperial troops will not treat you as if you were rebellious Magyars" —in these words of the Patriarch Rayachich is expressed what they have to expect next.

How entirely differently the Poles behaved! Oppressed, enslaved, exploited for eighty years, they have always placed themselves on the side of the Revolution, they have always declared the revolutionizing of Poland to be inseparable from the independence of Poland. In Paris, in Vienna, in Berlin, in Italy and in Hungary the Poles have fought alongside in all revolutions and revolutionary wars, unconcerned

whether they were fighting against Germans, against Slavs, against Magyars—indeed, even against Poles. The Poles are the only Slavic nation which is free from all Panslavist desires. But they also have very good reasons for this: They have principally been subjugated by their so-called Slavic brothers, and for the Poles, hatred of the Russians comes before hatred of the Germans, and with full reason. Therefore, because the liberation of Poland is inseparable from the Revolution, because the words *Pole* and *revolutionary* have become identical, for this reason Poland has the sympathy of all Europe, and the re-establishment of its nationality is just as certain as is the hatred of all Europe for the Czechs, Croats and Russians, and as certain as the bloodiest revolutionary war of all Western Europe against the latter.

The Austrian Panslavists should understand that all their desires, in so far as they can be realized at all, have been fulfilled in the setting up of the "Austrian dual monarchy" under Russian protection. If Austria falls, then the revolutionary terror of the Germans and Magyars awaits them, but in no case, as they imagine, the liberation of all the nations subjugated under Austria's scepter. They ought therefore to hope that Austria may hold together, even that Galicia may remain with Austria, so that the Slavs may retain the majority in the state. Also in this the Panslavist interests are directly opposed to the restoration of Poland; for a Poland without Galicia, one that does not extend from the Baltic to the Carpathians, is not Poland. But for this reason also, a "Slavic Austria" is still an empty dream; for without the supremacy of the Germans and Magyars, without the two centers—Vienna and Budapest—Austria will again fall apart, as its entire history up to the last few months demonstrates. Therefore, the realization of Panslavism must limit itself to the Russian patronage over Austria. Hence the openly reactionary Panslavists were entirely right when they demanded the preservation of the dual monarchy; it was the only means of saving anything. But the so-called democratic Panslavists were in a serious dilemma: They either had to abandon the Revolution in order to save at least partially their nationality through maintenance of the dual monarchy, or abandon their nationality and save the Revolution through the fall of the dual monarchy. At that time the fate of the East European revolution depended on the position of the Czechs and South Slavs. We shall not forget that at the decisive moment they betrayed the Revolution to Petersburg and Olmütz for the sake of their petty national aspirations!

What would people say if the democratic party in Germany opened

its program with a demand for the return of Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium, which in all respects belong to France, under the pretext that the majority of the population there is Germanic? How ridiculous the German democrats would make themselves if they wanted to set up a Pangermanic German-Danish-Swedish-English-Dutch Alliance for the "Liberation" of all German-speaking countries! Fortunately, German democracy has advanced far beyond such pipe-dreams. German students of 1817 and 1830 were filled with similar reactionary enthusiasms and are judged today in all Germany according to their merits. The German revolution first came into being, the German nation first began to be something, when such futilities had been entirely relinquished.

But Panslavism is also just as childish and reactionary as Pangermanism. When one reads the history of the Panslavist movement of last spring in Prague, one feels as if one were moved back thirty years in time: tri-colored ribbons, old-Frankish costumes, old-Slavic masses, a complete restoration of the times and customs of the primeval forest. The *Swornost* is a complete Student's Association, the Slav Congress is a new edition of the Festival on the Wartburg. There are the same slogans, the same sentimentality, the same lamentation afterward: "We have built a stately house," etc. Whoever would like to read this famous song translated into Slavic prose, let him read Bakunin's pamphlet.

Just as in the long run the German Students Associations produced the most decidedly counterrevolutionary ideology, the wildest hatred of the French and the narrowest nationalism, just as they later were to betray everything about which they had previously pretended to go into raptures,—in exactly the same way, only quicker, since 1848 was a revolutionary year, the democratic veneer of the Panslavists soon dissolved into fanatical hatred of the Germans and Magyars, into indirect opposition to the restoration of Poland (Lubomirski) and into an indirect union with the counterrevolution.

And if a few, upright Slavic democrats now appeal to the Austrian Slavs to join the Revolution, to regard the Austrian dual monarchy as their main enemy, even to stand with the Magyars in the interest of the Revolution, then they remind one of the mother hen which runs around on the edge of the pond, horrified about the goslings which she had hatched, and which now suddenly escape into an unknown element into which she herself cannot follow them.

For the rest, let us entertain no illusions. For all Panslavists

nationality, that is, a fantastic, universal-Slavic nationality, takes precedence over the Revolution. The Panslavists want to join the Revolution on condition that they be allowed to form into independent Slavic states all Slavs without exception, without any consideration of material necessities. If we Germans had tried to set up the same fantastic conditions, how far would we have gotten in March! But the Revolution does not permit the setting up of any conditions. One is either a revolutionary, and accepts the consequences of the Revolution, whatever they may be, or one is driven into the arms of the counter-revolution and one morning perhaps quite unintentionally, finds oneself arm in arm with Nicholas and Windischgraetz.

We [Germans] and the Magyars ought to guarantee the Austrian Slavs their independence—so Bakunin demands, and people of the calibre of a Ruge are capable of really having made such promises in confidence. They require that we and the other revolutionary peoples of Europe should guarantee these strongholds of the counterrevolution an unhindered existence, the freedom of bearing arms and conspiring against the Revolution. They demand that we set up right in the heart of Germany a counterrevolutionary Czech kingdom, that we break the power of the German, Polish, and Magyar Revolutions by pushing between them Russian outposts on the Elbe, the Carpathians and the Danube.

We will not think of it. To the sentimental slogans of brotherhood which are here offered us in the name of the counterrevolutionary nations of Europe, we reply that hatred of Russia was and still is the first revolutionary passion of Germans; that since the Revolution, hatred of the Czechs and Croats has been added to it, and that we, along with the Poles and Magyars, will only be able to secure the Revolution through the most determined terror against these Slavic peoples. We now know where the enemies of the Revolution are concentrated: in Russia and the Austrian Slavic countries; and no slogans, no promises of an uncertain democratic future of these countries will prevent us from treating our enemies as enemies.

And when Bakunin finally calls out: "Truly, the Slav must lose nothing, on the contrary he must gain! Truly, he must live! And we shall live. And as long the slightest part of our rights is denied, as long as one single member of our collective body is held separate or torn loose, then we shall fight to the finish, ceaselessly to the death, until Slavdom finally stands great and free and independent in the world" if revolutionary Panslavism takes this position seriously, and

leaves the Revolution entirely out of the game whenever the fanatic Slavic nationality is concerned, then we too shall know what we have to do.

Then it is war. "A ceaseless fight to the death" with Slavdom, which betrays the Revolution, a battle of annihilation and ruthless terrorism—not in the interests of Germany, but of the Revolution!

4
Panslavism and the Crimean War (1855)

NEUE ODER-ZEITUNG, 21 APRIL 1855.—We have been assured by the best sources that the present Russian Czar has sent a telegram to certain Courts wherein, among other things, it is stated that: "The moment Austria shall irrevocably ally herself to the West, or commit any overt act of hostility against Russia, Alexander II will place himself at the head of the Panslavist movement, and change his title of Emperor of all the Russians into that of Emperor of all the Slavs." This declaration of Alexander's if authentic is the first plain-spoken word since the war began; it is the first step toward giving the war, frankly and openly, that European character which has hitherto been lurking behind all sorts of pretexts and pretences, protocols and treaties, Vatel phrases and Puffendorf quotations. Turkey's independence and existence is thrown into the background. Who is to rule in Constantinople is no longer the question, but who is to command all Europe. The Slavic race long divided by internal contests, repelled towards the East by Germans, subjugated, in part, by Turks, Germans, Hungarians, quietly reuniting its branches, after 1815, by the gradual rise of Panslavism, for the first time asserts its unity, and, in doing so, declares war to the knife against the Romano-Celtic and Germanic races which have hitherto ruled Europe. Panslavism is not a movement which merely strives after national independence; it is a movement which aims to

undo what a thousand years of history have created; which cannot realize itself without sweeping from the map of Europe Hungary, Turkey, and a large part of Germany. Moreover, it must subjugate Europe in order to secure the stability of these results, if they are ever obtained. Panslavism is now, from a creed, turned into a political programme, with 800,000 bayonets to support it.

It leaves Europe only one alternative: submission to the Slavic yoke or destruction forever of the center of its offensive strength—Russia. The next question to be answered is: "How will Austria be affected by Russian-equipped Panslavism?"

Of the seventy million Slavs living east of the Bohemian forest and the Carinthian Alps, about fifteen million are subject to the Austrian Emperor, comprising representatives of almost every variety of Slavic speech. The Bohemian or Czech branch (six million) falls exclusively within the Austrian dominions; the Polish branch is represented by about three million Galicians; the Russian by three million Malo-Russians (Red Russians, Ruthenes) in Galicia and North-eastern Hungary—the only Russian tribe outside the pale of the Russian Empire; the South Slavic branch by about three million Slovenes (Carinthians and Croats) and Serbians, including some scattered Bulgarians. These Austrian Slavs are of two different kinds. One part of them consists of the remnants of tribes whose history belongs to the past, and whose present historical development is attached to that of nations of different race and speech; and to complete their unfortunate position, these hapless relics of former greatness have not even a national organization within Austria, but, on the contrary, are divided among different provinces. Thus the Slovenes, although scarcely 1,500,000 in number, are scattered over the different provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, and South-western Hungary. The Bohemians, though the most numerous group of Austrian Slavs, are settled partly in Bohemia, partly in Moravia, and partly (the Slovak branch) in North-western Hungary. These peoples, therefore, though living exclusively on Austrian soil, are far from being recognized as constituting separate nations. They are considered as appendages, either to the German or the Hungarian nations, and in reality they are nothing else.

The second portion of Austrian Slavs is composed of fragments of different tribes, which in the course of history have become separated from the great body of their nation, and which, therefore, have their centre of gravity outside of Austria. Thus, the Austrian Poles have their

natural centre of gravity in Russian Poland; the Ruthenes in the other Malo-Russian provinces united with Russia; the Serbs in the Serbian Principality under Turkish rule. That these fragments, torn from their respective nationalities, will continue to gravitate, each toward its natural centre, is a matter of course, and becomes more and more evident as civilization, and with it the want of historical, national, activity is spread among them. In either case, the Austrian Slavs are only *disjecta membra,* seeking their reunion either among each other, or with the main body of their separate nationalities.

This is the reason why Panslavism is not a Russian but an Austrian discovery. In order to secure the restoration of each Slavic nationality, the different Slavic tribes in Austria are beginning to work for a union of all the Slavic tribes in Europe.

Russia was strong in itself; Poland proved itself in the sense of the indestructible toughness of its national life and at the same time in its open enmity toward Slavic Russia. Both these nations were obviously not called upon to invent Panslavism. The Serbs and Bulgarians in Turkey were, however, too barbaric to conceive such an idea. The Bulgarians quietly subordinated themselves to the Turks; the Serbs had enough to do with the fight for their own independence.

* * *

NEUE ODER-ZEITUNG, 24 APRIL 1855.—The first form of Austrian Panslavism was literary. Dobrovsky, a Bohemian, the founder of the scientific philology of the Slavic dialects, and Kolar, a Slovak poet from the Hungarian Carpathians, were its originators. With Dobrovsky it was the enthusiasm of a scientific discoverer; with Kolar, political ideas soon became predominant. But, as yet, Panslavism was satisfied to wallow only in elegiac moods; the greatness of the past, the disgrace, the misfortune, and foreign oppression of the present, were the themes of this poetry. "Is there, oh God, no man on earth, who will render the Slavs their due?" The dream of a Panslavic empire dictating laws to Europe was at that time hardly hinted at.

But the lamenting period soon passed away, and with it the cry merely for "Justice for the Slavs!" Historical research on the political, literary and linguistic development of the Slavonic race made great progress in Austria. Schafarik, Kopitar, and Miklosich as linguists, Palacky as a historian, took the lead, followed by a host of men with little or no scientific talent like Hanka and Gaj and others. The

glorious epochs of Bohemian and Serbian history were depicted in glowing colors in contrast to the present degraded and broken state of those nations. Just as in Germany "philosophy" formed the pretext under the protection of which politics or theology were subjected to critical analysis, in Austria, and under the very nose of Metternich, philological science was used by the Panslavists as a cloak to preach the doctrine of Slavic unity, and to create a political party with the unmistakable aim of upsetting the relations of all nationalities in Austria, and instituting a vast Slavic empire in its place.

The linguistic confusion which reigns east of Bohemia and Carinthia to the Black Sea is truly astonishing. The process of denationalization among the Slavs bordering on Germany, the slow but uninterrupted advance of the Germans, the invasion of the Magyars, which separated the North Slavs from the South Slavs by a compact mass of seven million people of Finnish race, the intermixing of Turks, Tatars, Wallachians among the Slavic tribes, produced a linguistic Babel. The language varies from village to village, almost from estate to estate. Out of five milion inhabitants, Bohemia alone numbers two million Germans alongside three million Slavs, surrounded, moreover, on three sides by Germans. The same is the case with all Austrian-Slavic tribes. To restore all originally Slavic soil and territory to the Slavs, to convert Austria, with the exception of the Tirol and Lombardy, into a Slavic Empire—the goal of the Panslavists—is to declare null and void the historical development of the last thousand years, is to cut off a third of Germany and all of Hungary, and to change Vienna and Budapest into Slavic cities—a process with which the Germans and Hungarians who own these districts cannot exactly sympathize. Moreover, the difference between the Slavic dialects is so great that, with few exceptions, they are mutually unintelligible. This was demonstrated in a comical fashion at the Slavic Congress in Prague in 1848, where, after various vain attempts to find a language intelligible to all members, they were finally obliged to use the tongue most hated by all of them—the German.

Thus we see that Austrian Panslavism was lacking the most essential elements of success: mass support and unity. It wanted mass support because the Panslavic party consisted only of a portion of the educated classes, and had no hold upon the masses, and hence no strength capable of resisting both the Austrian government and the German and Hungarian nationalities against which it entered the lists.

It lacked unity, because its uniting principle was a mere ideal one, which, at the very first attempt at realization, was broken up by the fact of diversity of language.

In fact, so long as Panslavism was a movement limited to Austria it offered no great danger, but that very center of unity and mass support which it wanted was very soon found for it. The national uprising of the Turkish Serbs, in the beginning of this century, had called the attention of the Russian government to the fact that there were some seven million Slavs in Turkey, whose speech, of all other Slavic dialects, most resembled the Russian. Their religion too, and their sacred language—old Slavonic or Church Slavonic—were exactly the same as in Russia. It was among these Serbs and Bulgarians that the Czar for the first time began a Panslavist agitation supported by appeals to his position as the head and protector of the Greek Orthodox Church. It was, therefore, only natural that as soon as this Panslavist movement in Austria had gained consistency, Russia should extend thither on the soil of its ally the ramifications of its agencies. Where Roman Catholic Slavs were met with, the religious side of the question was dropped; Russia was merely held up as the centre of gravity of the Slavic race, as the core around which the regenerated Slavic tribes would range themselves, as the strong and united people which was to realize the great Slavic empire from the Elbe to China, and from the Adriatic to the Polar sea. Precisely here the lacking power and unity were found. Panslavism fell into the trap immediately. It thus pronounced its own judgment on itself. In order to newly restore imaginary nationalities, the Panslavists declared themselves ready to sacrifice 800 years of actual participation in civilization to Russian-Mongolian barbarism. Was not this the natural result of a movement which began as a decided reaction against the main stream of European civilization and continued by seeking to reverse the course of world history?

Metternich, in the years of his greatest power, very well recognized the danger and saw through the Russian intrigues. He opposed the movement with all the means in his power. But all the means known to him can be summarized in one word: suppression. But the only proper means—general freedom of expansion of the German and Hungarian spirit, more than sufficient to scare away the Slavic specter—did not fit in to his system of petty policy. Accordingly, on Metternich's downfall in 1848, the Slavic movement broke out stronger than ever, and embraced a larger proportion of the population than ever before. But here its thoroughly reactionary character at once came to light.

While the German and Hungarian movements in Austria were decidedly progressive the Slavs saved the old system from destruction, enabled Radetzky to advance on the Mincio, and Windischgraetz to conquer Vienna. And to complete the drama, and the dependence of Austria on the Slavic race the Russian army, that great Slavic reserve, had to descend into Hungary in 1849 and settle the war for Austria there by a dictated peace.

But if the adherence of the Panslavic movement to Russia was its own self-condemnation, Austria acknowledged its lack of vitality no less through the acceptance, even the provocation, of this Slavic assistance against the only three nations within its dominions which do possess and show historic vitality—the Germans, Italians, and Hungarians. Since 1848 this debt to Panslavism has always held Austria down, and the awareness of it has been the mainspring of Austrian policy. Austria's first move was to react against the Slavs in its own territory but this required the adoption of an at least partially progressive policy. The special privileges of all provinces were abolished; a centralized administration took the place of a federal one; and, instead of all the different nationalities, an artificial Austrian nationality was alone to be acknowledged. Though these changes were directed in some degree also against the German, Italian, and Hungarian nationalities, they yet fell with far greater weight on the less compact Slavic tribes, and gave the German element a considerable preponderance.

The dependence on the Slavs within the realm having been removed, there remained the dependence on Russia; and with it the necessity, at least for a moment and to a certain degree, to break this direct and humiliating dependence. That was the real reason for the wavering, but at least openly professed anti-Russian policy of Austria with respect to the Eastern Question. On the other hand, Panslavism has not disappeared; it has been deeply wounded, it grumbles, pauses, and since the intervention in Hungary looks to the Russian Czar as its predestined Messiah. It is not our province to determine whether Austria can reply with concessions in Hungary and Poland without endangering its existence if Russia should openly step forward as the head of Panslavism. This much is certain; it is no longer Russia alone, but the Panslavist conspiracy which threatens to build its realm on the ruins of Europe. Through the undeniable strength it possesses and can maintain, the union of all Slavs will soon compel the side which opposes it to appear in a totally different form than theretofore. On this occasion we have spoken neither of Poland (to her honor usually an

enemy of Panslavism) nor of the so-called democratic or socialist form of Panslavism, which differs basically, only in its phraseology and hypocrisy from the ordinary genuine openly Russian variety. We have said equally little of abstract German speculation, which in sublime ignorance has sunk to becoming an organ of the Russian conspiracy. We shall return in detail to these and other questions relating to Panslavism.

IV
THE POLISH QUESTION

5
The Debate on Poland in Frankfurt (1848)

COLOGNE, AUGUST 19.—We have followed in detail the report of Mr. Stenzel, the basis of the debate. We have proven how he falsified both the older and more recent history of Poland and of the Germans in Poland, how he confused the whole question, how Stenzel the historian not only let himself be guilty of deliberate falsification, but also of gross ignorance.

Before we consider the debate itself we must take another look at the Polish question.

It does not make sense to take the question of Posen by itself; there is no possibility of a solution. It is a part of the Polish question and can only be solved in combination with the latter. The borders between Germany and Poland can only be determined if Poland exists again.

But can and will Poland rise again? This has been denied in the debates.

A French historian has said: *"Il y a des peuples necessaires:* There are necessary peoples." The Polish people belong doubtless among the indispensable peoples of the 19th Century.

But the national existence of Poland is necessary for no one more than for us Germans.

To begin with, on what has the power of the reaction in Europe been based since 1815, indeed, in part since the first French Revolution? On the Russian-Prussian-Austrian Holy Alliance. And what holds this Holy Alliance together? The partition of Poland, from which all three allies derive advantages.

The split which the three powers drew through Poland is the bond which links them to one another; the common theft has made them conjointly responsible each for the other.

From the moment of the first rape of Poland, Germany fell into dependency on Russia. Russia ordered Prussia and Austria to remain absolute monarchies and Prussia and Austria had to obey. The already feeble and timid efforts mainly of the Prussian bourgeoisie, to gain supremacy, were completely frustrated by the impossibility of tearing Prussia from Russia, from the support which Russia gave the feudal-absolutist class in Prussia.

To this must be added that, ever since the first allied attempts at repression, the Poles have been fighting not only as insurrectionists for their own independence, but as revolutionaries they have also risen up against their own internal social conditions.

The partition of Poland was brought about through the alliance of the high feudal aristocracy in Poland with the three partitioning powers. It was not a progressive step, as the ex-poet Mr. Jordan asserted, it was the last means of the high aristocracy to save itself from a revolution; it was reactionary through and through.

Quite naturally, the result of the first partition was an alliance of the other classes, that is, of the nobles, the city bourgeoisie and a part of the peasants, directed as much against the oppressors of Poland as against the high aristocracy of the country itself. The Constitution of 1791 shows how much the Poles at that time already understood that their external independence was inseparable from the overthrow of the aristocracy and from internal agrarian reform.

The great agricultural lands between the Baltic and the Black Sea can save themselves from their patriarchal-feudal barbarism through an agrarian revolution which will transform the peasants—both the serfs and those compelled to do statutory labor—into free land-owners, a revolution which will be quite comparable to the French Revolution of 1789 as concerns the countryside. Among all its neighboring agricultural peoples, the Polish nation has the merit of being the first to proclaim this. The first attempt at reform was the Constitution of 1791; in the 1830 uprising the agrarian revolution was declared by Lelewel to be the only means of saving the country, but it was recognized too late by the Parliament; in the revolutions of 1846 and 1848 it was openly proclaimed.

From the day of their repression on, the Poles came forward as revolutionaries and thereby bound their oppressors the more tightly to

the counterrevolution. They forced their oppressors to uphold the patriarchal-feudal system not only in Poland but also in their other domains. And particularly since the Cracow uprising of 1846, the struggle for the independence of Poland has also been a struggle for agrarian democracy—the only kind possible in Eastern Europe—against patriarchal-feudal absolutism.

Thus so long as we help suppress Poland, so long as we attach a part of Poland to Germany, so long will we remain attached to Russia and to Russian policy, so long will we ourselves remain unable to break completely patriarchal-feudal absolutism at home. The restoration of a democratic Poland is the first condition for the restoration of a democratic Germany.

But the re-establishment of Poland and the settlement of its boundaries with Germany is not only necessary, it is also by far the most easily solvable of all the political questions which have arisen since the Revolution in Eastern Europe. Much more involved are the struggles for independence of the peoples of all the races which are thoroughly inter-mixed with each other south of the Carpathian mountains; these struggles will cost much more blood, confusion and civil war than the fight for Polish independence and the determination of boundaries between Germany and Poland.

It is understood that what is meant is not the restoration of a sham Poland, but the re-establishment of a state on a viable basis. Poland must have at least the area it had in 1772, must have not only the watershed but also the mouths of its great rivers, and must at least possess a considerable stretch of the Baltic sea coast.

Germany could have guaranteed Poland all that and still protect its own interests and honor, if after the revolution it had had the courage, for the sake of its own interest, to demand with weapons in its hands, from Russia the return of Poland. It would not have created serious difficulties, and it is understood that the intermixture of Germans and Poles along the borders, and especially along the coast, would have required both sides to make mutual concessions, so that many Germans would have had to become Polish and many Poles German.

But after the German half-revolution the courage to take such decisive steps has been lacking. Pompous speeches are heard about the liberation of Poland; Poles travelling through the country have been acclaimed at the railway stations and the warmest sympathies of the German people have been extended to them (haven't they always been so extended to anyone?), but to start a war with Russia that would call

in question the entire European balance of power, and finally to return even the tiniest portion of stolen territory—indeed, for that we know the Germans too well!

And what would this war with Russia mean? The war with Russia would be a complete, public and real break with our whole shameful past, it would mean the real liberation and unification of Germany, the re-establishment of democracy on the ruins of feudalism and the brief dream of ascendancy of the bourgeoisie. War with Russia would be the only possible way to save our honor and interests with respect to our Slavic neighbors and particularly with respect to the Poles.

But we were and we remain Philistines. We have made a score or two revolutions, large and small, of which we ourselves were afraid before they were ended. After we had had a mouthful ourselves, we carried out almost nothing. Instead of broadening our viewpoint the Revolution narrowed it. All questions were handled with a faint-hearted, stupid, narrow-minded Philistinism so that, naturally, our true interests were thereby again compromised. On the basis of this petty Philistinism the great question of the liberation of Poland was reduced to narrow phrases about the reorganization of a part of the province of Posen; our enthusiasm for Poland was transformed into buckshot and flint.

We repeat that the only possible, the only solution which would have preserved Germany's honor, Germany's interests, was war with Russia. This was not dared and the inevitable has followed: The soldiery of the reaction, beaten in Berlin, raised its head again in Posnania; under the pretext of saving Germany's honor and nationality, it raised the banner of the counterrevolution, and suppressed the revolutionary Poles, our allies—and, for a moment, swindled Germany applauded its victorious enemy. The new partition of Poland was carried out and it lacks only the sanction of the German National Assembly.

There was still one way possible for the Frankfurt assembly to repair the harm done; all Posnania could have been excluded from the German Confederation, and the border question should have been declared open until it could have been taken up with a re-established Poland as between equal nations.

But this would have been too much to expect of our Frankfurt National Assembly of professors, lawyers and pastors! The temptation was too great: They, the peaceful burghers who had never fired a shot, by merely standing or remaining seated could conquer for Germany a

land of 500 square miles in area, could incorporate 800,000 *Netzbrueder* —German Poles, Jews and Poles—even if at the expense of the honor and the true, permanent interests of Germany—what a temptation! They succumbed to it, they ratified the partition of Poland.

On what grounds we shall see tomorrow.

6
What Have the Working Classes to Do With Poland? (1866)

I

Sir,—Wherever the working classes have taken a part of their own in political movements, there, from the very beginning, their foreign policy was expressed in the few words—Restoration of Poland. This was the case with the Chartist movement so long as it existed; this was the case with the French working men long before 1848, as well as during that memorable year, when on the 15th of May they marched on to the National assembly to the cry of *"Vive la Pologne!"*—Poland for ever! This was the case in Germany, when, in 1848 and 49, the organs of the working class demanded war with Russia for the restoration of Poland. It is the case even now; with one exception—of which more anon—the working men of Europe unanimously proclaim the restoration of Poland as a part and parcel of their political programme, as the most comprehensive expression of their foreign policy. The middle class, too, have had, and have still, "sympathies" with the Poles; which sympathies have not prevented them from leaving the Poles in the lurch in 1831, in 1846, in 1863, nay, have not even prevented them from leaving the worst enemies of Poland, such as Lord Palmerston, to manage matters so as to actually assist Russia while they talked in favor of Poland. But with the working classes it is different. They mean intervention, not non-intervention; they mean war with Russia

while Russia meddles with Poland; and they have proved it every time the Poles rose against their oppressors. And recently, the International Workingmen's Association has given a fuller expression to this universal instinctive feeling of the body it claims to represent, by inscribing on its banner, "Resistance to Russian encroachments upon Europe —Restoration of Poland."

This programme of the foreign policy of the working men of Western and Central Europe has found a unanimous consent among the class to whom it was addressed, with one exception, as we said before. There are among the working men of France a small minority who belong to the school of the late P. J. Proudhon. This school differs in toto from the generality of the advanced and thinking working men: it declares them to be ignorant fools, and maintains, on most points, opinions quite contrary to theirs. This holds good in their foreign policy also. The Proudhonists, sitting in Judgment on oppressed Poland find the verdict of the Staleybridge Jury, "serves her right." They admire Russia as the great land of the future, as the most progressive nation upon the face of the earth, at the side of which such a paltry country as the United States is not worthy of being named.— They have charged the Council of the International Association with setting up the Bonapartist principle of nationalities, and with declaring that magnanimous Russian people without the pale of civilized Europe, such being a grievous sin against the principles of universal democracy and the fraternity of all nations. These are the charges. Barring the democratic phraseology at the wind-up, they coincide, it will be seen at once, verbally and literally with what the extreme Tories of all countries have to say about Poland and Russia. Such charges are not worth refuting; but, as they come from a fraction of the working classes, be it ever so small a one, they may render it desirable to state again the case of Poland and Russia, and to vindicate what we may henceforth call the foreign policy of the united working men of Europe.

But why do we always name Russia alone in connection with Poland? Have not two German Powers, Austria and Prussia, shared in the plunder? Do not they, too, hold parts of Poland in bondage, and, in connection with Russia, do they not work to keep down every national Polish movement?

It is well known how hard Austria has struggled to keep out of the Polish business; how long she resisted the plans of Russia and Prussia for partition. Poland was a natural ally of Austria against Russia. When Russia once became formidable, nothing could be more in the interest

of Austria than to keep Poland alive between herself and the newly-rising Empire. It was only when Austria saw that Poland's fate was settled, that with or without her, the other two powers were determined to annihilate her, it was only then that in self-protection she went in for a share of the territory. But as early as 1815 she held out for the restoration of an independent Poland; in 1831 and in 1863 she was ready to go to war for that object, and give up her own share of Poland provided England and France were prepared to join her. The same during the Crimean war. This is not said in justification of the general policy of the Austrian Government. Austria has shown often enough that to oppress a weaker nation is congenial work to her rulers. But in the case of Poland the instinct of self-preservation was stronger than the desire for new territory or the habits of Government. And this puts Austria out of court for the present.

As to Prussia, her share of Poland is too trifling to weigh much on the scale. Her friend and ally, Russia, has managed to ease her of nine-tenths of what she got during the three partitions. But what little is left to her weighs as an incubus upon her. It has chained her to the triumphal car of Russia, it has been the means of enabling her Government, even in 1863 and 64, to practise unchallenged, in Prussian Poland, those breaches of the law, those infractions of individual liberty, of the right of meeting, of the liberty of the press, which were so soon afterwards to be applied to the rest of the country; it has falsified the whole middle-class Liberal movement which, from fear of risking the loss of a few square miles of land on the eastern frontier, allowed the Government to set all law aside with regard to the Poles. The working men, not only of Prussia, but of all Germany, have a greater interest than those of any other country in the restoration of Poland, and they have shown in every revolutionary movement that they know it. Restoration of Poland, to them, is emancipation of their own country from Russian vassalage. And this, we think puts Prussia out of court, too. Whenever the working classes of Russia (if there is such a thing in that country, in the sense it is understood in Western Europe) form a political programme, and that programme contains the liberation of Poland—then, but not till then, Russia as a nation will be out of court too, and the Government of the Czar will remain alone under indictment.

II

Sir,—It is said that to claim independence for Poland is to acknowledge the "principle of nationalities," and that the principle of nationalities

is a Bonapartist invention concocted to prop up the Napoleonic despotism in France. Now what is this "principle of nationalities"?

By the treaties of 1815 the boundaries of the various states of Europe were drawn merely to suit diplomatic convenience, and especially to suit the convenience of the then strongest continental Power—Russia. No account was taken either of the wishes, the interests, or the national diversities of the populations. Thus, Poland was divided, Germany was divided, Italy was divided, not to speak of the many smaller nationalities inhabiting south-eastern Europe, and of which few people at that time knew anything. The consequence was that for Poland, Germany, and Italy, the very first step in every political movement was to attempt the restoration of that national unity without which national life was but a shadow. And when, after the suppression of the revolutionary attempts in Italy and Spain, 1821-23, and again, after the revolution of July, 1830, in France, the extreme politicians of the greater part of civilised Europe come into contact with each other, and attempted to mark out a kind of common programme, the liberation and unification of the oppressed and subdivided nations became a watchword common to all of them. So it was again in 1848, when the number of oppressed nations was increased by a fresh one, viz., Hungary. There could, indeed, be no two opinions as to the right of everyone of the great national subdivisions of Europe to dispose of itself, independently of its neighbours, in all internal matters, so long as it did not encroach upon the liberty of the others. This right was, in fact, one of the fundamental conditions of the internal liberty of all. How could, for instance, Germany aspire to liberty and unity, if at the same time she assisted Austria to keep Italy in bondage, either directly or by her vassals? Why, the total breaking-up of the Austrian monarchy is the very first condition of the unification of Germany!

This right of the great national subdivisions of Europe to political independence, acknowledged as it was by the European democracy, could not but find the same acknowledgement with the working classes especially. It was, in fact, nothing more than to recognise in other large national bodies of undoubted vitality the same right of individual national existence which the working men of each separate country claimed for themselves. But this recognition, and the sympathy with these national aspirations, were restricted to the large and well defined historical nations of Europe; there was Italy, Poland, Germany, Hungary. France, Spain, England, Scandinavia were neither subdivided nor under foreign control, and therefore but indirectly interested in the

matter; and as to Russia, she could only be mentioned as the detainer of an immense amount of stolen property, which would have to be disgorged on the day of reckoning.

After the *coup d'état* of 1851, Louis Napoleon, the Emperor "by the grace of God and the national will," had to find a democraticised and popular sounding name for his foreign policy. What could be better than to inscribe upon his banners the "principle of nationalities"? Every nationality to be the arbiter of its own fate—every detached fraction of any nationality to be allowed to annex itself to its great mother-country —what could be more liberal? Only, mark, there was not, now, any more question of *nations,* but of *nationalities.*

There is no country in Europe where there are not different nationalities under the same government. The Highland Gaels and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationalities to what the English are, although nobody will give to these remnants of peoples long gone by the title of nations, any more than to the Celtic inhabitants of Brittany in France. Moreover, no state boundary coincides with the natural bound of nationality, that of language. There are plenty of people out of France whose mother tongue is French, same as there are plenty of people of German language out of Germany; and in all probability it will ever remain so. It is a natural consequence of the confused and slow-working historical development through which Europe has passed during the last thousand years, that almost every great nation has parted with some outlying portions of its own body, which have become separated from the national life, and in most cases participated in the national life of some other people; so much so, that they do not wish to rejoin their own main stock. The Germans in Switzerland and Alsace do not desire to be reunited to Germany, any more than the French in Belgium and Switzerland wish to become attached politically to France. And after all, it is no slight advantage that various nations, as politically constituted, have most of them some foreign elements within themselves, which form connecting links with their neighbours, and vary the otherwise too monotonous uniformity of the national character.

Here, then, we perceive the difference between the "principle of *nationalities*" and the old democratic and working-class tenet as to the right of the great European *nations* to separate and independent existence. The "principle of nationalities" leaves entirely untouched the great question of the right of national existence for the historic peoples of Europe; nay if it touches it, it is merely to disturb it. The principle

of nationalities raises two sorts of questions; first of all, questions of boundary between these great historic peoples; and secondly, questions as to the right to independent national existence of those numerous small relics of peoples which, after having figured for a longer or shorter period on the stage of history, were finally absorbed as integral portions into one or the other of those more powerful nations whose greater vitality enabled them to overcome greater obstacles. The European importance, the vitality of a people is as nothing in the eyes of the principle of nationalities; before it, the Roumans of Wallachia, who never had a history, nor the energy required to have one, are of equal importance to the Italians who have a history of 2000 years, and an unimpaired national vitality; the Welsh and Manxmen, if they desired it, would have an equal right to independent political existence, absurd though it would be, with the English. The whole thing is an absurdity, got up in a popular dress in order to throw dust in shallow people's eyes, and to be used as a convenient phrase, or to be laid aside if the occasion requires it.

Shallow as the thing is, it required cleverer brains than Louis Napoleon's to invent it. The principle of nationalities, so far from being a Bonapartist invention to favour a resurrection of Poland, is nothing but a *Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland*. Russia has absorbed the greater part of ancient Poland on the plea of the principle of nationalities as we shall see hereafter. The idea is more than a hundred years old, and Russia uses it now every day. What is Panslavism but the application, by Russia, and Russian interest, of the principle of nationalities to the Serbians, Croats, Ruthenes, Slovaks, Czechs, and other remnants of bygone Slavonian peoples in Turkey, Hungary, and Germany? Even at this present moment, the Russian Government have agents travelling among the Lapponians in Northern Norway and Sweden, trying to agitate among these nomadic savages the idea of a "great Finnic nationality," which is to be restored in the extreme North of Europe, under Russian protection, of course. The "cry of anguish" of the oppressed Laplanders is raised very loud in the Russian papers—not by those same oppressed nomads, but by the Russian agents —and indeed it is a frightful oppression, to induce these poor Laplanders to learn the civilised Norwegian or Swedish language, instead of confining themselves to their own barbaric, half Esquimaux idiom! The principle of nationalities, indeed, could be invented in Eastern Europe alone, where the tide of Asiatic invasion, for a thousand years, recurred again and again, and left on the shore those heaps of intermingled ruins

of nations which even now the ethnologist can scarcely disentangle, and where the Turk, the Finnic Magyar, the Rouman, the Jew, and about a dozen Slavonic tribes, live intermixed in interminable confusion. That was the ground to work the principle of nationalities, and how Russia has worked it there, we shall see by-and-by in the example of Poland.

III

The Doctrine of nationality applied to Poland.

Poland, like almost all other European countries, is inhabited by people of different nationalities. The mass of the population, the nucleus of its strength, is no doubt formed by the Poles proper, who speak the Polish language. But ever since 1390 Poland proper has been united to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which has formed, up to the last partition in 1794, an integral portion of the Polish Republic. This Grand Duchy of Lithuania was inhabited by a great variety of races. The northern provinces, on the Baltic, were in possession of *Lithuanians* proper, people speaking a language distinct from that of their Slavonic neighbours; these Lithuanians had been, to a great extent, conquered by German immigrants, who again found it hard to hold their own against the Lithuanian Grand Dukes. Further south, and east of the present kingdom of Poland, were the *White Russians,* speaking a language betwixt Polish and Russian, but nearer the latter; and finally the southern provinces were inhabited by the so-called *Little Russians,* whose language is now by best authorities considered as perfectly distinct from the great Russian (the language we commonly call Russian). Therefore, if people say that to demand the restoration of Poland is to appeal to the principle of nationalities, they merely prove that they do not know what they are talking about, for the restoration of Poland means the re-establishment of a state composed of at least four different nationalities.

When the old Polish State was thus being formed by the union with Lithuania, where was then Russia? Under the heel of the Mongolian conqueror, whom the Poles and Germans combined, 150 years before, had driven back east of the Dnieper. It took a long struggle until the Grand Dukes of Moscow finally shook off the Mongol yoke, and set about combining the many different principalities of great Russia into one State. But this success seems only to have increased their ambition. No sooner had Constantinople fallen to the Turk, than the Moscovite Grand Duke placed in his coat-of-arms the double headed eagle of the

Byzantine Emperors, thereby setting up his claim as successor and future avenger, and ever since, it is well known, the Russians worked to conquer Czarigrad, the town of the Czar, as they call Constantinople in their language. Then, the rich plains of Little Russia excited their lust of annexation; but the Poles were then a strong, and always a brave people, and not only knew how to fight for their own, but also how to retaliate; in the beginning of the seventeenth century they even held Moscow for a few years.

The gradual demoralisation of the ruling aristocracy, the want of power to develop a middle class, and the constant wars devastating the country, at last broke the strength of Poland. A country which persisted in maintaining unimpaired the feudal system of society, while all its neighbours progressed, formed a middle class, developed commerce and industry, and created large towns—such a country was doomed to ruin. No doubt the aristocracy did ruin Poland, and ruin her thoroughly; and after ruining her, they upbraided each other for having done so, and sold themselves and their country to the foreigner. Polish history, from 1700 to 1772, is nothing but a record of Russian usurpation of dominion in Poland, rendered possible by the corruptibility of the nobles. Russian soldiers were almost constantly occupying the country, and the kings of Poland, if not willing traitors themselves, were placed more and more under the thumb of the Russian Ambassador. So well had this game succeeded, and so long had it been played, that, when Poland at last was annihilated, there was no outcry at all in Europe, and, indeed, people were astonished at this only, that Russia should have the generosity of giving such a large slice of the territory to Austria and Prussia.

The way in which this partition was brought about is particularly interesting. There was, at that time, already an enlightened "public opinion" in Europe. Although the *Times* newspaper had not yet begun to manufacture that article, there was that kind of public opinion which had been created by the immense influence of Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau, and the other French writers of the eighteenth century. Russia always knew that it is important to have public opinion on one's side, if possible, and Russia took care to have it, too. The Court of Catherine II was made the headquarters of the enlightened men of the day, especially Frenchmen; the most enlightened principles were professed by the Empress and her Court, and so well did she succeed in deceiving them that Voltaire and many others sang the praise of the "Semiramis of the North," and proclaimed Russia the most progressive

country in the world, the home of liberal principles, the champion of religious toleration.

Religious toleration—that was the word wanted to put down Poland. Poland had always been extremely liberal in religious matters; witness the asylum of Jews found there while they were persecuted in all other parts of Europe. The greater portion of the people in the Eastern provinces belonged to the Greek faith, while the Poles proper were Roman Catholics. A considerable portion of these Greek Catholics had been induced, during the sixteenth century, to acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope, and were called United Greeks; but a great many continued true to their old Greek religion in all respects. They were principally the serfs, their noble masters being almost all Roman Catholics, they were Little Russians by nationality. Now, this Russian Government, which did not tolerate at home any other religion but the Greek, and punished apostasy as a crime; which was conquering foreign nations and annexing foreign provinces right and left; and which was at that time engaged in riveting still firmer the fetters of the Russian serf—this same Russian Government came soon upon Poland in the name of religious toleration, because Poland was said to oppress the Greek Catholics; in the name of the principle of nationalities, because the inhabitants of these Eastern provinces were Little Russians, and ought, therefore, to be annexed to *Great* Russia; and in the name of the right of revolution arming the serfs against their masters. Russia is not at all scrupulous in the selection of her means. Talk about a war of class against class as something extremely revolutionary;—why, Russia set such a war on foot in Poland nearly 100 years ago, and a fine specimen of a class-war it was, when Russian soldiers and Little Russian serfs went in company to burn down the castles of Polish lords, merely to prepare Russian annexation, which being once accomplished the same Russian soldiers put the serfs back again under the yoke of their lords.

All this was done in the cause of religious toleration, because the principle of nationalities was not then fashionable in Western Europe. But it was held up before the eyes of the Little Russian peasants at the time, and has played an important part since in Polish affairs. The first and foremost ambition of Russia is the union of all Russian tribes under the Czar, who calls himself the Autocrat of all Russias *(Samodergetz vsekh Rossyiskikh),* and among these she includes White and Little Russia. And in order to prove that her ambition went no further, she took very good care, during the three partitions, to annex none but

White and Little Russian provinces; leaving the country inhabited by Poles, and even a portion of Little Russia (Eastern Galicia) to her accomplices. But how do matters stand now? The greater portion of the provinces annexed in 1793 and 1794 by Austria and Prussia are now under Russian dominion, under the name of the kingdom of Poland, and from time to time hopes are raised among the Poles, that if they will only submit to Russian supremacy, and renounce all claims to the ancient Lithuanian provinces, they may expect a reunion of all other Polish provinces and a restoration of Poland, with the Russian Emperor for a king. And if at the present juncture Prussia and Austria came to blows, it is more than probable that the war will not be, ultimately, for the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia, or of Venice to Italy, but rather of Austrian, and at least a portion of Prussian, Poland to Russia.

So much for the principle of nationalities in Polish affairs.

7
Poland's European Mission (1867)[1]

[When the last Ukases on the abolition of Poland became known in this country, the organ of the leading stock-exchanges exhorted the Poles to become Muscovites. Why not, if it was a means of adding to the security of the six million pounds sterling recently lent to the Czar by the English capitalists?]

About thirty years ago a revolution broke out in France. It was an event unforeseen by the Providence of St. Petersburg, which had just concluded a secret treaty with Charles X to improve the administration and geographic arrangement of Europe. As soon as the sad news arrived the Czar Nicholas called together the officers of his guard and delivered to them a short warlike harangue, summing up with the

[1] The paragraphs in brackets were crossed out in Marx's manuscript. Ed.

words, "To your horses, Gentlemen!" It was not a vain threat. Paskievitch was sent to Berlin, from which point he was to direct the invasion of France. A few months later everything was ready. The Prussians were supposed to deploy their concentration on the Rhine, the Polish army to enter Prussia and the Muscovites to follow in the rear. But then, as Lafayette said in the Chamber of Deputies, "the advance guard turned on the mass of the army"—the Warsaw uprising saved Europe from a second anti-Jacobine war.

Eighteen years later there was another eruption of the revolutionary volcano, or rather an earthquake which shook the entire continent. Even Germany began to stir, in spite of the maternal apron-strings on which Russia had held her since the so-called war of independence. And what was even more astonishing, of all the German cities, Vienna was the first to try its hand at the raising of street-barricades, and with success! This time, perhaps for the first time in history, the Russian lost his nerve. Czar Nicholas lost no time in haranguing his guards. He published a Manifesto to his people, saying that the French plague had infested even Germany, that it was approaching the frontiers of the Empire and that the Revolution, in its delirium was casting crazed glances at Holy Russia. Nothing astonishing in this, he cried. For years this same Germany had been a ferment of infidelity. The cancer of a sacrilegious philosophy had cut into the vital organs of this people, so healthy in its outward aspect. And he concluded with this message to the Germans: "God is with us! Now hear this, infidels, and yield to us, for God is with us!" Shortly afterwards, by the instrument of his faithful servant, Nesselrode, he sent the Germans another message, but this one was overflowing with tenderness for this pagan people. Whence came this change?

The reason is that the people of Berlin had not only made a revolution, they had proclaimed the restoration of Poland, and the Poles in Prussia, deceived by the popular enthusiasm, were in the process of setting up military camps in Posen. Hence the amiability of the Czar. Once again it was Poland, the immortal knight of Europe, who kept the Mongol in awe! It was only after the betrayal of the Poles by the Germans, particularly by the German National Assembly in Frankfort, that Russia recovered its force and became strong enough to stab the Revolution of 1848 and its last refuge, Hungary. And even there, the last man to lead a campaign against Russia was a Pole, General Bem.

Now there are many people who are naïve enough to believe that all that has changed, that Poland has ceased to be "a necessary nation,"

as a French writer called it, and is now only a sentimental memory. And you know that sentiments and memories are not listed on the stock exchange.

[But I ask you, what is there that has changed? Has the danger diminished? No, only the intellectual blindness of the ruling classes of Europe has reached its zenith.]

In the first place the policy of Russia is changeless, according to the admission of its official historian, the Muscovite Karamsin. Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star. In our times only a civilized government ruling over barbarian masses can hatch out such a plan and execute it. As the greatest Russian diplomat of modern times, Pozzo di Borgo, wrote to Alexander I at the time of the Congress of Vienna, Poland is the great instrument for the execution of Russian designs on the world, but it is also an invincible obstacle to them, until such time as the Poles, worn out by the accumulated betrayals of Europe, become a whip in the hand of the Muscovite.

Well, except for the dispositions of the Polish people, has anything intervened to thwart the Russian plans or paralyze its action? I do not need to tell you that the progress of its conquests in Asia has been continuous. I do not need to tell you that the so-called war of England and France against Russia delivered to the latter the mountain fortresses of the Caucasus, control of the Black Sea and maritime rights which Catherine II, Paul and Alexander I had tried in vain to wrest from England. Railroads are uniting and concentrating its forces, scattered over a vast expanse. Its material resources in Congress Poland, where it has entrenched itself in Europe, have increased enormously. The fortifications of Warsaw, Modlin, Ivangorod—points chosen by the first Napoleon—command the entire course of the Vistula, and constitute a formidable base for attacks to the North, West and South. Panslavist propaganda has had the satisfactory result of weakening Austria and Turkey. And as to the meaning of this Panslavist propaganda, you had a foretaste of it in 1848-49, when Hungary was invaded, Vienna was devastated and Italy crushed by the Slavs fighting under the flags of Jellachich, Windischgraetz and Radetzky. And, in addition to all that, the crimes of England against the Irish have raised a new and powerful ally of Russia on the other side of the Atlantic.

[The plan of Russian policy remains changeless; its means of action have considerably increased since 1848, but up to now, one thing remains beyond her reach, and Peter the Great touched this weak point

when he wrote that in order to conquer the world, the Muscovites needed only souls. Well, the vivifying spirit which Russia needs will be infused into its carcass at the moment when the Poles become Russian subjects. What will you then have to throw into the other tray of the balance?]

[A continental European will perhaps reply that by the emancipation of the serfs, Russia has entered the family of civilized nations, that German power, recently concentrated in Prussian hands, can resist all Asiatic shocks, and finally, that the social revolution in Western Europe will end the danger of international conflicts. An Englishman who reads only the *Times* will be able to say that, supposing the worst, i.e., if Russia seizes Constantinople, England will then take possession of Egypt and will thus secure the path to its great market in India.]

As concerns the first point, the emancipation of the serfs freed the supreme government from obstacles which the nobles were in a position to place in the way of its centralized action. It created a vast reservoir for the recruitment for its army, dissolved the communal property of the Russian peasants, isolated them, and above all, strengthened their faith in their Autocrat and Pope. It has not disinfected them from their Asiatic barbarity, the creeping heritage of centuries. Any attempt to raise their moral level is punished as a crime. I need remind you only of the official provocations against the temperance societies which tried to wean the Muscovite from what Feuerbach calls the material substance of his religion, namely, vodka. Whatever the future effects may be, for the present the emancipation of the serfs has increased the forces at the Czar's disposition.

Let us pass on to Prussia. Formerly a vassal of Poland, it grew to be a first-rate power only under the auspices of Russia and through the partition of Poland. If Prussia should lose its Polish prey tomorrow, it would sink back into Germany instead of absorbing it. In order to maintain itself as a power distinct from Germany it must lean for support on the Muscovite. Its recent increase of power, far from relaxing the bonds, has made them indissoluble. Besides this increase of power has increased Prussia's antagonism with France and Austria. At the same time Russia is the pillar on which the arbitrary rule of the Hohenzollern dynasty and its feudal tenants rests. It is its safeguard against popular disaffection. Consequently Prussia is not a bulwark against Russia, but its predestined instrument for the invasion of France and the digestion of Germany.

As for the social revolution, what does this word mean if not class

struggle. It is possible that the struggle between the workers and capitalists will be less fierce and bloody than the struggles between the feudal lords and the capitalists in England and France. Let us hope so. But in any case, although a social crisis of this sort may increase the energies of the Western peoples, it will also, like every internal conflict, call for aggression from without. Once more this conflict will clothe Russia anew with the role it had during the anti-Jacobine war and since the Holy Alliance, that of the pre-destined savior of order. It will enlist in Russia's ranks all the privileged classes of Europe. Already, during the February Revolution, the Count of Montalembert was not the only one who put his ear to the ground to listen for the distant sound of the hoofs of Cossack horses. The Prussian country bumpkins were not the only ones in the German representative bodies who proclaimed the Czar their "Father Protector." All the stock exchanges of Europe rose with each Russian victory over the Magyars and fell with each Russian defeat.

[Finally, as to what the *Times* says—let Russia take Constantinople if it does not prevent England from establishing itself in Egypt—what does that mean? It means that England will hand over Constantinople to Russia if Russia will permit England to contest France's claim to Egypt. This is the agreeable perspective opened to us by the *Times*. As for the Russian love of England, fond as it is of British pounds, shillings and pence, it is enough to quote the words of the *Moscow Gazette* of December 1851: "No, perfidious Albion's turn must come, and before long we need not make any more treaties with this people except in Calcutta."]

There is but one alternative for Europe. Either Asiatic barbarism, under Muscovite direction, will burst around its head like an avalanche, or else it must re-establish Poland, thus putting twenty million heroes between itself and Asia and gaining a breathing spell for the accomplishment of its social regeneration.

8
A Polish Proclamation (1874)

When the Emperor of Russia arrived in London, the whole police force there was already in action. It was rumored that the Poles wanted to assassinate him, that a new Beresowski had already been found and was better armed than formerly in Paris. The houses of well-known Poles were surrounded by plain clothesmen; indeed, even the Police Commissioner from Paris was brought in whose special task it had been to watch over the Poles there, under the Empire. Police precautions along the Czar's route from his residence to the city were arranged practically according to strategic principles—and all this trouble was in vain! No Beresowski showed up, no pistol shot rang out. And the Czar, trembling no less than his daughter, got off with no more than a bad fright. However, the pains taken were not entirely useless; for as a tip the Emperor left each Police Superintendent concerned five and each Inspector two pounds sterling (100 and 40 marks respectively).

Meanwhile the Poles were thinking of quite other things than the murder of the noble Alexander. The society, "The Polish People," published an "Address by the Polish Refugees to the English People," signed by General B. Wroblewski, President, and J. Krynski, Secretary. This address was distributed in great quantity in London during the presence of the Czar. With the exception of *Reynold's News* the London press unanimously refused to mention it: "England's Guest" must not be offended!

The address begins by pointing out to the English that the Czar does not do them an honor but rather insults them by paying a visit at the same time that he is making all the necessary preparations in Central Asia to overthrow English domination in India, and that if instead of listening to the enticements of the Czar, this so-called father of the peoples whom he oppresses, England were to be less indifferent to the Polish strivings for independence, then England as well as the rest of Europe could safely discontinue its colossal armaments. And this is

entirely correct. The background of all European militarism is Russian militarism. Standing as a reserve in the war of 1859 on the side of France, in 1866 and 1870 on the side of Prussia, the Russian army made it possible on each occasion for the leading military power to defeat its enemy single-handedly. Prussia as the first European military power is directly the creation of Russia, even though it has since then unpleasantly outgrown its patron saint.

The address continues: "Because of its geographical position and its readiness at any moment to stand up for the cause of mankind, Poland has been and will always be the first defender of justice, of civilization and of social progress in all North-East Europe. Poland has proven this irrefutably by its centuries of resistance on the one hand against the invasions of the Eastern barbarians, and on the other hand against the inquisition which formerly oppressed almost the entire Western world. How did it come about that in precisely the most decisive epochs of modern times the Western European peoples could devote themselves without disturbance to the development of their vital social forces? Because, and only because, on the Eastern borders of Europe the Polish soldier stood at his post, ever watchful, ever ready to shoot, always prepared to throw his health, his possessions, his life into the balance. Europe can thank the protection of Polish weapons for the possibility of developing its newly awakened life in the Arts and Sciences during the 16th century, that trade, industry and wealth could reach their present astonishing heights. What, for example, would have become of the legacy of civilization won by the West through two centuries of labor, if the Poles, although themselves threatened in the rear by the Mongol hordes, had not helped the center of Europe against the Turks, and had not broken the power of the Ottomans by their brilliant victory under the walls of Vienna?"

The address further expands on how essential the resistance of Poland is even today in preventing Russia from turning its full strength against the West, a resistance which has even succeeded in disarming Russia's most dangerous allies, its Panslavist agents. The leading Russian historian, Pogodin says in a book printed at the order and expense of the Russian Government, that Poland, up to now a thorn in Russia's flesh, must become its right hand, by being restored as a small, weak kingdom under a Russian prince. In this way the Turkish and Austrian Slavs may best be trapped: "We shall announce this in a proclamation; England and France will bite their lips, and it will be the final blow for Austria . . . All Poles, even the most irreconcilable, will rush

into our arms; the Austrian and Prussian Poles will again unite with their brothers. All the Slavic tribes which are now oppressed by Austria —Czechs, Croats, Hungarians (!), even the Turkish Slavs—will yearn for the day when they can breathe as freely as the Poles then will. We shall then be a race of 100 million under one scepter and then, you peoples of Europe, may come and test your strength against us!" Unfortunately this fine plan is lacking only its basic premise: the consent of Poland. But "all the world knows that to all these enticements, Poland answered: 'I will and must live, if I live at all, not as a tool for the plans of world conquest of a foreign Czar, but as a free people among the free peoples of Europe.'" The address then shows in detail how Poland actually carried out this unshakeable decision. In a critical moment of its existence, at the outbreak of the French Revolution, Poland was already crippled by the first partition and divided between four states. Nevertheless it had the courage, in its Constitution of May 3, 1791, to plant the banner of the French Revolution on the Vistula—a deed which placed it far ahead of all its neighbors. With this the old Polish disorder was doomed, a few decades of peaceful development, undisturbed from the outside, and Poland would have been the most advanced and powerful country east of the Rhine. But the partitioning powers could not permit Poland to rise again, and even less, permit it to revive through the domestication of the Revolution in Northeast Europe. Its fate was sealed: The Russians carried out in Poland what Prussian, Austrian and German troops had attempted in vain in France. "Kosciusko was fighting simultaneously for the independence of Poland and for the principle of equality. And all the world knows that from the moment of its loss of national independence, and in spite of its loss, Poland has been the foremost defender of injured rights, wherever it may be, taking part in every battle against tyranny, thanks to its love of country and its solidarity with all peoples struggling for the cause of mankind. Unbroken by its own misfortune, unmoved by the blindness and bad faith of the European governments, Poland has not for a moment abandoned the duties placed on it by itself, its history and its concern for the future." But at the same time it has also developed the principles according to which this future, the new Polish Republic, ought to be organized. They have been laid down in the proclamations of 1830, 1845 and 1863. "The first manifesto proclaimed in addition to the unshakeable right of Poland to independent nationhood the *emancipation of the peasants.* The manifesto of 1845, published on Polish soil in the then still free city of Cracow

and endorsed by representatives of all parts of Poland, proclaims not only this emancipation but also the principle that *the peasants are to become owners of the soil* which they have cultivated for centuries. In the parts of Poland robbed by the Muscovites the land-owners basing their action on these manifestoes as the basis of Polish national law, decided to settle these internal questions (1859-1863) which had weighed upon their conscience, voluntarily and in agreement with the peasants long before the Czarist so-called Emancipation Proclamation. The Polish land question had in principle been solved by the Constitution of May 3, 1791. If the Polish peasant remained oppressed, nevertheless, this was only the fault of the despotism and Machiavellianism of the Czar, who based his domination on the enmity between land-owners and peasants. This decision had been taken long before the Czarist proclamation of February 18, 1861, and this proclamation, which was applauded by all Europe and which supposedly gave the peasants legal equality, was only a mask for one of the perennially recurring attempts of the Czar to acquire foreign property. The Polish peasants are as oppressed as before, but—*The Czar has become the owner of the land.* And as punishment for the bloody protest which Poland raised in 1863 against the malicious barbarism of its oppressors, it has had to suffer a series of brutal tortures before which even the tyranny of past centuries would shudder."

"And yet, neither the cruel yoke of the Czars, although lasting for a full century, nor the indifference of Europe have been able to kill Poland. We have lived, and we shall live, by the force of our own will, our own strength and our social and political development, which place us high above our oppressors; their existence is founded from the first to the last on brutal force, the prison and the gallows; and their most important tools of action abroad are underground machinations, treacherous assaults, and, finally, conquest by force."

Let us now leave the address, sufficiently characterized by these excerpts, in order to link up with it a few remarks about the importance of the Polish question to the German workers.

Up to the moment when it took possession of Poland, Russia still remained essentially as much a non-European power as, for example, Turkey, no matter how much it had developed and how much its influence in Europe had grown since Peter the Great (in which process although knowing exactly where he stood, Frederick II of Prussia played no small part). The first partition of Poland was in 1772. Al-

ready in 1779 Russia sought and obtained in the Peace of Teschen a vested right of intervention in German affairs. That should have taught the German princes a lesson; nevertheless, Frederick William II, the one Hohenzollern who ever seriously opposed Russian policy, and Francis II acquiesced in the complete destruction of Poland. In addition, after the Napoleonic wars Russia took the lion's share of the former Prussian- and Austrian-Polish provinces, and now stepped forward openly as the arbiter of Europe, a role which it continued to play without interruption until 1853. Prussia was downright proud to be allowed to cringe before Russia; Austria followed unwillingly, but at the decisive moment always giving in due to her fear of the Revolution, against which the Czar always remained the last support. Thus Russia became the sanctuary of European reaction, without at the same time foregoing the pleasure of preparing further conquests in Austria and Turkey through Panslavist agitation. During the revolutionary years the suppression of Hungary by Russia was as decisive a factor in Central and Eastern Europe as the Paris June Days battle had been for the West; and when Czar Nicholas soon thereafter sat as judge in Warsaw over the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, the supremacy of European reaction was assured jointly with the supremacy of Russia in Europe. The Crimean War freed the West and Austria from the insolence of the Czar. Prussia and the petty German states cringed all the more willingly before him. But already in 1859 he punished the Austrians for their disobedience by seeing to it that his German vassals did not take their side, and in 1866 Prussia completed the disciplining of Austria. We have already seen before how the Russian army forms the pretext and support for European militarism as a whole. In 1853 only because Nicholas, relying on his million soldiers—which to be sure for the most part existed only on paper—challenged the West, did Louis Napoleon obtain a pretext, the Crimean War, to make the then rather weakened French army into the strongest in Europe. Only because in 1870 the Russian army prevented Austria from taking sides with France, could Prussia defeat France and achieve the Prussian-German military monarchy. In all these actions of vital national importance we see the Russian army in the background. And unless the internal development of Russia does not soon take a revolutionary course the German victory over France will as certainly bring about a war between Russia and Germany as the Prussian victory over Austria at Sadowa brought about

the Franco-Prussian War.[1] Yet, the Russian army will always be of service against an internal [revolutionary] movement in Prussia. Today official Russia is still the sanctuary and shield of the entire European reaction, its armies form the reserves of all the other armies which are charged with the suppression of the working classes of Europe.

But now it is the German workers in the so-called German Empire as well as in Austria who are in the first line of attack by this vast reserve army of oppression. As long as the Russians stand behind the bourgeoisie and governments of Austria and Germany the force of the whole German labor movement is dulled. Thus our first aim is to get the Russian reaction and the Russian army off our necks.

And for this task we have only one reliable ally, but one who is reliable regardless of the circumstances—*the Polish people.*

Even far more than France, Poland, due to its historical development and its present position, is faced with the choice either of becoming revolutionary or of perishing. And this point invalidates all the silly talk of the essentially aristocratic character of the Polish movement. There are many people among the Polish emigrés who have aristocratic ambitions; as soon as Poland itself starts to stir, the movement becomes thoroughly revolutionary, as we have seen in 1846 and 1863. These movements were not only national; at the same time they were aimed directly at the liberation of the peasants and their acquiring property in their own land. In 1870 the great mass of the Polish emigrés in France enlisted in the service of the Commune. Was that a deed of aristocrats? Does that not prove that these Poles stand fully in the forefront of the modern movement? What has happened since Bismarck introduced the *Kulturkampf* in Poland, and under the pretext of thus striking a blow against the Pope, hunted out Polish schoolbooks, suppressed the Polish language, and did his utmost to drive Poland into the arms of Russia? The Polish aristocracy attached itself more and more to Russia in order to bring Poland together at least under Russian domination. The revolutionary masses answered by offering an alliance to the German Workers Party and by fighting in the ranks of the International.

Poland has demonstrated in 1863 and further proves every day that it cannot be done to death. Its claim to an independent existence in the European family of nations cannot be refused. But, its restoration has

[1] This was already stated in the Second Manifesto of the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association concerning the Franco-Prussian War (dated 9 September, 1870).

become a necessity particularly for two peoples: for the Germans, and for the Russians themselves.

A people which oppresses another cannot emancipate itself. The power which it uses to suppress the other finally always turns against itself. As long as Russian soldiers remain in Poland, the Russian people cannot free itself either politically or socially. But, at the present state of Russian development it is certain that on the day on which Russia loses Poland the [revolutionary] movement in Russia itself will be powerful enough to overthrow the existing order of things. Independence of Poland and revolution in Russia mutually determine each other. And the independence of Poland and revolution in Russia—which is much nearer than appears on the surface due to the boundless social, political and financial disorder and to the corruption penetrating all official Russia—these events mean for the German workers: the limiting of the bourgeoisie, of the governments in short, of the reaction in Germany to their own resources—forces with which we will be able to deal in time ourselves.

9
Nationalism, Internationalism and the Polish Question (1882)

One of the real tasks of the Revolution of 1848—and the *real,* and not illusory tasks of a revolution are always solved as a consequence of this revolution—was the constitution of the suppressed and scattered nationalities of Central Europe, provided they were at all viable and provided especially that they were ripe for independence. This task was accomplished by the executors of the revolution, Bonaparte, Cavour, and Bismarck for Italy, Hungary, and Germany in accordance with the then prevailing conditions. There remained Ireland and Poland. We may leave Ireland out of consideration here, since it affects the situation on the European continent only very indirectly. But Poland is situated in the center of the continent, and the maintenace of its partition is the very tie which binds the Holy Alliance together again and again. We have, therefore, great interest in Poland.

It is historically impossible for a great people even to discuss internal problems of any kind seriously, as long as it lacks national independence. Before 1859 there was no question of socialism in Italy; even the number of Republicans was small, although they formed the most active element. Only after 1861 the Republicans increased in influence and later transferred their best elements to the Socialists. The same was true in Germany. Lasalle was at the point of giving up his work as a failure, when he had the fortune of being shot. Only when in the year 1866 the greater Prussian unity of petty Germany [*die grosspreussische Einheit Kleindeutschlands*] had been actually decided, the Lassallean, as well as the so-called Eisenach parties assumed some importance. And only after 1870 when the Bonapartist appetite of intervention had been removed definitively the thing got really going. If we still had the old *Bundestag,* where would be our Party? The same happened in

Hungary. Only after 1860 it was drawn into the modern movement: fraud on top, socialism below.

An international movement of the proletariat is possible only among independent nations. The little bit of republican internationalism between 1830 and 1848, was grouped around France which was destined to free Europe. *Hence it increased French chauvinism* in such a way as to cause the world-liberating mission of France and with it France's native right to be in the lead to get in our way every day even now. (The Blanquists present a caricature of this view, but it is still very strong also among Malon and company.) Also in the International the Frenchmen considered this point of view as fairly obvious. Only historical events could teach them—and several others also—and still must teach them daily that international cooperation is possible only among *equals,* and even a *primus inter pares* can exist at best for immediate action.

So long as Poland is partitioned and subjugated, therefore, neither a strong socialist party can develop in the country itself, nor can there arise real international intercourse between the proletarian parties in Germany, etc., with *other than emigré Poles.* Every Polish peasant or worker who wakes up from the general gloom and participates in the common interest, encounters first the fact of national subjugation. This fact is in his way everywhere as the first barrier. To remove it is the basic condition of every healthy and free development. Polish socialists who do not place the liberation of their country at the head of their program, appear to me as would German socialists who do not demand first and foremost repeal of the socialist law, freedom of the press, association, and assembly. In order to be able to fight one needs first a soil to stand on, air, light, and space. Otherwise all is idle chatter.

It is unimportant whether a reconstitution of Poland is possible *before* the next revolution. *We* have in no case the task to deter the Poles from their efforts to fight for the vital conditions of their future development, or to persuade them that national independence is a very secondary matter from the international point of view. On the contrary, independence is the basis of any common international action. Moreover in 1873 a war between Germany and Russia was at the point of breaking out, and the constitution of *some kind* of a Polish state, which could form the core of a later real one, very much within the realm of possibility. And if my lords, the Russians, do not stop soon their Panslavist intrigues and agitation in Herzegovina, they may be drawn into a war which will put to shame their own, Austria's, and

Bismarck's worst fears. Only the Russian Panslavist party and the Czar have an interest to let the matter in Herzegovina become serious. We can have as little interest in the gang of Bosnian robbers as in the stupid Austrian ministers and bureaucrats who are now making so much noise there. Thus even *without* revolution, merely through a European collision the constitution of an independent Poland proper [*Kleinpolen*] would not be so far from possible, just as the Prussian Germany proper [*Kleindeutschland*] which was invented by the bourgeois was not reached by way of the revolutionary or parliamentary path of their dream, but as a result of war.

Thus I hold the view that there are *two* nations in Europe which do not only have the right but the duty to be nationalistic before they become internationalists: the Irish and the Poles. They are internationalists of the best kind if they are very nationalistic. The Poles have understood this in all crises and have proved it on the battlefields of all revolutions. Take away their expectation to re-establish Poland, or persuade them that the new Poland will soon fall into their laps by itself, and they are finished with their interest in the European Revolution.

We, in particular, have no reason whatever to block their irrefutable striving for independence. In the first place, they have invented and applied in 1863 the method of fighting which the Russians are now imitating with such great success (see *Berlin und Petersburg*, appendix 2); and secondly they were the only reliable and capable lieutenants in the Paris Commune.

Who are, by the way, the people who fight against the nationalist strivings of the Poles? Firstly the European bourgeois with whom the Poles have lost all credit since the insurrection of 1846 with its socialist tendencies; and secondly the Russian Panslavists and people influenced by them, such as Proudhon who looked through the colored glasses of Herzen. Among the Russians, even the best, there are today only very few who are free from Panslavist leanings or memories. They are so firmly convinced of the Panslavist mission of Russia, as the French are of the innate revolutionary initiative of France. But in truth Panslavism is a smoke screen for world dominion, appearing in the cloak of a non-existent *Slavic* nationality, and therefore our, as well as the Russian people's, worst enemy. This smoke screen will go up in thin air in its day, but in the meantime it may become very unpleasant for us. A Panslavist war, as the last sheet-anchor of Russian Czarism and Russian reaction is being prepared at this very moment. It is very questionable

whether it will come off, but if war breaks out one thing is certain: the splendidly progressing development in a revolutionary direction in Germany, Austria, and even Russia, will become totally deranged and will be pushed onto another, at first unpredictable, path. At best we lose three to ten years, a respite for a constitutional "new era" in Germany, and perhaps also in Russia. The most probable outcome seems to be the establishment of a small Polish state [*Kleinpolen*] under German hegemony, a war of revenge with France, a renewal of national antagonisms, and finally the establishment of a new Holy Alliance. Thus, Panslavism is now, more than ever before, our most deadly enemy, even though it is on the brink of its grave, or rather just because of this. For the Katkoff, Aksakoff, Ignatieff, and company know this one thing: that their rule is forever finished, as soon as Czarism is overthrown and the Russian people takes the center of the stage. Hence this fiery zeal for war, at a time when the public exchequer is negative and when no banker is willing to loan even a penny to the Russian government.

This is the reason why all Panslavists carry such a deadly hatred for the Poles. They are the only *anti*-Panslavist Slavs. Hence they are traitors to the sacred cause of Slavdom and they must be fitted by force into the Greater Slavic realm of the Czar, the future capital of which is Czarigrad, i.e., Constantinople.

Now you may ask me, whether I have no sympathy whatever for the small Slavic peoples, and remnants of peoples, which have been severed asunder by the three wedges driven in the flesh of Slavdom: the Germans, Magyars, and Turks? In fact I have damned little sympathy for them. The Czecho-Slovak cry of distress *"Bože ak juš nikto nenj' na zemi ktoby Slavom* (sic) *spraviedlivost činil?"* [Is there, oh God, no man on earth who will render the Slavs their due?] is answered from Petersburg, and the entire Czech national movement tends in a direction in which the Czar will *spraviedlivost činiti* [render them their due]. The same with the others, Serbs, Bulgarians, Slovenes, Galician Ruthenes (at least in part). But we cannot stand for these aims. Only when with the collapse of Czarism the nationalist ambitions of these dwarfs of peoples will be freed from association with Panslavist tendencies of world domination, only then we can let them take their fate in their own hands. And I am certain that six months of independence will suffice for most Austro-Hungarian Slavs to bring them to a point where they will beg to be readmitted. But these tiny nations can never be granted the right, which they now assign to themselves in Serbia,

Bulgaria, and Eastern Rumelia, to prevent the extension of the European railroad net to Constantinople.

As concerns the differences between the Poles in Switzerland, those are quarrels between emigrés, which are rarely of importance, and least so among an emigré group which in three years will celebrate its hundredth anniversary, and among which, with the impulse of all emigrés to do, or at least to plan something new, one plan has followed another, one allegedly new theory has replaced another. From what I have already said, it becomes clear that we do not share the views of the people associated with Równość, and we have told them this in a declaration on the occasion of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of 29 November 1830, which was read at the Geneva meeting. You find this declaration printed in Polish in the Report of the meeting (*Sprawozdanie z miedzynarodowego zebrania zwolanego w 50 letnia rocznice listopadowego powstania przez redakcje Równości w Genewie,* Biblijoteka Równość: Nr. 1, Geneva 1881, pp. 30 ff). It appears that the Równość group has been impressed by the radically sounding phrases of the Geneva Russians, and now want to prove also that the reproach of chauvinist nationalism does not touch them. This deviation founded on purely local and passing causes will play itself out without much effect in Poland itself and does not deserve to be refuted in detail.

By the way, we do not take any position at this time on any future settlement between the Poles and the Lithuanians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians of the old [greater] Poland, nor on the frontier settlement with Germany.

The splendid cooperation among German and Czech workers in Bohemia proves moreover, how little the workers themselves in the allegedly "subjugated" countries are infected by the Panslavist appetites of the professors and bourgeois.

V

THE CRIMEAN WAR

10
The Background of the Dispute (1853-1854)

NEW YORK *Tribune,* APRIL 7, 1853.—Prince Mentschikoff, after reviewing the Russian forces stationed in the Danubian Principalities, and after an inspection of the army and fleet at Sebastopol, where he caused maneuvers of embarking and disembarking troops to be executed under his own eyes, entered Constantinople in the most theatrical style on February 28, attended by a suite of twelve persons, including the Admiral of the Russian squadron in the Black Sea, a General of Division, and several staff officers, with Count Nesselrode, junr., as Secretary of the Embassy. He met with such a reception from the Greek and Russian inhabitants as if he were the orthodox Czar himself entering Czarigrad to restore it to the true faith. An enormous sensation was created here and at Paris by the news that Prince Mentschikoff, not satisfied with the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, had demanded that the Sultan should abandon to the Emperor of Russia not only the protection of all the Christians in Turkey, but also the right of nominating the Greek Patriarch; that the Sultan had appealed to the protection of England and France; that Colonel Rose, the British Envoy, had despatched the steamer *Wasp* in haste to Malta to request the immediate presence of the English fleet in the Archipelago, and that Russian vessels had anchored at Kili, near the Bosphorus. The Paris *Moniteur* informs us that the French Squadron at Toulon has been ordered to the Grecian waters. Admiral Dundas, however, is still at Malta. From all this it is evident that the Eastern Question is once more on the European *"ordre du jour"* a fact not astonishing for those who are acquainted with history.

Whenever the revolutionary hurricane has subsided for a moment, one ever-recurring question is sure to turn up: the eternal *"Eastern Question."* Thus, when the storms of the first French Revolution had passed, and Napoleon and Alexander of Russia had divided, after the peace of Tilsit, the whole of Continental Europe between themselves, Alexander profited by the momentary calm to march an army into Turkey, and to "give a lift" to the forces that were breaking up, from within, that decaying empire. Again, no sooner had the revolutionary movements of Western Europe been quelled by the Congresses of Laibach and Verona, than Alexander's successor, Nicholas, made another dash at Turkey. When, a few years later, the revolution of July, with its concomitant insurrections in Poland, Italy, Belgium, had had its turn, and Europe, as re-modelled in 1831, seemed out of reach of domestic squalls, the Eastern Question in 1840 appeared on the point of embroiling the "great Powers" in a general war. And now, when the shortsightedness of the ruling pigmies prides itself on having successfully freed Europe from the dangers of anarchy and revolution, up starts again the everlasting topic, the never-failing difficulty: What shall we do with Turkey?

Turkey is the living sore of European legitimacy. The impotency of legitimate, monarchical government, ever since the first French Revolution, has resumed itself in the one axiom: Keep up the *status quo*. A *testimonium paupertatis,* an acknowledgment of the universal incompetence of the ruling powers, for any purpose of progress or civilization, is seen in this universal agreement to stick to things as by chance or accident they happen to be. Napoleon could dispose of a whole continent at a moment's notice; aye, and dispose of it, too, in a manner that showed both genius and fixedness of purpose. The entire "collective wisdom" of European legitimacy, assembled in Congress at Vienna, took a couple of years to do the same job; got at loggerheads over it, made a very sad mess indeed of it, and found it such a dreadful bore that ever since they have had enough of it, and have never tried their hands again at parcelling out Europe. Myrmidons of mediocrity, as Beranger calls them; without historical knowledge or insight into facts, without ideas, without initiative, they adore the *status quo* they themselves have bungled together, knowing what a bungling and blundering piece of workmanship it is.

But Turkey no more than the rest of the world remains stationary; and just when the reactionary party has succeeded in restoring in civilized Europe what they consider to be the *status quo ante,* it is per-

ceived that in the meantime the *status quo* in Turkey has been very much altered; that new questions, new relations, new interests have sprung up, and that the poor diplomatists have to begin again where they were interrupted by a general earthquake some eight or ten years before. Keep up the *status quo* in Turkey! Why, you might as well try to keep up the precise degree of putridity into which the carcass of a dead horse has passed at a given time, before dissolution is complete. Turkey goes on decaying, and will go on decaying as long as the present system of "balance of power" and maintenance of the *status quo* goes on; and in spite of congresses, protocols and ultimatums it will produce its yearly quota of diplomatic difficulties and international squabbles quite as every other putrid body will supply the neighborhood with a due allowance of carburetted hydrogen and other well-scented gaseous matter.

Let us look at the question at once. Turkey consists of three entirely distinct portions: the vassal principalities of Africa, viz., Egypt and Tunis; Asiatic Turkey; and European Turkey. The African possessions, of which Egypt alone may be considered as really subject to the Sultan, may be left for the moment out of the question. Egypt belongs more to the English than to anybody else, and will and must necessarily form their share in any future partition of Turkey. Asiatic Turkey is the real seat of whatever strength there is in the empire; Asia Minor and Armenia, for four hundred years the chief abode of the Turks, form the reserved ground from which the Turkish armies have been drawn, from those that threatened the ramparts of Vienna, to those that dispersed before Diebitsch's not very skillful maneuvers at Kulewtscha. Turkey in Asia, although thickly populated, yet forms too compact a mass of Mussulman fanaticism and Turkish nationality to invite at present any attempts at conquest; and, in fact, whenever the "Eastern Question" is mooted, the only portions of this territory taken into consideration are Palestine and the Christian valleys of the Lebanon.

The real point at issue always is Turkey in Europe—the great peninsula to the south of the Save and Danube. This splendid territory has the misfortune to be inhabited by a conglomerate of different races and nationalities, of which it is hard to say which is the least fit for progress and civilization. Slavonians, Greeks, Wallachians, Arnauts, twelve millions of men, are all held in submission by one million of Turks, and up to a recent period, it appeared doubtful whether, of all these different races, the Turks were not the most competent to hold the supremacy which, in such a mixed population, could not but accrue

to one of these nationalities. But when we see how lamentably have failed all attempts at civilization by Turkish authority—how the fanaticism of Islam, supported principally by the Turkish mob in a few great cities, has availed itself of the assistance of Austria and Russia invariably to regain power and to overturn any progress that might have been made; when we see the central, i.e. Turkish, authority weakened year after year by insurrections in the Christian provinces, none of which, thanks to the weakness of the Porte and to the intervention of neighbouring States, is ever completely fruitless; when we see Greece acquire her independence, parts of Armenia conquered by Russia—Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, successively placed under the protectorate of the latter power,—we shall be obliged to admit that the presence of the Turks in Europe is a real obstacle to the development of the resources of the Thraco-Illyrian Peninsula.

We can hardly describe the Turks as the *ruling class* of Turkey, because the relations of the different classes of society there are as mixed up as those of the various races. The Turk is, according to localities and circumstances, workman, farmer, small free-holder, trader, feudal landlord in the lowest and most barbaric stage of feudalism, civil officer, or soldier; but in all these different social positions he belongs to the privileged creed and nation—he alone has the right to carry arms, and the highest Christian has to give up the footpath to the lowest Moslem he meets. In Bosnia and the Herzegovina, the nobility, of Slavonian descent, have passed over to Islam, while the mass of the people remain Rayahs, *i.e.* Christians. In this province then, the ruling creed and the ruling class are identified, as of course the Moslem Bosnian is upon a level with his co-religionist of Turkish descent.

The principal power of the Turkish population in Europe, independently of the reserve always ready to be drawn from Asia, lies in the mob of Constantinople and a few other large towns. It is essentially Turkish, and though it finds its principal livelihood by doing jobs for Christian capitalists, it maintains with great jealousy the imaginary superiority and real impunity for excesses which the privileges of Islam confer upon it as compared with Christians. It is well known that this mob in every important *coup d'état* has to be won over by bribes and flattery. It is this mob alone, with the exception of a few colonized districts, which offers a compact and imposing mass of Turkish population in Europe. And certainly there will be, sooner or later, an absolute necessity for freeing one of the finest parts of this continent

from the rule of a mob, compared with which the mob of Imperial Rome was an assemblage of sages and heroes.

Among the other nationalities, we may dispose in a very few words of the Arnauts, a hardy aboriginal mountain people, inhabiting the country sloping toward the Adriatic, speaking a language of their own, which, however, appears to belong to the great Indo-European stock. They are partly Greek Christians, partly Moslems, and, according to all we know of them, as yet very unprepared for civilization. Their predatory habits will force any neighboring Government to hold them in close military subjection, until industrial progress in the surrounding districts shall find them employment as hewers of wood and drawers of water; the same as has been the case with the Gallegas in Spain, and the inhabitants of mountainous districts generally.

The Wallachians or Daco-Romans, the chief inhabitants of the district between the Lower Danube and the Dniester, are a greatly mixed population, belonging to the Greek Church and speaking a language derived from the Latin, and in many respects not unlike the Italian. Those of Transylvania and the Bukowina belong to the Austrian, those of Bessarabia to the Russian Empire; those of Moldavia and Wallachia, the only two principalities where the Daco-Roman race has acquired a political existence, have princes of their own, under the nominal suzerainty of the Porte and the real dominion of Russia. Of the Transylvanian Wallachians we heard much during the Hungarian War; hitherto oppressed by the feudalism of Hungarian landlords who were, according to the Austrian system, made at the same time the instruments of all Government exactions, this brutalized mass was, in like manner as the Ruthenian serfs of Galicia in 1846, won over by Austrian promises and bribes, and began that war of devastation which has made a desert of Transylvania. The Daco-Romans of the Turkish Principalities have at least a native nobility and political institutions; and in spite of all the efforts of Russia, the revolutionary spirit has penetrated among them, as the insurrection of 1848 well proved. There can hardly be a doubt that the exactions and hardships inflicted upon them during the Russian occupation since 1848 must have raised this spirit still higher, in spite of the bond of common religion and Czaro-Popish superstition which has hitherto led them to look upon the Imperial chief of the Greek Church as their natural protector. And if this is the case, the Wallachian nationality may yet play an important part in the ultimate disposal of the territories in question.

The Greeks of Turkey are mostly of Slavonic descent, but have

adopted the modern Hellenic language; in fact, with the exception of a few noble families of Constantinople and Trebizond, it is now generally admitted that very little pure Hellenic blood is to be found even in Greece. The Greeks, along with the Jews, are the principal traders in the seaports and many inland towns. They are also tillers of the soil in some districts. In all cases, neither their number, compactness, nor spirit of nationality, gives them any political weight as a nation, except in Thessaly and perhaps Epirus. The influence held by a few noble Greek families as dragomans (interpreters) in Constantinople is fast declining, since Turks have been educated in Europe, and European legations have been provided with attachés who speak Turkish.

We now come to the race that forms the great mass of the population and whose blood is preponderant wherever a mixture of races has occurred. In fact, it may be said to form the principal stock of the Christian population from the Morea to the Danube, and from the Black Sea to the Arnaut Mountains. This race is the Slavonic race, and more particularly that branch if it which is resumed under the name of Illyrian (Ilirski), or South Slavonian (Yugoslavyanski). After the Western Slavonian (Polish and Bohemian), and Eastern Slavonian (Russian), it forms the third branch of that numerous Slavonic family which for the last twelve hundred years has occupied the East of Europe. These southern Slavonians occupy not only the greater part of Turkey, but also Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia and the South of Hungary. They all speak the same language, which is much akin to the Russian, and by far, to the Western ears, the most musical of all Slavonic tongues. The Croatians and part of the Dalmatians are Roman Catholics; all the remainder belong to the Greek Church. The Roman Catholics use the Latin alphabet, but the followers of the Greek Church write their language in the Cyrillian character, which is also used in the Russian and old Slavonic or Church language. This circumstance, combined with the difference of religion, has contributed to retard any national development embracing the whole South Slavonic territory. A man in Belgrade may not be able to read a book printed in his own language at Agram or Petch, he may object even to take it up, on account of the "heterodox" alphabet and orthography used therein; while he will have little difficulty in reading and understanding a book printed at Moscow in the Russian language, because the two idioms, particularly in the old Slavonic etymological system of orthography, look very much alike, and because the book is printed in the "orthodox" *(pravoslavni)* alphabet. The mass of the Greek Slavonians will not even

have their Bible, liturgies, and prayer-books printed in their own country, because they are convinced that there is a peculiar correctness and orthodoxy and odour of sanctity about anything printed in holy Moscow or in the imperial printing establishment of St. Petersburg. In spite of all the Panslavistic efforts of Agram and Prague enthusiasts, the Servian, the Bulgarian, the Bosnian Rayah, the Slavonian peasant of Macedonia and Thracia, has more national sympathy, more points of contact, more means of intellectual intercourse with the Russian than with the Roman Catholic South Slavonian who speaks the same language. Whatever may happen, he looks to St. Petersburg for the advent of the Messiah who is to deliver him from all evil; and if he calls Constantinople his *Czarigrad,* or Imperial City, it is as much in anticipation of the orthodox Czar coming from the north and entering it to restore the true faith, as in recollection of the orthodox Czar who held it before the Turks overran the city.

Subjected in the greater part of Turkey to the direct rule of the Turk, but under local authorities of their own choice, partly (in Bosnia) converted to the faith of the conqueror, the Slavonian race has, in that country, maintained or conquered political existence in two localities. The one is Servia, the valley of the Morava, a province with well-defined natural lines of frontier, which played an important part in the history of these regions six hundred years ago. Subdued for a while by the Turks, the Russian War of 1809 gave it a chance of obtaining a separate existence, though under the Turkish supremacy. It has remained ever since under the immediate protection of Russia. But, as in Moldavia and Wallachia, political existence has brought new wants, and forced upon Servia an increased intercourse with Western Europe. Civilization began to take root, trade extended, new ideas sprang up, and thus we find in the very heart and stronghold of Russian influence, in Slavonic or orthodox Servia, an anti-Russian Progressive party (of course very modest in its demands of reform), headed by the ex-Minister of Finances, Garaschanin.

There is no doubt that, should the Greco-Slavonian population ever obtain the mastery in the land which it inhabits, and where it forms three-fourths of the whole population (seven millions), the same necessities would by-and-by give birth to an anti-Russian Progressive party, the existence of which has been hitherto the inevitable consequence of any portion of it having become semi-detached from Turkey.

In Montenegro we have not a fertile valley with comparatively large cities, but a barren mountain country difficult of access. Here a set

of robbers have fixed themselves, scouring the plains, and storing their plunder in their mountain fastnesses. These romantic but rather uncouth gentlemen have long been a nuisance in Europe, and it is but in keeping with the policy of Russia and Austria that they should stick up for the rights of the Black Mountain people (Tserno-Gorgi) to burn down villages, burn the inhabitants, and carry off the cattle.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* APRIL 11, 1853.—In ancient Greece an orator who was paid to remain silent was said to have an *ox on his tongue*. The *ox,* be it remarked, was a silver coin imported from Egypt. With regard to *The Times,* we may say that, during the whole period of the revived Eastern Question, it also had an ox on its tongue, if not for remaining silent, at least for speaking.

* * *

There is no doubt that the Russian bear will not draw in his paws until he is assured of a momentary *entente cordiale* between England and France. Now mark the following wonderful coincidence. On the very day when *The Times* was trying to persuade my lords Aberdeen and Clarendon that the Turkish affair was a mere squabble between France and Russia, the *roi des drôles,* as Guizot used to call him, M. Granier de Cassagnac, happened to discover in the *Constitutionnel* that it was nothing but a quarrel between Lord Palmerston and the Czar. Truly, when we read these papers, we understand the Greek orators with Macedonian oxen on their tongues at the times when Demosthenes fulminated his Phillipics.

As for the British aristocracy, represented by the Coalition Ministry, they would, if need be, sacrifice the national English interests to their particular class interests, and permit the consolidation of a juvenile despotism in the East in the hopes of finding a support for their valetudinarian oligarchy in the West. As to Louis Napoleon, he is hesitating. All his predilections are on the side of the autocrat whose system of governing he has introduced into France; and all his antipathies are against England, whose parliamentary system he has destroyed there. Besides, if he permits the Czar's plundering in the East, the Czar will perhaps permit him to plunder in the West. On the other hand, he is quite sure of the feelings of the Holy Alliance with regard to the "parvenu Khan." Accordingly he observes an ambiguous policy, striving to dupe the great powers of Europe as he duped the

parliamentary parties of the French National Assembly. While fraternizing ostentatiously with the English Ambassador for Turkey, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he simultaneously cajoles the Russian Princess de Lieven with the most flattering promises, and sends to the court of the Sultan M. De la Cour, a warm advocate of an Austro-French alliance, in contradistinction to an Anglo-French one. He orders the Toulon fleet to sail to the Grecian waters, and then announces the day afterward, in the *Moniteur,* that this had been done without any previous communication with England. While he orders one of his organs, the *Pays,* to treat the Eastern Question as most important to France, he allows the statement of his other organ, the *Constitutionnel,* that Russian, Austrian and English interests are at stake in this question, but that France has only a very remote interest in it, and is therefore in a wholly independent position. Which will outbid the other, Russia or England? That is the question with him.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* APRIL 12, 1853.—We are astonished that in the current discussion of the Oriental question the English journals have not more boldly demonstrated the vital interests which should render Great Britain the earnest and unyielding opponent of the Russian projects of annexation and aggrandizement. England cannot afford to allow Russia to become the possessor of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Both commercially and politically such an event would be a deep if not a deadly blow at British power. This will appear from a simple statement of facts as to her trade with Turkey.

Before the discovery of the direct route to India, Constantinople was the mart of an extensive commerce; and even now, though the products of India find their way into Europe by the overland route through Persia, Teheran, and Turkey, yet the Turkish ports carry a very important and rapidly increasing traffic both with Europe and the interior of Asia. To understand this it is only necessary to look at the map. From the Black Forest to the sandy heights of Novgorod Veliki, the whole inland country is drained by rivers flowing into the Black or Caspian Seas. The Danube and the Volga, the two giant rivers of Europe, the Dniester, Dnieper, and Don, all form so many natural channels for the carriage of inland produce to the Black Sea—for the Caspian itself is only accessible through the Black Sea. Two-thirds of Europe—that is, a part of Germany and Poland, all Hungary, and the most fertile parts of Russia, besides Turkey in Europe—are thus

naturally referred to the Euxine for the export and exchange of their produce; and the more so as all these countries are essentially agricultural, and the great bulk of their products must always make water carriage the predominant means of transport. The corn of Hungary, Poland, Southern Russia, the wool and the hides of the same countries, appear in yearly increasing quantities in our Western markets, and they are all shipped at Galatz, Odessa, Taganrog, and other Euxine ports. Then there is another important branch of trade carried on in the Black Sea. Constantinople, and particularly Trebizond, in Asiatic Turkey, are the chief marts of the caravan trade to the interior of Asia, to the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, to Persia and Turkestan. This trade, too, is rapidly increasing. The Greek and Armenian merchants of the two towns just named import large quantities of English manufactured goods, the low price of which is rapidly superseding the domestic industry of the Asiatic harems. Trebizond is better situated for such trade than any other point. It has in its rear the hills of Armenia, which are far less impassable than the Syrian desert, and it lies at a convenient proximity to Bagdad, Schiraz, and Teheran, which latter place serves as an intermediate mart for the caravans from Khiva and Bokhara. How important this trade, and the Black Sea trade generally, is becoming may be seen at the Manchester Exchange, where dark-complexioned Greek buyers are increasing in numbers and importance, and where Greek and South Slavonian dialects are heard along with German and English.

The trade of Trebizond is also becoming a matter of most serious political consideration, as it has been the means of bringing the interests of Russia and England anew into conflict in inner Asia. The Russians had, up to 1840, an almost exclusive monopoly of the trade in foreign manufactured goods to that region. Russian goods were found to have made their way, and, in some instances, even to be preferred to English goods, as far down as the Indus. Up to the time of the Afghan War, the conquest of Sindh and the Punjab, it may be safely asserted that the trade of England with inner Asia was nearly nil. The fact is now different. The supreme necessity of a never-ceasing expansion of trade—the *fatum* which spectre-like haunts modern England, and, if not appeased at once, brings on these terrible revulsions which vibrate from New York to Canton, and from St. Petersburg to Sidney—this inflexible necessity has caused the interior of Asia to be attacked from two sides by English trade: from the Indus and from the Black Sea; and although we know very little of the exports of Russia to that part

of the world, we may safely conclude from the increase of English exports to that quarter that the Russian trade in that direction must have sensibly fallen off. The commercial battlefield between England and Russia has been removed from the Indus to Trebizond, and the Russian trade, formerly venturing out as far as the limits of England's Eastern Empire, is now reduced to the defensive on the very verge of its own line of custom-houses. The importance of this fact with regard to any future solution of the Eastern Question, and to the part which both England and Russia may take in it, is evident. They are, and always must be, antagonists in the East.

But let us come to a more definite estimate of the Black Sea trade. According to *The London Economist,* the British exports to the Turkish dominions, including Egypt and the Danubian Principalities, were:

In 1840	£1,440,592
In 1842	2,068,342
In 1844	3,271,333
In 1846	2,707,571
In 1848	3,626,241
In 1850	3,762,480
In 1851	3,548,595

Of these amounts, at least, two-thirds must have gone to ports in the Black Sea, including Constantinople. And all this rapidly increasing trade depends upon the confidence that may be placed in the Power which rules the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the keys to the Black Sea. Whoever holds these can open and shut at his pleasure the passage into this last recess of the Mediterranean. Let Russia once come into possession of Constantinople, who will expect her to keep open the door by which England has invaded her commercial domain?

So much for the commercial importance of Turkey, and especially the Dardanelles. It is evident that not only a very large trade, but the principal intercourse of Europe with Central Asia, and, consequently, the principal means of re-civilizing that vast region, depends upon the uninterrupted liberty of trading through these gates to the Black Sea.

Now for the military considerations. The commercial importance of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus at once makes them first-rate military positions; that is, positions of decisive influence in any war. Such a point is Gibraltar, and such is Helsingor on the Sound. But the Dardanelles are, from the nature of their locality, even more im-

portant. The cannons of Gibraltar or Helsingor cannot command the whole of the strait on which they are situated, and they require the assistance of a fleet in order to close it; while the narrowness of the strait at the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus is such that a few properly erected and well-armed fortifications, such as Russia, once in possession, would not tarry an hour to erect, might defy the combined fleets of the world if they attempted a passage. In that case, the Black Sea would be more properly a Russian Lake than even the Lake of Ladoga, situated in its very heart. The resistance of the Caucasians would be starved out at once; Trebizond would be a Russian port; the Danube a Russian river. Besides, when Constantinople is taken, the Turkish Empire is cut in two. Asiatic and European Turkey have no means of communicating with or supporting each other; and while the strength of the Turkish army, repulsed into Asia, is utterly harmless, Macedonia, Thessaly, Albania, outflanked and cut off from the main body, will not put the conqueror to the trouble of subduing them; they will have nothing left but to beg for mercy and for an army to maintain internal order.

But having come thus far on the way to universal empire, is it probable that this gigantic and swollen Power will pause in its career? Circumstances, if not her own will, forbid it. With the annexation of Turkey and Greece she has excellent seaports, while the Greeks furnish skillful sailors for her navy. With Constantinople, she stands on the threshold of the Mediterranean; with Durazzo and the Albanian coast from Antivari to Arta, she is in the very center of the Adriatic; within sight of the British Ionian Islands, and within thirty-six hours' steaming of Malta. Flanking the Austrian dominions on the north, east, and south, Russia will already count the Hapsburgs among her vassals. And then, another question is possible, is even probable. The broken and undulating western frontier of the Empire, ill-defined in respect of natural boundaries, would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Dantzic, or perhaps Stettin, to Trieste. And as sure as conquest follows conquest, and annexation follows annexation, so sure would the conquest of Turkey by Russia be only the prelude for the annexation of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and for the ultimate realization of the Slavonic Empire which certain fanatical Panslavistic philosophers have dreamed of.

Russia is decidedly a conquering nation, and was so for a century, until the great movement of 1789 called into potent activity an antagonist of formidable nature. We mean the European Revolution, the

explosive force of democratic ideas and man's native thirst for freedom. Since that epoch there have been in reality but two powers on the continent of Europe—Russia and Absolutism, the Revolution and Democracy. For the moment the Revolution seems to be suppressed, but it lives and is feared as deeply as ever. Witness the terror of the reaction at the news of the late rising at Milan. But let Russia get possession of Turkey, and her strength is increased nearly half, and she becomes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such an event would be an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary cause. The maintenance of Turkish independence, or, in case of a possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the arrest of the Russian scheme of annexation, is a matter of the highest moment. In this instance the interests of the revolutionary Democracy and of England go hand in hand. Neither can permit the Czar to make Constantinople one of his capitals, and we shall find that when driven to the wall, the one will resist him as determinedly as the other.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* APRIL 19, 1853.—It is only of late that people in the west of Europe and in America have been enabled to form anything like a correct judgment of Turkish affairs. Up to the Greek insurrection Turkey was, to all intents and purposes, a *terra incognita,* and the common notions floating about among the public were based more upon the Arabian Nights' Entertainment than upon any historical facts. Official diplomatic functionaries, having been on the spot, boasted a more accurate knowledge; but this, too, amounted to nothing, as none of these officials ever troubled himself to learn Turkish, South Slavonian, or modern Greek, and they were one and all dependent upon the interested accounts of Greek interpreters and Frank merchants. Besides, intrigues of every sort were always on hand to occupy the time of these lounging diplomatists, among whom Joseph von Hammer, the German historian of Turkey, forms the only honourable exception. The business of these gentlemen was not with the people, the institutions, the social state of the country: it was exclusively with the court, and especially with the Fanariote Greeks, wily mediators between two parties, either of which was equally ignorant of the real condition, power, and resources of the other. The traditional notions and opinions, founded upon such paltry information, formed for a long while and strange to say, form to a great extent, even now, the groundwork for all the action of Western diplomacy with regard to Turkey.

But while England, France, and, for a long time, even Austria, were groping in the dark for a defined Eastern policy, another Power outwitted them all. Russia, herself semi-Asiatic, in her condition, manners, traditions, and institutions, found men enough who could comprehend the real state and character of Turkey. Her religion was the same as that of nine-tenths of the inhabitants of Turkey in Europe; her language almost identical with that of seven millions of Turkish subjects; and the well-known facility with which a Russian learns to converse in, if not fully to appropriate, a foreign tongue made it an easy matter for her agents, well paid for the task, to acquaint themselves completely with Turkish affairs. Thus at a very early period the Russian Government availed itself of its exceedingly favourable position in the south-east of Europe. Hundreds of Russian agents perambulated Turkey, pointing out to the Greek Christians the orthodox Emperor as the head, the natural protector, and the ultimate liberator of the oppressed Eastern Church, and to the South Slavonians especially, pointing out that same emperor as the almighty Czar, who was sooner or later to unite all the branches of the great Slav race under one sceptre, and to make them the ruling race of Europe. The clergy of the Greek Church very soon formed themselves into a vast conspiracy for the spread of these ideas. The Servian insurrection of 1809, the Greek rising in 1821, were more or less directly urged on by Russian gold and Russian influence; and wherever among the Turkish pashas the standard of revolt was raised against the Central Government Russian intrigues and Russian funds were never wanting; and when thus internal Turkish questions had entirely perplexed the understanding of Western diplomatists, who knew no more about the real subject than about the man in the moon, then war was declared, Russian armies marched toward the Balkans, and portion by portion the Ottoman Empire was dismembered.

It is true that during the last thirty years much has been done toward general enlightenment concerning the state of Turkey. German philologists and critics have made us acquainted with its history and literature; English residents and English trade have collected a great deal of information as to the social condition of the Empire. But the diplomatic wiseacres seem to scorn all this, and to cling as obstinately as possible to the traditions engendered by the study of Eastern fairy-tales, improved upon by the no less wonderful accounts given by the most corrupt set of Greek mercenaries that ever existed.

And what has been the natural result? That in all essential points

Russia has steadily, one after another, gained her ends, thanks to the ignorance, dullness, and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of Western Governments. From the battle of Navarino to the present Eastern crisis, the action of the Western Powers has either been annihilated by squabbles among themselves—mostly arising from their common ignorance of Eastern matters, and from petty jealousies which must have been entirely incomprehensible to any Eastern understanding —or that action has been in the direct interest of Russia alone. And not only do the Greeks, both of Greece and Turkey, and the Slavonians, look to Russia as their natural protector; nay, even the Government at Constantinople, despairing, time after time, to make its actual wants and real position understood by these Western ambassadors, who pride themselves upon their own utter incompetency to judge by their own eyes of Turkish matters, this very Turkish Government has, in every instance, been obliged to throw itself upon the mercy of Russia, and to seek protection from that Power which openly avows its firm intention to drive every Turk across the Bosphorus, and plant the cross of St. Andrew upon the minarets of the Aya-Sofiyah.

In spite of diplomatic tradition, these constant and successful encroachments of Russia have at last roused in the Western cabinets of Europe a very dim and distant apprehension of the approaching danger. This apprehension has resulted in the great diplomatic nostrum, that the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey is a necessary condition of the peace of the world. The magniloquent incapacity of certain modern statesmen could not have confessed its ignorance and helplessness more plainly than in this axiom which, from always having remained a dead letter, has, during the short period of twenty years, been hallowed by tradition, and become as hoary and indisputable as King John's Magna Carta. Maintain the *status quo!* Why, it was precisely to maintain the *status quo* that Russia stirred up Servia to revolt, made Greece independent, appropriated to herself the protectorate of Moldavia and Wallachia, and retained part of Armenia! England and France never stirred an inch when all this was done, and the only time they did move was to protect, in 1849, not Turkey, but the Hungarian refugees. In the eyes of European diplomacy, and even of the European press, the whole Eastern Question resolves itself into this dilemma; either the Russians at Constantinople, or the maintenance of the *status quo*—anything besides this alternative never enters their thoughts.

Look at the London press for illustration. We find *The Times*

advocating the dismemberment of Turkey, and proclaiming the unfitness of the Turkish race to govern any longer in that beautiful corner of Europe. Skillful, as usual, *The Times* boldly attacks the old diplomatic tradition of the *status quo,* and declares its continuance impossible. The whole of the talent at the disposal of that paper is exerted to show this impossibility under different aspects, and to enlist British sympathies for a new crusade against the remnant of the Saracens. The merit of such an unscrupulous attack upon a time-hallowed and unmeaning phrase which two months ago was as yet sacred to *The Times* is undeniable. But whoever knows that paper knows also that this unwonted boldness is applied directly in the interest of Russia and Austria. The correct premises put forth in its columns as to the utter impossibility of maintaining Turkey in its present state serve no other purpose than to prepare the British public and the world for the moment when the principal paragraph of the will of Peter the Great—the conquest of the Bosphorus—will have become an accomplished fact.

The opposite opinion is represented by *The Daily News,* the organ of the Liberals. *The Times,* at least, seizes a new and correct feature of the question, in order afterwards to pervert it to an interested purpose. In the columns of the Liberal journal, on the other hand, reigns the plainest sense, but merely a sort of *household sense.* Indeed, it does not see farther than the very threshold of its own house. It clearly perceives that a dismemberment of Turkey *under the present circumstances* must bring the Russians to Constantinople, and that this would be a great misfortune for England; that it would threaten the peace of the world, ruin the Black Sea trade, and necessitate new armaments in the British stations and fleets of the Mediterranean. And in consequence *The Daily News* exerts itself to arouse the indignation and fear of the British public. Is not the partition of Turkey a crime equal to the partition of Poland? Have not the Christians more religious liberty in Turkey than in Austria and Russia? Is not the Turkish Government a mild, paternal Government, which allows the different nations and creeds and local corporations to regulate their own affairs? Is not Turkey a paradise compared with Austria and Russia? Are not life and property safe there? And is not British trade with Turkey larger than that with Austria and Russia put together, and does it not increase every year? And then goes on in dithyrambic strain, so far as *The Daily News* can be dithyrambic, with an apotheosis of Turkey, the Turks, and everything Turkish, which must appear quite incomprehensible to most of its readers.

The key to this strange enthusiasm for the Turks is to be found in the works of David Urquhart, Esq., M.P. This gentleman, of Scotch birth, with mediaeval and patriarchal recollections of home, and with a modern British civilized education, after having fought three years in Greece against the Turks, passed into their country and was the first thus to enamour himself of them. The romantic Highlander found himself at home again in the mountain ravines of the Pindus and Balkans, and his works on Turkey, although full of valuable information, may be summed up in the following three paradoxes, which are laid down almost literally thus: If Mr. Urquhart were not a British subject, he would decidedly prefer being a Turk; if he were not a Presbyterian Calvinist, he would not belong to any other religion than Islamism; and thirdly, Britain and Turkey are the only two countries in the world which enjoy self-government and civil and religious liberty. This same Urquhart has since become the great Eastern authority for all English Liberals who object to Palmerston, and it is he who supplies *The Daily News* with the materials for these panegyrics upon Turkey.

The only argument which deserves a moment's notice upon this side of the question is this: "It is said that Turkey is decaying; but where is the decay? Is not civilization rapidly spreading in Turkey and trade extending? Where you see nothing but decay our statistics prove nothing but progress." Now it would be a great fallacy to put down the increasing Black Sea trade to the credit of Turkey alone; and yet this is done here, exactly as if the industrial and commercial capabilities of Holland, the high road to the greater part of Germany, were to be measured by her gross exports and imports, nine-tenths of which represent a mere transit. And yet, what every statistician would immediately, in the case of Holland, treat as a clumsy concoction, the whole of the Liberal press of England, including the learned *Economist,* tries, in the case of Turkey, to impose upon public credulity. And then, who are the traders in Turkey? Certainly not the Turks. Their way of promoting trade, when they were yet in their original nomadic state, consisted in robbing caravans; and now that they are a little more civilized it consists in all sorts of arbitrary and oppressive exactions. Remove all the Turks out of Europe, and trade will have no reason to suffer. And as to progress in general civilization, who are they that carry out that progress in all parts of European Turkey? Not the Turks, for they are few and far between, and can hardly be said to be settled anywhere except in Constantinople and two or three small

country districts. It is the Greek and Slavonic middle class in all the towns and trading posts who are the real support of whatever civilization is effectually imported into the country. That part of the population is constantly rising in wealth and influence, and the Turks are more and more driven into the background. Were it not for their monopoly of civil and military power they would soon disappear. But that monopoly has become impossible for the future, and their power is turned into impotence except for obstructions in the way of progress. The fact is, they must be got rid of. To say that they cannot be got rid of except by putting Russians and Austrians in their place means as much as to say that the present political constitution of Europe will last for ever. Who will make such an assertion?

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JUNE 9, 1853.—On Saturday last dispatches were received by telegraph from Brussels and Paris with news from Constantinople to May 13. Immediately after their arrival a Cabinet Council was held at the Foreign Office, which sat three hours and a half. On the same day orders were sent by telegraph to the Admiralty at Portsmouth, directing the departure of two steam-frigates—the *London,* 90, and *Sanspareil,* 71—from Spithead for the Mediterranean. The *Highflyer* steam-frigate, 21, and *Oden* steam-frigate, 16, are also under orders for sea.

What were the contents of these dispatches which threw the ministers into so sudden an activity, and interrupted the quiet dullness of England?

You know that the question of the Holy Shrines had been settled to the satisfaction of Russia; and, according to the assurances of the Russian Embassy at Paris and London, Russia asked for no other satisfaction than a priority share in those Holy Places. The objects of Russian diplomacy were merely of such a chivalric character as were those of Frederic Barbarossa and Richard Coeur de Lion. This, at least, we were told by *The Times.* "But," says the *Journal des Débats,* "on the 5th of May the Russian steam-frigate *Bessarabia* arrived from Odessa, having on board a Russian colonel with dispatches from Prince Mentschikoff; and on Saturday, 7th inst., the Prince handed to the Ministers of the Porte the draught of a convention or special treaty in which the new demands and pretensions were set forth. This is the document called the ultimatum, since it was accompanied by a very brief note, fixing Tuesday, 10th May, as the last day on which the

refusal or acceptance of the Divan could be received. The note terminated in nearly the following words: 'If the Sublime Porte should think proper to respond by refusal, the Emperor would be compelled to see in that act a complete want of respect for his person, and for Russia, and would receive intelligence of it with *profound regret.*'"

The principal object of this treaty was to secure to the Emperor of Russia the Protectorate of all Greek Christians subject to the Porte. By the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, concluded at the close of the 18th century, a Greek chapel was allowed to be erected at Constantinople, and the privilege was granted to the Russian Embassy of interfering in cases of collision between the priests of that chapel and the Turks. This privilege was confirmed again in the Treaty of Adrianople. What Prince Mentschikoff now demands is the conversion of the exceptional privilege into the general Protectorate of the whole Greek Church in Turkey, i.e., of the vast majority of the population of Turkey in Europe. Besides, he asks that the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as the Metropolitan Archbishops, shall be immovable, unless proved guilty of high treason (against the Russians), and then only upon the consent of the Czar; in other words, he demands the resignation of the Sultan's sovereignty into the hands of Russia.

This was the news brought by the telegraph on Saturday; firstly, that Prince Mentschikoff had granted a further delay—until 14th inst. —for the answer to his *ultimatum;* that then a change in the Turkish Ministry ensued, Reschid Pasha, the antagonist of Russia, being appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fuad Effendi reinstated in his office; lastly, that the *Russian ultimatum had been rejected.*

It would have been impossible for Russia to make more extensive demands upon Turkey after a series of signal victories. This is the best proof of the obstinacy with which she clings to her inveterate notion—that every inter-regnum of the counterrevolution in Europe constitutes a right for her to exact concessions from the Ottoman Empire. And, indeed, since the first French Revolution Continental retrogression has ever been identical with Russian progress in the East. But Russia is mistaken in confounding the present state of Europe with its condition after the congresses of Laibach and Verona, or even after the peace of Tilsit. Russia herself is more afraid of the revolution that must follow any general war on the Continent than the Sultan is afraid of the aggression of the Czar. If the other Powers hold firm, Russia is sure to retire in a very decent manner. Yet, be this as it may,

her late maneuvers have, at all events, imparted a mighty impetus to the elements engaged in disorganizing Turkey from within. The only question is this: Does Russia act on her own free impulse, or is she but the unconscious and reluctant slave of the modern *fatum,* Revolution. I believe the latter alternative.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JUNE 14, 1853.—Admiral Corry's fleet has been seen in the Bay of Biscay on the way to Malta, where it is to reinforce the squadron of Admiral Dundas. *The Morning Herald* justly observes: "Had Admiral Dundas been permitted to join the French squadron at Salamis, several weeks ago, the present state of affairs would be quite different."

Should Russia attempt, were it only for the salvation of appearances to back up the ridiculous demonstrations of Mentschikoff by actual maneuvers of war, her first two steps would probably consist in the re-occupation of the Danubian Principalities, and in the invasion of the Armenian province of Kars and the port of Batum, territories which she made every effort to secure by the Treaty of Adrianople. The port of Batum being the only safe refuge for ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea, its possession would deprive Turkey of her last naval station in the Pontus and make the latter an exclusively Russian Sea. This port added to the possession of Kars, the richest and best cultivated portion of Armenia, would enable Russia to cut off the commerce of England with Persia by way of Trebizond, and afford a basis of operations against the latter Power, as well as against Asia Minor. If, however, England and France hold firm, Nicholas will no more carry out his projects in that quarter, than the Empress Catherine carried out hers against Aga Mahmed, when he commanded his slaves to drive the Russian Ambassador Voinovitch and his companions with scourges to their ships, away from Asterabad.

In no quarter did the latest news create greater consternation than in Printing-House Square. The first attempt made by *The Times* to lift up its head under the terrible blow was a desperate diatribe against the electric telegraph, that "most extraordinary" instrument. "No correct conclusions could be drawn," it exclaimed, "from that mendacious wire." Having thus laid its own incorrect conclusions to the fault of the electric wire, *The Times,* after the statement of Ministers in Parliament, endeavours now also to get rid of its ancient "correct" promises. It says:

"Whatever may be the ultimate fate of the Ottoman Empire, or rather of that Mohammedan Power which has ruled it for four centuries, there can be no difference of opinion between ALL parties in this country and in Europe, that the gradual progress of the indigenous Christian population toward civilization and independent government is the interest of the world, and that these races of men ought never to be suffered to fall under the yoke of Russia and to swell her gigantic dominions. On that point we confidently hope, that the resistance offered to these pretensions of Russia, would be not only that of Turkey, but of all Europe; and this spirit of annexation and aggrandizement needs but to display itself in its true shape to excite universal antipathy and an insurmountable opposition, in which the Greek and Slavonian subjects of Turkey are themselves prepared to take a great part."

How did it happen that the poor *Times* believed in the "good faith" of Russia toward Turkey, and her "antipathy" against all aggrandizement? The good will of Russia toward Turkey! Peter I proposed to raise himself on the ruins of Turkey. Catherine persuaded Austria, and called upon France, to participate in the proposed dismemberment of Turkey, and the establishment of a Greek Empire at Constantinople, under her grandson who had been educated and even named with a view to this result. Nicholas, more moderate, only demands the *exclusive Protectorate* of Turkey. Mankind will not forget that Russia was the *protector* of Poland, the *protector* of the Crimea, the *protector* of Courland, the *protector* of Georgia, Mingrelia, the Circassian and Caucasian tribes. And now Russia, the protector of Turkey! As to Russia's antipathy against aggrandizement, I allege the following facts from a mass of the acquisitions of Russia since Peter the Great.

The Russian frontier has advanced:—

Towards Berlin, Dresden and Vienna about	700 miles
Towards Constantinople	500 miles
Towards Stockholm	630 miles
Towards Teheran	1,000 miles

Russia's acquisitions from Sweden are greater than what remains of that Kingdom; from Poland, nearly equal to the Austrian Empire; from Turkey in Europe, greater than Prussia (exclusive of the Rhenish Provinces); from Turkey in Asia, as large as the whole dominion of Germany proper; from Persia, equal to England; from Tartary, to an extent as large as European Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain, taken

together. The total acquisitions of Russia during the last sixty years are equal in extent and importance to the whole Empire she had in Europe before that time.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* APRIL 15, 1854.—In order to understand both the nature of the relations between the Turkish Government and the spiritual authorities of Turkey, and the difficulties in which the former is at present involved with respect to the question of a protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, that question which ostensibly lies at the bottom of all the actual complications in the East, it is necessary to cast a retrospective glance at its past history and development.

The Koran and the Mussulman legislation emanating from it reduce the geography and ethnography of the various peoples to the simple and convenient distinction of two nations and of two countries; those of the Faithful and of the Infidels. The Infidel is *"harby,"* i.e., the enemy. Islamism proscribes the nation of the Infidels, constituting a state of permanent hostility between the Mussulman and the unbeliever. In that sense the corsair ships of the Berber States were the holy fleet of Islam. How, then, is the existence of Christian subjects of the Porte to be reconciled with the Koran? "If a town," says the Mussulman legislation, "surrenders by capitulation, and its inhabitants consent to become *rayahs,* that is, subjects of a Mussulman prince without abandoning their creed, they have to pay the *kharatch* (capitation tax), when they obtain a truce with the faithful, and it is not permitted any more to confiscate their estates than to take away their houses. . . . In this case their old churches form part of their property, with permission to worship therein. But they are not allowed to erect new ones. They have only authority for repairing them, and to reconstruct their decayed portions. At certain epochs commissaries designated by the provincial governors are to visit the churches and sanctuaries of the Christians, in order to ascertain that no new buildings have been added under guise of repairs. If a town is conquered by force, the inhabitants retain their churches, but only as places of abode or refuge, without permission to worship."

Constantinople having surrendered by capitulation, as in like manner the greater portion of European Turkey, the Christians there enjoy the privileges they have, exclusively by virtue of their agreeing to accept the Mussulman protection. It is, therefore, owing to this cir-

cumstance alone that the Christians submit to be governed by the Mussulmans, according to Mussulman law, and that the Patriarch of Constantinople, their spiritual chief, is at the same time their political representative, and their chief justice. Wherever, in the Ottoman Empire, we find an agglomeration of Greek rayahs, the Archbishops and Bishops are by law members of the Municipal Councils, and, under the direction of the Patriarch, rule over the repartition of the taxes imposed upon the Greeks. The Patriarch is responsible to the Porte as to the conduct of his co-religionists. Invested with the right of judging the rayahs of his Church, he delegates this right to the Metropolitans and Bishops within the limits of their dioceses, their sentences being obligatory for the executive officers, cadis, etc., of the Porte to carry out. The punishments which they have the right to pronounce are fines, imprisonment, bastonado, and exile. Besides, their own Church gives them the power of excommunication. Independent of the produce of the fines, they receive variable taxes on the civil and commercial law-suits. Every hierarchic scale among the clergy has its moneyed price. The Patriarch pays to the Divan a heavy tribute in order to obtain his investiture, but he sells, in his turn, the archbishoprics and bishoprics to the clergy of his worship. The latter indemnify themselves by the sale of subaltern dignities, and the tribute exacted from the popes. These again sell by retail the powers they have bought from their superiors, and traffic in all acts of their ministry, such as baptisms, marriages, divorces, and testaments.

It is evident from this *exposé* that this fabric of theocracy over the Greek Christians of Turkey, and the whole structure of their society, has its keystone in the subjection of the rayahs under the Koran, which, in its turn, by treating them as infidels—i.e., as a nation only in a religious sense—sanctions the combined spiritual and temporal power of their priests. Then, if you abolish their subjection under the Koran, by a civil emancipation, you cancel at the same time their subjection to the clergy, and provoke a revolution in their social, political, and religious relations, which, in the first instance, must inevitably hand them over to Russia. If you supplant the Koran by a *code civil,* you must occidentalize the entire structure of Byzantine society.

Having described the relations between the Mussulman and his Christian subject, the question arises: What are the relations between the Mussulman and the unbelieving foreigner?

As the Koran treats all foreigners as foes, nobody will dare to present himself in a Mussulman country without having taken his

precautions. The first European merchants, therefore, who risked the chances of commerce with such a people, contrived to secure themselves an exceptional treatment and privileges originally personal, but afterwards extended to their whole nation. Hence the origin of capitulations. Capitulations are imperial diplomas, letters of privilege, granted by the Porte to different European nations, and authorizing their subjects to freely enter Mohammedan countries, and there to pursue in tranquillity their affairs, and to practice their worship. They differ from treaties in this essential point, that they are not reciprocal acts, contradictorily debated between the contracting parties, and accepted by them on the condition of mutual advantages and concessions. On the contrary, the capitulations are one-sided concessions on the part of the Government granting them, in consequence of which they may be revoked at its pleasure. The Porte has, indeed, at different times nullified the privileges granted to one nation by extending them to others, or repealed them altogether by refusing to continue their application. This precarious character of the capitulations made them an eternal source of disputes, of complaints on the part of Ambassadors, and of a prodigious exchange of contradictory notes and firmans revived at the commencement of every new reign.

It was from these capitulations that arose the right of a *protectorate* of foreign Powers, not over the Christian subjects of the Porte—the rayahs—but over their co-religionists visiting Turkey, or residing there as foreigners. The first Power that obtained such a protectorate was France. The capitulations between France and the Ottoman Porte made in 1535 under Soliman the Great and Francis I, in 1604 under Ahmet I and Henry IV, and in 1673 under Mustapha II and Louis XIV, were renewed, confirmed, recapitulated, and augmented in the compilation of 1740, called "ancient and recent capitulations and treaties between the Court of France and the Ottoman Porte."

Art. 32 of this agreement constitutes the right of France to a protectorate over all monasteries professing the French religion, to whatever nation they may belong, and over the Frank visitors to the Holy Places.

Russia was the first Power that, in 1774, inserted the capitulation, imitated after the example of France, into a *treaty,* the Treaty of Kainardji. Thus, in 1802, Napoleon thought fit to make the existence and maintenance of the capitulation the subject of an article of treaty, and to give it the character of synallagmatic contract.

In what relation, then, does the question of the Holy Places stand to the Protectorate?

The question of the Holy Shrines is the question of a protectorate over the religious Greek Christian communities settled at Jerusalem, and over the buildings possessed by them on the holy ground, and especially over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. It is to be understood that possession here does not mean proprietorship, which is denied to the Christians by the Koran, but only the right of *usufruct*. This right of *usufruct* excludes by no means the other communities having no other privilege besides that of keeping the keys, of repairing and entering the edifices, of kindling the holy lamp, of cleaning the rooms with the broom, and of spreading the carpets, which is an Oriental symbol of possession. In the same manner now in which Christianity culminates at the Holy Place, the question of the Protectorate is there found to have its highest ascension.

Parts of the Holy Places and of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre are possessed by the Latins, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Abyssinians, the Syrians, and the Copts. Between all these diverse pretendants there originated a conflict. The sovereigns of Europe, who saw in this religious quarrel a question of their respective influences in the Orient, addressed themselves in the first instance to the masters of the soil, to fanatic and greedy pashas, who abused their position. The Ottoman Porte and its agents adopting a most troublesome *système de bascule,* gave judgment in turn favourable to the Latins, Greeks, and Armenians, asking and receiving gold from all hands, and laughing at each of them. Hardly had the Turks granted a firman, acknowledging the right of the Latins to the possession of a contested place, than the Armenians presented themselves with a heavier purse, and instantly obtained a contradictory firman. The same tactics with respect to the Greeks, who knew, besides, as officially recorded in different firmans of the Porte and "*hudgets*" (judgments) of its agents, how to procure false and apocryphal titles. On other occasions the decisions of the Sultan's Government were frustrated by the cupidity and ill-will of the pashas and subaltern agents in Syria. Then it became necessary to resume negotiations, to appoint fresh commissaries, and to make new sacrifices of money. What the Porte formerly did from pecuniary considerations, in our days it has done from fear, with a view to obtain protection and favour. Having done justice to the reclamations of France and the Latins, it hastened to grant the same conditions to

Russia and the Greeks, thus attempting to escape from a storm which it felt powerless to encounter. There is no sanctuary, no chapel, no stone of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, that has been left unturned for the purpose of constituting a quarrel between the different Christian communities.

Around the Holy Sepulchre we find an assemblage of all the various sects of Christianity, behind the religious pretensions of whom are concealed as many political and national rivalries.

Jerusalem and the Holy Places are inhabited by nations professing different religions: the Latins, the Greeks, the Armenians, Copts, Abyssinians, and Syrians. There are 2,000 Greeks, 1,000 Latins, 350 Armenians, 100 Copts, 20 Syrians, and 20 Armenians—3,490. In the Ottoman Empire we find 13,730,000 Greeks, 2,400,000 Armenians, and 900,000 Latins. Each of these is again sub-divided. The Greek Church, of which I treated above, the one acknowledging the Patriarch of Constantinople, essentially differs from the Greco-Russian, whose chief spiritual authority is the Czar, and from the Hellenes, of whom the King and the Synod of Athens are the chief authorities. Similarly, the Latins are sub-divided into the Roman Catholics, United Greeks, and Maronites; and the Armenians into Gregorian and Latin Armenians—the same distinction holding good with the Copts and Abyssinians. The three prevailing religious nationalities at the Holy Places are the Greeks, the Latins, and the Armenians. The Latin Church may be said to represent principally Latin races; the Greek Church, Slav, Turko-Slav, and Hellenic races; and the other Churches, Asiatic and African races.

Imagine all these conflicting peoples beleaguering the Holy Sepulchre, the battle conducted by the monks, and the ostensible object of their rivalry being a star from the grotto of Bethlehem, a tapestry, a key of a sanctuary, an altar, a shrine, a chair, a cushion—any ridiculous precedence! In order to understand such a monastical crusade, it is indispensable to consider, firstly, the manner of their living, and, secondly the mode of their habitation.

"All the religious rubbish of the different nations," says a recent traveller, "live at Jerusalem separated from each other, hostile and jealous, a nomad population, incessantly recruited by pilgrimage or decimated by the plague and oppressions. The European dies or returns to Europe after some years; the Pashas and their guards go to Damascus or Constantinople; and the Arabs fly to the desert. Jerusalem is but a place where everyone arrives to pitch his tent and where nobody

remains. Everybody in the holy city gets his livelihood from his religion—the Greeks or Armenians from the 12,000 to 13,000 pilgrims who yearly visit Jerusalem, and the Latins from the subsidies and alms of their coreligionists of France, Italy, etc."

Besides their monasteries and sanctuaries, the Christian nations possess at Jerusalem small habitations or cells, annexed to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and occupied by the monks who have to watch day and night that holy abode. At certain periods these monks are relieved in their duty by their brethren. These cells have but one door, opening into the interior of the Temple, while the monk guardians receive their food from without, through some wicket. The doors of the church are closed, and guarded by Turks, who do not open them except for money, and close them according to their caprice or cupidity.

The quarrels between Churchmen are the most venomous, said Mazarin. Now fancy these Churchmen, who not only have to live upon, but live in, these sanctuaries together!

To finish the picture, be it remembered that the fathers of the Latin Church, almost exclusively composed of Romans, Sardinians, Neapolitans, Spaniards, and Austrians, are all of them jealous of the French Protectorate, and would like to substitute that of Austria, Sardinia, or Naples, the kings of the two latter countries both assuming the title of King of Jerusalem, and that the sedentary population of Jerusalem numbers about 15,500 souls, of whom 4,000 are Mussulmans and 8,000 Jews. The Mussulmans, forming about a fourth part of the whole, and consisting of Turks, Arabs, and Moors, are, of course, the masters in every respect, as they are in no way affected by the weakness of their Government at Constantinople. Nothing equals the misery and the sufferings of the Jews at Jerusalem, inhabiting the most filthy quarter of the town, called *hareth-el-yahoud,* in the quarter of dirt between the Zion and the Moriah, where their synagogues are situated—the constant objects of Mussulman oppression and intolerance, insulted by the Greeks, persecuted by the Latins, and living only upon the scanty alms transmitted by their European brethren. The Jews, however, are not natives, but from different and distant countries, and are only attracted to Jerusalem by the desire of inhabiting the valley of Jehoshaphat, and dying on the very place where the redemption is to be expected.

To make these Jews more miserable, England and Prussia appointed, in 1840, an Anglican bishop at Jerusalem, whose avowed object is their conversion. He was dreadfully thrashed in 1845, and sneered at alike by Jews, Christians, and Turks. He may, in fact, be

stated to have been the first and only cause of a union between all the religions at Jerusalem.

It will now be understood that the common worship of the Christians at the Holy Places resolves itself into a continuance of desperate Irish rows between the diverse sections of the faithful; that, on the other hand, these sacred rows merely conceal a profane battle, not only of nations but of races; and that the protectorate of the Holy Places, which appears ridiculous to the Occident, but all important to the Orientals, is one of the phases of the Oriental question incessantly reproduced, constantly stifled, but never solved.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* OCTOBER 24, 1854.—The days in which religious considerations were a governing element in the wars of Western Europe are, it seems, long gone by. The Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648, which wound up the Thirty Years' War in Germany, marks the epoch when such questions lost their force and disappeared as a moving cause of international strife. The attitude of the two great Powers of Western Europe in the present war against Russia is a striking illustration of this truth. We there see England, professedly Protestant, allied with France, professedly Catholic ("damnably heretical" as they naturally are in each other's eyes, according to the orthodox phraseology of both), for the purpose of defending Turkey, a Mohammedan Power, against the aggressions of "holy" Russia, a Power Christian like themselves; and though the position of Austria and Prussia is more equivocal than that of England and France, the maintenance of the Mussulman Empire in its integrity against the assaults of its Christian neighbour of the North is an object that has been avowed and guaranteed equally with France and England, by the two great Powers of Christian Germany. Religious considerations are certainly not the influences which restrain these from action against Russia.

To perfectly appreciate this state of things we must call to mind the period of the Crusades, when Western Europe, so late as the thirteenth century, undertook a "holy war" against the "infidel" Turks for the possession of the Holy Sepulchre. Western Europe now not only acquiesces in the Mussulman jurisdiction over the Sepulchre, but goes so far as to laugh at the contests and rivalries of the Greek and Latin monks to obtain undivided possession of a shrine once so much coveted by all Christendom; and when Christian Russia steps forward to "protect" the Christian subjects of the Porte, Western Europe of today

arrays itself in arms against the Czar to thwart a design which it would once have deemed highly laudable and righteous. To drive the Moslems out of Europe would once have roused the zeal of England and France; to prevent the Turks from being driven out of Europe is now the most cherished resolve of those nations. So broad a gulf stands between Europe of the nineteenth and Europe of the thirteenth century! So fallen away since the latter epoch is the political influence of religious dogma.

We have carefully watched for any expression of the purely ecclesiastical view of the European crisis, and have only found one pamphlet by a Cambridge D.D., and one North British Reviewer for England, and the Paris *Univers* for France, which have dogmatically represented the defense of a Mohammedan Power by Christendom as absolutely sinful; and these pronunciamentos have remained without an echo in either country. Whence is this?

From the period of the Protestant Reformation, the upper classes in every European nation, whether it remained Catholic or adopted Protestantism, and especially the statesmen, legists, and diplomatists, began to unfasten themselves individually from all religious relief, and become free-thinkers so-called. This intellectual movement in the higher circles manifested itself without reserve in France from the time of Louis XIV, resulting in the universal predilection for what was denominated Philosophy during the eighteenth century. But when Voltaire found residence in France no longer safe, not because of his opinions, nor because he has given oral expression to them, but because he had communicated them by his writings to the whole reading public, he betook himself to England and testified that he found the *salons* of high life in London still "freer" than those of Paris. Indeed, the men and women of the court of Charles II, Bolingbroke, the Walpoles, Hume, Gibbon, and Charles Fox are names which all suggest a prevalent unbelief in religious dogmas, and a general adhesion to the philosophy of that age on the part of the upper classes, statesmen and politicians of England. This may be called, by way of distinction, the era of aristocratic revolt against ecclesiastical authority. Comte, in one short sentence, has characterized this situation:

"From the opening of the revolutionary period in the 16th century this system of hypocrisy has been more and more elaborated in practice, permitting the emancipation of all minds of a certain bearing, on a tacit condition that they should aid in protracting the submission of the masses. This was eminently the policy of the Jesuits."

This brings us down to the period of the French Revolution, when the masses, firstly of France, and afterwards of all Western Europe, along with a desire for political and social freedom, began to entertain an ever-growing aversion from religious dogma. The total abolition of Christianity, as a recognized institution of State by the French Republican Convention of 1793, and since then the gradual repeal in Western Europe, wherever the popular voice has had power, of religious tests and political and civil disabilities of the same character, together with the Italian movement of 1848, sufficiently announce the well-known direction of the popular mind in Europe. We are still witnesses of this epoch, which may be characterized as the era of democratic revolt against ecclesiastical authority.

But this very movement among the masses since the French Revolution, bound up as it was with the movement for social equality, brought about a violent reaction in favour of church authority in high quarters. Nobility and clergy, lords temporal and lords spiritual, found themselves equally threatened by the popular movement, and it naturally came to pass that the upper classes of Europe threw aside their scepticism in public life and made an outward alliance with the State churches and their systems. This reaction was most apparent in France, first under Bonaparte, and during the Restoration under the elder branch of the Bourbons, but it was not less the case with the rest of Western Europe. In our own day we have seen renewed on a smaller scale this patching up of an alliance offensive and defensive between the upper classes and the ecclesiastical interest. Since the epoch of 1830 the statesmen had begun to manifest anew a spirit of independence towards ecclesiastical control, but the events of 1848 threw them back into the arms of Mother Church. Again France gave the clearest exemplification of this phenomenon. In 1849, when the terror of the Democratic deluge was at its height, Messrs. Thiers, De Hauranne, and the Universitarians (who had passed for Atheists with the clergy), together with the so-called Liberal Opposition, were unanimous in supporting that admirably qualified "saviour of religion," M. Bonaparte, in his project for the violent restoration of the Pope of Rome, while the Whig Ministry of Protestant England, at whose head was a member of the ultra-Protestant family of Russell, were warm in their approval of the same expedition. This religious restoration by such processes was indeed only redeemed from universal ridicule by the extremely critical posture of affairs which, for the moment, in the interest of "order" did

not allow the public men of Europe to indulge in the sense of the ludicrous.

But the submission of the classes of leading social influence to ecclesiastical control, which was hollow and hypocritical at the beginning of this century after the Revolution of 1792, has been far more precarious and superficial since 1848, and is only acknowledged by those classes so far as it suits their immediate political interest. The humiliating position of utter dependence which the ecclesiastical power sustains toward the temporal arm of Government has been made fully manifest since 1848. The Pope indebted to the French Government for his present tenure of the chair of St. Peter; the French clergy, for the sake of their salaries, blessing trees of liberty and proclaiming the sovereignty of the people, and afterwards canonizing the present Emperor of France as the chosen instrument of God and the Saviour of religion, their old proper doctrines of legitimacy, and the divine right of kings being in each case laid aside with the downfall of the corresponding political *régime;* the Anglican clergy, whose *ex officio* head is a temporal Queen, dependent for promotion on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, now generally a Liberal, and looking for favours and support against popular encroachment to Parliament in which the Liberal element is ever on the increase—constitute an *ensemble* from which it would be absurd to expect acts of pure ecclesiastical independence, except in the normally impossible case of an overwhelming popular support to fall back upon.

Such was the position of affairs in 1853, when the governing classes of England and France deemed it necessary and politic to espouse the cause of the Ottoman Porte against the Christian Czar; and that policy was not only sanctioned, but in a measure forced upon them by the popular sentiment of the two nations. Then the Governments of France and England entered upon a policy totally inconsistent with religious considerations, and threw off unhesitatingly their feigned ecclesiastical alliances. Then at length the upperclass current of revolt (which had been so long dissembled) formed a juncture with the broad popular current, and the two together, like the Missouri and the Mississippi, rolled onward a tide of opinion which the ecclesiastical power saw it would be madness to encounter. Beneath this twofold assault the pure ecclesiastical point of view has not dared to manifest itself; while, on the contrary, the state clergy of England, on the appointed day of the national fast and humiliation, had to pray and preach patriotic sermons on behalf of the success of the Crescent and its allies. These considera-

tions seem to afford a rational explanation of two apparent anomalies with which we started; namely, the defence of the Crescent by allied Catholic and Protestant Europe against the assaults of the Cross, as represented by Christian Russia, and the fact that no voice of any influence has been lifted up to denounce to Christendom the novel position in which it is placed.

This coalition between the politicians of Western Europe and the popular opinion in behalf of a purely secular policy, is likely to generate ulterior consequences and to subject ecclesiastical influence to further shocks from its old accomplices, the politicians. It is doubtless owing to the ripeness of the public mind in this respect, that Lord Palmerston ventured to refuse the request of the Edinburgh Presbytery for a day of public fast and humiliation to avert the divine scourge of cholera, the Home Secretary audaciously averring that prayers would be of no consequence unless they cleansed their streets and habitations, and that cholera was generated by natural causes, such as deleterious gases from decomposed vegetable matter. The vain and unscrupulous Palmerston knew that buffeting the clergy would be a cheap and easy way of acquiring popularity, otherwise he would not have ventured on the experiment.

A further evidence of the extreme incompetence of ecclesiastical policy to answer the exigencies of the European situation is found in the consideration that the ecclesiastical view, if logically carried out, would condemn Catholic Europe to entire indifference in the present European crisis; for though it might be permissible for Anglican orthodoxy to side with the Greek Cross against the Turkish Crescent, Catholic Europe could not unite with so impious a denier of the authority of the successor of St. Peter, and so unhallowed a pretender to the highest spiritual functions, as the Czar of Russia, and would apparently have no other opinion to utter than that both the belligerent parties were inspired by Satan!

To complete the disparagement which ecclesiastical authority has undergone in the present European crisis, it is patent to the world that while the advance communities of Western Europe are in a forward stage of ecclesiastical decay, in barbarian Russia, on the other hand, the State Church retains a powerful and undiminished vigour. While Western Europe, discarding religious biases, has advanced in defence of "right against might" and "for the independence of Europe," "holy" Russia has claimed for its war of might against right a religious sanction as a war of the vicegerent of God against the infidel Turks. It is

true that Nesselrode, in his State papers, has never had the assurance in the face of Europe to appeal to the ecclesiastical aspect of the question, and this is in itself a remarkable symptom of the decline of the ecclesiastical sentiment; this method of treatment is reserved by the Russian Court for internal use among the ignorant and credulous Muscovites, and the miracle-pictures, the relics, the crusading proclamations of the Russian generals show how much stress is there laid upon the religious phase of the struggle for inflaming the zeal of the Russian people and army. Even the St. Petersburg journals do not omit to cast in the teeth of France and England the reproach that they are fighting on behalf of the abhorred Crescent, against the religion of the Cross. Such a contrast between religious Russia and secular France and England is worthy of a profound and thorough examination, which we cannot undertake to give it, our object being simply to call to these large, impressive, and novel facts a degree of attention they have not hitherto received. They are facts which perhaps the philosophic and religious historians of the future will alone be able to appreciate at their exact value. They appear, however, to constitute an important step in the great movement of the world towards abrogating absolute authority and establishing the independence of the individual judgment and conscience in the religious as well as the political sphere of life. To defend or attack that movement is not our purpose; our duty is discharged in the simple attestation of its progress.

11
Bluff and Counterbluff (1853)

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JUNE 22, 1853.—All the Russian Generals and other Russians residing at Paris have received orders to return to Russia without delay. The language adopted by M. de Kisseleff, the Russian envoy at Paris, is rather menacing; and letters from Petersburg are ostentatiously shown by him, in which the Turkish question is treated

assez cavalièrement. A rumour has issued from the same quarter, reporting that Russia demands from Persia the cession of the territory of Asterabad, at the south-eastern extremity of the Caspian Sea. Russian merchants, at the same time, despatch, or are *reported* to have despatched, orders to their London agents "*not* to press any sales of grain at the present juncture, as prices were expected to rise in the imminent eventuality of a war." Lastly, confidential hints are being communicated to every newspaper that the Russian troops are marching to the frontier; that the inhabitants of Jassy are preparing for their reception; that the Russian Consul at Galatz has brought up an immense number of trees for the throwing of several bridges across the Danube, and other *canards,* the breeding of which has been so successfully carried on by the *Augsburger Zeitung* and other Austro-Russian journals.

These, and a lot of similar reports, communications, etc., are nothing but so many ridiculous attempts on the part of the Russian agents to strike a wholesome terror into the western world, and to push it to the continuance of that policy of extension, under the cover of which Russia hopes, as heretofore, to carry out her projects upon the East. . . .

* * *

Notwithstanding all these soporifics, administered by Russian diplomacy to the Press and people of England, "that old and obstinate" Aberdeen has been compelled to order Admiral Dundas to join the French fleet on the coast of Turkey; and even *The Times,* which, during the last few months, knew only how to write Russian, seems to have received a more English inspiration. It talks now very big. . . .

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JULY 8, 1853.—In the year 1828, when Russia was permitted to over-run Turkey with war, and to terminate that war by the Treaty of Adrianople, which surrendered to her the whole of the eastern coast of the Black Sea, from Anapa in the north to Poti in the south (except Circassia), and delivered into her possession the islands at the mouth of the Danube, virtually separated Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey, and placed them under Russian supremacy—at that epoch Lord Aberdeen happened to be Minister of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain. In 1853 we find the very same Aberdeen as the chief of the "Composite Ministry" in the same country. This simple fact goes far to explain the overbearing attitude assumed by Russia in her present conflict with Turkey and with Europe.

I told you in my last letter that the storm aroused by the revelations of *The Press,* respecting the secret transactions between Aberdeen, Clarendon, and Baron Brunnow, was not likely to subside under the hair splitting, tortuous and disingenuous pleading of Thursday's *Times. The Times* was even then forced to admit, in a semi-official article, that Lord Clarendon had indeed given his assent to the demands about to be made by Russia on the Porte, but said that the demands as represented in London, and those actually proposed at Constantinople, had turned out to be of quite a different tenor, although the papers communicated by Baron Brunnow to the British Minister purported to be *"literal extracts"* from the instructions forwarded to Prince Mentschikoff. On the following Saturday, however, *The Times* retracted its assertions—undoubtedly in consequence of remonstrances made on the part of the Russian Embassy—and gave Baron Brunnow a testimonial of "perfect candour and faith." *The Morning Herald* of yesterday puts the question "whether Russia had not perhaps given false instructions to Baron Brunnow himself, in order to deceive the British Minister." In the meantime, fresh disclosures, studiously concealed from the public by a corrupt daily Press, have been made, which exclude any such interpretation, throwing the whole blame on the shoulders of the "Composite Ministry," and quite sufficient to warrant the impeachment of Lords Aberdeen and Clarendon before any other Parliament than the present, which is but a paralytic product of dead constituencies artificially stimulated into life by unexampled bribery and intimidation.

It is stated that a communication was made to Lord Clarendon, wherein he was informed that the affair of the Shrines was *not* the *sole object* of the Russian Prince. In that communication the general question was entered into, the question of the Greek Christians of Turkey and of the position of the Emperor of Russia with respect to them under certain treaties. All these points were canvassed, and the course about to be adopted by Russia explicitly stated—the same as detailed in the projected Convention of the 6th of May. Lord Clarendon, with the assent of Lord Aberdeen, in no wise either disapproved or discouraged that course. While matters stood thus in London, Bonaparte sent his fleet to Salamis, public opinion pressed from without, Ministers were interpellated in both Houses, Russell pledged himself to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Turkey, and Prince Mentschikoff threw off the mask at Constantinople. It now became necessary for Lords Aberdeen and Clarendon to initiate the other Ministers into

what had been done, and the Coalition was on the eve of being broken up, as Lord Palmerston, forced by his antecedents, urged a directly opposite line of policy. In order to prevent the dissolution of his Cabinet, Lord Aberdeen finally yielded to Lord Palmerston, and consented to the combined action of the English and French fleets in the Dardanelles. But at the same time, in order to fulfill his engagements toward Russia, Lord Aberdeen intimated through a private despatch to St. Petersburg that he would not look upon the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians as a *casus belli* and *The Times* received orders to prepare public opinion for this new interpretation of international treaties. . . .

* * *

The dissension in the camp of the Coalition Ministry has thus been betrayed to the public by the clamorous dissension in their organs. Palmerston urged upon the Cabinet to hold the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia as a declaration of war, and he was backed up by the Whig and sham-Radical members of the Composite Ministry. Lord Aberdeen, having only consented to the common action of the French and English fleets upon the understanding that Russia would not act at the Dardanelles, but in the Danubian Provinces, was now quite "outwitted." The existence of the Government was again at stake. At last, at the pressing instances of Lord Aberdeen, Palmerston was prepared to give a sullen assent to the unchallenged occupation of the Principalities by Russia, when suddenly a despatch arrived from Paris announcing that Bonaparte had resolved to view the same act as a *casus belli*. The confusion has now reached its highest point.

Now, if this statement be correct—and from our knowledge of Lord Aberdeen's past there is every reason to consider it as such—the whole mystery of the Russo-Turkish tragi-comedy that has occupied Europe for months together is laid bare. We understand at once why Lord Aberdeen would not move the British fleet from Malta. We understand the rebuke given to Colonel Rose for his resolute conduct at Constantinople, the bullying behaviour of Prince Mentschikoff, and the heroic firmness of the Czar, who, conceiving the warlike movements of England as a mere farce, would have been glad to be allowed, by the uncontroverted occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, not only to withdraw from the stage as the "master," but to hold his annual grand maneuvers at the cost and expense of the subjects of the Sultan. We

believe that, if war should break out, it will be because Russia has gone too far to withdraw with impunity to her honour; and above all, we believe her courage to be up to this notch simply because she has all the while counted on England's connivance. . . .

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune*, JULY 25, 1853.—A despatch from Constantinople, dated 26th ult., states: "The Sultan, in consequence of the rumours that the whole Russian fleet has left Sebastopol and is directing its course toward the Bosphorus, has inquired of the Ambassadors of England and France whether, in the event of the Russians making a demonstration before the Bosphorus, the combined fleets are ready to pass the Dardanelles. Both answered in the affirmative. A Turkish steamer, with French and English officers on board, has just been sent from the Bosphorus to the Black Sea in order to *reconnoitre*."

The first thing the Russians did, after their entry into the Principalities, was to prohibit the publication of the Sultan's firman, confirming the privileges of all kinds of Christians, and to suppress a German paper, edited at Bucharest, which had dared to publish an article on the Eastern question. At the same time, they pressed from the Turkish Government the first annuity stipulated for in their former occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, in 1848-49. Since 1828 the Protectorate of Russia has cost the Principalities 150,000,000 piastres, besides the immense losses caused through pillage and devastation. England defrayed the expenses of Russia's wars againt France, France that of her war against Persia, Persia that of her war against Poland; Hungary and the Principalities have now to pay for her war against Turkey.

The most important event of the day is the new Circular Note of Count Nesselrode, dated St. Petersburg, 20th June, 1853. It declares that the Russian armies will not evacuate the Principalities until the Sultan shall have yielded to all the demands of the Czar, and the French and English fleets shall have left the Turkish waters. The Note in question reads like direct scorn of England and France. Thus it says: "The position taken by the two maritime Powers is a maritime occupation which gives us a reason for re-establishing the equilibrium of the reciprocal situations by taking up a military position."

Be it remarked that Besika Bay is at a distance of 150 miles from Constantinople. The Czar claims for himself the right of occupying Turkish territory, while he defies England and France to occupy neutral

waters without his special permission. He extols his own magnanimous forbearance in having left the Porte complete mistress of choosing under what form she will abdicate her sovereignty—whether "convention," sened, or other synallagmatic act, or even under the form of signing a simple note. He is persuaded that "impartial Europe" must understand that the treaty of Kainardji, which gives Russia the right of protecting a single Greek chapel at Stamboul, proclaims her *eo ipso* the Rome of the Orient. He regrets that the West is ignorant of the inoffensive character of a Russian religious Protectorate in foreign countries. He proves his solicitude for the integrity of the Turkish Empire by historical facts—"the very moderate use he made in 1829 of his victory at Adrianople," when he was only prevented from being immoderate by the miserable condition of his army, and by the threat of the English admiral, that, authorized or not authorized, he would bombard every coast-place along the Black Sea; when all he obtained was due to the "forbearance" of the Western Cabinets, and the perfidious destruction of the Turkish fleets at Navarino. "In 1833 he alone in Europe saved Turkey from inevitable dismemberment." In 1833 the Czar concluded, through the famous treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, *a defensive alliance* with Turkey, by which foreign fleets were forbidden to approach Constantinople, by which Turkey was saved only from dismemberment in order to be saved entire for Russia. "In 1839, he took the initiative with the other Powers in the propositions which, executed in common, prevented the Sultan from seeing his throne give place to a new Arabian Empire." That is to say, in 1839 he made the other Powers take the initiative in the destruction of the Egyptian fleet, and in the reduction to impotence of the only man who might have converted Turkey into a vital danger to Russia, and replaced a "dressed-up turban" by a real head. "The fundamental principle of the policy of our august master has always been to maintain, as long as possible, the *status quo* of the East." Just so. He has carefully preserved the decomposition of the Turkish State, under the exclusive guardianship of Russia.

It is granted that a more ironical document the East has never dared to throw in the face of the West. But its author is Nesselrode—a nettle, at once and a rod. It is a document, indeed, of Europe's degradation under the rod of counterrevolution. Revolutionists may congratulate the Czar on this masterpiece. If Europe withdraws, she withdraws not with a simple defeat, but passes, as it were, under *furcae Caudinae*.

12
Traditional Russian Policy (1853)

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JULY 14, 1853.—Since the year 1815 the Great Powers of Europe have feared nothing so much as an infraction of the *status quo.* But any war between any two of those Powers implies subversion of that *status quo.* That is the reason why Russia's encroachments in the East have been tolerated, and why she has never been asked for anything in return but to afford some pretext, however absurd, to the Western Powers, for remaining neutral, and for being saved the necessity of interfering with Russian aggressions. Russia has all along been glorified for the forbearance and generosity of her "august master," who has not only condescended to cover the naked and shameful subserviency of Western Cabinets, but has displayed the magnanimity of devouring Turkey piece after piece, instead of swallowing her at a mouthful. Russian diplomacy has thus rested on the timidity of Western statesmen, and her diplomatic art has gradually sunk into so complete a *mannerism,* that you may trace the history of the present transactions almost literally in the annals of the past.

The hollowness of the new pretexts of Russia is apparent, after the Sultan has granted, in his new firman to the Patriarch of Constantinople, more than the Czar himself had asked for—so far as religion goes.

* * *

Russia proposes now to make an aggressive step and then to talk about it. In 1829 Prince Lieven wrote to Count Nesselrode: "We shall continue to confine ourselves to generalities, for every circumstantial communication on a subject so delicate would draw down real dangers; and once we discuss with our allies the articles of the treaty with the Porte, we shall only content them when they will *imagine* that they have imposed upon us irremediable sacrifices. It is in the midst of our camp that peace must be signed, and it is when it shall have been

concluded that Europe must know its conditions. Remonstrances will then be too late, and it will then patiently suffer what it can no longer prevent."

Russia has now for several months been delaying action under one pretence or another, in order to maintain a state of things which, being neither war nor peace, is tolerable to herself, but ruinous to the Turks. She acted in precisely the same manner in the period we have alluded to. As Pozzo di Borgo said: "It is our policy to see that nothing new happens during the next four months, and I hope we shall accomplish it, *because men in general prefer waiting;* but the fifth must be fruitful in events."

The Czar, after having inflicted the greatest indignities on the Turkish Government, and notwithstanding that he now threatens to extort by force the most humiliating concessions, nevertheless raises a great cry about his "friendship for the Sultan Abdul Medjed," and his solicitude "for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire." On the Sultan he throws the "responsibility" of opposing his "just demands," of continuing to "wound his friendship and his feelings," of rejecting his "note," and of declining his "Protectorate."

In 1828, when Pozzo di Borgo was interpellated by Charles X about the bad success of the Russian arms in the campaign of that year, he replied that, not wishing to push the war *à outrance* without absolute necessity, the Emperor had hoped that the Sultan would have profited by his *generosity,* which *experiment* had now failed.

Shortly before commencing her present quarrel with the Porte, Russia sought to bring about a general coalition of the Continental Powers against England on the Refugee Question, and having failed in that experiment, she attempted to bring about a coalition with England against France. Similarly, from 1826 to 1829, she intimidated Austria by the "ambitious projects of Prussia," doing simultaneously all that was in her power to swell the power and pretensions of Prussia, in order to enable her to balance Austria. In her present circular note she indicts Bonaparte as the only disturber of peace by his pretensions respecting the Holy Places; but, at the same time, in the language of Pozzo di Borgo, she attributed "all the agitation that pervaded Europe to the agency of Prince Metternich, and tried to make the Duke of Wellington himself perceive that the deference which he would have to the Cabinet of Vienna would be a drawback to his influence with all the others, and to give such a turn to things that it would be no longer Russia that sought to compromise France with Great Britain,

but Great Britain who had repudiated France, in order to join the Cabinet of Vienna." Russia would now submit to a great humiliation if she retreated. That was identically her situation after the first unsuccessful campaign of 1828. What was then her supreme object? We answer in the words of her diplomatist: "A second campaign is indispensable in order to acquire the superiority requisite for the success of the negotiation. When this negotiation shall take place we must be in a state to dictate the conditions of it in a prompt and rapid manner. . . . *With the power of doing more,* His Majesty would consent to *demand less.* To obtain this superiority appears to me what ought to be the aim of all our efforts. *This superiority has now become a condition of our political existence,* such as we must establish and maintain in the eyes of the world."

But does Russia not fear the common action of England and France? Certainly. In the Secret Memoirs on the means possessed by Russia for breaking up the alliance between France and England, revealed during the reign of Louis Phillippe, we are told: "In the event of a war in which England should coalesce with France, Russia indulges in no hope of success, unless that union be broken up; so that at the least England should consent to remain neutral during the Continental conflict." The question is: Does Russia believe in a common action of England and France? We quote again from Pozzo di Borgo's despatches: "From the moment that the idea of the ruin of the Turkish Empire ceases to prevail, it is not probable that the British Government would risk a general war for the sake of exempting the Sultan acceding to such or such a condition, above all in the state in which things will be at the commencement of the approaching campaign, when everything will be as yet uncertain and undecided. These considerations would authorize the belief that we have no cause to fear an open rupture on the part of Great Britain, and that she will content herself with counselling the Porte to beg peace, and with lending the aid of the good offices in her power during the negotiation if it takes place, without going further, should the Sultan refuse or we persist."

And as to Nesselrode's opinion of the "good" Aberdeen, the Minister of 1828, and the Minister of 1853, it may be well to quote the following from a despatch by Prince Lieven: "Lord Aberdeen reiterated in his interview with me the assurance that at no period had it entered into the intentions of England to seek a quarrel with Russia—that he feared that the position of the English Ministry was not well understood at St. Petersburg—that he found himself in a delicate situation. Public

opinion was always ready to burst forth against Russia. The British Government could not constantly BRAVE it; and it would be dangerous to excite it on questions that touched so nearly the national prejudices. On the other side we could reckon with entire confidence upon the friendly dispositions of the English Ministry which struggled against them."

The only astonishing thing in the note of Count Nesselrode, of June 11, is not "the insolent *mélange* of professions refuted by acts and threats veiled in disclaimers," but the reception Russian diplomatic notes meet with for the first time in Europe, calling forth, instead of the habitual awe and admiration, blushes of shame at the past, and disdainful laughter from the Western world at this insolent amalgamation of pretensions, finesse and real barbarism. Yet Nesselrode's circular note, and the *ultimatissimum* of June 16, are not a bit worse than the so much admired masterpieces of Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Lieven. Count Nesselrode was at their time what he is now—the diplomatic head of Russia. . . .

There is a facetious story told of two Persian naturalists who were examining a bear; the one who had never seen such an animal before, inquired whether that animal dropped its cubs alive or laid eggs; to which the other, who was better informed, replied: "That animal is capable of anything." The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with to be capable of nothing.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* AUGUST 5, 1853.—The Czar has not only commenced war, he has already terminated his first campaign. The line of operations is no longer behind the Pruth, but along the Danube. Meanwhile, what are the Western Powers about? They counsel, i.e. compel, the Sultan to consider the war as peace. Their answers to the acts of the Autocrat are not cannons, but notes. The Emperor is assailed, not by the two fleets, but by no less than four projects of negotiation: one emanating from the English Cabinet, the other from the French, the third presented by Austria, and the fourth improvised by the "brother-in-law" of Potsdam. The Czar, it is hoped, will consent to select from this *embarras de richesses* that which is most suitable to his purposes. The (second) reply of M. Drouyn de l'Huys to the (second) note of Count Nesselrode takes infinite pains to prove that "it was not England and France who made the first demonstration." Russia only throws

out so many notes to the Western diplomats, like bones to dogs, in order to set them at an innocent amusement, while she reaps the advantage of further gaining time. England and France, of course, catch the bait. . . .

The English press has lost all countenance. "The Czar cannot comprehend the courtesy which the Western Powers have shown to him. . . . He is incapable of courteous demeanour in his transactions with other Powers." So says *The Morning Advertiser. The Morning Post* is exasperated because the Czar takes so little note of the internal *embarras* of his opponents:

"To have put forward, in the mere wantonness of insolence, a claim that possessed no character of immediate urgency, and to have done so without any reference to the inflammable state of Europe, was an indiscretion almost incredible."

The writer of the Money Market article in *The Economist* finds out "that men discover now to their cost how inconvenient it is that all the most secret interests of the world [i.e. of the Exchange] are dependent upon the vagaries of one man."

Yet in 1848 and 1849 you could see the bust of the Emperor of Russia side by side with the golden calf itself.

Meanwhile the position of the Sultan is becoming every hour more difficult and complicated. His financial embarrassments increase the more, as he bears all the burdens, without reaping any of the good chances, of war. Popular enthusiasm turns round upon him for want of being directed against the Czar. The fanaticism of the Mussulman threatens him with palace revolutions, while the fanaticism of the Greek menaces him with popular insurrections. The papers of to-day contain reports of a conspiracy directed against the Sultan's life by Mussulman students belonging to the old Turkish party, who wanted to place Abdul-Aziz on the throne.

* * *

To sum up the Eastern Question in a few words. The Czar, vexed and dissatisfied at seeing his immense Empire confined to one sole port of export, and that even situated in a sea unnavigable through one half of the year, and assailable by Englishmen through the other half, is pushing the design of his ancestors, to get access to the Mediterranean; he is separating, one after the other, the remotest members of the Ottoman Empire from its main body, till at last Constantinople, the heart, must cease to beat. He repeats his periodical invasions as often

as he thinks his designs on Turkey endangered by the apparent consolidation of the Turkish Government, or by the more dangerous symptoms of self-emancipation manifest amongst the Slavonians. Counting on the cowardice and apprehensions of the Western Powers, he bullies Europe, and pushes his demands as far as possible, in order to appear magnanimous afterwards, by contenting himself with what he immediately wanted.

The Western Powers, on the other hand, inconsistent, pusillanimous, suspecting each other, commence by encouraging the Sultan to resist the Czar, from fear of the encroachments of Russia, and terminate by compelling the former to yield, from fear of a general war giving rise to a general revolution. Too impotent and too timid to undertake the reconstruction of the Ottoman Empire by the establishment of a Greek Empire, or of a Federal Republic of Slavonic States, all they aim at is to maintain the *status quo,* i.e. the state of putrefaction which forbids the Sultan to emancipate himself from the Czar, and the Slavonians to emancipate themselves from the Sultan.

The revolutionary party can only congratulate itself on this state of things. The humiliation of the reactionary Western Governments, and their manifest impotency to guard the interests of European civilization against Russian encroachment, cannot fail to work out a wholesome indignation in the people who have suffered themselves, since 1849, to be subjected to the rule of counterrevolution. The approaching industrial crisis, also, is affected, and accelerated quite as much by this semi-Eastern complication as by the completely Eastern complication of China. While the prices of corn are rising, business in general is suspended, at the same time that the rate of exchange is setting against England, and gold is beginning to flow to the Continent. The stock of bullion in the Bank of France has fallen off between the 9th of June and the 14th of July to the extent of £2,200,000, which is more than the entire augmentation which had taken place during the preceding three months.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* AUGUST 12, 1853.—"It is our policy to see that nothing new happens during the next four months, and I hope we shall accomplish it, because *men in general prefer waiting;* but the fifth must be fruitful in events."

Thus wrote Count Pozzo di Borgo on the 28th November, 1828, to Count Nesselrode, and Count Nesselrode is now acting on the same

maxim. While the military assumption of the Principalities was completed by the assumption of their civil government by the Russians, while troops after troops are pouring into Bessarabia and the Crimea, a hint has been given to Austria that her mediation might be accepted, and another to Bonaparte that his proposals were likely to meet with a favourable reception from the Czar. The Ministers at Paris and London were comforted with the prospect that Nicholas would condescend to definitely accept their excuses. All the Courts of Europe, transformed into so many Sultanas, were anxiously awaiting which of them the magnanimous Commander of the Faithful would throw his handkerchief to. Having kept them in this manner for weeks, many for months, in suspense, Nicholas suddenly makes the declaration that neither England, nor France, nor Austria, nor Prussia, has any business in his quarrel with Turkey, and that with Turkey alone he could negotiate. It was probably in order to facilitate his negotiations with Turkey that he recalled his Embassy from Constantinople. But while he declares that the Powers are not to meddle in Russia's concerns, we are informed, on the other hand, that the representatives of France, England, Austria, and Prussia kill their time by meeting in conference at Vienna, and in hatching projects for the arrangement of the Eastern Question, neither the Turkish nor Russian Ambassador participating in these mock conferences. The Sultan had appointed, on the 8th inst., a warlike Ministry, in order to escape from his armed suspension, but was compelled by Lord Redcliffe to dismiss it on the same evening. He has now been so much confused that he intends to send an Austrian courier to St. Petersburg with the mission of asking whether the Czar would re-enter into direct negotiations. On the return of that courier and the answer he brings will depend whether Reschid Pasha is himself to go to St. Petersburg. From St. Petersburg he is to send new draft notes to Constantinople; the new draft notes are to be returned to St. Petersburg, and nothing will be settled before the last answer is again returned from St. Petersburg to Constantinople—and then the fifth month will have arrived, and no fleets can enter the Black Sea; and then the Czar will quietly remain during the winter in the Principalities, where he pays with the same promises that still circulate there from his former occupations, and as far back as 1820.

You know that the Servian Minister Garaschanin has been removed at the instance of Russia. Russia insists now, following up that first triumph, on all anti-Russian officers being expelled from the service. This measure, in its turn, was intended to be followd by the reigning

Prince Alexander being replaced by Prince Michael Obrenowich, the absolute tool of Russia and Russian interest. Prince Alexander, to escape from this calamity, and likewise under the pressure of Austria, has struck against the Sultan, and declared his intention of observing a strict neutrality. The Russian intrigues in Servia are thus described in the *Presse* of Paris:

"Everybody knows that the Russian Consulate at Orsova—a miserable village where not a single Russian subject is to be found, but situated in the midst of a Servian population—is only a poor establishment, yet it is made the hotbed of Muscovite propaganda. The hand of Russia was judiciarily seized and established in the affair of Braila in 1840, and of John Lutzo in 1850, in the affair of the recent arrest of fourteen Russian officers, which arrest became the cause of the resignation of Garaschanin's Ministry. It is likewise known that Prince Mentschikoff, during his stay at Constantinople, fomented similar intrigues through his agents at Broussa and Smyrna, to those in Thessalonia, Albania, and Greece."

There is no more striking feature in the politics of Russia than the traditional identity, not only of her objects, but of her manner of pursuing them. There is no complication of the present Eastern Question, no transaction, no official note, which does not bear the stamp of quotation from known pages of history.

Russia has now no other pretext to urge against the Sultan except the treaty of Kainardji, although that treaty gave her, instead of a Protectorate over her co-religionists, only the right to build a chapel at Stamboul, and to implore the Sultan's clemency for his Christian subjects, as Reschid Pasha justly urged against the Czar in his note of the 14th inst. But already in 1774, when that treaty was signed, Russia intended to interpret it one day or the other in the sense of 1853. The then Austrian Internuncio at the Ottoman Porte, Baron Thugut, wrote in the year 1774 to his Court:

"Henceforth Russia will always be in a situation to effect, whenever she may deem the opportunity favourable, and without much preliminary arrangement, a descent upon Constantinople from her ports on the Black Sea. In that case a conspiracy concerted in advance with the chiefs of the Greek religion would no doubt burst forth, and it would only remain for the Sultan to quit his palace at the first intelligence of this movement of the Russians, to fly into the depth of Asia, and abandon the throne of European Turkey to a more experienced possessor. When the capital shall have been conquered, terrorism and the faithful

assistance of the Greek Christians will indubitably and easily reduce beneath the sceptre of Russia, the whole of the Archipelago, the coast of Asia Minor and all Greece, as far as the shore of the Adriatic. Then the possession of these countries, so much favoured by nature, with which no other part of the world can be compared in respect to the fertility and richness of the soil, will elevate Russia to a degree of superiority surpassing all the fabulous wonders which history relates of the grandeurs of the monarchies of ancient times."

In 1774, as now, Russia was tempting the ambition of Austria with the prospect of Bosnia, Servia, and Albania being incorporated with her. The same Baron Thugut writes thus on this subject: "Such aggrandizement of the Austrian territory would not excite the jealousy of Russia. The reason is that the requisition which Austria would make of Bosnia, Servia, etc., although of great importance under other circumstances, would not be of the least utility to Russia, the moment the remainder of the Ottoman Empire should have fallen into her hands. For these provinces are inhabited almost entirely by Mohammedans and Greek Christians: the former would not be tolerated as residents there; the latter, considering the close vicinity of the Oriental Russian Empire, would not hesitate to emigrate thither; or if they remained their faithlessness to Austria would occasion continuous troubles; and thus an extension of territory, without intrinsic strength, so far from augmenting the power of the Emperor of Austria would only serve to weaken it."

Politicians are wont to refer to the Testament of Peter I, in order to show the traditional policy of Russia in general, and particularly with regard to her views on Constantinople. They might have gone back still further. More than eight centuries ago, Sviataslaff, the yet Pagan Grand Duke of Russia, declared in an assembly of his Boyards, that "not only Bulgaria, but the Greek Empire in Europe, together with Bohemia and Hungary, ought to undergo the rule of Russia." Sviataslaff conquered Silistria and threatened Constantinople, A.D. 769, as Nicholas did in 1828. The Rurik dynasty transferred, soon after the foundation of the Russian Empire, their capital from Novgorod to Kiev, in order to be nearer to Byzantium. In the eleventh century Kiev imitated in all things Constantinople, and was called the *second Constantinople,* thus expressing the everlasting aspirations of Russia. The religion and civilization of Russia are of Byzantine off-spring, and that she should have aimed at subduing the Byzantine Empire, then in the same decay as the Ottoman Empire is in now, was more natural

than that the German Emperors should have aimed at the conquest of Rome and Italy. The unity, then, in the objects of Russian policy, is given by her historical past, by her geographical conditions, and by her necessity of gaining open seaports in the Archipelago as in the Baltic, if she wants to maintain her supremacy in Europe. But the traditional manner in which Russia pursues those objects is far from meriting that tribute of admiration paid to it by European politicians. If the success of her hereditary policy proves the weakness of the Western Powers, the stereotyped mannerism of that policy proves the intrinsic barbarism of Russia herself. Who would not laugh at the idea of French politics being conducted on the Testament of Richelieu, or the Capitularies of Charlemagne? Go through the most celebrated documents of Russian diplomacy, and you will find that shrewd, judicious, cunning, subtle as it is in discovering the weak points of European kings, ministers, and courts, its wisdom is at a complete deadlock as often as the historical movements of the Western peoples themselves are concerned. Prince Lieven judged very accurately of the character of the good Aberdeen when he speculated on his connivance with the Czar, but he was grossly mistaken in his judgment of the English people when he predicted the continuance of Tory rule on the eve of the Reform movement in 1831. Count Pozzo di Borgo judged very correctly of Charles X, but he made the greatest blunder with regard to the French people when he induced his "august master" to treat with that king about the partition of Europe on the eve of his expulsion from France. Russian policy, with its traditional craft, cheats, and subterfuges, may impose upon the European Courts which are themselves but traditional things, but it will prove utterly powerless with the revolutionized peoples.

At Beirut the Americans have abstracted another Hungarian refugee from the claws of the Austrian eagle. It is cheering to see the American intervention in Europe beginning just with the Eastern Question. Besides the commercial and military importance resulting from the situation of Constantinople, there are other important considerations, making its possession the hotly controverted and permanent subject of dispute between the East and the West—and America is the youngest and most vigorous representative of the West.

Constantinople is the eternal city—the Rome of the East. Under the ancient Greek Emperors, Eastern civilization amalgamated there so far with Western civilization, as to make this centre of a theoretical Empire the effectual bar against European progress. When the Greek

Emperors were turned out by the Sultans of Iconium, the genius of the ancient Byzantine Empire survived this change of dynasties, and if the Sultan were to be supplanted by the Czar, the *Bas-Empire* would be restored to life with more demoralizing influences than under the ancient Emperors, and with more aggressive power than under the Sultan. The Czar would be for Byzantine civilization what Russian adventurers were for centuries to the Emperors of the Lower Empire—the *Corps de garde* of their soldiers. The struggle between Western Europe and Russia about the possession of Constantinople involves the question whether Byzantinism is to fall before Western civilization, or whether its antagonism shall revive in a more terrible and conquering form than ever before. Constantinople is the golden bridge thrown between the West and the East, and Western civilization cannot, like the sun, go round the world without passing that bridge; and it cannot pass it without a struggle with Russia. The Sultan holds Constantinople only in trust for the Revolution, and the present nominal dignitaries of Western Europe, themselves finding the last stronghold of their "order" on the shores of the Neva, can do nothing but keep the question in suspense until Russia has to meet her real antagonist, the Revolution. The Revolution which will break the Rome of the West will also overpower the demoniac influences of the Rome of the East.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* DECEMBER 30, 1853.—Those readers who have followed with any attention the expositions which from time to time *The Tribune* has given of the Eastern Question, will not be surprised at the exhibit which our statement of yesterday makes of the great lever of Russian aggrandizement. They will have learned before that the idea of Russian diplomatic supremacy owes its efficacy to the imbecility and the timidity of the Western nations, and that the belief in Russia's superior military power is hardly less a delusion. But they were, perhaps, scarcely prepared for the strong and sudden light in which our informant held up this phantasm as an element relied upon in the calculations of the Imperial Government. Bully Turkey and her supporters—France and England—we are told, was relied on to the last by the Czar as sufficient to bend them to his demands. Accordingly, instead of sending into the Principalities a force of 120,000 men, as we were first informed had been done, or of 70,000, which we afterwards assured was the whole number, we now learn that he sent only 50,000, or the army corps of General Dannenberg alone—a fact there was reason

to suspect before, since no other general commanding an army corps has been heard of in any of the actions fought there, and it is well known that long after hostilities began neither Luders nor Osten-Sacken had crossed the Pruth. The same state of facts has also been indicated by the disgrace of Mentschikoff, reported from Sweden and Paris, and most conclusively confirmed by our informant, and by the Prince's setting off in a most inclement season of the year, as a courier, to convey to the Czar the news of Nachimoff's victory over the squadron of Omer Pasha. When a man of seventy years of age voluntarily undertakes such a journey, riding night and day, there can be no doubt that he has some most imperative reason for propitiating the favour of the monarch.

But the great point is that Nicholas has perfectly relied upon bullying Turkey and her allies. This has been manifest throughout the affair, though never before avowed by any authority claiming to express the feeling of the Russian Court itself. It has been a bullying business all along. The appearance and conduct of Mentschikoff at Constantinople were simply those of a bully; the manifestoes of Nesselrode were the menaces of a bully; and the entry of Gortschakoff into the Principalities with a single army corps was nothing but the bold presumption of a bully. It has all been justified by the result. England, especially, has been imposed on. She has been bullied, and is so still. She has not dared to declare her soul to be her own from the beginning to the present day. France, too, has been bullied, though not so seriously. But both together have been frightened out of the only policy which could at once have guaranteed the preservation of peace, while maintaining their own respectability. To the arrogance of the Autocrat they have replied with symptoms of cowardice. They have encouraged the very assumptions they have deprecated, just as poltroons always encourage bullies to be overbearing. If, at the outset, they had used a manly style of language adequate to the position they hold, and the pretensions they set up before the world; if they had proved that bluster and swagger could not impose on them, the Autocrat would not only have refrained from attempting it, but would have entertained for them a very different feeling from that contempt which must now animate his bosom. At that time, to show that they seriously meant to preserve Turkey intact, and were ready to back up their intention with the last reason of kings—fleets and armies, was the sure means of maintaining peace. There is only one way to deal with a Power like Russia, and that is the fearless way.

It is not to be denied that Turkey, the weak State, has shown more true courage, as well as more wise statesmanship, than either of her powerful allies. She has risen to the height of the occasion; they have cowered beneath it. She has rejected the demands of her hereditary foe, not with braggadocio, but with grave and worthy earnestness and dignity; they have faltered and sought to evade the crisis. She has acted with decision; they have prevented her from acting with effect. For we may justly attribute the delays and hesitation shown in the maneuvers of Omer Pasha to the paralyzing and temporizing influence of Lord Redcliffe and M. de la Cour, over the Divan. At the moment when he was opening the campaign, they procured orders to be sent to him to delay the beginning of hostilities. Just when he was surprising Europe by advantages gained over the enemy, they prepared new terms of mediation and asked for an armistice. Thus at every step they have exhibited that dread of Russia on which we are assured the Emperor and his advisers have continually placed their dependence. They have been bullied, and have accordingly done their utmost to bring on the very evil they are so afraid of. If there be a general war, it will not be the fault of Turkey, but next to Russia, of France and England. They might have prevented it infallibly, but they did not.

As matters now stand we incline to follow our wishes and predict peace. The decision rests with the Czar, and peace is his interest. The prestige of his diplomacy and the renown of his arms can be maintained in peace much more easily and safely than in war. The naval success of Nachimoff enables him to cease fighting with more than an equal share of victory on his side. A general breaking up of Europe has its possibility of loss and even of destruction for him as well as for Turkey, while even if he triumphs, it must be at a far heavier cost than that of his recent vast acquisitions of power and influence. The bullying system is much less expensive than actual warfare, as we see illustrated in the small army under Gortschakoff. There is, then, a considerable chance that some one of the schemes of mediation already on foot, or to be generated during the winter, may be fixed on. Then the work of Russian encroachments in Europe will once again be confined to the slower but surer processes of diplomacy and intrigue, animated by unscrupulous arrogance on one side, and aided by weakness and pusillanimity on the other. In view of such a possibility it is impossible not to agree with Mr. Douglas when he assigns to Russia the attributes of the future, and to Western Europe those of the past. There is an energy and vigour in that despotic Government and that barbarous race which we

seek in vain among the monarchies of the older States. But if we look a little deeper into the cause of this relative weakness, we find it full of encouragement. Western Europe is feeble and timid because her Governments feel that they are outgrown and no longer believed in by their people. The nations are beyond their rulers, and trust in them no more. It is not that they are really imbecile, but that there is new wine working in the old bottles. With a worthier and more equal social state, with the abolition of caste and privilege, with free political constitutions, unfettered industry, and emancipated thought, the people of the West will rise again to power and unity of purpose, while the Russian Colossus itself will be shattered by the progress of the masses and the explosive force of ideas. There is no good reason to fear the conquest of Europe by the Cossacks. The very divisions and apparent weakness which would seem to render such an event easy are the sure pledge of its impossibility.

13
American Intervention and Neutral Rights (1853)

NEW YORK *Tribune,* AUGUST 5, 1853.—The *Kölnische Zeitung,* in a letter dated Vienna, July 11, contains the following report on the Smyrna affair:

Shekib Effendi has been sent to Smyrna in order to commence an instruction against the authors of the sedition in which Baron Hackelberg perished. Shekib has also received orders to deliver to Austria the refugees of Austrian or Tuscan origin. Mr. Brown, chargé d'affaires of the United States, has had communications on this subject with Reschid Pasha, the result of which is not yet known. I hear at this moment that the assassin of Baron Hackelberg has received from the American Consul at Smyrna a passport that places him out of the reach of the Turkish authorities. *This fact proves that the United States intend intervening in European affairs.* It is also certain that three American men-of-war are with the Turkish fleet

in the Bosphorus, and further, that the American frigate Cumberland has brought 80,000,000 of piastres to the Turkish Government.

Whatever truth there be in this and like reports, they prove one thing; viz., that American intervention is expected everywhere, and is even looked upon with favour by portions of the English public. The behavior of the American Captain and Consul are loudly praised in popular meetings, and an "Englishman" in *The Advertiser* of yesterday called upon the Stars and Stripes to appear in the Mediterranean, and to shame the "muddy old Union Jack" into activity.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* AUGUST 19, 1853.—The great event of the day is the appearance of American policy on the European horizon. Saluted by one party, detested by the other, the fact is admitted by all.

"Austria must look to the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire for indemnification for the loss of her Italian provinces—a contingency not rendered less likely by the quarrel she has had the folly to bring on her with Uncle Sam. An American squadron in the Adriatic would be a very pretty complication of an Italian insurrection, and we may all live to see it, for the Anglo-Saxon spirit is not yet dead in the West."

Thus speaks *The Morning Herald,* the old organ of the English aristocracy:

"The Koszta affair," says the Paris *Presse,* "is far from being terminated. We are informed that the Vienna Cabinet has asked from the Washington Cabinet a reparation, which it may be quite sure it will not receive. Meanwhile, Koszta remains under the safeguard of the French Consul."

"We must get out of the way of the Yankee, who is half a buccaneer, and half a backwoodsman, and no gentleman at all," whispers the Vienna *Presse.*

The German papers grumble about the secret treaty pretended to have been concluded between the United States and Turkey, according to which the latter would receive money and maritime support, and the former the harbour of Enos in Roumelia, which would afford a sure and convenient place for a commercial and military station of the American Republic of the Mediterranean.

"In due course of time," says the Brussels *Emancipation,* "the conflict at Smyrna between the American Government and the Austrian one, caused by the capture of the refugee Koszta, will be placed in the first line of events of 1853. Compared with this fact, the occupation of

the Danubian Principalities and the movements of the combined navies at Constantinople, may be considered as of second-rate importance. The event of Smyrna is the beginning of a new history, while the accident at Constantinople is only the unravelling of an old question about to expire."

An Italian paper, *Il Parlamento,* has a leader under the title *"La Politica Americana in Europa,"* from which I translate the following passages literally: "It is well known that a long time has elapsed since the United States have tried to get a maritime station in the Mediterranean and in Italy, and more particularly at such epochs when complications arose in the Orient. Thus for instance in 1840, when the great Egyptian question was agitated, and when St. Jean d'Acre was assailed, the Government of the United States asked in vain from the King of the Two Sicilies to temporarily grant it the great harbor of Syracuse. Today the tendency of American policy for intervening with European affairs cannot be but more lively and steadfast. There can be no doubt but that the actual Democratic Administration of the Union manifests the most clamorous sympathies with the victims of the Italian and Hungarian revolution, that it cares nothing about an interruption of the diplomatical intercourse with Austria, and that at Smyrna it has supported its system with the threat of cannon. It would be unjust to grumble at this aspiration of the great transatlantic nation, or to call it inconsistent or ridiculous. The Americans certainly do not intend conquering the Orient and going to have a land war with Russia. But if England and France make the best of their maritime forces, why should not the Americans do so, particularly as soon as they will have obtained a station, a point of retreat and of *'approvisionement'* in the Mediterranean? For them there are great interests at stake, the republican element being diametrically opposed to the Cossack one. Commerce and navigation having multiplied the legitimate relations and contacts between all peoples of the world, none can consider itself a stranger to any sea of the Old or New Continent, or to any great question like that of the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. The American commerce, and the residents who exercise it on the shores of our seas, require the protection of the stars and stripes, and in order to make it valid in all seasons of the year, they want a port for a military marine that ranks already in the third line among the maritime powers of the world. If England and France interfere directly with all that regards the Isthmus of Panama, if the former of those powers goes so far as to invent a King of the Mosquitoes, in order to oppose territorial rights

to the operations of the United States, if they have come to the final understanding, that the passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific shall be open to all nations, and be possessed by a neutral state, is it not evident then, that the United States must pretend at exercising the same vigilance with regard to the liberty and neutrality of the Isthmus of Suez, holding their eyes closely fixed on the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which will be likely to devolve Egypt and Syria, wholly or partly to the dominion of some first-rate power. Suez and Panama are the two great doorways of the Orient, which, shut till now, will hereafter compete with each other. The best way to assure their ascendancy in the Transatlantic question is to cooperate in the Mediterranean question.

"We are assured that the American men-of-war in the neighborhood of the Dardanelles do not renounce the pretention to enter them whenever they please, without being subjected to the restrictions convened upon the Great Powers in 1841, and for this incontrovertible reason, that the American Government did not participate in that Convention. Europe is amazed at the boldness, because it has been, since the peace of 1813, in the habit of considering the United States in the condition of the Swiss Cantons after the Westphalian Treaty, viz., as peoples allowed a legitimate existence, but which it would be too arduous to ask to enter into the aristocracy of the primitive Powers, and to give their votes on subjects of general policy. But on the other side of the Ocean the Anglo-Saxon race, sprung up to the most exalted degree of wealth, civilization and power, cannot any longer accept the humble position assigned to it in the past. The pressure exercised by the American Union on the Council of Amphyctrions of the Five Powers, till now the arbiters of the globe, is a new force that must contribute to the downfall of the exclusive system established by the treaties of Vienna.

"Till the Republic of the United States succeed in acquiring a positive right and an official seat in the Congresses arbitrating on general political questions, it exercises with an immense grandeur, and with a particular dignity the more humane actions of natural rights and of the *jus gentium*. Its banner covers the victims of the civil wars without distinction of parties, and during the immense conflagration of 1848-1849 the hospitality of the American Navy never submitted to any humiliation or disgrace."

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* SEPTEMBER 2, 1853.—The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent to all the European Courts a note relative to the conduct of the American frigate *St. Louis* in the Koszta affair, denouncing the American policy in general. Austria contends that she has the right to kidnap foreigners from the territory of a neutral power, while the United States have no right to commence hostilities in order to defend them.

[In an editorial on the Koszta affair in the *Tribune* of August 6, 1853, the editor had observed that: "We state an obvious fact in saying that Captain Ingraham, had he sunk the Austrian corvette in Smyrna harbour, as it was but a chance he did not, would almost inevitably have been the next President of the United States. Had the two ships been cruising off the harbour, instead of at anchor within it, where action must have been a gross outrage on neutral rights and resulted in a woeful destruction of life and property on shore, the collision could not have been averted." The following excerpt from one of Marx's "letters to the editor" describes the reaction in the European press to this editorial.]

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* SEPTEMBER 24, 1853.—A note issued from Washington could scarcely have produced a greater sensation in Europe than your editorial remarks on Capt. Ingraham. They have found their way, with and without commentaries, into almost the whole weekly press of London, into many French papers, the Brussels *Nation,* the Turin *Parlemento,* the Basel *Gazette,* and every liberal newspaper of Germany. . . . The journals hold out the prospect of an intervention on the part of the United States in favour of Switzerland, if it should be threatened by an attack. Today we are informed that several Powers have the intention of making a collective declaration against the doctrine of international right put forth by the United States. If the American intervention theories were not refuted in a peremptory manner, *the extirpation of the revolutionary spirit in Europe would meet with an insuperable obstacle.* France is among the Powers ready to participate in this remonstrance. On this last point, the *Constitutionnel* of Tuesday last takes good care not to leave any doubt, when it says: "It is necessary to be candid in all things. It is not as a citizen of the United States that Koszta is defended against Austria by the agents of the American *Republic,* but as a revolutionist. But none of the European Powers will ever admit as a principle of public law that

the Government of the United States has the right to protect revolution in Europe by force of arms. On no grounds would it be permitted to throw obstacles in the way of the exercise of the jurisdiction of a Government, under the ridiculous pretence that the offenders have renounced their allegiance, and from the real motive that they are in revolt against the political constitution of their country. The Navy of the American Union might not always have such an easy triumph, and such headstrong conduct as that pursued by the Captain of the *St. Louis* might on another occasion be attended with very disastrous consequences."

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* MARCH 13, 1854.—[With respect to the question, "Could privateers be fitted out in neutral ports to interfere with British shipping?" Marx notes that the problem was brought up in Parliament and that a direct answer was evaded by Lord Palmerston. Marx continues:] The Palmerston organ [*The Morning Post*] declares the "difficult topic" to form the subject of pending negotiations, and, on the other, the necessity of leaving it to the "spontaneous sense of justice" of the interested Powers. If the much-boasted treaty of neutrality with Denmark and Sweden was not dictated by the St. Petersburg Cabinet, it must, of course, have forbidden privateers being fitted out in their ports; but, in fact, the whole question can only be understood to refer to the United States of America, as the Baltic is to be occupied by English line-of-battle ships, and Holland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and the Italian ports on the Mediterranean are completely in the hands of England and France. Now, what is the opinion of the St. Petersburg Cabinet as to the part to be performed by the United States in case the Turkish war should lead to a war between England and Russia? We may answer this question authentically from a dispatch addressed by Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode in the autumn of 1825. At that time Russia had resolved upon invading Turkey. As now she proposed to begin by a pacific occupation of the Principalities.

"In supposing the adoption of this plan," says Pozzo di Borgo, "it would be requisite to enter into explanations with the Porte in the most measured terms, and to assure it that if it did not wish to precipitate itself into a war, the Emperor was willing to terminate these differences by conciliation."

After having enumerated all the steps they would be obliged to take, Pozzo di Borgo continues as follows:

It would be advisable to communicate all these acts to the United States of America as an evidence of the regard of the Imperial Cabinet, and of the importance which it attaches to enlightening its opinion, and even obtaining its suffrage.

In case of England's siding with Turkey and undertaking a war with Russia, Pozzo di Borgo remarks that—

in blockading our ports they (England) would exercise *their pretended maritime rights in respect to neutrals. This the United States would not suffer! Thence would arise bitter dissensions and dangerous situations.*

Now, as the Russian historian Karamsin justly remarks that "nothing changes in our (Russian) external policy," we are justified in presuming that, at the present moment, and perhaps as long ago as February, 1853, Russia has "communicated all her acts to the United States," and done her best to cajole the Washington cabinet into at least a neutral attitude. At the same time, in the case of a war with England, she bases her hopes upon eventual quarrels about the "maritime rights of the neutrals" producing "bitter dissensions and dangerous situations," and involving the United States in a more or less avowed alliance with St. Petersburg.

14
Military Stalemate and the Home Front (1854-1855)

NEW YORK *Tribune*, FEBRUARY 2, 1854.—At last the long-pending question of Turkey appears to have reached a stage where diplomacy will not much longer be able to monopolize the ground for its ever-shifting, ever-cowardly, and ever-resultless movements. The French and the British fleets have entered the Black Sea in order to prevent the Russian navy from doing harm either to the Turkish fleet or the Turkish coast. The Czar Nicholas long since declared that such a step would be, for him, the signal for a declaration of war. Will he now stand it quietly?

It is not to be expected that the combined fleets will at once attack and destroy either the Russian squadron or the fortifications and navy-yards of Sebastopol. On the contrary, we may rest assured that the instructions which diplomacy has provided for the two admirals are so contrived as to evade, as much as possible, the chance of a collision. But naval and military movements once ordered, are subject not to the desires and plans of diplomacy, but to laws of their own which cannot be violated, without endangering the safety of the whole expedition. Diplomacy never intended the Russians to be beaten at Oltenitza; but a little latitude once given to Omer Pasha, and military movements once begun, the action of the two hostile commanders was carried on in a sphere which was to a great extent uncontrollable by the Ambassadors at Constantinople. Thus, the fleets once removed from their moorings in the Beicos Roads, there is no telling how soon they may find themselves in a position from which Lord Aberdeen's prayers for peace, or Lord Palmerston's collusion with Russia, cannot draw them, and where they will have to choose between an infamous retreat or a resolute struggle. A narrow land-locked sea like the Euxine, where the opposing navies can hardly contrive to get out of sight of each other, is precisely the locality in which conflicts under such circumstances may become necessary almost daily. And it is not to be expected that the Czar will allow, without opposition, his fleet to be blockaded in Sebastopol.

If, then, a European war is to follow from this step, it will be, in all likelihood, a war between Russia on the one hand, and England, France, and Turkey on the other. The event is probable enough to warrant us in comparing the chances of success and striking the balance of active strength on each side, so far as we can do so.

But will Russia stand alone? What part will Austria, Prussia, and the German and Italian States, their dependents, take in a general war? It is reported that Louis Bonaparte has notified the Austrian Government that if, in case of conflict with Russia, Austria should side with that Power, the French Government would avail itself of the elements of insurrection which in Italy and Hungary only require a spark to be kindled into a raging fire, and that then the restoration of Italian and Hungarian nationality would be attempted by France. Such a threat may have its effect upon Austria; it may contribute to keep her neutral as long as possible, but it is not to be expected that Austria will long be enabled to keep aloof from such a struggle, should it come to pass. The very fact of the threat having been uttered may call forth partial

insurrectionary movements in Italy, which could not but make Austria a still more dependent and still more subservient vassal of Russia. And then, after all, has not this Napoleonic game been played once already? Is it to be expected that the man who restored the Pope to his temporal throne, and who has a candidate cut and dried for the Neapolitan monarchy, will give to the Italians what they want as much as independence from Austria—unity? Is it to be expected that the Italian people will rush headlong into such a snare? No doubt they are sorely oppressed by Austrian rule, but they will not be very anxious to contribute to the glory of an Empire which is already tottering in its native soil of France, and of a man who was the first to combat their revolution. The Austrian Government knows all this, and therefore we may assume that it will be more influenced by its own financial embarrassments than by these Bonapartistic threats; we may also be certain that, at the decisive moment, the influence of the Czar will be paramount at Vienna, and will entangle Austria on the side of Russia.

Prussia is attempting the same game which she played in 1780, 1800, and 1805. Her plan is to form a league of neutral Baltic, or North German, States, at the head of which she can play a part of some importance, and turn to whichever side offers her the greatest advantages. The almost comical uniformity with which all these attempts have ended by throwing the greedy, vacillating, and pusillanimous Prussian Government into the arms of Russia, belongs to history. It is not to be expected that Prussia will now escape her habitual fate. She will put out feelers in every direction, offer herself at public auction, intrigue in both camps, swallow camels and strain at gnats, lose whatever character may perchance yet be left to her, get beaten, and at last be knocked down to the lowest bidder, who in this and every other instance will be Russia. She will not be an ally, but an incumbrance to Russia, for she will take care to have her army destroyed beforehand, for her own account and gratification.

Until at least one of the German Powers is involved in a European war, the conflict can only rage in Turkey, on the Black Sea, and in the Baltic. The naval struggle must, during this period, be the most important. That the allied fleets can destroy Sebastopol and the Russian Black Sea fleet; that they can take and hold the Crimea, occupy Odessa, close the Sea of Azof, and let loose the mountaineers of the Caucasus, there is no doubt. With rapid and energetic action nothing is more easy. Supposing this to occupy the first month of active operations, another month might bring the steamers of the

combined fleets to the British Channel, leaving the sailing vessels to follow; for the Turkish fleet would then be capable of doing all the work which might be required in the Black Sea. To coal in the Channel and make other preparations, might take another fortnight; and then, united to the Atlantic and Channel fleets of France and Britain, they might appear before the end of May in the roads of Cronstadt in such a force as to ensure the success of an attack. The measures to be taken in the Baltic are as self-evident as those in the Black Sea. They consist in an alliance, at any price, with Sweden; an act of intimidation against Denmark, if necessary; an insurrection in Finland, which would break out upon landing a sufficient number of troops, and a guarantee that no peace would be concluded except upon the condition of this province being reunited to Sweden. The troops landed in Finland would menace Petersburg, while the fleets would bombard Cronstadt. This place is certainly very strong by its position. The channel of deep water leading up to the roads will hardly admit of two men-of-war abreast presenting their broadsides to the batteries, which are established not only on the main island, but on smaller rocks, banks, and islands about it. A certain sacrifice, not only of men, but of ships, is unavoidable. But if this be taken into acount in the very plan of the attack, if it be once resolved that such and such a ship must be sacrificed, and if the plan be carried out vigorously and unflinchingly, Cronstadt must fall. The masonry of its battlements cannot for any length of time withstand the concentrated fire of heavy Paixhan guns, that most destructive of all arms when employed against stone walls. Large screw-steamers, with a full complement of such guns amidships, would very soon produce an irresistible effect, though of course they would in the attempt risk their own existence. But what are three or four screw-ships of the line in comparison with Cronstadt, the key of the Russian Empire, whose possession would leave St. Petersburg without defence?

Without Odessa, Cronstadt, Riga, Sebastopol, with Finland emancipated, and a hostile army at the gates of the capital, with all her rivers and harbors closed up, what would Russia be? A giant without arms, without eyes, with no other recourse than trying to crush her opponents under the weight of her clumsy torso, thrown here and there at random, wherever a hostile battle-cry was heard. If the maritime powers of Europe should act thus resolutely and vigorously, then Prussia and Austria might so far be relieved from the control of Russia that they might even join the allies. For both the German Powers, if secure at

home, would be ready to profit by the embarrassments of Russia. But it is not to be expected that Lord Aberdeen and M. Drouyn de l'Huys should attempt such energetic steps. The Powers that be are not for striking their blows *home,* and if a general war breaks out, the energy of the commanders will be shackled so as to render them innocuous. If nevertheless, decisive victories occur, care will be taken that it is by mere chance, and that their consequences are as harmless as possible for the enemy.

The war on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea might at once be put an end to by the fleets; that on the European side would go on comparatively uninterrupted. The Russians, beaten out of the Black Sea, deprived of Odessa and Sebastopol, could not cross the Danube without great risk (except in the direction of Servia, for insurrectionary purposes), but they might very well hold the Principalities, until superior forces and the risk of large bodies of troops being landed on their flank and rear, should drive them out of Wallachia. Moldavia they need not evacuate without a general action, for flank and rear demonstrations would there be of little importance so long as Chotin and Kishineff offered them a safe communication with Russia.

But as long as the war is confined to the Western Powers and Turkey on the one hand, and Russia on the other, it will not be a European war such as we have seen since 1792. However, let it once commence, and the indolence of the Western Powers and the activity of Russia will soon compel Austria and Prussia to decide for the Autocrat. Prussia will probably be of no great account, as it is more than likely that her army, whatever its capacities may be, will be wasted by presumption at some second Jena. Austria, notwithstanding her bankrupt condition, notwithstanding the insurrections that may occur in Italy and Hungary, will be no contemptible opponent. Russia herself, obliged to keep up her army in the Principalities and on the Caucasian frontier, to occupy Poland, to have an army for the defence of the Baltic coast, and especially of St. Petersburg and Finland, will have very few troops to spare for offensive operations. If Austria, Russia and Prussia (always supposing the latter not yet put to rout) can muster five or six hundred thousand men on the Rhine and the Alps, it will be more than can be reasonably expected. And for five hundred thousand allies the French alone are a match, supposing them to be led by generals not inferior to those of their opponents, among whom the Austrians alone possess commanders worthy of the name. The Russian generals are not formidable, and as to the Prussians, they have no generals at all; their officers are hereditary subalterns.

But we must not forget that there is a sixth power in Europe, which at given moments asserts its supremacy over the whole of the five so-called "great" Powers, and makes them tremble, every one of them. That power is the Revolution. Long silent and retired, it is now again called to action by the commercial crisis and by the scarcity of food. From Manchester to Rome, from Paris to Warsaw and Pesth, it is omnipresent, lifting up its head and awakening from its slumbers. Manifold are the symptoms of its returning life, everywhere visible in the agitation and disquietude which have seized the proletarian class. A signal only is wanted, and the sixth and greatest European power will come forward, in shining armor and sword in hand, like Minerva from the head of the Olympian. This signal the impending European war will give, and then all calculations as to the balance of power will be upset by the addition of a new element which, ever buoyant and youthful, will as much baffle the plans of the old European Powers, and their generals, as it did from 1792 to 1800.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* AUGUST 17, 1854.—It is now very nearly twelve months since a small Turkish corps, two battalions, succeeded in crossing the Danube near Turtukai, opposite Oltenitza, threw up entrenchments there, and being attacked by the Russians, repulsed them in a very spirited little affair, which, being the first engagement in the war, took the style and title of the Battle of Oltenitza. There the Turks alone were opposed to the Russians; they had no British or French troops behind them as a reserve, and could not even expect any support from the allied fleets. And yet they held their ground on the Wallachian side of the river, for a fortnight at Oltenitza, and for the whole winter at Kalafat.

Since then, England and France have declared war against Russia; sundry exploits, of a doutbful nature it is true, have been achieved. Black Sea fleets, Baltic fleets, and an army of now nearly a hundred thousand English and French soldiers are there to assist the Turks or to make diversions in their favor. And the upshot of all this is nothing but a repetition of the Oltenitza business on a larger scale, but rather less successfully than last year.

The Russians laid siege to Silistria. They went about it stupidly but bravely. They were defeated day after day, night after night; not by superior science, not by Captain Butler or Lieutenant Nasmyth, the two British officers present, who, according to *The Times,* saved Silistria. They were defeated by the ignorance of the Turks, an ignorance

extending so far as not to know when a fort or rampart ceases to be tenable, and to sticking doggedly to every inch of ground, every mole-hill which the enemy appears to covet. They were defeated besides by the stupidity of their own generals, by fever and cholera; finally, by the moral effect of an allied army menacing their left, and an Austrian army menacing their right wing. When the war began, we stated that the Russian army had never been able to lay a regular siege, and the ill-managed operations before Silistria show that they have not improved since. Well, they were defeated; they had to decamp in the most discreditable way imaginable; they had to raise the siege of an incomplete fortress in the midst of a fine season, and without any troops coming to relieve the garrison. Such an event occurs not more than once in a century; and whatever the Russians may try to do in the autumn, the campaign is lost, disgracefully lost, for them.

But now for the reverse of the medal. Silistria is free. The Russians retreat to the left bank of the Danube. They even prepare for and gradually execute, the evacuation of the Dobrudscha. Hirsova and Marschin are dismantled. The Sereth seems to be the line to which the Russians trust for the defense, not of their conquests, but of their own territory. Omer Pasha, the wily old Croat, who can hold his tongue or tell a lie as well as anybody, "in the execution of his duty," at once sends a corps to the Dobrudscha, and another to Rustchuk, thus engaging the two wings of the Russians at once. There were far better maneuvers possible at the time, but poor old Omer appears to know the Turks and the Allies better than we do. The correct military move to be made would have been to march through the Dobrudscha or by Kalarash upon the communications of the enemy; but, after what we have seen, we cannot even acuse Omer of having missed a good opportunity. We know that his army is very badly cared for—provided with almost nothing— and cannot therefore execute rapid movements which would remove it to a distance from its base, or open up fresh lines of operation. These movements, decisive as they are in their effect when undertaken by a sufficient force, are not within the reach of an army which lives from hand to mouth, and has to pass through a barren country. We know that Omer Pasha went to Varna, imploring the aid of the allied generals, who at that time had 75,000 capital soldiers there, within four days' march of the Danube, but neither St. Arnaud nor Raglan thought proper to come up to where they could meet the enemy. Thus Omer could do no more than he has done. He sent 25,000 men toward the Dobrudscha, and marched with the rest of his

army to Rustchuk. Here his troops passed from island to island until the Danube was crossed, and then by a sudden march to the left took Giurgevo in the rear, and forced the Russians to quit it. On the next day the Russians were drawn up on some heights to the north of Giurgevo, where the Turks attacked them. A sanguinary battle ensued, remarkable for the number of English officers who, with rare success, competed for the honor of being shot first. They all got their bullets, but with no benefit to anybody, for it would be preposterous to think that the sight of a British officer being shot could inflame a Turkish soldier to invincibility. However, the Russians having a mere advanced guard on the spot—a brigade, the two regiments of Kolyvan and Tomsk—got beaten, and the Turks made good their footing on the Wallachian bank of the Danube. They at once set about fortifying the place, and as they had British sappers, and, as at Kalafat, they did very well for themselves, there is no doubt that they were making a formidable position of it. But thus far they were allowed to go and no farther. That Emperor of Austria who now for eight months has been trying hard to act the part of an independent man, steps in at once. The Principalities have been promised to his troops as a feeding ground, and he intends to have them. What business have the Turks there? Let them go back to Bulgaria. So down comes the order from Constantinople to withdraw the Turkish troops from the left bank, and to leave "all that plot of land" to the tender mercies of the Austrian soldiers. Diplomacy is above strategy. Whatever may come of it, the Austrians will save their own frontiers by occupying a few yards of ground beyond; and to this important end even the necessities of the war must give way. Besides, is not Omer Pasha an Austrian deserter? and Austria never forgets. In Montenegro she interrupted his victorious career; and she repeats the process again, to make the renegade feel that he is not yet out of the allegiance to his lawful sovereign.

It is entirely useless to enter into the military details of this present stage of the campaign. The actions possess little tactical interest, being plain, straightforward front attacks; the movements of troops on either side are ruled more by diplomatic than strategical motives. Most likely we shall see the campaign closing without any great enterprise, for on the Danube there is nothing prepared for a grand offensive, and as to the taking of Sebastopol, of which we hear so much, the beginning will probably be delayed until the season is so far advanced that it must be postponed till next year.

It would seem that whoever may have had any conservative lean-

ings in Europe must lose them when he looks at this everlasting Eastern Question. There is all Europe, incapable, convicted for the last sixty years of incapability, to settle this puny little strife. There they are, France, England, Russia, going actually to war. They carry on their war for six months, and unless by mistake, or on a very shabby scale, they have not even come to blows. There they are, eighty or ninety thousand English and French soldiers, at Varna, commanded by old Wellington's late military secretary and by a Marshal of France (whose greatest exploits, it is true, were performed in London pawnshops)—there they are, the French doing nothing and the British helping them as fast as they can; and as they may think this sort of business not exactly honorable, the fleets are come up to Baltchik Roads to have a look at them and to see which of the two armies can enjoy the *dolce far niente* with the greater decorum. And, although the Allies have hitherto only been eating up the provisions upon which the Turkish army had calculated, idling away day after day at Varna, for the last two months, they are not yet fit for duty. They would have relieved Silistria if required by about the middle of May next year. The troops that have conquered Algeria had learned the theory and practice of war on one of the most difficult theatres in existence, the soldiers who fought the Sikhs on the sands of the Indus, and the Kaffirs in the thorny bush of South Africa, in countries far more savage than Bulgaria—there they are, helpless and useless, fit for nothing in a country which even exports corn!

But if the Allies are miserable in their performances, so are the Russians. They have had plenty of time to prepare. They have done whatever they could, for they knew from the beginning what resistance they would find. And yet, what have they been able to do? Nothing. They could not take a yard of contested ground from the Turks; they could not take Kalafat; they could not beat the Turks in one single engagement. And yet they are the same Russians who, under Muennich and Suvaroff, conquered the Black Sea coast from the Don to the Dniester. But Schilders is not Muennich, Paskevitch is not Suvaroff, and though the Russian soldier can bear flogging with the cane beyond all others, yet when it comes to habitual retreating he loses his steadiness as well as anybody else.

The fact is, that conservative Europe—the Europe of "order, property, family, religion"—the Europe of monarchs, feudal lords, moneyed men, however they may be differently assorted in different countries—is once more exhibiting its extreme impotency. Europe may be rotten,

but a war should have roused the sound elements, a war should have brought forth some latent energies; and assuredly there should be that much pluck among two hundred and fifty millions of men, that at least one decent struggle might be got up wherein both parties could reap some honor, such as force and spirit can carry off even from the field of battle. But no, not only is the England of the middle classes, the France of the Bonapartes, incapable of a decent, hearty, hard-fought war; but even Russia, the country of Europe least infected by infidel and unnerving civilization, cannot bring about anything of the kind. The Turks are fit for sudden starts of offensive action, and stubborn resistance on the defensive, but seem not to be fit for large combined maneuvers with great armies. Thus everything is reduced to a degree of impuissance and a reciprocal confession of weakness, which appears to be as reciprocally expected by all parties. With Governments such as they are at present, this Eastern war may be carried on for thirty years, and yet come to no conclusion.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* APRIL 27, 1855.—With the middle classes both of France and England this war is decidedly unpopular. With the French bourgeoisie it was so from the beginning, because this class has been ever since the 2nd of December in full opposition against the Government of the "saviour of society." In England the middle class was divided. The great bulk had transferred their national hatred from the French to the Russians, and although John Bull can do a little annexation business himself now and then in India, he has no idea of allowing other people to do the same in other neighbourhoods in an uncomfortable proximity to himself or his possessions. Russia was the country which in this respect had long since attracted his anxious notice. The enormously increasing British trade to the Levant, and through Trebizond to Inner Asia, makes the free navigation of the Dardanelles a point of the highest importance to England. The growing value of the Danubian countries as granaries forbids England to allow their gradual absorption into Russia, and the closing of the navigation of the Danube by the same Power. Russian grains form already a too important item in British consumption, and an annexation of the corn-producing frontier countries by Russia would make Great Britain entirely dependent upon her and the United States, while it would establish these two countries as the regulators of the corn-market of the world. Besides, there are always some vague and alarming rumours

afloat about Russian progress in Central Asia, got up by interested Indian politicians or terrified visionaries, and credited by the general geographical ignorance of the British public. Thus, when Russia began her aggression upon Turkey, the national hatred broke forth in a blaze, and never, perhaps, was a war so popular as this. The peace party was for a moment interdicted from speaking; even the mass of its own members went along with the popular current. Whoever knew the character of the English must have felt certain that this warlike enthusiasm could be of but short duration, at least so far as the middle class was concerned; as soon as the effects of the war should become taxable upon their pockets, mercantile sense was sure to overcome national pride, and the loss of immediate individual profits was sure to outweigh the certainty of losing gradually great national advantages. The Peelites, adverse to the war, not so much out of real love of peace as from a narrowness and timidity of mind which holds in horror all great crises and all decisive action, did their best to hasten the great moment when every British merchant and manufacturer could calculate to a farthing what the war would cost him, individually, per annum. Mr. Gladstone, scorning the vulgar idea of a loan, at once doubled the income tax, and stopped financial reform. The result came to light at once. The peace party raised their heads again. John Bright dared popular feeling with his own well-known spirit and tenacity until he succeeded in bringing the manufacturing districts round to him. In London the feeling is still more in favour of the war, but the progress of the peace party is visible even here; besides, it must be recollected that the peace society never at any time commanded any mentionable influence in the capital. Its agitation, however, is increasing in all parts of the country, and another year of doubled taxation, with a loan—for this is now considered to be unavoidable—will break down whatever is left of warlike spirit among the manufacturing and trading classes.

With the mass of the people in both countries, the case is entirely different. The peasantry in France have ever since 1789 been the great supporters of war and warlike glory. They are sure this time not to feel much of the pressure of the war; for the conscription, in a country where the land is infinitesimally subdivided among small proprietors, not only frees the agricultural districts from surplus labour, but also gives to some 20,000 young men every year the opportunity of earning a round sum of money by engaging to serve as substitutes. A protracted war only would be felt. As to war taxes, the Emperor cannot

impose them upon the peasantry without risking his crown and his life. His only means of maintaining Bonapartism among them is to buy them up by freedom from war taxation, and thus for some years to come they may be exempted from this sort of pressure. In England the case is similar. Agricultural labour is generally oversupplied, and furnishes the mass of soldiery, which only at a later period of the war receives a strong admixture of the rowdy class from the town. Trade being tolerably good, and a good many agricultural improvements being carried out when the war began, the quota of agricultural recruits was, in this instance, supplied more sparingly than before, and the town element is decidedly preponderant in the present militia. But even what has been withdrawn had kept wages up, and the sympathy of the villagers is always accompanying soldiers who come from among them, and who are now transformed into heroes. Taxation, in its direct shape, does not touch the small farmers and labourers, and until an increase of indirect imposts can reach them sensibly, several years of war must have passed. Among these people the war enthusiasm is as strong as ever, and there is not a village where is not to be found some new beershop with the sign of "The Heroes of the Alma," or some such motto, and where are not in almost every house wonderful prints of Alma, Inkerman, the charge at Balaklava, portraits of Lord Raglan and others, to adorn the walls. But if in France the great preponderance of the small farmers (four-fifths of the population), and their peculiar relation to Louis Napoleon, give to their opinions a great deal of importance, in England that one-third of the population forming the country people has scarcely any influence except as a tail and chorus to the aristocratic landed proprietors.

The industrial working population has in both countries almost the same peculiar position with regard to this war. Both British and French proletarians are filled with an honourable national spirit, though they are more or less free from the antiquated national prejudices common in both countries to the peasantry. They have little immediate interest in the war, save that if the victories of their countrymen flatter their national pride, the conduct of the war, foolhardy and presumptuous as regards France, timid and stupid as regards England, offers them a fair opportunity of agitating against the existing Governments and governing classes. But the main point with them is this: That this war, coinciding with a commercial crisis, only the first developments of which have, as yet, been seen, conducted by hands and heads unequal to the task, gaining at the same time European

dimensions, will and must bring about events which will enable the proletarian class to resume that position which they lost to France by the battle of June, 1848, and that not only as far as France is concerned, but for all Central Europe, England included.

In France, indeed, there can be no doubt that every fresh revolutionary storm must bring sooner or later the working class to power; in England things are fast approaching a similar state. There is an aristocracy willing to carry on the war, but unfit to do so, and completely put to the blush by last winter's mismanagement. There is a middle class unwilling to carry on that war which cannot be put a stop to, sacrificing everything to peace, and thereby proclaiming their own incapacity to govern England. If events turn out the one, with its different fractions, and do not admit the other, there remain but two classes upon which power can devolve—the petty bourgeoisie, the small trading class, whose want of energy and decision has shown itself on every occasion when it was called upon to come from words to deeds—and the working class which has been constantly reproached with showing far too much energy and decision when proceeding to action as a class.

Which of these classes will be the one to carry England through the present struggle, and the complications about to arise from it?

15
Russian Blunders and the Death of the Czar (1854-1855)

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JULY 11, 1854.—A certain class of writers have been wont to attribute to the Emperor of Russia the possession of extraordinary powers of mind, and especially of that far-reaching, comprehensive judgment which marks the really great statesman. It is difficult to see how such illusions could be derived from any truthful view of his character, or from any part of his history; but the most obstinate

of his admirers must, we think, now question the justice of their conclusions. Russia is now in a difficult and most humiliating position. Her armies are defeated in Turkey, and, after immense losses of men and means, are retreating within her own frontiers; her possessions in Asia, the fruit of many years' effort and vast expenditure, are partly lost and wholly imperilled; her foreign commerce is destroyed, and her home industry injured by turning the national attention and the people's energies to a useless and disastrous war; her navy is imprisoned, and her fortresses menaced; and she must even regard as an advantage an intervention which, whatever its other benefits, interposes an effectual barrier to the realization of her ambitious dreams, and renders impossible a renewal of her attack on Turkey, because that would involve a direct collision with Germany, as well as with the Western Powers. And all this is the work of this great statesman and wise ruler Nicholas I. Praise of this headstrong imperial blunderer's mental gifts must hereafter be considerably qualified, if indulged in at all.

The defeat at Silistria is not enough to destroy the reputation of the Czar, or of his army, any more than the defeat at Oltenitza, Tchetalea, or Karakul, for a defeat is something that the wisest foresight and the most complete preparations cannot always prevent. But apart from this there is a fact which stands out with greater prominence than any other in the whole course of the late remarkable siege and the Russian retreat which followed it. It is this—that the Russian army, with its enormous numbers and its whole swarms of officers, cannot afford leaders to take the place of Paskevitch, Gortschakoff, being each over seventy, and Luders, the youngest, being over sixty—and likely as they were to die a natural death any day; such is the narrowness and imbecility of the system on which the Czar has managed his vast military establishment that we can affirm it as a positive and undeniable fact, that there is hardly a single officer who could step into the vacated place of either of these generals, and carry with him confidence of the army and the nation. For years the Emperor, with an unaccountable blindness which seemed, indeed, to fall little short of stupidity, has directed his efforts to the real injury and depression of the service for whose improvement and perfection he fancied he was doing the utmost. Thus he has limited promotion to mere parade martinets, whose principal merit consists in stolid obedience and ready servility, added to accuracy of eyesight in detecting a fault in the buttons and button-holes of the uniform—constantly preferring such

sticks to men of real military ability and intellectual superiority. Years of the dullest service, such as garrison duty and daily parade, and not youth, activity, and the study and acquirement of military science, have been the exclusive titles to the Czar's favour and to advancement. Thus the army is commanded on the average by old valetudinarians, or by ignorant corporals, who might manage a platoon, but have not brains and knowledge enough to direct the extensive and complicated movements of a campaign.

The same narrow-mindedness and presumption appear throughout the Czar's whole management of this Eastern Question. Every one can now see that he began the war in an unwise and inadequate manner. Indeed, his very first military demonstration was totally absurd and unequal to the purpose in hand. He ought to have known that Europe would not allow the destruction of Turkey, and should, therefore, either have kept quiet, biding his time, or have crossed the Pruth, not with between forty and fifty thousand men, as he did last year, when during the whole winter he had only one army corps in the Principalities, but should have pounced at once with his most powerful masses upon Turkey, reaching across the Balkans before the Turks could have gathered together their scattered forces, and before the Western Powers could have combined in their opposition and sent fleets of troops. To strike by surprise and terror ought to have been his aim, instead of engaging in such an imbecile manner his nation in a gigantic struggle. But Nicholas is growing old, and has all the faults of decrepit age. One of the reasons which prevented him from putting all his resources into action at once was that he feared the cost of such an effort. Now he will lose a hundred times as much money, and without results. Penny-wisdom in such an affair is no wisdom at all.

When the Russian forces first crossed the Pruth, the Czar had no doubt—as we happened to know and took occasion to state at the time—that he could bully all Europe, and reap laurels at small expense. His diplomatic agents, too, encouraged him in this foolish opinion. The most mischievous of these accessories to the Great Russian blunder has proved to be the Russian Minister at Paris, Kisseleff, whose dispatches were full of the most satisfactory accounts concerning the friendly and pacific intentions of Louis Napoleon. Kisseleff having resided for more than twenty-eight years in the French capital, very naturally dreaded the idea of being recalled from the position where he led an epicurean life. The Czar, accordingly, who delights to read adulatory and flattering reports from his agents, caught at the first

bait, and any dispatch smelling of a disagreeable truth from any quarter was discredited, treated with contempt, and did nothing but injury with the Autocrat to the faithful and able diplomatist sending it. Thus nearly all the Russian diplomatic reports were full of encomiums on the Imperial sagacity, to which Europe bowed, as they assured his Majesty, with respect and admiration. In one word we are able to affirm that, since 1851, Nicholas has never had laid before him a truthful account of the state of Europe, and of the feelings of the other Governments towards him and Russia; and if his numerous agents misled him in such a manner, the reason was that this was the most, nay the only, palatable dish for his political appetite. He craved universal adulation; now he tastes its bitter and poisonous fruits.

We do not put any faith in the rumour of his abdication, a thing totally impossible and unwarranted; but, on the other hand, only a miracle can extricate him from the difficulties now heaped on him and Russia by his pride, shallowness, and imbecility.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* MARCH 28, 1855.—The death of the Emperor Nicholas, with its immediate and prospective consequences, overtops all other news. As *The Tribune* informed its readers would be the case, contrary to the opinion of nearly all the journals, Alexander II, quietly asumed the inheritance of his father. Europeans speculate upon the course which the new Emperor will pursue in the ominous conflict now pending. Until yet, however, the few public acts of Alexander show that he intends to pursue the same course as his predecessor. The manifesto to the nation, of which only the most interesting part is published in the European journals, declares that the new Czar will do all in his power to maintain Russia in the high position which she holds, and that he will continue the policy of Peter, Catherine, Alexander, and his deceased father. Such a declaration is very natural in the mouth of a new sovereign, but it would be preposterous to draw conclusions therefrom as to his future acts. Such words are neither for war nor for peace, and other indications are required in order to judge of his intentions. One of these is that he has no liking for the English; and another is the nomination of Count Rudiger as War Minister, instead of Prince Dolgoroucki, who filled this post under the deceased Czar, and was his favourite. These are the only changes yet known to be made among the higher dignitaries of the Empire, and they followed almost immediately on the

death of Nicholas. We perceive in them a demonstration that the new Emperor is preparing for extremities, and for an energetic prosecution of the war, should the Conference of Vienna prove a failure.

As we long ago stated, it was the practice of Nicholas to direct personally all the movements of his armies and the destination and location of his troops. In a word, he was his own War Minister. Prince Dolgoroucki, a man of secondary capacity, without any military experience, was a good Secretary—laborious and exact in the execution of orders, but unable alone to conceive any plans, or combine or energetically organize new resources. The present Emperor himself, inexperienced in military matters, and never having really devoted to them much of his time, has, in appointing Count Rudiger Minister of War, compensated for his own deficiencies. This Minister is one of oldest generals of Russia, having served with distinction in interior grades during the French campaigns, as general against the Turks in 1828-49, as the commander of a corps in the Polish campaign of 1831, and having finally contributed chiefly to bring to an end the Hungarian invasion, Georgey surrendering to him. He is beyond seventy years, but active, very energetic, and a military man to the marrow, enjoying great consideration in the army as well as at St. Petersburg. He was highly esteemed by Nicholas, and was always a favourite with the present Emperor. Personally he is on rather unfriendly terms with Prince Paskevitch and Prince Gortschakoff, the late commander on the Danube, and now in the Crimea. Count Rudiger has represented the German party, but that must not be confounded with a peace party. The Germans in the military service of Russia are more warlike than the Russians themselves. War is for them the only way of acquiring distinction and rising to elevated positions. Rudiger is descended from an ancient family in the Baltic provinces, as are nearly all the Germans in the Russian service. These noble descendants of the ancient Teutonic knights have preserved all the warlike traditions and the aristocratic character of their ancestors, and all of them prefer to enter the army, war being for them an object of ambition as well as an attraction. The elevation, therefore, of Rudiger, though a German, would give a new and powerful impulse to the preparations for war.

16
Strategic Analyses of the War (1855)

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JANUARY 1, 1855.—The sun of Austerlitz has melted in water. A great battle, as was confidently announced and believed in Paris, was to be fought before Sebastopol in celebration of the second of December, but from a dispatch of General Canrobert, of the third of December, it appears that "rain was falling in torrents, the roads were cut up, the trenches filled with water, and the siege operations—as well as all the works—put in a state of suspense."

The Russians hitherto had the offensive, the Allies the defensive, superiority on the Chernaya; at the walls of Sebastopol it was the reverse. In other words the Russians were strong enough on the Chernaya to hold the field, but the Allies were not, though able to keep their position; while at Sebastopol the Allies, strong enough to carry on the siege, were so nearly matched by the garrison that the operations, though not stopped from without, yet proceeded with hardly any visible effect. The proportions of force seem about to change, and the Allies appear on the point of becoming strong enough to repulse the Russians from the Chernaya. In that case, the Russians can act two ways, after having lost their position above Inkerman. Either they can go round and take up the entrenched camp about the North Fort, or they can with their main body retreat into the interior, where the Allies cannot follow them far. The Allies can hardly be strong enough before February either to invest the northern camp or follow a retreating army much further than Baktchiserai. They could scarcely fight a second battle against an army entrenched somewhere about Simpheropol. In either case they would have to fall back on the Chernaya, and thus this game of alternate advance and retreat is likely to be played all the winter over, unless, indeed, Sebastopol, on the south side, succumbs to an assault. But as the news which we receive respecting the siege is very meagre, we cannot say any more on this point than that it is not at all likley. We are, indeed, aware that,

according to a dispatch of December 7, published in the Paris *Moniteur,* and reprinted in the London papers, the allied armies had all of a sudden got the upper hand, and only two days after the deluge "almost completed the investment of the town." This spurious dispatch was evidently concocted with a view to make amends for the baffled second of December prophecy.

If, in 1812, the Continental force launched against Russia was far weaker than that which she may perhaps see on her frontiers in April or May—if then England was her ally instead of her foe, Russia may console herself with the reflection that the more numerous the armies are which penetrate her interior, the more chance is there of their speedy destruction, and that, on the other hand, she has now three times the troops under arms which she had then.

Not that we think "Holy Russia" unassailable. On the contrary, Austria and Prussia united are quite able, if merely military chances are taken into account, to force her to an ignominious peace. Any forty millions of men, concentrated upon a country of the size of Germany proper, will be able to cope successfully with the scattered sixty millions of Russian subjects. The strategy of an attack upon Russia from the west has been clearly enough defined by Napoleon, and had he not been forced by circumstances of a non-strategic nature to deviate from his plan, Russia's integrity would have been seriously menaced in 1812. That plan was to advance to the Dvina and the Dnieper, to organize a defensive position, both as to fortifications, depots, and communications, to take her fortresses on the Dvina, and to delay the march to Moscow until the spring of 1813. He was induced to abandon this plan, late in the season, from political reasons, from the outcry of his officers against winter quarters in Lithuania, and from a blind faith in his invincibility. He marched to Moscow, and the result is known. The disaster was immensely aggravated by the mal-administration of the French Commissariat, and by the want of warm clothing for the soldiers. Had these things been better attended to, Napoleon, on his retreat, might have found himself at Vilna at the head of an army twice in numbers that which Russia could oppose to him. His errors are before us; they are none of them of a nature irremediable; the fact of his penetrating to Moscow, the march of Charles XII to Poltava, prove that the country is accessible, though difficult of access; and as to maintaining a victorious army in its heart, that all depends upon the length of the line of operations from the Rhine to Eylau and Friedland, if we consider long lines of operations in their capacity

of drawbacks upon the active force of an army, will be about equal to a line of operations from Brest-Litovsk (supposing the Polish fortresses to be taken in the first year) to Moscow. And in this supposition no account is taken of the circumstance that the immediate base of operations would have been advanced to Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Smolensk, without which preparatory act a march on Moscow would certainly be hazardous.

Russia is certainly thinly populated; but we must not forget that the central provinces—the very heart of Russian nationality and strength—have a population equal to that of central Europe. In Poland—that is, the five Governments constituting the Russian kingdom of Poland—the average is about the same. The most populous districts of Russia—Moscow, Tula, Riazan, Nijni-Novgorod, Kaluga, Yaroslavl, Smolensk, etc.—are the very heart of Great Russia, and form a compact body; they are continued, on the south, by the equally populous Little Russian provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Tehernigov, Voronezh, etc. There are, in all, twenty-nine provinces or governments, in which the population is quite half as dense as that of Germany. It is only the eastern and northern provinces, and the steppes of the south, where population is very thin; partly also the formerly Polish provinces of the west—Minsk, Mogilev, and Grodno—on account of extensive swamps between the (Polish) Bug and Dniester. But an advancing army, having in its rear the corn-producing plains of Poland, Volhynia, and Podolia, and in front, and for its theatre of operations, those of Central Russia, need not be afraid of its subsistence, if it manages the matter anything like well, and if it learns from the Russians themselves how to employ the means of transport of the country. As for a devastation of all resources by the retreating army, as in 1812, such a thing is only possible on one line of operations, and in its immediate vicinity; and if Napoleon had not, by his hurried advance from Smolensk, tied himself down to a very short time in which to complete his campaign, he would have found plenty of resources around him. But being in a hurry, he could not forage out the country at a short distance from his line of march, and his foraging parties, at that time, appear actually to have been afraid of penetrating far into the immense pine forests which separate village from village. An army which can detach strong cavalry parties to hunt up provisions, and the numerous carts and wagons of the country, can easily provide itself with everything necessary in the shape of food; and it is not likely that Moscow will burn down a second time. But even in that case, a retreat to Smolensk

cannot be prevented, and there the army would find its well-prepared base of operation provided with every necessary.

* * *

NEW YORK *Tribune,* JANUARY 22, 1855.—The entire British public, starting from the recent vehement leaders of the London *Times,* seems to be in a state of great anxiety and excitement respecting the condition of the forces in the Crimea. Indeed, it is impossible longer to deny or palliate the fact that, through unparalleled mismanagement in every branch of the service, the British army is rapidly approaching a state of dissolution. Exposed to the hardships of a winter campaign, suffering cold and wet, with the most harassing and uninterrupted field duty, without clothing, food, tents, or housing, the veterans who braved the burning sun of India and the furious charges of the Beloochee and Afghan die away by hundreds daily, and as fast as reinforcements arrive they are eaten up by the ravages of disease. To the question who is to blame for this state of things, the reply just now most popular in England is that it is Lord Raglan; but this is not just. We are no admirers of his Lordship's military conduct, and have criticized his blunders with freedom, but truth requires us to say that the terrible evils amid which the soldiers in the Crimea are perishing are not his fault, but that of the system on which the British war establishment is administered.

The British army has a Commander-in-Chief, a person dispensed with in almost all other civilized armies. But it would be a mistake to suppose that this Commander-in-Chief really commands anything. If he has some control over the infantry and cavalry, the artillery, engineers, sappers and miners are entirely beyond his sphere. If he has any authority over trousers, coatees, and stocks, all great-coats are exempt from his influence. If he can make every foot-soldier carry two cartridge pouches, he cannot find him a single musket. If he can have all his men tried by court-martial and well flogged, he cannot make them stir a single inch. Marching is beyond his competence, and as to feeding his troops, that is a thing which does not concern him at all. Then there is the Master-General of the Ordnance. This person is a lamentable relic of the times when science was considered unsoldier-like, and when all scientific corps, artillery, and engineers were not soldiers, but a sort of nondescript body, half savants, half handicrafts-men, and united in a separate guild or corporation, under the command of such a Master-General. This Master-General of the Ordnance, besides artillery and engineers, has under him all the great-coats and

small arms of the army. To any military operation, of whatever nature, he must, therefore, be a party. Next comes the Secretary at War. If the two preceding characters were already of comparative nullity, he is beyond nullity. The Secretary at War can give no order to any part of the army, but he can prevent any portion of the army from doing anything. As he is the chief of the military finances, and as every military act costs money, his refusal to grant funds is equivalent to an absolute veto upon all operations. But, willing as he may be to grant the funds, he is still a nullity, for he cannot feed the army; that is beyond his sphere. In addition to all this, the Commissariat, which really feeds the army, and, in case of any movement, is supposed to find it in means of transport, is placed under the control of the Treasury. Thus the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Treasury, has a direct hand in the getting up of every military operation, and can at his pleasure either push it, retard it, or stop it. Everybody knows that the Commissariat is almost a more important portion of the army than the soldiers themselves; and for this very reason the collective wisdom of Great Britain has thought proper to make it quite independent of the army, and to place it under control of an essentially different department. Finally, the army, formerly, put in motion by the Colonial Secretary, is now subject to the orders of the new War Minister. He dislocates the troops, from England to China, and from India to Canada. But, as we have seen, his authority, taken singly, is as ineffectual as that of any of the four preceding military powers, the co-operation of all the five being required in order to bring about the least movement.

It was under the auspices of this wonderful system that the present war began. The British troops, well fed and well cared for at home, in consequence of a forty years' peace, went out in high condition, persuaded that, whatever the enemy might do, England would not let her gallant lads want for anything. But scarcely had they landed at their first stage, at Gallipoli, when the comparison with the French army showed the ludicrous inferiority of all British arrangements, and the pitiable helplessness of every British official. Although it was here comparatively easy to provide for everything, although sufficient notice had been given, and a very small body of troops only was sent out, everything went wrong. Everybody made himself very busy, and yet nobody would perform duties that had not fallen to his lot at home in time of peace; so that not a man was to be found to do that business which was created by the very war itself. Thus shiploads of stuff were left to rot on the shore where they were first landed, and troops had to be sent on to Scutari for want of room. Chaotic disorder announced

itself in unmistakable signs; but as it was the beginning of the war, an improvement was expected from growing experience.

The troops went to Varna. Their distance from home increased, their number increased, the disorder in the administration increased. The independent working of the five departments composing the administration, each of them responsible to a different minister at home, here first resulted in open and unmistakable clashing. Want reigned in the camp, while the garrison of Varna had the best of comforts. The Commissariat, lazily indeed, got together some means of transport from the country; but as the General-in-Chief did not appoint any escort wagons, the Bulgarian drivers disappeared again as fast as they had been brought together. A central depot was formed at Constantinople —a sort of first base of operations; but it served no purpose, except to create a fresh centre of difficulties, delays, questions of competency, quarrels between the army, the Ordnance, the paying staff, the Commissariat, and the War Office. Wherever anything was to be done, everybody tried to shove it off his own shoulders upon those of somebody else. The avoiding of all responsibility was the general aim. The consequence was that everything went wrong, and that nothing whatever was done. Disgust at these proceedings, and the certainty of seeing his army rot in inactivity, may have had some influence in determining Lord Raglan to risk the expedition to the Crimea.

This expedition crowned the success of John Bull's military organization. There in the Crimea came the "palpable hit." So long as the army was, in point of fact, in a state of peace, as at Gallipoli, Scutari, and Varna, the magnitude of the disorder, the complexity of the confusion, could hardly be expected fully to develop itself. But now, in face of the enemy, during the course of an actual siege, the case was different. The resistance of the Russians gave full scope to the British officials for the exercise of their business-like habits. And it must be confessed never was the business of destroying an army done more effectually than by these gentlemen. Of more than 60,000 men sent to the East since February last, not more than 17,000 are now fit for duty; and of these some 60 or 80 die daily, and about 200 or 250 are every day disabled by sickness, while of those that fall sick hardly any recover. And out of the 43,000 dead or sick, not 7,000 have been disabled by the direct action of the army.

When it first was reported in England that the army in the Crimea wanted food, clothing, housing, everything; that neither medical nor surgical stores were on the spot; that the sick and wounded had either to lie on the cold, wet ground, exposed to the weather, or to be crowded

on board ships moored in an open roadstead, without attendance or the simplest requisites for medical treatment; when it was reported that hundreds were dying for want of the first necessaries—everybody believed that the Government had neglected to send proper supplies to the scene of action. But soon enough it became known that, if this had been partially the case in the beginning, it was not so now. Everything had been sent there, even in profusion; but, unfortunately, nothing ever happened to be where it was wanted. The medical stores were at Varna, while the sick and wounded were either in the Crimea or at Scutari; the clothing and provisions arrived in sight of the Crimea, but there was nobody to land them. Whatever by chance got landed was left to rot on the beach. The necessary cooperation of the naval force brought a fresh element of dissension to bear upon the already distracted councils of the department whose conflicts were to insure triumph to the British army. Incapacity, sheltered by regulations made for peace, reigned supreme; in one of the richest countries of Europe, on the sheltered coast of which hundreds of transports laden with stores lay at anchor, the British army lived upon half rations; surrounded by numberless herds of cattle, they had to suffer from scurvy in consequence of being restricted to salt meat; with plenty of wood and coal on board ship, they had so little of it on shore that they had to eat their meat raw, and could never dry the clothes which the rain had drenched. Think of serving out the coffee not only unground but even unroasted. There were stores of food, of drink, of clothing, of tents, of ammunition by tons and hundreds of tons, stowed away on board the ships, whose masts almost touched the tops of the cliffs where the camp was placed; and yet, Tantalus-like, the British troops could not get at them. Everybody felt the evil, everybody ran about, cursing and blaming everybody else for neglect of duty, but nobody knew, to use the vernacular expression, "which was which," for everybody had his own set of regulations, carefully drawn up, sanctioned by the authorities, and showing that the very thing wanted was no part of his duty, and that he, for one, had no power to set the matter right.

Now, add to this state of things the increasing inclemency of the season, the heavy rains setting in and transforming the whole Heracleatic Chersonesus into one uninterrupted pool of mud and slush, knee-deep if not more; imagine the soldiers two nights at least out of four in the trenches, the other two sleeping, drenched and dirty in the slush, without boards under them, and with hardly any tents over them; the constant alarms completing the impossibility of anything like proper rest and adequate sleep; the cramps, diarrhoea, and other mala-

dies arising from constant wet and cold; the dispersion of the medical staff, weak though it was from the beginning, over the camp; the hospital tents with 3,000 sick almost in the open air, and lying on the wet earth; and it will be easily believed that the British army in the Crimea is in a state of complete disorganization—reduced to "a mob of brave men," as the London *Times* says—and that the soldiers may well welcome the Russian bullet which frees them from all their miseries.

But what is to be done? Why, unless you prefer waiting until half a dozen Acts of Parliament are, after due consideration by the Crown lawyers, discussed, amended, voted on, and enacted; until by this means the whole business connected with the army is concentrated in the hands of a real War Minister; until this new Minister, supposing him to be the right man, has organized the service of his office, and issued fresh regulations; in other words, unless you wait until the last vestige of the Crimean army has disappeared, there is only one remedy. This is the assumption by the General-in-Chief of the expedition, upon his own authority and his own responsibility, of that dictatorship over all the conflicting and contending departments of the military administration which every other General-in-Chief possesses, and without which he cannot bring the enterprise to any end but ruin. That would soon make matters smooth; but where is the British general who would be prepared to act in this Roman manner, and on his trial defend himself, like the Roman, with the words, "Yes, I plead guilty to having saved my country"?

Finally we must inquire who is the founder and preserver of this beautiful system of administration. Nobody but the old Duke of Wellington. He stuck to every detail of it as if he was personally interested in making it as difficult as possible for his successors to rival him in war-like glory. Wellington, a man of eminent common sense, but of no genius whatever, was the more sensible of his own deficiencies in this respect from being the contemporary and opponent of the eminent genius of Napoleon. Wellington, therefore, was full of envy of the success of others. His meanness in disparaging the merits of his auxiliaries and allies is well known; he never forgave Blucher for saving him at Waterloo. Wellington knew full well that had not his brother been minister during the Spanish War he never could have brought it to a successful close. Was Wellington afraid that future exploits would place him in the shade? And did he therefore preserve to its full extent this machinery so well adapted to fetter generals and to ruin armies?

VI

THE CLASS STRUGGLES IN RUSSIA

17
Russia and the Social Revolution (1873)

The future path of Russia is of the greatest importance to the German working class because the present Russian empire is the last great center of support for all reactionary forces in western Europe. This was proved conclusively in 1848 and 1849. Because Germany failed to create an insurrection in Poland in 1848 and to declare war against the Russian tsar (as had been demanded by the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* from the beginning), this very same tsar could in 1849 crush the Hungarian revolution which had penetrated to the gates of Vienna, could in 1850 sit in judgment at Warsaw over Austria, Prussia, and the smaller German states, and could finally reestablish the old German *Bundestag*. And only a few days ago—in the beginning of May, 1875—the Russian tsar received the homage of his vassals in Berlin and thus proved that he is today, as he was twenty-five years ago, still the arbiter of Europe. Therefore, no revolution in western Europe can be definitely and finally victorious as long as the present Russian state exists at its side. Germany is its nearest neighbor. Germany must sustain the first shock from the armies of Russian reaction. The overthrow of the Russian tsarist state and the dissolution of the Russian empire is therefore one of the first conditions for the final victory of the German proletariat.

This revolution need not be brought about from the outside, although a foreign war could hasten it greatly. Within the Russian empire itself are forces which contribute powerfully to its decline.

The Poles constitute the first such force. Because they have been suppressed for centuries they must either become revolutionary or

support every revolutionary uprising in the west as a first step toward their own liberation or perish. Especially today can they find their allies only among the proletariat. They have always been betrayed by all bourgeois parties of the west. In Germany the bourgeoisie has been a political factor only since 1848, and since that date it has been hostile to the Poles. France's Napoleon betrayed Poland in 1812, and as a consequence of this betrayal lost the war, his crown, and his empire. The bourgeois monarchy followed his example in 1830 and in 1846, as did the bourgeois republic in 1848 and Napoleon III in the Crimean war and in 1863. One betrayed Poland as shamefully as the other. Even today the radical bourgeois republicans of France court the favor of the tsar to barter a renewed betrayal of Poland in return for a revanche-alliance against Prussia; while at the same time the bourgeoisie of the German empire hails this very same tsar as the protector of the European peace, i.e. of the German-Prussian annexations. Only among the revolutionary workers can the Poles find honest and unreserved support, for both have an interest in the overthrow of the common enemy and the liberation of Poland depends on his fall.

But the activity of the Poles is limited. It is confined to Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine [*Kleinrussland*]. The heart of the Russian empire, however, Russia proper [*Grossrussland*], is for all practical purposes outside the scope of its impact. Besides, forty million Russians with a separate historical development form too large a nation to have a movement originating outside their midst imposed upon them. But this is not necessary. It is true that the mass of the Russian people, the peasants, have lived mutely for centuries from generation to generation in a kind of timeless stupor, and that the only interruptions in this monotonous existence have been a few sporadic, fruitless revolts resulting in new suppressions by the nobility and the government. The Russian government itself set "history in motion" in 1861 by the abolition of serfdom and the absolution from personal services, reforms which could no longer be postponed. These measures were introduced in such a manner that they are sure to defeat their purpose and result in the ruin of the majority of the peasants. The very position in which the Russian peasant has been placed is driving him into an opposition movement which, while now in its very first stages, inexorably must grow because of the increasingly unfavorable economic conditions of the peasant masses. The rumbling discontent of the peasants is already being heard today and is a fact which the government as well as all discontented and opposition parties have to consider.

Thus, when we talk below about Russia, we do not mean to include the whole Russian empire but only Russia proper, i.e.: that region which has at its westernmost boundary the provinces of Pskow and Smolensk, and as its southernmost limit the provinces of Kursk and Voronesh.

To return to our problem, Mr. Tkachoff tells the German workers that as to Russia I do not have even "little knowledge" but am entirely "ignorant," and he feels compelled, therefore, to reveal to them the true state of affairs, and especially the reasons why a social revolution could be started in Russia now with the greatest facility and with much less difficulty than in western Europe.

"We have no urban proletariat, this is true; but, on the other hand, neither have we a bourgeoisie . . . our workers will have to fight only against the holders of *political power;*—the *power of capital* is still in its early origins. And you, my dear sir, probably know well that the struggle against the former is much easier than against the latter."

The revolution sought by modern socialism is, briefly, the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie and the reorganization of society by the abolition of all class distinctions. To accomplish this, we need not only the proletariat, which carries out the revolution, but also a bourgeoisie in whose hands the productive forces of society have developed to such a stage that they permit the final elimination of all class distinctions. In some primitive and pre-literate societies class distinctions are frequently absent, and every people has gone through such a stage of development. To reestablish this phase cannot be our aim, for the reason that from it, with the development of productive forces of society, class distinctions necessarily arise. Only during a definite, for our period, very high stage of the development of the productive forces of society does it become possible to increase production to such an extent that the abolition of classes becomes a truly progressive move. At this stage only can it remain without halting or even reversing the gains in the mode of production. This stage of development is only reached in bourgeois production. The bourgeoisie is consequently equally as necessary a precondition of the socialist revolution as the proletariat itself. A person who says that this revolution can be carried out easier in a country which has no proletariat or bourgeosie, proves by this statement that he has still to learn the ABC of socialism.

The Russian workers—and these workers are, as Mr. Tkachoff himself says, "land laborers, and as such not proletarians but proprietors"—have an easier task because they do not have to overcome the power of

capital but "only the holders of political power," the Russian state. And this state "appears as a power only from afar . . . it has no roots in the economic life of the people; it does not embody in itself the interests of any class . . . In your part of the world the state is not an apparent power. It is based firmly on capital; it embodies in itself (!) certain economic interests . . . In our country this situation is just the reverse—our social structure owes its existence to the state, to a state which so to speak is suspended in mid-air, a state which has nothing in common with the existing social order, and which has its roots in the past but not in the present."

Let us not devote time to the confused conception that the economic interests need the state, which they themselves create, in order to "be embodied"; or by the bold assertion that the Russian social structure (of which the communal property of the peasants is also part and parcel) owes its existence to the state; or by the contradiction that this very state "has nothing in common" with the social order, which is at the same time declared to be the creature of the state. Let us look rather more closely at this "state suspended in mid-air" which does not represent the interests of a single class.

In European Russia the peasants own 105 million desyatins, the nobles (as I will call the large land-owners for short) 100 million desyatins of land. Of this latter amount approximately half is owned by some 15,000 nobles, so that each one of them owns an average of 3,300 desyatins. The total peasant land acreage is thus only slightly larger than that of the nobles. The nobles, as we can see, do not have the slightest interest in the existence of the present Russian state which protects their ownership of half the land! Further, the peasants pay annually from their portion of the land 195 million rubles land tax, the nobles 13 million. The estates of the nobles are, on the average, twice as fertile as the peasant land, since at the time of the redistribution of land in exchange for freedom from personal services the state not only robbed the peasants of most of the land, but also of the best land, which was transferred to the nobles; in addition, the peasants had to pay for the poorest land the price of the best. So the Russian nobility has no interest in the existence of the Russian state!

The peasants as a whole have been placed, through the abolition of serfdom, in a very miserable, and quite precarious, position. Not only were they deprived of the largest and best part of their land, so that in the fertile parts of the country the acreage they till is much too little to support them, considering the state of Russian agriculture; not only

were they charged an excessive amount for their land, which was loaned to them by the state and for which they now have to pay interest and amortization; not only has almost the entire burden of the land tax been shifted to them, while the nobles are free from it, so that it eats up almost the entire ground rent of the peasant land, but all other payments which the peasant has to make (which I shall mention presently) represent direct deductions from that part of his income which forms his wage. Not only all this. To the land tax and the interest and amortization payments on the government loans are also added, since the recent introduction of local government, the provincial and cantonal taxes. The chief consequence of this land "reform" was a new tax burden on the peasants. The central government maintained its receipts, on the whole, but shifted a large part of its expenditures to the provinces and cantons *(Kreise)* which imposed new taxes; and in Russia it is a rule that the upper classes are practically tax exempt while the peasant bears almost all the burden.

In such a situation usury flourishes; and, with the almost unrivalled talent of the Russians for trade on a small scale, for exploitation of favorable business conditions, and for cheating combined with it, usury is seldom absent. Even Peter I said that one Russian could handle three Jews.

When taxes are due, the usurer, the kulak—frequently a wealthy peasant of the same community—offers his cash to the peasant who must have the money under any circumstances and must accept the conditions of the usurer without recourse. In this way he gets deeper into trouble, and needs more and more cash. At harvest time the grain merchant comes. The need for ready cash forces the peasant to sell part of the grain which he and his family need for sustenance. The grain merchant spreads false alarms, affecting the price of grain unfavorably, and pays a low price, frequently in the form of commodities at exorbitant prices; for the trucking system also is highly developed in Russia. The large grain exports from Russia are made possible as can be seen, by the very hunger of the peasant population.

There is another kind of exploitation of the peasants. A speculator rents public land from the government for a period of several years. As long as it produces high yields without fertilizer he works it himself. Then he divides it into smaller lots and rents the exhausted land at high rents to the peasants in the neighborhood who cannot manage with their own holdings alone. Just as we earlier found the English trucking system, so here we find the Irish middleman. In short, there

is no country in which capitalist parasitism, although still in its childhood, is so highly developed and has the mass of the people so thoroughly entangled and enmeshed as in Russia. And all these exploiters of the peasantry have no interest in the existence of the Russian state whose laws and tribunals protect their dirty, yet profitable practices?

The large bourgeois class of Petersburg, Moscow, and Odessa, which has grown rapidly in the last ten years, primarily as a result of the building of railroads, the grain, hemp, flax, and tallow exporters whose whole business is built on the misery of the peasants, the whole Russian large-scale industry which exists only owing to the protective tariff granted by the state—all these important and rapidly growing elements of the population have no interest in the existence of the Russian state? And what of the large army of bureaucrats which overflows Russia, robs the country and forms a real class? And if Mr. Tkachoff assures us that the Russian state has "no roots in the economic life of the people, it does not embody in itself the interest of any class," it is "suspended in mid-air," it appears to us that it is not the Russian state which is suspended in mid-air but rather Mr. Tkachoff.

It is clear that the position of the Russian peasants has become insufferable since the abolition of serfdom, and for this reason alone a revolution is in the offing. The sole question is . . . what can, and what will be the result of this revolution? Mr. Tkachoff says it will be a social revolution. This is a pure tautology. Every real revolution, through bringing about the rule of a new class and permitting it to reorganize the social structure according to its own needs, is a social revolution. But what he wants to say is that it will be a socialist revolution, it will introduce in Russia the social order advocated by western European socialists even before this aim is achieved in the West—and all this in a social situation where the proletariat as well as the bourgeoisie are small in numbers and on the lowest stage of development. And this should be possible, because the Russians are, so to speak, the chosen people of socialism and have the *artel* and collective ownership of land.

The *artel* (which Mr. Tkachoff mentions only in passing, but which we include here because it already played a mysterious role with some Russians in Herzen's day) is a type of association very common in Russia, the simplest form of free cooperation as it can be found among hunting tribes in communal hunts. The word and the institution are not of Slavonic but of Tatar origin. Both are found among the Kirghizes and Yakuts, etc., in the east, as well as among the Lapps,

Samojeds and other Finns.[1] Hence the *artel* in Russia developed at first in the north and east in the contacts with Finns and Tatars, and not in the southwest. The harsh climate creates a need for industrial activities of various kinds, and the lack of urban developments and capital is replaced, as far as possible, by this form of cooperation. One of the most significant features of the *artel,* the mutual liability of the members for each other to third persons, is based originally on kinship, just as were the *gewere* among the old Germanic tribes or the *vendetta,* etc. Furthermore, the word *artel* is used in Russia not only to designate any kind of collective activity, but also certain types of collective institutions. Among the labor *artels* there is an elected chairman (*starosta,* elder) who is paid to perform the duties of treasurer, accountant, etc., and, when necessary, manager. Such *artels* are established (1) for temporary enterprises, and are dissolved when their purposes have been achieved; (2) by the members of the same trade, e.g. porters, etc.; (3) in permanent industrial enterprises.

The *artel* is established by means of a contract signed by all members. If the members cannot raise the necessary capital among themselves, which often happens (*e.g.* in the case of cheese manufacture, or fishing, for nets, boats, etc.), the *artel* falls into the claws of a usurer who lends the necessary capital at high interest, and from then on pockets the largest share of the labor product. Still more dismally exploited are the members of *artels* who hire themselves out as a whole to an entrepreneur as wage laborers. They direct their industrial activity themselves, and thus save the entrepreneur cost of supervision. He rents shacks to the members and advances them food, and thus the most abominable trucking system develops. These conditions prevail for the lumberjacks and tar-burners in the province of Archangel, and in many industries in Siberia, etc.[2] Here the *artel* serves to facilitate the exploitation of the wage laborers by the capitalists. On the other hand, there exist *artels* which in turn employ wage laborers who are not members of the association.

We see that the *artel* is a naturally originated, and hence still very undeveloped cooperative association, and as such neither exclusively Russian nor even Slavonic. Such associations are formed wherever there is a need for them . . . in Switzerland in the dairy industry, in

[1] Compare on the *artel,* e.g., *Sbornik materialov ob artelyach v Rossii (Collection of Materials on the Artels in Russia)* St. Petersburg, 1873, First part.

[2] Cf. Flerovsky, *Polozhenie rabochago klassa v Rossii (The Conditions of the Working Class in Russia)* Petersburg, 1869.

England in fishing, where they take on very varied forms, among the Silesian navvies (Germans, not Poles) who in the forties built quite a few German railroads and were organized in complete *artels*. The predominance of the *artel* form of organization in Russia proves the existence of a strong drive for association among the Russian people but does not prove by any means that this drive makes possible a jump directly from the *artel* to the socialist society. For this to be possible it is necessary above all that the *artel* itself become capable of development and divest itself of its original form, in which it serves the capitalists rather than the laborers (as we have seen), and at least rise to the level of the western European cooperative associations. But if we may give credence to Mr. Tkachoff (which is, indeed, very questionable after all we have quoted from him) this is by no means the trend. On the contrary, he assures us with pride, highly significant for his point of view, "As concerns the cooperative and credit associations of German (!) type recently transplanted to Russia, they have been received by the majority of our workers with complete indifference and have failed almost everywhere." The modern cooperative society has at least proved that it can run a large scale industrial plant on its own account with advantage (spinning and weaving factories in Lancashire). The *artel* in its present form is not only incapable of this, it is necessarily destroyed by large-scale industry unless it is further developed.

The communal property of the Russian peasants was discovered in 1845 by the Prussian official Haxthausen, and announced over the whole world as something quite wonderful, although Haxthausen could in his home in Westphalia find many remains of it and as a civil servant should have known about it. From Haxthausen, Alexander Herzen, himself a Russian landowner, learned that his peasants owned the land communally; and he used this as an occasion to represent the Russian peasants as the true bearers of socialism, as born communists, while the workers of the senile, disintegrating European West had to strive for it artificially and tortuously. From Herzen this knowledge came to Bakunin, and from Bakunin to Mr. Tkachoff. Let us hear what he has to say:

"Our people are permeated in the large majority . . . with the principles of communal property; they are, if I may say so, instinctively, traditionally communist. The idea of collective property is so deeply rooted in the whole world philosophy of the Russian people (we will see presently how far the world of the Russian peasant goes) that the

government, which is now beginning to understand that this idea cannot be reconciled with the principles of a 'well-ordered' society, and which in the name of these principles wants to impress upon the consciousness and the life of the people the idea of individual private property, can carry out its ideas only by means of the bayonet and the knout. From this it follows that our people, despite their ignorance, are much nearer to a socialist society than the peoples of western Europe with their higher education."

Actually, communal property of land is an institution which we find where there is a low state of productive development, among all Indo-European peoples from India to Ireland, and even among those Malay peoples (e.g. on Java) whose development is influenced by Indian custom. As late as 1608 legal rule of the communal property in land was used by the English as a pretext, in the newly conquered northern part of Ireland, to declare the land as unowned and to confiscate it on behalf of the king. In India there still exist today quite a number of forms of communal property. In Germany it was quite common; the occasionally found common lands are remains of this institution, and we frequently find, especially in the mountainous parts, distinct traces of it, and sometimes partitions of the common lands, etc. The exact accounts and details in regard to the old-Germanic communal property can be found in the various writings of Maurer which are classics on this point. In western Europe, including Poland and the Ukraine, communal property became a fetter and a brake to agricultural production at a certain stage of social development and was therefore gradually abolished. In Russia proper it survived until today, and thus provides primary evidence that agricultural production and the corresponding conditions of rural society are here at a still very undeveloped stage. The Russian peasant lives and works only in his community; the rest of the world exists for him only insofar as it intrudes into his community. This is so patently the case, that in the Russian language the word, *mir,* means on the one hand "world" and on the other "village community." *Vse mir,* "the whole world," means to the peasant the assembly of the members of the community. If Mr. Tkachoff therefore talks of the "world philosophy" of the Russian peasants, he has obviously translated the Russian word *mir* wrongly.

Such a complete isolation of the various villages from each other, which produces in the whole country identical, but the very opposite of truly common interests, is the natural basis of oriental despotism,

and from India to Russia this type of social structure has always produced despotism wherever it was paramount, and has always found its completion in this form of government. Not only the Russian state in general, but its specific form, the despotism of the tsar, instead of being suspended in mid-air, is a necessary and logical product of Russian social conditions, with which, according to Mr. Tkachoff, it has "nothing in common." The further development of Russia in a bourgeois direction will destroy communal property gradually in this country also, without any need on the part of the Russian government to interfere with "bayonet and knout." And this is the more certain, since the communal land in Russia is not *worked* collectively by the peasants and only the final product distributed, as is the case in several parts of India; on the contrary, the land is distributed from time to time among the various heads of families and every family tends its land on its own. This makes possible large differences in wealth among the various members of the community, and such differences exist in reality. Almost everywhere are to be found some wealthy peasants—sometimes even millionaires—who practice usury and exploit the mass of the peasants. Nobody knows this better than Mr. Tkachoff. While he makes the German workers believe that the Russian peasant, this instinctive, traditional communist, can only be cured of the "idea of collective property" by means of bayonets and the knout, he states in his Russian pamphlet on page 15: "In the midst of the peasants there develops a class of usurers *(kulakov),* of purchasers and tenant-holders of peasant land and the estates of the nobles—a type of peasant aristocracy." These are the same type of exploiters of whom I have talked in greater detail earlier in this paper.

The event that contributed most to the breaking up of collective property was the abolition of serfdom. The nobles received the largest and best part of the land; the peasants were left with hardly enough land, often insufficient to sustain themselves. At the same time the forests were awarded to the nobles; fire-wood and lumber for building and other purposes, which the peasant once could obtain free, now has to be bought. Thus the peasant now owns nothing more than his house and the bare land, without the means to work it, and, on the average, not enough land to provide a living for himself and his family from one harvest to the next. Under such conditions and under the burden of taxes and usury, the communal property in land is no longer an advantage, but a fetter. The peasants frequently run away with or without

their families, in order to make a living as migratory workers, and leave their land behind.[3]

We see that communal property long ago passed its highpoint in Russia, and to all appearances is nearing its doom. Yet there exists, doubtless, the possibility of transforming this social organization into a higher form in the event it persists until the time when circumstances are ripe for such a change, and in case the institution of communal property proves to be capable of development so that the peasants do not continue to cultivate the land individually but jointly.[4] Society would have to be transformed into this higher form without the Russian peasants going through the intermediate step of bourgeois individual private ownership of land. But this can happen only if in western Europe a victorious proletarian revolution is achieved before the complete disintegration of communal property. This would provide the Russian peasant with the preconditions to such a transformation of society, chiefly the material conditions which he needs, in order to carry through the necessary complementary change of his whole system of agriculture. It is, therefore, pure "hot air" for Mr. Tkachoff to say that the Russian peasants, although "owners of property" are "nearer to socialism" than the propertyless workers of western Europe. On the contrary, if there is anything which can save the Russian system of communal property, and provide the conditions for it to be transformed into a really living form, it is the proletarian revolution in western Europe.

Mr. Tkachoff is just as simple with the political revolution as with the economic revolution. The Russian people, he tells us, "protest incessantly" against slavery, sometimes in the form of "religious sects... refusal to pay taxes . . . robber bands (the German workers will be happy to know that according to this view Schinderhannes is the father of German Social Democracy) . . . incendiarism . . . revolts . . . and hence we may call the Russian people instinctive revolutionaries." And

[3] On the position of the peasants see e.g., the official reports of the government commission on agricultural production, 1873, also Skaldin, *V zakholusti i v stolice, (In a Faraway Province and in the Capital)*, Petersburg, 1870; the latter work by a liberal conservative.

[4] In Poland, especially in the province of Grodno, where the nobility has been largely ruined by the revolt of 1863, the peasants are used to buying or renting estates of the nobles and cultivating them jointly and for joint account. And these peasants have not had communal property for centuries, and furthermore are not Russians, but Poles, Lithuanians, and Byelorussians.

thus Tkachoff is convinced that "it is only necessary to awaken simultaneously in several places the heaped up feeling of exasperation and discontent which . . . always is present in the bosom of our people." Then "the unification of the revolutionary powers will be achieved by itself . . . and the struggle must end with a victory for the side of the people. Practical necessity, the instinct of self-preservation" achieves thus quite by itself "a firm and inseparable bond among the revolting communities."

It is impossible to imagine an easier and more pleasant revolution. An uprising occurs in three or four places simultaneously, and the "instinctive revolutionary," "practical necessity," the "instinct of self-preservation" do the rest, "quite by themselves." Why, if it is so ridiculously easy, did not the revolution occur long ago, the people liberate itself, and Russia change to a model socialist country?

Actually the situation is quite different. The Russian people, this mass of instinctive revolutionaries, have made numerous isolated peasant revolts against the nobility and single officials, but never against the tsar, unless a false tsar put himself at the helm and claimed the throne. The last large peasant revolt under Catherine II was made possible only because Emilian Pugachoff passed himself off as her husband, Peter III, claiming he had not been murdered by his wife but only robbed of his throne and imprisoned, and had then escaped. On the contrary, the tsar is the god on earth of the Russian peasant. *Bog vysok, tsar dalyok.* "God is in the Heavens and the tsar is far away," is his cry of distress. There is no doubt that the mass of the peasants, especially since the freeing of the serfs, has been placed in a position which forces upon it an increasing struggle against the government and also against the tsar. But the fairy tale of the "instinctive revolutionaries" has to be sold by Mr. Tkachoff on another market.

However instinctively-revolutionary the nature of the Russian peasants, assuming even that a revolution can be produced on order as a piece of cotton-cloth or a teapot, even then I ask whether the course of a revolution can be pictured by a mature man in such a childish way as it is done here? After all, this was written after the first revolution manufactured on the Bakunian model, the Spanish revolution of 1873, had failed so brilliantly. It was thought there too that practical necessity and the instinct of self-preservation would produce by themselves a firm and unbreakable bond between the communities. But every village and town defended only itself; there was no question of mutual assistance. So, with no more than 3000 men, Pavia conquered one town

after the other in two weeks and made an end to the whole anarchist splendor.[5]

No doubt, Russia stands on the eve of a revolution. Its finances are completely shattered, oppressive taxation fails to work, interest on the old public debt is paid only by raising new loans, and every new loan meets with increasing difficulties. Money can be raised only by the pretense of building railroads. The administration is thoroughly corrupt; the officials are living more by theft, graft, and blackmail than on their salaries. The whole agricultural production—of overwhelming importance in Russia—has been brought into complete disorder since the abolition of serfdom; the large estates are without sufficient labor; the peasants are without enough land yet are crushed by taxes and exploited by usurers; land yields decrease from year to year. The whole is held together laboriously and externally by an Oriental despotism, whose arbitrariness and caprice we cannot imagine in the West, a despotism which not only clashes openly with the views of the educated classes and especially those of the rapidly growing urban bourgeoisie, but which has become mad in the person of its present representative, who makes concessions to the liberals today in order to take them back terrified tomorrow, and thus discredits himself more and more. This is accompanied by the growing recognition among the educated groups of the nation, who are concentrated in the capital, that this situation is untenable, that a revolution is on its way, and by the illusion that this revolution can be guided into a quiet constitutional course. All the conditions of a revolution are present, a revolution which will be started by the upper classes in the capital, perhaps by the government itself, but which must be driven further by the peasants beyond its first constitutional phase; a revolution which will be of the utmost importance for all Europe simply for the reason that it will destroy the last, until now intact, reserve of all-European reaction with one coup. This revolution is certainly coming. Only two events can delay it; a victorious Russian war against Turkey or Austria, for which money and secure alliances are needed; or a premature attempt at revolt, which will again drive the propertied middle-class into the arms of the government.

[5] See my (Engels') article "Bakunisten an der Arbeit," *Volkstaat,* 1873, where this is discussed in detail.

18
Letter on the Economic Development of Russia (1877)

I. The author of the article "Karl Marx before the Tribunal of Mr. Zhukovsky" is evidently a man of intelligence, and if he had found a single passage supporting his conclusions in my exposition of primitive accumulation, he would have quoted it. Lacking such a passage, he had to seize upon a side-dish, polemical attack against a Russian journalist [*belletriste*] printed in the appendix of the first German edition of *Capital*. What do I object to in this writer? That he has discovered "Russian communism," not in Russia but in the book of Haxthausen, a councillor of the Prussian Government, and that in his hands the Russian village community serves merely as an argument to prove that Europe, old and decadent, ought to be regenerated by the victory of Panslavism. My estimate of this writer may be correct, it may be false, but in no case can it serve as a key to my views on the efforts of the Russians "to find for their country a different path of development from that which Western Europe has followed and is still following."

In the post-script to the second German edition of *Capital* I speak of "a great Russian scholar and critic" with the high consideration which he deserves. In several remarkable articles the latter has considered the question of whether Russia should begin by destroying the rural commune in order to pass to the capitalist system, as the liberal economists want it, or whether, on the contrary, without experiencing the hardships of this system, it can appropriate its benefits while developing its own historical conditions. He takes a stand in favor of the last solution, and my honorable critic might just as validly have inferred from my consideration for this "great Russian" that I shared his views on this question, as to conclude from my polemic against the Russian journalist and Panslavist that I rejected them.

Finally, since I do not like to leave anything "to guesswork" I shall

speak straight out. In order to be able to judge the economic development of contemporary Russia from a knowledge of its causes, I learned Russian, and then for many years studied the official and other publications concerning this subject.

I arrived at this conclusion: If Russia continues to move in the path followed up to 1861, it will lose the finest occasion that history has ever offered a people not to undergo all the sudden turns of fortune of the capitalist system.

II. In the chapter on primitive accumulation I claim only to trace the path by which the capitalist order in Western Europe developed out of the feudal economic order. Thus the Chapter traces the movement which divorced the producer from his means of production, transforming the former into a wage-earner (a proletarian in the modern sense of the word) and the latter into capital. In this historical process "every revolution stands out as a lever for the advancement of the capitalist class which is in the process of formation. But the basis of the evolution is the expropriation of the peasants." At the end of the chapter, I treat the historical tendency toward accumulation, and I assert that its last word is the transformation of capitalist property into socialist property. I do not supply any proof of this at this point for the good reason that this assertion itself is but the summary of long elaborations previously given in the chapters on capitalist production.

Now, what application to Russia can my critic draw from my historical sketch? Only this: if Russia attempts to become a capitalist nation, like the nations of Western Europe, *and in recent years it has made great efforts in this direction,* it will not succeed without having first transformed a good part of its peasants into proletarians, and afterwards, once it has crossed the threshold of the capitalist system, it will have to submit to the implacable laws of such a system, like the other Western nations. That is all, but it is too much for my critic. For him it is absolutely necessary to change my sketch of the origin of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophical theory of a Universal Progress, fatally imposed on all peoples, regardless of the historical circumstances in which they find themselves, ending finally in that economic system which assures both the greatest amount of productive power of social labor and the fullest development of man. But I must beg his pardon. This is to do me both too much honor and too much discredit. In various places in *Capital* I have alluded to the destiny which overtook the Plebians of ancient Rome.

They were originally free peasants cultivating each on his own

account his own parcel of land. In the course of Roman history they were expropriated. The same movement which separated them from their means of production and subsistence, brought about not only the formation of the great landed estates but that of great holdings of money capital as well. Thus one fine morning there were on the one hand free men deprived of everything except their labor power, and on the other, to exploit this labor, the holders of all acquired wealth. What happened? The Roman proletarians became, not wage-earners, but an idle *mob,* more abject than the former "poor whites" [sic] in the southern regions of the United States, and, beside them there developed a mode of production which was not capitalist but based on slavery. Thus events which were strikingly analogous, but which took place in different historical circumstances, led to entirely dissimilar results.

By studying each one of these evolutions separately, and by comparing them afterwards, the key to these phenomena can easily be found, but one will never succeed with the open sesame of an historico-philosophical theory, of which the supreme virtue consists in its being *supra-historical* [i.e., beyond the pale of history].

19
Letter on the Russian Village Community (1881)

I

The most serious argument which has been raised against the Russian village community comes down to this:

Go back in time to the beginnings of Western societies and you find everywhere communal ownership of the soil; with the advancement of society it has everywhere disappeared and been replaced by private property. Hence it could not escape the same fate in Russia alone.

I am going to be concerned with this argument only in so far as it is

derived from European experience. As concerns East-India, for example, everyone, except Sir Henry Maine and other people of the same fiber, knows only too well that there the suppression of the communal ownership of land was only an act of English vandalism, which has brought not an advance, but a setback, to the native peoples.

The primitive communities are not all fashioned on the same last. They form, on the contrary, a series of social groupings, which differ as to age and type and which represent successive stages of social evolution. One of these types which it is customary to call the *village community* is that in which the *Russian community* also falls. Its Western equivalent is the *Germanic community,* which is of very recent date. It did not yet exist at the time of Julius Caesar and it had ceased to exist when the Germanic tribes conquered Italy, Gaul, Spain, and so on. At the time of Julius Caesar there existed already an annual distribution of farm land among groups, the *gentes* and the *tribus,* but not yet among the individual families of a community; agriculture was probably also carried on communally by groups. On the land of Germany proper, this community of the oldest type transformed itself by a natural development into the *village community,* which has been described by Tacitus. From that time we lose it from sight. It perished unnoticed in the incessant wars and migrations. Perhaps it died a violent death. But its natural vitality is attested by two undeniable facts. Some scattered examples of this organization have survived all the vicissitudes of the Middle Ages and have remained intact to the present, for example in the country of my origin, the district of Trier. But what is more important, we find the imprint of this "village community" so well drawn on the newer community which arose out of it, that Maurer by analyzing the latter could reconstruct the former. The new community, in which agricultural land is the *private property* of the cultivators, while at the same time forests, pastures, wastes, etc., still remain *communally owned,* was introduced by the Germanic peoples into all the countries they conquered. Thanks to the hallmarks borrowed from its prototype it became during the entire Middle Ages the only refuge of popular liberty and life.

One also finds "rural communities" in Asia among the Afghans and other peoples, but they appear everywhere as the *most recent type* and, so to speak, as the last word of the *archaic organization* of society. I have gone into some detail in the discussion of the Germanic community in order to bring out this fact.

We must now consider the most characteristic features which distinguish the "village community" from more archaic communities.

(1) All other communities are based on relationship of consanguinity among their members. Only persons who are related by blood or adopted can attain membership. The structure of other communities is that of a genealogical tree. The "village community" was the first association of free men not related to one another by close blood lines.

(2) In the village community the house, and its complement the farmyard, are the private property of the peasant. The *communal house* and the *collective dwelling* formed, on the contrary, the economic basis of more primitive communities, and that long before the introduction of pastoral or agricultural pursuits. True, one can find village communities where the houses, although not any more collective dwelling places, change their occupants periodically. The separate use is, in this way, combined with communal ownership. But these are communities which still bear a visible sign of their origin: they are in a state of transition from a more archaic type of community to that of the village community proper.

(3) The agricultural land, inalienable property, held in common, is periodically distributed among the members of the village community, in such a way that each member works on his own account the fields assigned to him and appropriates the fruits as private property. In the more primitive communities, work is done in common and the common product, apart from a portion reserved for purposes of reproduction, is divided in accordance with the consumption needs of the members.

It is easy to see that the *dualism* inherent in the structure of the village community can endow it with a vigorous life. Emancipated from the strong but narrow links of blood relationship, the communal ownership of the land and the social relations deriving from it, provide it with a solid foundation, while at the same time, the house, and the yard, exclusive domain of each individual family, the cultivation by separate lots and the private appropriation of the harvest give full scope to an individualism which is incompatible with the structure of more primitive communities.

But it is no less evident that in the course of time this very dualism may transform itself into a germ of decomposition. In addition to all the mischievous influences coming from outside, the community carries in its own bosom elements of its own destruction. Private property in land has already crept in in the form of a house with its farmyard,

which can be transformed into a fortress whence the attack on communal land is prepared. We have seen this happen. But the essential thing is the existence of labor on one's own lot as a source of private appropriation. It makes possible the accumulation of movable goods, for example domestic animals, money, and sometimes even slaves or serfs. This movable property, which is beyond the control of the community, and subject to private exchange in which ruse and accident play a great role, rests more and more heavily on the entire rural economy. This is the decomposing factor of primitive social and economic equality. It introduces heterogeneous elements which provoke conflicts of interests in the bosom of the community, and which call forth passions designed to encroach first upon the communally owned farmlands, then the communal property of forests, pastures, wastes, etc., which once converted into *communal annexes* to private property will fall victim to the latter in the long run.

As the last stage of the primitive form of society, the village community forms at the same time a transitional phase to a secondary form. It represents thus the transition of a society founded on communal property to a society based on private property. The secondary form of society includes, of course, the series of social forms based on slavery and serfdom.

But does this mean that the historical development of the village community must inevitably lead to that outcome? Not at all. Its innate dualism permits an alternative development: either its factor favoring private property overcomes its factor favoring collectivism, or the latter overcomes the former. It all depends on the historical environment in which the community finds itself.

Let us leave out of consideration, for a moment, the troubles which beset the Russian community, and let us consider only its possibilities of development. It occupies a unique situation, without precedent in history. In all Europe it is the only one, which still forms an organic structure, predominating in the rural life of an immense empire. The communal ownership of the soil offers it a natural basis for collective appropriation, and its historical environment, the contemporaneous existence of capitalist production lends it all the ready made material conditions of cooperative labor, organized on a vast scale. The community can thus adopt the positive achievements elaborated by the capitalist system without having to undergo its hardships. It can gradually supplant the tilling of the soil by lots, by collective agriculture, with the aid of machines, the use of which the physical configuration of the

Russian soil invites. After having been put temporarily in a normal state of functioning in its present form, it can become the *direct point of origin* of the economic system towards which modern society develops and it can cast off its old skin without first committing suicide.

II

From the historical standpoint the only serious argument in favor of the *inevitability* of the dissolution of communal property in Russia is the following: Communal property has existed everywhere in Western Europe, it has everywhere disappeared wtih the progress of society. How could it then avoid the same fate in Russia?

In the first place, the death of communal property and the birth of capitalist production in Western Europe are separated from one another by an immense interval which embraces a whole series of successive revolutions and stages of economic evolution, of which capitalist production is only the most recent. On the one hand capitalism has developed the productive forces of society splendidly, but on the other hand it has betrayed its incompatibility with the very forces which it has itself brought to light. From that point on its history is but a history of struggles, of crises, of conflicts, of disasters. At the very end it has unveiled its purely transitory character to everyone, except those who are blinded by partisanship. The peoples of Europe and America among which it has attained its greatest development have no other wish but to break its chains and to replace capitalist production by cooperative production, and capitalist property by a form of property *superior* to the archaic type of property, that is, by communist property.

If Russia were isolated in the world, then it would have to work out by its own forces the economic advances which Western Europe has achieved only by passing through a long series of evolutions from its primitive communities to its present state. There would be, at least in my opinion, no doubt that its communities would be condemned to inevitable disappearance with the development of Russian society. But the situation of the Russian community is fundamentally different from that of the communities of the West. Russia is the only European country in which communal property has been preserved on a vast nation-wide scale. But, at the same time, Russia finds itself in a modern historical environment. It is contemporaneous with a superior civilization, it is tied to a world market in which capitalist production predominates.

By appropriating the positive results of this mode of production, it

is in a position to develop and transform the yet archaic form of its village community, instead of destroying it. (I note, in passing, that the form of communist property in Russia is the most modern form of the archaic type of property, which itself has undergone a series of evolutionary changes.)

If the patrons of the capitalist system in Russia deny the possibility of such a combination, let them prove that in order to use machinery, Russia was forced to pass through the early stages of production by mechanical means! Let them explain how they succeeded in introducing in Russia in a few days, so to speak, the mechanism of exchange (banks, credit institutions, etc.), the elaboration of which has taken centuries in the West!

III

The archaic or primary formations of our earth consist themselves of a series of layers of different age, superimposed upon one another. Similarly, the archaic structures of society reveal a series of different social types corresponding to progressive epochs. The Russian village community belongs to the most recent type of this chain. The peasant in Russia has already acquired private property in the house which he inhabits and in the garden belonging to it. This is the first factor which decomposes the archaic form, and which is unknown to the older types. On the other hand, these latter are based on blood relationships between the members of the community, whereas the type to which the Russian community belongs has emancipated itself from this narrow tie. For this very reason it is capable of a wider development. The isolation of the communities, the absence of links in the life of one with the others, this localized microcosm, is not found everywhere as an inherent characteristic of the primitive type, but wherever this isolation of communities is found, it causes a centralized despotism to elevate itself above them. I have the impression that this isolation which originally was foisted on the Russian communities by the vast extension of the territory can easily be eliminated, once the governmental fetters have been cast off.

This leads us to the bottom of the problem. There is no question that the archaic type to which the Russian community belongs, is invested with a deep-seated dualism which, given certain historical conditions, may bring about its destruction. Ownership of the soil is communal, but every peasant cultivates and exploits his field on his own account, just as the small peasant in the West. Communal property

of the soil and exploitation by individual lots, is a combination which though useful in former periods, becomes dangerous in our time. On the one hand, the movable assets, a factor which plays an increasingly important role even in agriculture, differentiate progressively the wealth of the members of the community and bring about a conflict of interests, which is enhanced by the fiscal pressure of the State. On the other hand, the economic superiority of communal property—as basis of cooperative and collective labor—is lost. But we must not forget that in the exploitation of the jointly owned meadowlands the Russian peasants already practice the collective mode of production; that their familiarity with the *artel* would greatly facilitate the transition from agriculture by individual plot to collective agriculture; that the physical configuration of the Russian soil demands combined mechanical cultivation on a large scale; and that, finally, Russian society which for such a long time has existed at the expense and cost of the village community owes it the first advances which are necessary for this change. It would, of course, only be a gradual change, which would begin by establishing the normal state of the community in its *present* form.

Leaving aside all more or less theoretical problems, I need not tell you that today the very existence of the Russian community is threatened by a conspiracy of powerful interests. A certain type of capitalism, fed at the expense of the peasants through the intervention of the State has arisen against the community. It wishes to annihilate the community. Moreover the large landowners have an interest in establishing an agricultural middle class out of the more or less well-to-do peasants and in transforming the poor cultivators, that is the large mass, into simple wage-earners. This would mean cheap labor. And how can the village community resist, if it is stamped under foot by the exactions of the state, pillaged by commerce, exploited by large landowners, internally sapped by usury?

What menaces the life of the Russian community is neither historical necessity, nor a social theory: it is the oppression by the state and the exploitation by capitalist intruders who have been made powerful at the expense and cost of the peasants by the very same State.

IV

Against [the village community] is drawn up large-scale private ownership of land, which controls almost half of the land of best quality, without even mentioning ever the State domains. Here is the reason why the conservation of the "village community" through its ultimate

development becomes part and parcel of the general movement of Russian society. This is the price of Russian regeneration.

Even from the economic standpoint alone, Russia can escape from its agricultural [deadlock] by means of the evolution of its rural community. It would try in vain to escape it by means of the English system of farm tenancy to which all the agricultural conditions of the country are opposed.

* * *

It is not necessary to chase the peasants away from their soil as was done in England and elsewhere, in order to expropriate them, nor is it necessary to abolish communal property by ukases. Rob the peasants of the product of their agricultural labor beyond a certain measure, and in spite of your police and your army you won't succeed in chaining them to their fields. During the last years of the Roman Empire, the provincial decurions, not peasants but landowners, fled from their homes, abandoned their land, and even sold themselves into slavery. And all that, in order to get rid of a property which had become only an official pretext to squeeze them without mercy and pity.

From the day of the so-called emancipation of the peasants, the Russian community was put by the State into an abnormal economic situation, and since that time it has not stopped to press down on the community with the social power concentrated in its hands. Worn out by fiscal demands, the community became an inert mass which could easily be exploited by commerce, landed property and the usurer. This oppression which came from the outside has unloosened in the bosom of the community itself, conflicts of interest which were already present and thus has rapidly developed germs for its decomposition. But this is not all. At the cost of the peasants the State has aided in a hothouse growth of those branches of the Western capitalist system, which without developing in any way the productive conditions of agriculture, are the most appropriate to facilitate and precipitate the theft of its crops by unproductive middlemen. The State has thus helped in the enrichment of a new capitalist pest which is sucking the already thin blood of the "village community."

In one word, the State has lent a helping hand in the rapid development of those technical and economic means which are best suited to facilitate and advance the exploitation of the agriculturist, that is the greatest productive force of Russia and to enrich the "new pillars of society."

This coincidence of destructive influences must naturally lead to the death of the village community unless it is broken by a powerful counterforce.

But one may ask, why do all these interests (I include large industry which is placed under the tutelage of the government), which benefit from the present state of the village community, why do they knowingly conspire to kill the goose that lays the golden egg? Precisely because they sense that this "present state" cannot be maintained, and therefore the present fashion of exploiting the community must go out of fashion. The poverty of the peasant has infected his land, which has become barren. Good harvests are offset by famines. Instead of exporting grain, Russia must import it. On the average, agricultural production in the last ten years shows not only stagnation, but retrogression. Now, for the first time, Russia must import grain, instead of exporting it. Thus, there is no time to lose. The community must be finished. The minority of more or less well-to-do peasants must be made into a rural middle class and the majority into simple proletarians. These are the reasons why the spokesmen of the "new pillars of society" explain the wounds inflicted on the community by themselves as the natural symptoms of its decrepitude.

On the one hand, the "village community" is reduced almost to its last gasp, and on the other, a powerful conspiracy is on the lookout to give it the final blow. Only a Russian Revolution can save the Russian village community. The men who hold positions of social and political power, moreover do their best to prepare the masses for such a cataclysm. If such a revolution takes place in time, if it concentrates all its forces to assure the free development of the rural community, this latter will soon become the regenerating element of Russian society, and the factor giving it superiority over the countries enslaved by the capitalist system.

20
The Communist Manifesto in Russian (1882)

The first Russian edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party,* in Bakunin's translation, was published in the early sixties by the printing firm of the "Kolokol." At that date the West could see nothing in a Russian issue of the Manifesto save as a literary curio. Today, such an interpretation is no longer possible.

The limited scope of the proletarian movement at that time (December 1847) is best shown by the last chapter of the Manifesto which is entitled: Attitude of the Communists towards the various Opposition Parties in different countries. For there are two specially noteworthy omissions: Russia and the United States. At that time Russia constituted the last great reserve of the reaction of all Europe; and the United States absorbed, in the form of emigrants, the proletarian surplus power of Europe. Both countries provided Europe with raw materials, and simultaneously, served as markets for the products of European industry. Both countries, therefore, in one way or another, were at that time pillars of the European social order.

How different is the situation today! The very immigrants from Europe made possible the gigantic growth of agricultural production in North America, the competition of which has shaken the landed interests of Europe—great and small alike—to their very foundations. The immigrants also enabled the United States to exploit the vast industrial resources of the country with such force and in such unceasing rate as to put an end within a short time to the monopoly hitherto exercised by Western Europe and particularly by England in the realm of industry. Both these factors in their turn exert a revolutionary impact upon the United States. The small and medium-sized landed property of the farmers, the fundament of the entire political system, tend more and more to be destroyed by the competition of giant farms. Simultaneously in the industrial districts there develops,

for the first time, a multitudinous proletariat and a fabulous concentration of capitals.

Let us now look at Russia. At the time of the revolution of 1848-1849, the European bourgeoisie, no less than the European princes, looked upon Russian intervention as the only salvation from the just awakening proletariat. The Czar was acclaimed as the head of European reaction. Today he is a prisoner of the Revolution at Gatchina, and Russia forms the vanguard of the revolutionary movement of Europe.

The Communist Manifesto had the objective to proclaim the inevitably coming disintegration of present-day bourgeois property relations. In Russia, however, we find that in contrast to the rapidly growing capitalist system and the emerging bourgeois system of landholding, more than half the land is owned in common by the peasantry.

The crucial question now is: can the Russian *obshtchina* [village community], an already seriously undermined form of the age-old communal property of the soil, become transformed directly into the superior form of communist ownership of land, or will it have to pass through the same process of decomposition which is evidenced by the course of the historical evolution of the West?

Today only one answer is possible to this question. If the Russian revolution sounds the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, [the decomposition of the communal ownership of land in Russia can be evaded][1] so that each complements the other, the prevailing form of communal ownership of land in Russia may form a starting-point for a communist course of development.

[1] The clause in brackets is stricken out in the original manuscript. Tr.

21
Russia and the Social Revolution Reconsidered (1894)

First I must state that Mr. P. Tkachoff, to speak correctly, was not a Bakunist, i.e., an anarchist, but rather, claimed to be a "Blanquist." My error was a natural one, since this gentleman allied himself closely with the entire group of Russian emigrés as opposed to the West, according to the custom of the Russian emigrés of the time. In his pamphlet moreover he defended, in fact, Bakunin and his followers against my attacks as if these were aimed at himself.

The opinions concerning the Russian communistic village communities which he raised against me were in essence those of Herzen. This Panslavist journalist parading as a "revolutionary" had learned from Haxthausen's *Russian Studies* that the unfree peasants on his estate do not know private property in land, but rather re-divide fields and pastures among themselves from time to time. As a journalist he did not need to learn what soon afterwards became common knowledge, that communal ownership of land is a form of property which was predominant in pre-historic times among the Germans, Celts, Indians—in short among all Indo-Germanic peoples—still exists in India, has only recently been forcibly suppressed in Ireland and Scotland, and occurs even here and there in Germany but is now dying out. In fact, it is an institution common to all peoples at a certain state of development.

But since he was a Panslavist who could only be called a socialist by name he found in this fact a new pretext to present his "holy" Russia and its mission—to rejuvenate and to fertilize again the rotten degenerate West, by force if necessary—in a still more splendid light when contrasted with this same decadent West. What the decrepit English and French can not achieve in spite of all efforts, the Russians have already accomplished at home. "To maintain the peasant commune,

to establish freedom of the individual, to extend the self-government of the village to the cities and to the entire state, with the preservation of national unity—the whole question of the future of Russia is contained therein, that is, the question of the same social contradictions, the solution of which preoccupies and stirs the spirits of the West." (Herzen, *Letters to Linton*). Thus Russia may be faced with a political question, but the Russian "social question" has already been solved.

His successor, Tkachoff, dealt with the problem as lightly as Herzen. Even though in the year 1875 he could no longer hold that the "social question" was already solved in Russia, nevertheless, since according to him the Russian peasants are born Communists they are incomparably closer to socialism, and, in addition, immeasurably better off than the poor, God-forsaken Western European proletarians. If, thanks to their century-long revolutionary activities, the French Republicans considered France to be the politically chosen nation, many Russian socialists of that time declared Russia to be the socially chosen people. The old economic order was to achieve its rebirth, not through the struggles of the Western European proletariat, but rather out of the innermost core of the Russian peasantry. My attack was levelled at this childish conception.

However the Russian commune has found attention and recognition among men who stand immeasurably higher than the Herzen and the Tkachoff. Among these is Nicolai Chernyshevsky, that great thinker to whom Russia is so greatly indebted and whose slow murder as a result of years of exile among the Siberian Yakuts will remain an eternal blot on the memory of Alexander II, the "liberator."

Due to the Russian intellectual *cordon sanitaire* Chernyshevsky had never known the works of Marx, and when *Capital* appeared, he had long been in Central Vilyuisk among the Yakuts. His whole spiritual development took place in the environment created by this intellectual *cordon sanitaire*. Whatever the Russian censor kept out hardly existed for Russia, or not at all. Thus if there are occasional weaknesses or limitations in the breadth of his views we can only wonder that there are not more of them.

Chernyshevsky also sees in the Russian peasant community a means of rising out of the existing form of society to a new stage of development which is higher than the Russian commune on the one hand and the Western European capitalistic society, with its class conflicts, on the other. And he sees an advantage in that Russia possesses this means while the West lacks it.

"The introduction of a better order of society is made especially difficult in Western Europe because of the unlimited extension of the rights of the individual personality . . . no one renounces lightly even a small part of the rights which he is accustomed to enjoying. In Western Europe the individual is already accustomed to unlimited private rights. Only long reflection and bitter experience will teach the advantage and the unavoidability of making reciprocal concessions. In the West a better order of economic relationships entails sacrifices and is therefore difficult to achieve. It will go against the customs of the English and French peasant." But: "What seems to be utopia there already exists here as a fact . . . those customs, which it would seem to be insurmountably difficult to introduce into the life of the English and French people, already exist in fact in the life of the people in Russia . . . the order of things to which the West must strive along a long and difficult path already exists among us in the powerful folkways of our peasant life. . . . We see what sad results the disappearance of communal property in land has produced in the West and how difficult it will be for the Western peoples to restore what has been lost." (Chernyshevsky, *Works,* vol. V, pp. 16-19, Geneva, quoted by Plekhanov, *Nashi raznoglasiya,* Geneva, 1885). And concerning the Cossacks of the Urals, among whom still persists communal cultivation of the land and subsequent distribution of the product he says: "If these people of the Urals maintain their present institutions until such time as mechanized wheat farming is introduced, then they will be very glad to have preserved property relationships corresponding to the use of such machines, which presuppose agricultural units of enormous size, of hundreds of *desyatin.*" (*ibid.,* p. 135). But it must not be forgotten that the communal agriculture of the people of the Urals—preserved from extinction for military reasons (we also have communism in our army barracks)—is quite an exception in Russia, similar to the village communities along the Mosel river with us, with their occasional redistributions of land. And if they maintain their present system until they are ripe for the introduction of machinery, then not they but the Russian military treasury by which they are enslaved will derive all the advantages.

In any case the facts were as follows: at a time when in Western Europe capitalist society was disintegrating and threatened to perish as a consequence of the necessary contradictions of its own development—at this same time about one-half of all the land under cultivation in Russia was still communal property of the peasant communes.

If now in the West the solution of these contradictions—through a reorganization of society—has as a prerequisite the transfer of all means of production, including also land, into common property of society, what is the relationship of this communal property yet to be created in the West, to the communal property in Russia, which already or rather still exists? Can this communal property not serve as the springboard for a national action which, by skipping the entire capitalistic period, leads Russian peasant communism at once into modern socialist collective ownership of all the means of production while enriching it simultaneously with all the technical achievements of the capitalistic era? Or, to use the words with which Marx summarized Chernyshevsky's approach in a letter, which is quoted more fully below: "Should Russia begin by destroying the peasant commune, as the liberals demand, in order to pass on to the capitalist system, or can it, on the contrary, appropriate all the benefits of this system without experiencing its hardships, by further developing its own historical conditions?"

The mere statement of the problem already points to the direction in which its solution must be sought. The Russian village community has existed for centuries without ever having produced any stimulus to develop out of itself a higher form of communal property. This was likewise the case with the German *mark*, the Celtic clan, the Indian or other village communities with primitive communistic institutions. In the course of time all of them lost more and more of their communistic character under the influence of commodity production and exchange relations between single families and individuals which surrounded them or developed in each of them and gradually penetrated them. They disintegrated into communities of landed proprietors independent of each other. Thus, if the question can be raised at all, of whether the Russian village community will have a different and better fate, the answer depends not on the virtue of the community itself, but solely on the circumstance that it has maintained a relative vitality in one European country up to a time in which not only commodity production as such, but its highest and final form, capitalistic production, has fallen into contradiction with its own productive forces; when Western European capitalism shows itself incapable of further developing these forces, and when it is perishing from these inner contradictions and the class conflicts arising out of them. From this it already follows that the initiative for such a possible transformation of the Russian village community can only originate, not in the

community itself, but solely among the industrial proletariat of the West. The victory of the Western European proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the associated replacement of capitalistic production by one socially directed—that is the necessary precondition for raising the Russian village community to the same level.

In fact agrarian communism, a derivative of gentile society, has never developed anywhere out of its own forces anything but its own disintegration. The Russian village community itself was already in 1861 a relatively weakened form of this communism. The communal farming of land which still persists in certain regions of India and in the South Slavic household community (*zadruga*)—which was apparently the mother of the Russian commune—has had to give way to cultivation of the land by individual families. Communal ownership came to the surface when land was redistributed, which occurred in different localities at different times. These redistributions need only to die off or end by decree and the village is ready for farming by peasants each on his own lot.

But the mere fact that alongside the Russian peasant community capitalistic production in Western Europe is simultaneously approaching the breaking point where it is itself pointing to a new form of production in which the means of production will be used as socially owned property in planned production—this simple fact can not lend the Russian community enough force to develop out of itself this new form of society. How could it acquire the gigantic productive forces of capitalistic society in the form of socially owned property and instruments of production before capitalistic society itself has brought about this revolution? How could the Russian communities show the world how to operate heavy industry collectively when they have already forgotten how to cultivate their lands for their common good?

To be sure there are plenty of people in Russia with an exact knowledge of Western capitalistic society with all its irreconcilable contradictions and conflicts, who moreover fully understand which is the way out of these apparent blind alleys. But in the first place the few thousand people who understand this do not live in the villages, and the roughly fifty million great Russians who live on communally-owned lands do not have the remotest suspicion of all this. The lack of familiarity and understanding with which they oppose the few thousand are at least as great as the opposition of the English proletarians from 1800 to 1840 to the plans which Robert Owen devised for

their salvation. And among the workers whom Robert Owen employed in his factory at New Lanark the majority were likewise people who had grown up among the institutions and customs of a disintegrating communistic gentile society, in the Celtic-Scottish clan; but there is not a word in Owen's reports to the effect that he found any better understanding among them. And in the second place it is an historic impossibility that a lower stage of economic development should be able to solve the problems and conflicts which have arisen and can only arise on a much higher stage of development. All forms of gentile society whch have arisen before the introduction of commodity production and individual exchange of goods have this factor in common with the future socialistic society: that there are certain objects, means of production, which are common property of and destined to the common use of certain groups. This one common characteristic, however, does not enable the lower form of society to create out of itself the future socialistic society, this uttermost, final product of capitalism.

Each given economic system has to solve its own problems which originate within itself; for one system to seek to solve the problems of other, quite alien systems, would be absolute nonsense. And this goes for the Russian community no less than for the South Slavic, *zadruga,* for the Indian gentile household, or for any other savage or barbaric social system characterized by common ownership of the means of production.

On the other hand, it is not only possible but certain that, after the victory of the proletariat and the transfer of the means of production to common ownership among Western European peoples, the countries which have just entered the stage of capitalistic production and have still preserved institutions of gentile society or remains of them will derive from the remnants of common ownership and the corresponding folkways a powerful means of appreciably shortening their process of development to a socialist society and of escaping most of the sufferings and struggles through which we in Western Europe have had to labor. But in this process the example and the active support of the formerly capitalistic West is an unavoidable prerequisite. Only when the capitalistic economy has been evercome in its homeland and the countries of its flowering, only when the backward countries see by this example "how the job is done," how modern industrial productive forces can be made to serve the collectivity as socially owned property — only then can they tackle this shortened process of development. But then they will also be certain

of success. And this goes for all countries in a pre-capitalistic stage of development, not merely for Russia. However, it will be relatively easiest in Russia, because here a part of the indigenous population has already acquired the intellectual achievements of capitalistic development and it will thus be possible here, in a revolutionary period, to accomplish the social transformation almost simultaneously with the West.

This was already stated by Marx and myself on 21 January 1882 in the foreword to Plekhanov's Russian translation of the *Communist Manifesto*. There we wrote: "In Russia, however, we find that in contrast to the rapidly growing capitalist system and the emerging bourgeois system of landholding, more than half the land is owned in common by the peasantry. The crucial question now is: can the Russian *obshtchina* [village community], an already seriously undermined form of the age-old communal property of the soil, become transformed directly into the superior form of communist ownership or land, or will it have to pass through the same process of decomposiston which is evidenced by the course of the historical evolution of the West? Today only one answer is possible to this question. If the Russian revolution sounds the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that each complements the other, the prevailing form of communal ownership of land in Russia may form a starting-point for a communist course of development."

But, it should not be forgotten that the marked disintegration of Russian communal ownership, already noted here, has since made considerable progress. The defeats suffered in the Crimean War have made clear the necessity of rapid industrial development in Russia. Railroads were needed above all, and these are not possible on a large scale without internal heavy industry. The prerequisite for these things was the so-called liberation of the serfs, with which the capitalistic era began in Russia. But it was accompanied also by an era of rapid weakening of communal property in land. The emancipation payments imposed on the former serfs, in addition to the higher taxes and the simultaneous decrease in the size and the deterioration of the land distributed to them—all delivered them unavoidably into the arms of the usurers, who were for the most part members of the peasant community who had become rich. The railroads provided access for many remote places to the metropolitan grain market, but they also brought in the cheap products of large-scale industry and thus disrupted the home industries of the peasants who had previously made

similar products partly for their own use and partly for sale. The traditional modes of making a living were brought into disorder, the disruption set in which everywhere accompanies the transition from a barter economy [*Naturalwirtschaft*] to a money economy; great differences in wealth developed between the members of the communities; the poor became the debt slaves of the rich. In short, the same process began to destroy the Russian community which in the time of Solon had destroyed the Athenian *gens,* as a consequence of the introduction of a money economy.[1] To be sure, Solon could free the debt slaves by simply annulling the debts, a revolutionary intervention into the then still very recent right of private property. But he could not bring back to life the old Athenian *gens,* and it is just as impossible for any power on earth to restore the Russian community again, after its dissolution has reached a certain high point. Moreover, the Russian government has forbidden redistribution of the land among the members of the community more often than once every twelve years, in order to make the peasant less and less accustomed to it, and to get him to regard himself as the private owner of his portion.

Marx had expressed such an opinion in the year 1877 in a letter sent to Russia. A Mr. Zhukovsky, who as treasurer of the State Bank now consecrates Russian credit notes with his signature, had written an article on Marx in the *European Courier (Vestnik Evropy),* to which another author had replied in the *National Review (Otechestvennyia Zapiski).* To correct this article Marx wrote a letter to the editor of the *Review,* which, after copies of the French original had circulated in Russia for a long time, appeared in 1886 in the *Messenger of the People's Will (Vestnik Narodnoi Voli)* in Geneva, and later also in Russia itself in a Russian translation. Like everything which Marx wrote, this letter received great attention in Russia, and found widely different interpretations; and for this reason I shall now set forth its essential contents.

First Marx rejects the view attributed to him in the *Review,* that he is of the same opinion as the Russian liberals, according to whom Russia has nothing more urgent to do than to dissolve the communal ownership of the peasants and plunge into capitalism. His brief note on Herzen in the appendix to the first edition of *Capital* proves nothing. This appendix note reads: "Since on the European continent the influence of capitalistic production, which has undermined the human race

[1] See Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie,* etc., 5th Edition, Stuttgart, 1892, pp. 109-113. [*The Origin of the Family,* Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1902, pp. 135-140.]

. . . is developing further, hand in hand with competition in the size of national armies, state debts, taxes, the elegant conduct of war, etc., the rejuvenation of Europe by means of the knout and the forced infusion of Kalmyck blood, may finally become unavoidable, a rejuvenation so earnestly prophesied by the half-Russian and entirely Muscovite Herzen. (This scribbler, it should be noted in passing, made his discoveries concerning "Russian communism" not in Russia, but in the works of the Prussian State Counsellor, Haxthausen)" (*Das Kapital,* vol. I, p. 763, first German edition). Then Marx continued: This passage "can in no case serve as a key to my view of the efforts (the following is quoted in the original in Russian) of some Russians to find for their country a different path of development from that which Western Europe has followed and is still following. In the post-script to the second German edition of *Capital* I speak of a great Russian scholar and critic (Chernyshevsky) with the high consideration which he deserves. In several remarkable articles the latter has considered the question of whether Russia should begin by destroying the rural community in order to pass to the capitalist system, as the liberal economists want it, or whether, on the contrary, without experiencing the hardships of this system, it can appropriate its benefits while developing its own historical conditions. He takes a stand in favor of the last solution." "Finally since I do not like to leave anything 'to guesswork,' I shall speak straight out. In order to be able to judge the economic development of contemporary Russia from a knowledge of its causes, I learned Russian, and then for many years studied the official and other publications concerning this subject. I arrived at this conclusion: *If Russia continues to move in the path followed up to 1861, it will lose the finest occasion that history has ever offered a people not to undergo all the sudden turns of fortune of the capitalistic system."*

Later on Marx clears up another misunderstanding of his critic. The single passage which relating to our present question reads:

"Now, what application to Russia can my critic draw from my historical sketch? [The exposition of primitive accumulation in *Capital.*] Only this: if Russia attempts to become a capitalistic nation, like the nations of Western Europe, *and in recent years it has made great efforts in this direction,* then it will not succeed without having first transformed a good part of its peasants into proletarians, and afterwards, once it has crossed the threshold of the capitalist system, it will have to submit to the implacable laws of such a system, like the other Western nations. That is all."

Thus wrote Marx in 1877. At that time there were two governments in Russia: that of the Czar and that of the secret executive committee *(ispolnitel'nyi komitet)* of the terrorist conspirators. The power of this secret second government grew from day to day. The overthrow of Czarism seemed at hand; a revolution in Russia would have robbed the entire European reaction of its strongest support, of its great reserve army, and thus would also have given a new, powerful impetus to the political movement of the West, besides creating much more favorable conditions for [political] action. Small wonder then that Marx advised the Russians to be less hasty with the leap into capitalism.

The Russian revolution did not come. Czarism became master over terrorism which for the moment even drove all the "law-abiding" classes again into the arms of the former. And during the seventeen years which have passed since that letter, capitalism, as well as the dissolution of the peasant community in Russia, have made enormous progress. How does the question stand today, in 1894?

When the old Czarist despotism continued unaffected after the defeats of the Crimean War and the suicide of the Czar Nicholas, only one path remained open—the most rapid possible transition to capitalistic industry. The armies had perished from the vast dimensions of the Empire, on the long marches to the theater of war. The distances had to be overcome by a strategic network of railways. But railroads mean capitalistic industry and a revolutionizing of the primitive system of agriculture. On the one hand the agricultural products of even the remotest regions came into direct communication with the world market; on the other hand an extended railway system cannot be built and maintained without domestic industry which produces rails, locomotives, cars, etc. But one branch of large-scale industry cannot be introduced without taking into the bargain the entire system. A relatively modern textile industry, which had already taken root previously in the region of Moscow and Vladimir, as well as along the Baltic seacoast, experienced a new upswing. The expansion of existing banks and the founding of new ones was bound up with the railroads and factories. The setting free of the peasants from bonded serfdom created mobility, in expectation of what soon followed naturally: the setting free of a great part of these peasants from ownership of land. Thus in a short time all foundations of the capitalistic mode of production were laid in Russia. However, the axe had also been taken to the roots of the Russian village community.

Any regrets about this are now useless. If after the Crimean War the

Czarist despotism had been replaced by a direct parliamentary government of nobles and bureaucrats, then perhaps the process would have been somewhat slowed down. Had the rising bourgeoisie taken over the helm it would certainly have been accelerated. As things were, there was no other choice. Beside the Second Empire in France, beside the brilliant rise of capitalistic industry in England, Russia could really not be expected, because of its peasant communities, to plunge into state socialistic experiments initiated from above. What was possible, under the circumstances, happened—as at all times and in all countries with a system of commodity production, mainly only half consciously or entirely mechanically without an inkling of what was being done.

Then came the new period of revolutions from above, which originated in Germany, and with it a period of the rapid growth of socialism in all European countries. Russia took part in the general movement. Here—as is self-evident—this movement took the form of an attack to overthrow the Czarist despotism, to conquer intellectual and political freedom for the nation. A belief in the magic strength of the peasant commune out of which this social renaissance was supposed to come by necessity—a belief for which, as we have seen, Chernychevsky was responsible to some extent—this belief did its part to strengthen the enthusiasm and energy of the heroic Russian avantgarde. We will not enter into an argument with the scarcely two hundred men and women who by their sacrifices and heroic deeds brought the Czarist absolutism to the point where it already had to reckon with the possibility and the conditions of a capitulation, when they proclaim their Russian people to be the chosen people of the social revolution. But for this reason we need not share their illusion. The time of chosen peoples is forever past.

But during this struggle capitalism made rapid progress in Russia, and achieved more and more what terrorism had failed to accomplish—to bring Czarism to capitulation.

Czarism needed money. Not merely for its court luxuries, its bureaucracy, above all for its army and its foreign policy which is vested on bribery, but also for its miserable system of public finance and corresponding to it for its stupid railway policy. Foreign countries were no longer willing or able to make up for all the Czar's deficits; the homeland had to help. A part of the railway shares had to be subscribed for in the country itself, a part of the loans as well. The first victory of the Russian bourgeoisie consisted of the railway concessions, which allocated all future profits to the shareholders, but burdened the

state with all future losses. Then came subsidies and bonuses for industrial enterprises, protective tariffs for the benefit of home industries which finally made the importation of many articles virtually impossible. Due to its unlimited indebtedness and its almost totally ruined credit abroad, the Russian state had a direct fiscal interest in a hot-house development of domestic industry. It constantly needed gold to pay the interest on its foreign debt. But in Russia there is no gold, since only paper money circulates. A part is furnished by the decree that payment of customs be in gold, which incidentally raises these customs by 50%. But it is planned to obtain the greater part by the surplus of Russian exports of raw materials over the imports of the products of foreign industry. The government buys the foreign exchange for this surplus with paper at home and receives gold for it. Thus if the government wishes to pay the interest on its foreign debts abroad by any means other than new loans abroad, it must foster the rapid strengthening of Russian industry sufficiently to satisfy the entire domestic demand. Hence the insistence that Russia must become an entirely self-sufficient industrial country independent of foreign countries. Hence the feverish efforts of the government to bring in a few years the capitalistic development of Russia to its zenith. For unless this takes place, then nothing remains except to dig into the war reserves of precious metals heaped up in the State Bank and the State Treasury—or worse yet, national bankruptcy. And either of these contingencies would mean the end of Russian foreign policy.

One thing is clear: under such circumstances the young Russian bourgeoisie has the State entirely in its power. In all important economic questions the State must be subservient to the bourgeoisie. If meanwhile it is still tolerating the despotic autocracy of the Czar and his officials, this is only because this autocracy, thus far tempered by the corruption of the bureaucracy, offers its greater security than would a change—even in a burgeois-liberal direction—the consequences of which, given the internal situation in Russia, no one can foresee. And so the transformation of the country into a capitalistic-industrial nation, the proletarianization of a large part of the peasants, and the break-up of the old communistic village community—all progress at an ever faster tempo.

I do not pretend to be able to answer whether enough of this community has yet been preserved so that, as Marx and I still hoped in 1882, it may serve as the starting point of a communistic development, in harmony with a revolution in Western Europe if that case should

arise. However, this much is certain: if a remnant of these communities is to be preserved, the first condition for this is the overthrow of Czarist absolutism, the revolution in Russia. This revolution will not only lift the great mass of the nation, the peasants, out of the isolation of their villages, of the *mir* which forms their world, and place them onto the great stage where they will learn to know the world abroad and with it themselves, their own condition and the means to emancipate themselves from their present poverty. But the revolution will also give a new impetus to the working class movement of the West, and provide them with better conditions for the struggle. Thus it will hasten the victory of the modern industrial proletariat, without which contemporary Russia can not achieve a socialist transformation arising either out of the village community or out of capitalism.

VII

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND EDITORS' COMMENTS

1. The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism

This essay, written by Friedrich Engels for the new Russian journal *Sotsialdemokrat* published since early 1890 in Geneva under the editorship of George Plekhanov and Paul Axelrod, was completed toward the end of February 1890 in London. Its Russian translation appeared in number 2 (1890) of the paper edited by the Russian Social Democrats, and the German original was published (in two installments) in volume VIII of *Die Neue Zeit.* The English version in this collection has been translated from the German text as published in *Die Neue Zeit,* volume VIII (1890), pp. 145-154 and 193-203.

The essay received considerable attention at the time of its first appearance, and was translated into French and English. A French version of Sections I and II appeared in *L'Idée Nouvelle,* Vol. I, Nos. 8, 9, and 10 (August, September, and October, 1890), pp. 117-118, 131-134, and 149-151. This journal ceased to appear with No. 10 of volume I. An English version was published in the London magazine *Time* [(New Series) vol. I, nos. 4 and 5 (April and May 1890), pp. 353 to 369 and 525 to 545], edited by Belfort Bax.

But although the essay received considerable interest at the time of its first appearance it was soon forgotten. Above all, it does not seem to have been reprinted ever in Russian. In the summer of 1934 a special number of the Russian journal *Bolshevik* commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the first World War was planned, and the editors intended to republish Engels' essay in that number. The matter was submitted to Stalin, who ruled against the inclusion of the essay. His letter, dated 19 July 1934, giving his reasons for this decision was distributed to the members of the Politbureau, but the letter was not published until May 1941, when it was reprinted in *Bolshevik,* volume XVIII, number 9 (May 1941), pp. 1-5. That Stalin's viewpoint on the errors of Engels is still official doctrine is attested by a talk of Professor F. D. Kretov, on "The Theory and Tactics of the Bolshevik Party on Questions of War, Peace, and Revolution" broad-

cast over the Moscow radio on 25 March 1952, in which direct reference is made to Stalin's letter of 19 July 1934 and in which a number of passages were quoted from that letter.

Stalin's chief arguments against Engels are the following: In his article on the foreign policy of Russian Czarism, published in 1890, Engels explained the aggressive policy of Russian Czarism as being governed not so much by the needs of the military-feudal-tradesmen upper class of Russia for broadening foreign trade and conquering strategic points, as by the fact that Russia's foreign policy was headed by an alleged all-powerful gang of foreign adventurers.

Characterizing the situation of Europe which was rolling into the abyss of war and enumerating the causes which led to the World War, Engels exaggerated the role of the strivings of Czarist Russia toward the straits. Putting the aggressive strivings of Russian Czarism in the forefront, Engels overlooked a most decisive point—the imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, and for sources of raw materials, the contradictions between Germany and Britain, those very contradictions which subsequently played a definite role in the emergence and development of the First World War.

Finally Engels clearly exaggerated the role of Russian Czarism, as the last fortress of the all-European reaction and the role of the Russian bourgeois revolution in the national assembly, that is, in the bourgeois parliament.

Summing up his arguments against Engels, Stalin wrote: "When an imperialist struggle for colonies and spheres of influence is overlooked as a factor contributing to a world war; if the imperialist contradictions between Britain and Germany are also overlooked; if the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany as a factor of war is put in the background as compared with the strivings of Russian Czarism toward Constantinople, when the latter is considered to be a more important and even more definite factor of war; if, finally, Russian Czarism is the last bulwark of all European reaction—then surely it must be clear that war, let us say, between bourgeois Germany and Czarist Russia is not an imperialist war, not a war of plunder, not an anti-national war, but a war of liberation or of almost liberation."

It may be left to the reader to determine whether Stalin's arguments are decisive, and, indeed whether they are a fair criticism of Engels' article. It may not be without interest that two other outstanding old Bolsheviks, both of whom eventually fell victim to Stalinist purges, had a different opinion of Engles' article. In 1909 N. Ryazanoff wrote a

lengthy essay, *Karl Marx über den Ursprung der Vorherrschaft Russland's in Europa,* which appeared as Ergänzungsheft No. 5 to *Die Neue Zeit,* and was issued on 5 March 1909. On pages 63-64 Ryazanoff discusses the "brilliant" paper of Engels. It may be of interest to quote a few passages of Ryazanoff's evaluation.

"[Engels] proved that in spite of its development since Peter the Great and in spite of the growth of its influence in Europe, Russia began to play the role of arbiter of Europe only with Catharine II. He showed, moreover, that the unquestionable successes of the foreign policy of Russian Czarism were based less on the personal qualities of the Russian diplomats, and more on the general conditions of the European political situation, which were favourable for them, which they understood how to exploit, and which they would have exploited even more had it not been for Poland this "thorn in the flesh of Russia." He developed the view further which he already had uttered in 1859 [in a pamphlet *Savoyen Nizza und der Rhein*] showing that the internal development of Russia was making approach the day on which the Russian people would have a say in the determination of Russian policy, and on which the settlement of its own internal problems would rob Czarism of its fancy to concern itself with such "trifles" as the conquest of Constantinople, India, and world domination.

"Engels' prophecy was right. He has scored a direct hit on the core of the problem. But with this development the sense was progressively lost of the old schema of the foreign policy of European democracy which Marx and Engels had made their own in its main outlines—here Western Europe, there Asiatic Russia; here revolution, there absolutism, the refuge of European reaction. The traditional concepts, however, had become deeply rooted and international Social Democracy only changed with great effort its views on a whole number of "problems" which bourgeois society had created. Just as bourgeois democracy, it operated in the field of foreign policy with the traditional concepts of revolutionary and reactionary races and nations, without analyzing the historical process which changed the social character of any given government and the class composition of a people, which merited that government. . . .

"Never has this fact received such glaring expression as in the revolutionary year 1905. The history of 1848 was then placed on its head. The Revolution which in 1848 marched from West to East and was stopped at the Polish frontier, now was knocking at the doors of Western Europe. The Czar who in 1848 threatened Western democracy now was the prisoner of the Russian proletariat.

"Engels again proved to be a good prophet: 'On the day when the Czarist power falls—this last, powerful fortress of the entire European reaction—on that day a totally different wind will blow throughout all of

Europe. For the reactionary governments of Europe know one thing for sure: in spite of all their quarrels with the Czar over Constantinople, etc., the moment may come when they will toss in his lap everything he has so far demanded—Constantinople, the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and anything else he asks—if he will only protect them against the Revolution. Therefore on the day when this main fortress itself passes into the hands of the Revolution, then the last spark of self-assurance and security will die in the reactionary governments of Europe. They will then be thrown back on their own resources, and will soon discover what a difference that makes. Perhaps they may be in a position to order out their armies to restore the authority of the Czar—what an irony of history!'

"And this irony became reality. In Petersburg there circulated at that time persistent rumors—and the reactionary Russian press did not only not deny them, but repeated them triumphantly—that the German Emperor was concentrating his troops on the Polish frontier."

Ryazanoff wrote before the outbreak of the first World War. Immediately after the war there appeared an article by G. Zinoviev, "Der russische Sozialismus und Liberalismus über die auswärtige Politik des Zarismus" (*Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung,* volume VIII (1919), pp. 40-75), which however was composed in 1916. Zinoviev, like Ryazanoff, argues that in 1890 Engels' evaluation was correct and "found general agreement among the ranks of Russian Marxists, as well as among the French." (P. 47.) However, he also emphasized that the Revolution of 1905 was the turning point of Russian foreign policy, and that this was due to internal developments in Russia, notably the changed relative power of the different social classes.

But Zinoviev also reports the state of public opinion in Russia at the time of the outbreak of the first World War. He summarizes these observations as follows: "A single word suffices to characterize the enthusiasm for the war of the Russian bourgeoisie during the years 1914 to 1916. This word is *Constantinople.*" Then he quotes a long list of supporting evidence for this assertion, which it would be tedious to repeat here (pp. 62 ff).

For the rest Zinoviev's article discusses the path followed by a multitude of Russian liberals and socialists who originally had opposed Czarism and its foreign policy, but who gradually put themselves at the service of the "imperialist" designs of Czarism and shared its ambitions for territorial expansion in the West and South. From the examples Zinoviev cites it appears plainly that the present policy of

Stalinist Russia is an effort to put into effect the imperialist precept evolved originally by such men as Count Trubetzkoy, Paul Miliukov and others, who in 1917 were branded as mortal enemies of the Bolshevists.

2 and 3. Hungary and Panslavism, and Democratic Panslavism

These two articles were published first in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in January and February 1849. Since the original copies of this newspaper had become very scarce, Franz Mehring collected a series of the more important articles from the pen of Marx and Engels and published them in volume III of his *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle,* Stuttgart, 1902. As Mehring points out on page 269 of this work the articles on the Hungarian Revolution and on Democratic Panslavism were written by Engels, an opinion which is confirmed by Gustav Mayer in *Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie,* volume I, Berlin, 1920, page 424. Mayer cites there also the sources which provide evidence for assigning the authorship of these articles to Engels.

The three articles by Engels are reprinted in the collection made by Mehring on pages 233 to 264 and our translation has been made from this text. So far as we know no part of these essays has ever appeared in an English translation.

A problem which has been often discussed with reference to the opinions expressed by Engels especially on the Austrian Slavs is the correctness of his evaluation of the historical past and future of these nations. He denies that they had, since the early middle ages, a history of their own and doubts that they can develop viable national states in the future. Moreover, he assigns to them a permanent counter-revolutionary role.

That Engels did not basically change his opinion of this role of the Austrian Slavs even late in life becomes plain from a letter which he wrote to Karl Kautsky on 7 February 1882, and which is reprinted in this volume in Chapter 9.

It is impossible in this context to enter into an extended discussion of Engels' view on the problems and historical position of the Austrian Slavs. That his predictions were false in many important aspects was proved by the historical development of these nations. But in spite of many errors in his analysis of the historical role and national viability of the Austrian Slavs, Engels' views on Panslavism are of the greatest interest and his analysis of the Panslavist movement and the use made

of it by Russia are on a very different level of political acuteness than his views of the national future of such "hypothetical nations" as the Šokci or the Dalmatians.

Engels' views on the Slavs have been discussed in various places and it may suffice to mention the most significant contributions here. Some very pertinent remarks are contained in the editorial introduction by Franz Mehring to volume III of *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle* (pages 18 to 44 and 70 to 80; see also Mehring's postscript on page 270). Also Gustav Mayer takes up the problem in his work *Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie,* volume I, pages 345 to 352. The most exhaustive analysis of the whole problem, however, has been presented in the brilliant essay by Roman Rosdolsky, *Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Völker,* Detroit, n.d. [1949]. This work, of which only a few typed copies exist, some of which are deposited with leading U. S. libraries (e.g., the New York Public Library), may soon appear in English translation.

4. Panslavism and the Crimean War

The two articles reprinted in English translation in this chapter were written by Engels and appeared first in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung,* published in Breslau on 21 April and 24 April 1855. The articles also appeared in a considerably changed form in the *New York Tribune* of 5 May and 7 May 1855. Originally the articles were written for the *Tribune,* but they appeared there with so many editorial additions and omissions that the text of the *Tribune* articles, as they actually appeared, gives only a very incomplete, and in part, contradictory picture of Engels' and Marx's ideas on Panslavism. At the time at which Marx served as correspondent for the *New York Tribune* he also supplied articles to the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* and he sometimes sent the same article to both papers. This was the case with the articles on Panslavism. Since the text in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* seems a faithful reproduction of the author's manuscript we have decided to translate these articles rather than to reprint the version as it appeared in the *New York Tribune.* The articles as they appear in an adulterated form in the *New York Tribune* have been republished by Edward and Eleanor Marx Aveling in a work K. Marx, *The Eastern Question,* London, 1897. The text of the articles as they appeared in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* was reprinted in a work by N. Ryazanoff, *Gesammelte Schriften von Karl*

Marx und Friedrich Engels, 1852 bis 1862, Stuttgart, 1920, volume II, pages 227 to 233. Our translation was made from this edition.

The two articles on Panslavism included in this chapter are the only ones which were published from a series of nine which Marx had sent to the *New York Tribune.*

Of the nine articles on the general topic of Panslavism which Marx and Engels are known to have written, the only two believed to be extant are included in this collection. What happened to the others is in itself an interesting story. Marx complained that the articles (one entitled "The Danubian Principalities" and several others on Panslavism) were rejected by his editor, Mr. Dana, because of the influence of a "renegade Pole," Count Anton de Gurowski.

The external evidence that Gurowski, who cut quite a striking figure with his long, dark hair and continental airs (for a description of Gurowski and his activities see Mieczyslaw Haiman, *Z przeszlosci Polski w Ameryce; szkice historyczne* [Polish Past in America: Historical Sketches], Buffalo, 1927, pp. 273 ff.), did persuade the *Tribune* to reject the articles is convincing. The last chapter of Gurowski's book, *Russia As It Is* (New York and London, 1854), is entitled "Manifest Destiny." In it Gurowski asserts that the "inevitable" conquest by Russia of Constantinople "will be the satisfaction of an old—and in the feelings not only of the Russians, but of all the *Southern Slavi,* of a pious covetousness. . . . The destination of the nation, of Czarism, and of Europe, will then enter a new phase" (pages 278-279).

Now the unusual expression *Southern Slavi* (for South Slavs) occurs in the marginal notes on one of the rejected Panslavism articles (the ninth). After studying these marginal comments, some of which were in badly written French, Marx observed in a letter to Engels of 16 February 1857 (Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Briefwechsel,* volume II of the third Division of *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* Berlin, 1929, pages 211-212): "It is clear that the spirit of these notes is Russian. It is clear likewise that French with such accents and mistakes (e.g. 'C'est ni bon' [sic]) was not written by a Frenchman. Likewise it is no less clear that a Yankee would not speak of *'Southern Slavi'* but would write quite differently. Therefore, the source of these notes seems to me beyond question."

Marx then adds: "And if in my own, Freiligrath's and Olmsted's presence the Yankee traveling companion of Olmsted assured us that Gurowski is directly paid by the Russian Legation in Washington, then the whole crisis with the *Tribune* becomes completely clear. Moreover,

the fact emerges from the notes and deletions that the original plan was to print the Panslavism articles (through No. 9 inclusively) with modifications, and that this plan was only given up when the fellow got the point. This also explains the delayed decision of Dana."

Marx had already expressed a few months earlier his suspicions of Gurowski. In a letter of 30 October 1856 to Engels (*Briefwechsel,* edition cited, volume II, pages 193-194), he wrote: "I learned from the representative of Putnam's, Olmsted, and an American traveling companion of his, that Gurowski (the Pole) has great influence over Dana. These gentlemen also told me at the same time that this honest man receives regular contributions of cash directly from the Russian embassy in Washington. This Gurowski represents Panslavism against us and this is the only reason why your article was refused. . . . We thus have also the honor that our articles are, or rather were, directly watched over and censored by the Russian embassy."

Whether or not Marx's suspicion of Gurowski's role as an agent of the Russian government was correct is still an open question. It may well be that Gurowski, a fanatical mystic, acted on his own impulse. The lengths to which he went—and the influence which he apparently exercised on Dana—is exhibited by the fact that he succeeded in persuading him to include the following paragraph in the second article on Panslavism which appeared in the *New York Tribune* of 7 May 1855.

"Panslavism as a political theory has had its most lucid and philosophic expression in the writings of Count Gurowski. But that learned and distinguished publicist, while regarding Russia as the natural pivot around which the destinies of this numerous and vigorous branch of the human family can alone find a large historical development, did not conceive of Panslavism as a league against Europe and European civilization. In his view the legitimate outlook for the expansive force of Slavonic energies was Asia. As compared with the stagnant desolation of that old continent, Russia is a civilizing power, and her contact could not be other than beneficial. This manly and imposing generalization has, however, not been accepted by all the inferior minds which have adopted its fundamental idea. Panslavism has assumed a variety of aspects; and now, at last, we find it employed in a new form, and with great apparent effect, as a warlike threat. As such, its use certainly does credit to the boldness and decision of the new Czar."

Neither the praise of Gurowski or of the Czar stems from the pen of either Marx or Engels, nor did they consider Russian expansionism in Asia the fulfillment of its civilizing mission. Marx probably never

saw a copy of the 7 May 1855 issue of the *Tribune,* or he would surely have found stronger words for Gurowski and Dana than those cited earlier. A full account of the entire *affaire* Gurowski and Marx's relationship to the *New York Tribune* is contained in N. Ryazanoff, *Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, 1852 bis 1862,* Stuttgart, 1920, volume I, pages xvii to 1, especially pages xxxv to xliv.

Since the rejected articles were returned, but have never yet been published—except the two included here—the question naturally arises as to what became of them. As far as is known, the manuscripts are in none of the public or private collections of Marxiana, and according to a private information which we received from one authority in a position to know, they have never been in the possession of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. The articles may, however, be in some other archive of Marxian manuscripts, possibly in the International Institute of Social History at Amsterdam.

We have two reports on manuscripts by Marx and/or Engels composed in that period on the problem of Panslavism by two serious and reliable students who had access to substantial parts of the papers left by the two men. One is the account of Ryazanoff in an editorial note in volume II of the *Gesammelte Schriften,* mentioned before. On pages 520-521 of that work Ryazanoff writes:

"We have seen how Engels' attempt to influence the *Tribune* in an 'antiPanslavist' direction failed before the resistance of its editors. His articles which were directed against Gurowski were turned around in the *Tribune* to become an apology of the 'distinguished publicist' who gave the 'most lucid and philosophical expression' of Panslavism. According to a sketch of the later articles, which I found in the papers of Marx, Gurowski was to be exposed as the main representative of 'reactionary directly Russian Panslavism, fully supported by Russian agents.' I will publish this manuscript, which without extensive comment would be hardly understandable, at a later time together with a critical appraisal of the views of Marx and Engels on Panslavism and the relationship between Germany and the Slavs."

This manuscript has to our knowledge never been published in any language. Gustav Mayer mentions in his biography of Engels, *Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie,* Haag, 1934, volume II, page 54, that in addition to the two articles which in April 1855 appeared in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* fragments of a pamphlet, entitled *Germanen- und Slaventum* (Germans and Slavs), are preserved in Engels' papers, which at that

time were preserved in the archives of the German Social Democratic Party in Berlin. On pages 54 to 60 of volume II of Mayer's work can be found a short summary of this pamphlet, and we may suppose that the missing articles took up the points discussed in the pamphlet.

It would be out of order to repeat Gustav Mayer's summary of Engels' pamphlet *Germanen-und Slaventum* in this place. It is to be hoped that this manuscript will be made public soon, since it is most probably among the Marx and Engels papers now preserved in the International Institute of Social History at Amsterdam. Until this happens it will be difficult to judge whether and in what specific points the views of Engels on Panslavism in 1855 differed from those expressed earlier in 1848 or later in 1890 to 1894.

5. The Debate on Poland in Frankfurt

The contents of this chapter, as those of Chapters 2 and 3, originally formed an article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. The article translated here appeared in number 81 of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* of 20 August 1848 on pages 1 and 2.

This article is the third of a series of nine articles which Engels wrote for the paper on the debates on Poland at Frankfurt. Engels' authorship of the series was established by the members of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow and their explanation of this fact can be found on page XVI of volume 7, first division of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Karl Marx: Friedrich Engels, *Werke und Schriften von März bis Dezember 1848,* Moscow, 1935).

The article was reprinted first on pages 147 to 152 of volume III of Franz Mehring's work *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle,* Stuttgart, 1902; and later in volume 7 of the first division of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* on pages 301 to 304. Our translation was made from this text, which is, however, identical (apart from a few minute points) with that published by Mehring.

We were at first tempted to include not only this one article on the debate on Poland, but the whole series. But although they show Engels at his best in polemics with political opponents and although they perhaps represent a high point of political reporting, their chief appeal would be to a student of German politics in the revolution of 1848/49 rather than one interested in the history and politics of Germany's Eastern neighbors. We have, therefore, selected only one article in

which Poland, rather than the attitude of different German factions on Posen and Danzig, occupies the center of the stage.

6. What Have the Working Classes to Do with Poland?

This article, in the form of three letters to the editor of the British magazine *Commonwealth,* appeared in the issues of 24 March, 31 March, and 5 April 1866. The letters were reprinted as Appendix 5 to the article by N. Ryazanoff, "Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung,* volume VI (1916), pp. 212-219. We have been unable to find a translation of these letters into German or any other language, but Ryazanoff notes in the article mentioned (p. 195, footnote 3) that a Polish translation appeared in Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, *Odbudowa Polski,* Warsaw, 1910, pp. 99-118.

The occasion for the composition of these articles was provided when the International Workingmen's Association was torn by a discussion of the Polish question. Proudhon, in several writings since 1861, had opposed the support of the Polish cause by the Western European labor movement, and in 1864 Hector Denis, a disciple of Proudhon, had published a series of articles in the Belgian *La tribune du peuple,* a newspaper enjoying wide popularity among Belgian workers, in which he restated his master's position in a somewhat mitigated form. At the first Conference of the International in London, in September 1865, the Belgian representatives proved to be strongly influenced by the Proudhonist position and in turn exercised an influence on some English members of the International. Marx felt that it was important to publish a statement opposing the position of Proudhon on Poland in an English magazine or newspaper which had relatively wide circulation among laborers and he encouraged Engels to write this series of letters. The articles were apparently written originally in English by Engels. We have not edited them and only corrected a few obvious misprints.

For more details on the history of the composition of these articles, see the earlier mentioned article by Ryazanoff, especially pages 193-196 and Gustav Mayer, *Friedrich Engels: Eine Biographie,* Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1934, volume II, p. 127.

7. Poland's European Mission

This chapter contains a speech of Karl Marx, which was delivered in London probably on 22 January 1867. The original text of the speech

was in English, but this text has apparently been lost or is in the still uncatalogued part of the Marx manuscripts in the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in Moscow, or the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. The English version of Marx's speech was in the possession of his daughter, Laura, who was married to Paul Lafargue.

In 1908 the French journal *Le Socialisme* published a special number commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Marx's death, and Laura and Paul Lafargue contributed a French translation of this speech to that number. Marx's speech appears in a French translation on pages 4-5 of *Le Socialisme,* volume II, number 18 of 15 March 1908. The version in this volume is a retranslation of that French translation.

In the Introduction which Paul and Laura Lafargue wrote to the speech they express the belief that the speech was given in 1862; their argument was based on the fact that Marx mentions the emancipation of the serfs in the Russian empire which occurred in 1861, but does not mention the Polish uprising of 1863. This same opinion was repeated in the introductions to two independent Polish translations of the speech which have appeared. One in Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, *Odbudowa Polski,* Warsaw, 1910, pages 147-152, contains also the introduction by the Lafargues with no further comment. The other Polish translation which appeared in the Cracow journal *Mysl Socjalistyczna,* May 1908, pages 119-123, states that the speech was "probably" given in 1862.

N. Ryazanoff, in his article "Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung,* volume VI, pages 197 to 200, has shown that this dating is incorrect and that from internal evidence in the speech and from a short report of it in the official organ of the German section of the International Workingmen's Association, *Der Vorbote,* volume II (1867), pages 29-30, it must be concluded that it was given in 1867. On 22 January 1867 the General Council of the International held a joint meeting with the Polish Workers' Society in London in memory of the fourth anniversary of the Polish uprising of 1863. At this meeting four resolutions were proposed, the first by the Polish revolutionists Zabicki and Bobczynski, the second by Marx, the third by the Frenchman Besson, and the fourth by the Englishman Fox. The speech reproduced in this chapter was Marx's argumentation in favor of his resolution which stated: "Resolved that freedom in Europe cannot be established without the independence of Poland."

For further details concerning the dating of the speech and the cir-

cumstances under which it was made, see the article by Ryazanoff mentioned earlier.

In the last paragraph of this article Marx refers to "Asiatic barbarism under Muscovite direction." This statement should not be interpreted to imply a comparison between western European and Asiatic levels of civilization, based on a schema later to be expounded by Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State.* What Marx meant to stress and what he maintained throughout was that Czarism was founded on a social system derived from the absolutist rule of Mongolian overlords who dominated Muscovy for such a long time. In the articles which Marx published in 1856 and 1857 in the London *Free Press* he summed up the origin of Czarist power and the social relations on which it was based in the following words: "Muscovy was raised and educated in the vicious and miserable school of Mongolian slavery. It won its strength only by becoming a virtuoso in the arts of slavery. Even after having liberated itself, Muscovy as conqueror played its traditionally slave-like role. It was Peter the Great who finally combined the political skill of the Mongolian slave with the proud strivings of the Mongolian overlord to whom Jhengiz Khan had bequeathed in his last will the conquest of the world." In short the "Asiatic barbarism" was the social and political system of the Russian Czars, an anachronism preserved from the middle ages. That Marx did not regard the peoples of Asia of his day as "Asiatic barbarians" becomes clear from references to the Turkish peasants of Anatolia, whom he calls sober, hard-working, and tough, or to the masses of India and China, about whom he has very favorable things to say in many articles published in the late 1850's in the *New York Tribune.* There he reports on the resistances which British policy in Asia encountered owing to the rising aspirations, the discipline, and the political maturity of large masses of Asian peoples.

8. A Polish Proclamation

During the late 1860's and the 1870's Engels not infrequently wrote articles for the Leipzig *Volksstaat,* the organ of the Social Democratic Workers Party of Germany. The party had been founded in August 1869. The first number of the paper appeared on 1 October 1869. Its editor was Wilhelm Liebknecht.

The article translated in this chapter appeared in the number of 11 June 1874 in the *Volksstaat.*

Shortly before his death, in 1894, Engels brought out a collection

of various essays on problems of the international labor movement which he had originally contributed to the *Volksstaat*. This collection was entitled *Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat" (1871-1875)*, and was published in Berlin by the Verlag der Expedition des *Vorwärts*, then (in 1894) the official paper of the German Social Democratic Party. The translation in this volume was made from this reprinted version which appears on pages 34 to 40 of *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat*.

This essay forms a transition of Marx's and Engels's thought on the Polish question from the views expressed in chapters 5, 6, and 7, to the view expressed by Engels in chapter 9. Whereas in the earlier writings no sharp distinction is made between Czarism and the Russian people, here, for the first time a connection is traced between the Polish strivings for national independence and a revolutionary upheaval in Russia proper. This thought was expressed even more clearly in a Declaration sent in January 1880 by Marx and Engels to the Polish journal *Równość*, the editors of which organized on 21 November 1880 in Geneva a celebration in memory of the 50th anniversary of the Polish revolt of 1830. This Declaration is reprinted in Polish as Appendix 7 (pages 220 to 221) to the article by N. Ryazanoff, "Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels über die Polenfrage," *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, volume VI (1916). This Declaration, which is signed by Marx, Engels, Paul Lafargue, and F. Lessner, former members of the International Workingmen's Association, begins with a short historical sketch of the role played by the Poles in the various revolutionary movements during the five decades from 1830 to 1880. The Polish revolt of 1846 with its socialist tendencies is mentioned as well as the participation of Poles in the revolutions of 1848-49. Then the Declaration continues:

"The Polish revolt of 1863 which called forth the joint protest of the French and English workers against the international disgrace of their governments served as the point of origin of the International, which was founded with the participation of Polish emigrés. Finally, the Paris Commune found sincere defenders among the Polish refugees, and after the suppression of the Commune it was sufficient for a person to be Polish, in order to be condemned to death by the military tribunals of Versailles.

"Thus the Poles have played a great role beyond the borders of their homeland, in the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat—they were above all its international warriors.

"Today, when this struggle develops among the Polish people itself, it must be supported by propaganda and the revolutionary press, *it must join*

with the strivings of our Russian brethren. This is a new occasion to repeat the old watch-word: Long live Poland." [Work cited, page 221. Our italics.]

The letter by Engels to Kautsky which forms chapter 9 provides a further extended discussion of the points made in this declaration.

9. *Nationalism, Internationalism, and the Polish Question (1882)*

The content of this chapter is taken from a letter by Friedrich Engels to Karl Kautsky, dated 7 February 1882. The text here translated consists of the entire letter with the exception of the first two and the last line which are only the customary introductory and concluding sentences of a letter. The original letter, which is among the papers of Karl Kautsky, was published first in 1933 in the volume Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels, *Briefe an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht, K. Kautsky und andere,* Moscow, 1933, pages 250 to 256. It was republished with a short introductory statement by Karl Kautsky in his book, *Aus der Frühzeit des Marxismus,* Prague, 1935, pages 66 to 72. So far as we know, this is the first time it has been published in English.

In his introduction to this letter Kautsky says the following (pages 65-66 of the work cited):

"For a long time it had been self-evident among Polish revolutionaries of all shades that the reconstitution of Poland, or at least the establishment of a Polish national state formed the first and most important article of their program. But in 1877 a socialist movement arose among the Poles, which soon split in two factions, one more nationally oriented and clinging to the old nationalist revolutionary program, and another which took on a more internationalist character and which demanded above all an international social revolution the success of which would also free the enslaved nationalities. The members of this last-named socialist faction did not speak of a special Polish national program. In October 1879 they took over the journal *Równość (Equality)* which appeared in Geneva. The battle between nationalists and internationalists among the Polish socialists continued to be fought without issue. Finally the Zürich *Sozialdemokrat* [the organ of the then exiled German Social-Democratic Party, of which Kautsky was one of the editors] had to take a position in this quarrel. I asked Engels for his current opinion on the Polish question. His reply was the letter of 7 February 1882."

In the note to the preceding chapter we have summarized and given a short quotation from the Declaration to which Engels refers in his letter.

10. The Background of the Dispute

The Crimean War has been much disparaged. Sir Robert Morier described it as "the only perfectly useless modern war that has been waged." (See Webster Wemyss, *Memoirs and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Morier* [by his daughter, Mrs. Rosslyn Wemyss], London, 1911, volume II, p. 215.) The French statesman Thiers called it "a war to give a few monks the key of a grotto." On the other hand, Constantinople still commands one of the finest strategic positions in the world, and "had it not been for the Crimean War and the policy adopted by Lord Beaconsfield's Government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would now be in possession of Constantinople." (See Evelyn Baring Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays,* London, 1913, p. 275.)

It is this last consideration which links the Crimean War to the present in anything but an academic manner. Many an American citizen who knows nothing more about the conflict than a few lines of "The Charge of the Light Brigade" and the name of Florence Nightingale has been paying taxes since 1947 for a program—the policy of containment—which is clearly designed, among other things, to prevent the Russians from taking possession of Constantinople and the Straits.

It is also true that after almost a hundred years the origins of the Crimean War are not yet fully clear, and that the tangled web of diplomatic events which preceded it has not been entirely unraveled. Summed up by G. B. Henderson in a single sentence, "The Crimean War was the result of diplomatic drift and ministerial incompetence." (*Crimean War Diplomacy,* Glasgow, 1947, p. 199.) To these factors should be added a new and powerful force, public opinion, which, at least in England, was overwhelming in its insistent demand for war; a war for which, as the conduct of operations later demonstrated, none of the combatants was really prepared. The situation is not without its interest, and perhaps even its moral, in our own uneasy age of conflict and tension between the superpowers of the century, an age which has not been conspicuous for its diplomatic successes. Henderson expresses this (work cited, pp. 205-206) as follows: "Diplomacy has been compared to a paper currency with the actual power of the country playing the part of bullion on which that currency is based. Good diplomacy should prevent the wastefulness of war and excessive armaments, just

as currency saves the inconvenience of barter, and unnecessary transport of bullion." Fortunately, Great Britain and the other powers of the day all had enough reserves of both manpower and materials to be able to indulge in the luxury of backing up a sinking diplomatic currency with war—the first general war since the defeat of Napoleon—and scarcely feel the shock. The succeeding general conflicts, World Wars I and II, however, took a much heavier toll, and centered public interest everywhere on the problem of war in general and on that of "war guilt," or responsibility, in particular.

In spite of its brevity and relatively light cost in men and materials, even the Crimean War produced a crop of myths and legends as to the responsibility of the leading personalities involved. Czar Nicholas and his ambassador at Constantinople, Prince Menshikoff, the English Foreign Ministers Palmerston and Aberdeen and their ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Napoleon III, even Reschid Pasha, the Turkish Grand Vizier (labeled "Wretched Pasha" by Marx)—all have been held responsible in varying degrees by recognized historians, who by no means agree among themselves. For example, Kinglake, disappointed in his quest for the favors of Napoleon's mistress, has popularized the legend that the Emperor and Stratford de Redcliffe were largely responsible, with Napoleon playing the role of an unscrupulous adventurer who duped England into a useless war in order to establish his own throne more firmly and to regain the military and diplomatic prestige of a "bored" France. Another myth, popularly believed in England to have been "revealed" by the Seymour Conversations, is that of the Czar's villainy in seeking to carve up the Turkish Empire before the death of the "sick-man," and in attempting to secure English participation in the vivisection with the bribe of Egypt. (See Henderson, work cited, pp. 1-14.)

Actually, the only genuine villain in the background, one who set the English stage and fairly pushed the principal actors around on it, was public opinion. For roughly two decades (since the Treaty of Unkiar Skellessi of 1833), a flood of anti-Russian propaganda in England had been steadily mounting until it carried a "drifting" Cabinet (the expression was Aberdeen's) into the maelstrom of war. Professional agitators, such as "the strange, brilliant and restless David Urquhart, had spread the doctrine that Russia was an able, treacherous, corrupt, ambitious, and extraordinarily dangerous power . . . the British public, which likes a sensation and a villain, determined that Russia was the wolf, and Turkey the lamb, of the diplomatic fable. The mate-

rials for a war were thus ready-made in public opinion, and henceforth England was dependent on the discretion of her statesmen to avert it." (See Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea,* London, 1936, p. 378.) Although Marx wrote for the *New York Tribune,* and had little effect on American public opinion, which at that time was anti-British and openly pro-Russian, his articles are a good mirror of the mood of the British public and go a long way to explain why the diplomacy of the day failed.

Reference has been made to the various historical myths which have grown up around the Crimean War. Curiously enough, if the general bias of public opinion is discounted, many of the contemporary accounts of events leading up to the conflict are on the whole more penetrating than the work of later historians. G. B. Henderson who has done extensive research in the field of nineteenth century East European history, holds that: "Contemporary observers of the Crimean War gave very satisfactory judgments on the causes of the war and the respective responsibilities of the states concerned. The events of the war, and its results, were shrewdly and impartially analyzed. Delusions tended to grow later." (Work cited, p. 243.) This is not meant to suggest that Marx and Engels did not bring a number of delusions to their task of analysing daily events. It is meant to suggest that the *Tribune* articles may recommend themselves to the historian as well as to the general reader, not only for their quality of freshness, but also for many of the insights and judgments they contain.

Most, if not all, of the articles which Marx and Engels wrote for the *New York Tribune,* were collected by Marx's daughter, Eleanor Marx Aveling, and her husband, and were published in London (Sonnenschein, 1897) under the title *The Eastern Question.* However, for one reason or another the book has become quite rare. For example, during his term as Ambassador to the Governments-in-Exile in London during World War II, Mr. Anthony Drexel Biddle, Jr., had an extended but fruitless search made for it in London and on the continent. The present Library of Congress copy is from a recently acquired Nazi collection. While most scholars know that Marx and Engels once wrote for the *Tribune,* few have had the opportunity of studying their work as correspondents, as the files of the paper itself are not readily available. The articles were published in the Russian edition, volumes IX and X of the *Collected Works,* but these two volumes have also become quite rare. None of the popular editions of the works of Marx and Engels reproduces any of the articles in question, an oversight which

may not be entirely accidental. Similarly the standard German edition of the *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* edited by N. Ryazanoff[1] of the Marx-Engels Institute, Moscow, does not contain the *Tribune* articles. They *are* included in a rare German edition by Ryazanoff en titled, *Gesammelte Schriften von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels 1852 bis 1862* (Stuttgart, 1917), which is not even listed in the Bibliography cited in the exhaustive study, *Karl Marx, Chronik Seines Lebens in Einzeldaten,* zusammengestellt vom Marx-Engels-Lenin-Institut, Moskau (Marx-Engels-Verlag, Moscow, 1934) under the direction of V. Adoratsky.

The texts of the articles reproduced here are taken from the files of the *Tribune* in the Library of Congress, edited to modernize spellings and correct obvious misprints. Wherever feasible the entire original article has been reproduced. In most cases, however, material which is no longer of general interest (such as lengthy discussions of domestic politics, attacks on political personalities, local current events, etc.) has been deleted for the sake of brevity and consistency. The criterion in all such cases has been to retain Marx's analyses of the international political events of his day, with particular reference to Russian foreign policy.

This chapter includes articles dated in chronological order from 7 April to 14 June 1853. Two additional essays, although written a year later, have been added to this group of background articles. One, dated 24 October 1854, discusses "The Decay of Religious Authority," and points up the irony of a situation in which the Christian nations of Western Europe find themselves supporting the infidel Turk in a war of the Crescent against the Cross (in this case, the Russian-backed double-cross of the Greek Orthodox Church of which the Czar was both the temporal and the spiritual leader). The other article, dated 15 April 1854, is a colorful account of the religious dispute over control of the Holy Places in Palestine, which was the original incident out of which the Crimean War developed.

A brief review of the background and significance of this incident may be useful. As early as 1740, France had obtained from the Sultan of Turkey certain formal Capitulations granting Latin monks the privilege and duty of guarding certain Christian shrines (such as the Church of Bethlehem, the doors of the sacred manger, etc.) in Jerusalem. Since the Latin monks had gradually neglected their custodial

[1] Ryazanoff was the pseudonym used by D. B. Goldendach. Up to the Revolution he used the initial N., after 1917, his real initial D.

duties, many of these privileges had fallen through disuse into the hands of Greek Orthodox priests, who also exercised certain rights of their own. Disputes arose between the rival religious factions—Jews, Latin and Greek Orthodox Christians—which became increasingly embittered, since, as Mazarin remarked, quarrels between Christians are always the most venomous. That such unseemly quarrels in Palestine should have led to a general war between Russia and the Great Powers, England and France, of Western Europe may seem utterly fantastic. But as one historian describes the situation: "What Aristotle says of revolutions is also true of wars. The occasions may be trivial, the causes are always important." (See J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question,* London, 1947, p. 251.) Even today, a century later, such disputes flare up occasionally, and Marx's observation still has a certain validity: "(Such) desperate Irish rows . . . merely conceal a profane battle, not only of races, but of nations," and "the Protectorate of the Holy Places, which appears ridiculous to the Occident, but all important to the Orientals, is one of the phases of the Oriental question incessantly reproduced, constantly stifled, but never solved."

Napoleon III, seeing in the dispute a chance to reaffirm French prestige in the Levant and at the same time to curry favor at home as a champion of Catholic rights abroad, insisted that the Sultan restore the ancient custodial privileges to the Latin monks. The Sultan granted most of Napoleon's demands, at least in substance, to the great annoyance of Czar Nicholas I, who, in turn, as Emperor of all the Russians and titular head of the Greek Orthodox Church, felt his own prestige to have been grossly insulted by the Sultan's decision. Accordingly, in March 1853, he sent Prince Menshikoff, an insolent and overbearing soldier, to demand not only full satisfaction over the Holy Places, but also a formal protectorate over the twelve to fourteen million Greek Orthodox Christians living in Turkey, which at the time included most of the Balkans and the northern half of the territory of modern Greece. This position was not unlike Hitler's later demands for virtually protectorate rights over German racial minorities abroad, demands which were used to justify subversive and later military activities in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere. The Czar's demands, if granted, would have given Russia a perpetual right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey. The threat to Constantinople, to the Straits and to the entire Mediterranean lifeline of the British Empire was unmistakable. Prince Menshikoff's ultimatum was thus as inadmissible to England as to Turkey or France. British prestige and influence were already

considerable, due to her able Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who returned from England on 5 April 1853, just before Marx's chronicle begins.

Taken as a group, these background articles give a good general idea of the Eastern Question and of the precarious position of Turkey, caught between the upper and nether millstones of the Eastern and Western powers. It is interesting to note that while opposed to Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey and the Western powers, Marx by no means adopted the extreme pro-Turkish position of such propagandists as David Urquhart, whose case Marx ridicules in the article of 19 April 1853. Marx recognizes the vital necessity for modern reforms and that "the presence of the Turks in Europe is a real obstacle to the development of the resources of the . . . peninsula."

One of the articles, dated 12 April 1853, is especially noteworthy. Starting with the assumption that Russia had already seized Turkey, Greece, and what are now the Soviet satellite states on the Balkan peninsula, Marx suggests that Russian expansion would by no means end there: "The broken and undulating western frontier of the Empire, ill-defined in respect of boundaries, would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Dantzic, or perhaps, Stettin, to Trieste. And as sure as conquest follows conquest, and annexation follows annexation, so sure would the conquest of Turkey by Russia be only the prelude for the annexation of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and for the ultimate realization of the Slavonic Empire which certain fanatical Panslavistic philosophers have dreamed of."

Today, when, to use the current Soviet slogans, "peace hangs by a thread," but still "war is not inevitable," there is an arresting prescience to Marx's having been the first to draw the Stettin-Trieste line.

11. Bluff and Counterbluff

It is interesting to note that Marx was perhaps one of the first political columnists to describe what would today be called part of a "war of nerves," i.e., widespread rumours of Russian military preparations to occupy the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. This move was the measure which, beyond all others, led to war. Reports of such preparations were dismissed by Marx as merely "so many ridiculous attempts on the part of Russian agents to strike a wholesome terror into the Western world." Although dead wrong in fact, since Russian forces did actually cross the Pruth river and occupy the Princi-

palities, Marx, in principle, was not far wrong in his estimate, since "Nicholas did not intend to produce war by this action. It was only an extension of the unfortunate bluff methods which he had begun when he made his military preparations and sent Menshikoff on his mission." (See Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea,* London, 1936, p. 512.)

As news of Russian troop movements filtered through to London, the British Cabinet, not to be outbluffed in the war of nerves, decided, after much internal dissension, to order the British fleet to join the French at Besika Bay on the Aegean sea, roughly 150 miles below Constantinople. In the later game of accusation and counter-accusation which followed, the Russians falsely charged that it was this British "show of force" which prompted them to occupy the Principalities, whereas the decision had already been taken before news of the fleet movement had reached St. Petersburg. Actually, it was not until much later, 23 September 1853, that Aberdeen and Clarendon decided to send the fleet from Besika Bay to Constantinople, "on their own responsibility," but in deference to the clamor of public opinion. This later move "was the greatest single step taken by the British government in the direction of war, and taken by the most pacific of British statesmen [Aberdeen] and by a fairly moderate one [Clarendon]." (Temperely, work cited, p. 510.)

A final point worthy of note is the long, relentless feud of Marx with the "old, obstinate, peace-mongering" Aberdeen, which is aired in the article of 8 July 1853 and again in that of 25 July. This theme is used to explain (with a certain validity) the reluctance of the British Cabinet to plunge into war with Russia as quickly and as enthusiastically as Marx himself would have desired.

From the articles selected thus far it should be apparent that Crimean War diplomacy affords many striking parallels with later historical situations because of the background of almost pure "power politics" from which it sprang. Louis Bonaparte originally seized on the dispute over the Holy Places as a means of building up clerical support for himself at home and of restoring French prestige abroad. The Czar answered the implied challenge to Russian prestige with the blustering Menshikoff mission to the Porte, in order to "intimidate the Sultan." Seymour, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reports that "although the Emperor of all the Russians was wearing a helmet and sleeping in a camp-bed," he seemed pacific enough, but "felt the necessity of speaking to these wretched Turks with firmness." Added to the

mixed insolence and absurdity of Menshikoff's later behavior, such details tended to confirm Marx's dictum that "for Russia there remains no step from the sublime to the ridiculous, a ridiculous which can only be wiped out by blood."

With these moves, the dangerous game of bluff and counterbluff had begun in earnest. Professor Temperley (work cited, pp. 304-305) has described this basic and recurrent situation of power politics as follows:

"The Czar's idea of negotiating was to wave the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other. This dangerous method seems to have been fully approved by his most trusted advisers. 'Si vis pacem, para bellum,' wrote Nesselrode (February 14). 'An article [in an agreement] more or less long, more or less severe,' replied Brunow (April 2) 'will add nothing to the reality of our influence. That consists *in facts not words.* Russia is strong, Turkey is weak, that is the preamble of all our treaties. . . . This epitaph is inscribed already on the tomb of the Ottoman Empire.' (Martens, *Traités conclus par la Russie,* XII, 309-311.) These views only encouraged the Czar in his worst tendencies. He really wished for peace, but he intended 'a show of force.' He thought it the way to impress orientals, and it had twice been successful of late. Napoleon had browbeaten the Sultan over Tripoli, as had Leiningen over Montenegro. But the weakest power will not always yield to force, and Turkey was less likely to surrender to Russia than to Austria or to France. If Turkey refused to yield, what was to happen? Nicholas could not tell. A power which threatens force may be driven to use it. 'A menace which is not intended to be executed,' wrote Canning once, 'is an engine which Great Britain should never condescend to employ.' Well indeed if Nicholas had followed the sage advice of Canning. It was peculiarly difficult for him to do so. . . . Of all things he loved most an outstanding and dramatic success. Now if Menshikoff's menaces failed, the Czar's 'show of force' would be in vain. Could the haughty despot avow that he had been 'trifled with' or that he was powerless before 'these wretched Turks'? So war might be, and ultimately was, the result of bravado."

12. Traditional Russian Policy

The long-range strategy and changing tactics of Russian foreign policy are the two main themes which run through this series of articles and which give a certain unity of subject matter to the group as a whole. However, both these aspects of Russian foreign policy are treated by Marx with a very broad brush indeed, and the discussion in any one of the articles may range freely from one theme to another.

Marx analyzes the motivation and long-range objectives of Russian imperialism, with particular stress on the strategic and historic importance of Constantinople—"the Golden Bridge" between the East and the West—and Russia's Byzantine heritage. He emphasizes that the Russian "diplomatic art has gradually sunk into so complete a *mannerism* that you may trace the history of the present transactions almost literally in the annals of the past." Marx establishes this premise, now an accepted truism with reference to Soviet diplomacy as well, by a series of historical comparisons of the "then and now" variety. On the eve of the Crimean War the United States minister in St. Petersburg was Neill S. Brown. "The story is current in Washington that George F. Kennan, while a secretary of embassy in Moscow during the 1930's, stumbled upon copies of the Brown file, and by selecting certain passages and changing the proper names prepared a dispatch for Washington completely relevant to the current situation." (See Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia,* New York, 1950, p. 59, note 4.)

In the article of July 14, 1853 Marx plays up another of his favorite themes which may at the same time be considered as a basic principle of international politics, namely, that when what the Great Powers fear above all is an upset of the *status quo*—an upset implied in "any war between any two of those Powers"—then an aggressor state can successfully encroach on weak neighbors, provided the aggressor furnishes "some pretext, however absurd" to the other powers for remaining neutral. Acting on this principle, the aggressor state creates an international situation which, "being neither war nor peace, is tolerable to herself, but ruinous" to her victimized neighbors. As thus described by Marx, this relationship between Czarist Russia and Turkey on the eve of the Crimean War bears a striking resemblance to the relative positions of Soviet Russia, Greece and Turkey at the time the Truman Doctrine was formulated. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that according to official Soviet doctrine, it is impossible by definition for a "socialist" state to be either aggressive or imperialistic, and any resemblance between Czarist and Soviet imperialism is either purely accidental or an illusion resulting from a deceptive "bourgeois objectivity."

The article of 12 August 1853 is of especial interest in that Marx stresses the Byzantine derivation of both Russian religion and civilization, as well as the centuries-long conflict between Western civilization and "the intrinsic barbarity of Russia herself."

Marx's line of thought here is in much the same vein as Professor

Arnold Toynbee's lecture on "Russia's Byzantine Heritage" (in *Civilization on Trial,* New York, 1948, pp. 164-183). In a review of this lecture, an official Soviet critic, Professor Bernard Emmanuilovich Bykhovsky, observed in a broadcast on 4 November 1947: "Toynbee treats the history of two civilizations, the West and the East. . . . To his way of thinking the present contradictions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are a recrudescence in a new form of the struggle waged between Rome and Byzantium."

But, according to Professor Bykhovsky, the Toynbee thesis—developed at an earlier date by Marx himself—is nothing more than "the cynical face of imperialist ideology showing under a scientific mask." The Soviet commentator dismisses the whole idea with the definitive comment: "Every single word of this is sheer nonsense. . . . Westernization, to put it in a nutshell, is nothing but an English translation of the German *Drang nach Osten.*"

This fresh Soviet analysis thus sheds a new light on Marx, who (like Professor Toynbee later) must surely rank as one of the first political analysts to wear "the cynical face of imperialist ideology under a scientific mask." Happily, this little-known aspect of Marx's thought now stands fully exposed.

In the article dated 30 December 1853, Marx, although emphasizing that Russian tactics have been "a bullying business all along," nevertheless predicts peace, because "the bullying system is much less expensive than actual warfare." Events proved that he was wrong in his estimate of the situation, but the principle of *Realpolitik,* thus baldly stated, has since been illustrated by the spectacular successes of both Nazi and Soviet tactics of "indirect aggression." In contrast to general war, the last argument of kings, Marx describes such indirect tactics as "the slower but surer processes of diplomacy and intrigue, animated by unscrupulous arrogance on one side, and aided by weakness and pusillanimity on the other."

However to the Western Powers of his time Marx did suggest as an answer to the bullying system a political principle which may still have a certain validity when applied to the strained East-West relationships of today: "At that time, [at the first sign of Russian aggression] to show that they seriously meant to preserve Turkey intact, and were ready to back up their intention with the last reason of kings—fleets and armies, was the sure means of maintaining peace. There is only one way to deal with a Power like Russia, and that is the fearless way."

13. American Intervention and Neutral Rights

Marx's reporting on what he hoped would be American intervention in the Crimean War against Russia appears today to be blindly optimistic. It is also somewhat inconsistent, as he later realized that the United States might be drawn into "a more or less avowed alliance with St. Petersburg" because of British and French interference with the "neutral rights" of American shipping. Curiously enough his early illusions were shared by other European commentators, so little was known about the basically anti-British, pro-Russian bias of American public opinion at the time. (In this respect the quotation from an Italian paper, *Il Parlamento,* cited in the article of 19 August 1853 is especially interesting.)

The thin peg on which Marx hung his hopes of Yankee intervention on the side of England and France was a little known incident involving the dramatic rescue "from the claws of the Austrian eagle" of a Hungarian refugee by an impetuous American naval Commander. The facts of this incident, very sketchily reported by Marx, are as follows:

One of the Austrian revolutionary leaders of 1848, Martin Koszta, Hungarian by birth but an Austrian subject, had settled in Turkey and announced his intention—the goal of so many refugees then as now—of becoming an American citizen. At Smyrna, a Turkish port on the Aegean, the Austrian consul-general, exercising the right of extra-territorial jurisdiction, had Koszta arrested and imprisoned aboard an Austrian brig-of-war lying in the harbor near an American sloop, the *St. Louis.* With the authorization of Mr. Brown, American charge d'affaires at Constantinople, Commander Ingraham of the *St. Louis* demanded the release of Koszta, claiming that he was an American citizen, and when the Austrian commander refused to give him up, prepared to open fire. Hostilities were avoided only through an arrangement whereby Koszta was placed in the custody of the French consul-general at Smyrna pending settlement of the dispute. (The case is reported in detail in John Basset Moore, *Digest of International Law,* Washington, D. C., 1906, vol. III, pp. 824-835.)

Both Austria and Czar Nicholas protested vehemently through normal diplomatic channels over the "painful impression" and "dangerous precedent" made by the incident, and according to Marx, the affair created a genuine sensation in the European press. Although the Czar was apparently very much in earnest, his "protests were not fol-

lowed up, and by the next year, when the Crimean War broke out, the matter was practically forgotten." (See Benjamin Platt Thomas, *Russo-American Relations,* Baltimore, 1930, pp. 109-110.)

Thus what Marx heralded as "the great event of the day," "the appearance of American policy on the horizon, saluted by one party, detested by the other," proved to be a figment of his own wishful thinking so far as Yankee intervention was concerned. However, with respect to the possibility of belligerent interference with the neutral rights of American shipping, he was on firmer ground. His fear that British interference with Yankee trade might embroil the United States with England and ultimately involve the United States in a *de facto* alliance with St. Petersburg was fully justified. So also was his suspicion that Russia might be plotting some such course of action. Indeed, among the Russian diplomatic representatives in the United States at the time were Edouard de Stoeckl and Constantine de Catacazy, "two intriguers," who, in the words of Thomas A. Bailey, "with complete cold-bloodedness, plotted to drag this nation into the war on the side of the Czar. They planned to use the United States as bases for privateers, and they proposed to charter an American merchantman to take a cargo of Russian goods to a Russian port, in an attempt to break the Allied blockade. The British would seize the vessel, and John and Jonathan would again be at each other's throats." (*America Faces Russia,* Ithaca, 1950, p. 65.)

As Marx points out, the idea of embroiling the United States and England in a quarrel over neutral shipping was not new, having been suggested as early as 1825 by the Russian Ambassador Pozzo di Borgo. However, the adventurous schemes of the Russian diplomats in the United States were not supported by the Russian Foreign Office as it was feared they might back-fire. Likewise, although the British protested against American shipment of arms and ammunition to Russia, troublesome incidents were carefully avoided, and the United States maintained its neutrality throughout the Crimean War, a neutrality, however, that was benevolently sympathetic with the Russian cause. (On American-Russian relations for the period see Thomas, work cited, pp. 108-121, and Bailey, work cited, pp. 56-69.)

14. Military Stalemate and the Home Front (1854-55)

These articles illustrate how wrong Marx could be, in both his political and military estimates, as a suspicious war-monger, impatient to see the beginning of full-scale fighting against Russia. In his analysis

of Russian-English diplomatic relations, he had all along questioned the patriotism and sincerity of English Cabinet leaders in general, and particularly that of Aberdeen and Palmerston. He led himself to believe that either through weakness or treachery they would fail to protect English national interests against the challenge of Russian imperialism. Like the fanatic Turkophile, Urquhart, Marx struck his heaviest propaganda blows at Palmerston, writing a series of articles "exposing" the alleged connivings with Russia of the great English Foreign Minister. In this crusade Marx was apparently as sincere as he was misguided, for he wrote to Engels in a letter dated 2 November 1853: "Curious as it may seem to you, through an exact retracing of the noble Viscount, I have come to same conclusion as the monomaniac Urquhart, that Palmerston sold out to Russia several decades ago." (Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, *Briefwechsel,* volume I of Division III of *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* Berlin, 1929, p. 511.)

In reviewing Russian bullying tactics in his article of 30 December 1853, Marx wrote: "There is only one way to deal with a Power like Russia, and that is the fearless way." How badly he had misjudged Palmerston in this regard can be seen from the fact that, six months earlier (28 June), the latter had proposed that the Cabinet warn the Czar that occupation of the Principalities would mean the sending of the British and French fleets into the Black Sea. Palmerston's own words (uttered, to be sure, in a private communication to Lord Clarendon, at that time Foreign Secretary) ring quite as forcibly as those of Marx: "Nothing is to be gained with the Russian government, or indeed with any other, by anything which looks like doubt, hesitation or fear, while on the other hand, a bold firm course founded on right, and supported by strength is the safest way of arriving at a satisfactory and peaceable result." (See Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea,* London, 1936, p. 337.) Marx's misjudgment of Palmerston is all the more inexcusable because in his correspondence with Ferdinand Lassalle the latter, who obviously had reliable inside intelligence sources, wrote Marx on 7 March 1854 that: "Palmerston does not, to be sure, deserve the reputation which he enjoys, and which he has usurped in its entirety; recently he has become even more imbecile. However, at least so far as his intentions are concerned, he is not a Russian agent. I can best illustrate for you his attitude with the words which he spoke to a friend as early as last December: 'I won't say that I want to ruin Russia, but I do want to deal her a blow which will last a lifetime!' It is certain that in the Council of Ministers in December he pressed

for war, and to each objection that Russia would not be able to concede this or that, he always replied: 'So much the better!'" (See Franz Mehring, *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lassalle,* Stuttgart: Dietz, 1902, vol. IV, pp. 80-81.)

This deep-rooted suspicion of Palmerston and other British leaders proved to be a blind-spot which led Marx to the ridiculous assumption of devious political motives behind various military moves, and he failed almost entirely to grasp the significance of "the massacre of Sinope" which to an inflamed British public opinion became the "Pearl Harbor" of the Crimean War. Such erroneous assumptions cannot be attributed to Engels since Marx's correspondence is also full of gross misinterpretations of military events during the "Phony War" period, although they were not properly his "department."

For example, Marx describes the first victories of the Turks over the Russians at Oltenitza (4 November 1853) and Tchetatea (7 January 1854) as "misunderstandings," i.e., as contrary to the real wishes of the Western Powers, who, Marx asserted, did not intend to wage a serious war against the Russians. (See Marx-Engels, *Briefwechsel,* edition cited, vol. II, pp. 4-5.) From the outset he believed that the British and Russians had a secret understanding with each other against the Turks (see *ibidem,* pp. 34-35), and so firm was his suspicion, that he described the provocative demonstration of the British fleet in the Black Sea as merely "a dodge for the meeting of Parliament." Similarly, he described the advance of the Russians into the Balkans—through Matschin, Giurgevo, Kalafat—and even the capture of Silistria, as "mere humbug." (*Ibidem,* p. 7.)

In his eagerness to see Russia defeated, Marx's one hope, in the early stages of the war, was that Napoleon III would upset the British-Russian "understanding": "Bonaparte is the element that they have not taken into their calculations. However much of a rascal he may be, his neck is directly at stake, and as a professional swindler, he will not let himself be so easily handled as poor Louis Philippe, 1839 and 1840." (*Ibidem,* p. 35.)

Even after England had declared war, Marx's reaction to the British bombardment of the Russian seaport of Odessa, was that it was actually provoked by Russia, and that it was all a part of the secret understanding between England and Russia. He inferred the existence of such an understanding from alleged falsifications of dates and signatures in the "secret and Confidential Documents" published by the British, and

from the similarity of a British "Declaration in Council" on neutral and Russian shipping and the corresponding "Declarations" from St. Petersburg, which were "almost couched in the same terms." (*Ibidem,* p. 34.)

Finally, the article of 27 April 1855, which analyzes the popularity of the war with the various social classes of France and England, is also of especial interest. Marx raises the question as to which social class would be able to carry the war on to a successful conclusion. He correctly points up an essential aspect of the problem of war in general, namely, that like the Crimean conflict, a particular war may in fact be highly popular with the lower classes, i.e., with "the people." His exposition here is in amusing contradiction to later Communist propaganda that all wars are imposed upon the reluctant "people" by the assorted capitalists, merchants of death, and "cannibals in uniform" who make up the ruling circles and General Staffs of the "imperialist" powers.

15. Russian Blunders and the Death of the Czar

In discussing the origin of Russian military and political blunders, Marx stressed the inherent weaknesses of intelligence collection in any totalitarian system. In the case of the Czar, Marx sums up the situation with the following conclusion: "In one word, we are able to affirm that, since 1851, Nicholas has never had before him a truthful account of the state of Europe, and of the feelings of the other Governments towards him and Russia. . . . He craved universal adulation; now he tastes its bitter and poisonous fruits."

When one considers that Moscow signed a "Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression" with Yugoslavia just a few hours before the Nazi troops overran that country, Marx's observations on the collection and slanting of intelligence to please the Home Office gain added significance. The same observations apply to the intelligence which reached Hitler to the effect that the "decadent" British and French democracies would never really back up their treaty guarantees to Poland on the eve of World War II. Marx has thus highlighted a problem which calls for perennial soul-searching in all the Foreign Offices and Chancelleries of the Great Powers.

The article dated 28 March 1855 on the death of the Czar also has a contemporary ring to it. Thousands of words were written during the days of the Hitler regime speculating on what would happen when Hitler died. The theme repeats itself today with respect to Stalin's

succession. In the midst of the Crimean War Czar Nicholas *did* die, and was succeeded by Alexander II. The event created a great sensation all over Europe, and touched off a wave of the most unwarranted type of sanguine speculation. Against this background, Marx's sobering estimate of the situation is especially noteworthy.

16. Strategic Analyses of the War

No collection of Marx's and Engels' works would be representative without examples of their brilliant analyses of military events. The two articles selected are believed to be of enduring interest as examples of such writing. Although details of the siege of Sebastopol, for example, have long since been forgotten by all but a few military historians and experts, the vivid description of the heart-breaking confusion which seems an inescapable part of all military operations will appeal to anyone who has had a look at war from a fox-hole. The article on the siege of Sebastopol is a classic of military journalism in this respect. But of greatest interest, in the light of the Russian campaigns of both Napoleon Bonaparte and Hitler, is Engels' outline of the strategy required for a successful campaign against the central land mass of Russia. Anyone who has talked with veterans of Hitler's crack divisions which bogged down along the muddy trails running through "the immense pine forests" of Russia will recognize that in his article dated 1 January 1855 Engels has caught the essential logistical difficulty of *any* Russian campaign, as well as hinting at the main tactical problems which such forested terrain involves, problems which neither Napoleon nor Hitler learned to solve, although the latter should have been forewarned.

As a general rule Marx considered such militaria as strictly outside his "department," and there is no question that the tactical articles are almost entirely the work of Engels. However, contrary to the general assumption, Marx also followed military events with keen interest, and at times (when not blinded by his fixed idea of English-Russian "collusion") made some observations of considerable strategic insight. Marx was fully aware of the long-range issues at stake in the evolving pattern of power politics in the Balkans and on the continent of Europe itself. For example, in a letter to Engels dated 17 October 1854, Marx gives the following terse analysis of conflicting French and English strategic interests in the Crimean War:

"If one takes the viewpoint of traditional policy—and what else do England and France represent except that the English Cabinet is not

serious and Napoleon III is a caricature?—then one must distinguish between the interests of England and France. With the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Black and Baltic seas, with the Russians driven out of the Crimea, the Caucasus and the provinces stolen from Persia and Turkey, England could have assured for 50 years its supremacy on the seas and its hegemony in the most civilized parts of Asia. It would then be entirely in line with its traditional manner to let the continental powers wear themselves out in Seven-Year and other wars (the locale of which would be Germany and perhaps Italy) in order that at the end of the struggle neither Germany, Austria nor France would reign supreme on the continent. For France, on the contrary, the war would only be just beginning as soon as the Russian seapower and its influence in South Asia are destroyed. France would then be forced to break the Russian land power in order, through extension of French power on the continent, to throw a decisive weight into the scales against the English. Who is to guarantee that, as soon as the English have defeated the Russians in the Baltic and Black Sea and have rendered them harmless to themselves, revolutions will not break out on the continent, and that England will not seize this as a pretext in order to ally itself again officially with the Russians against the continent? Meanwhile the prize joke remains that the currently ruling English—neither Chatham, Pitt Junior and not even Wellington—do not take seriously the destruction even of the Russian seapower and of Russian influence in the Turkey-Persia-Caucasus region." (See Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, *Briefwechsel,* vol. II of Division III of *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe,* Berlin, 1929, pp. 68-69.)

Marx's insight that "for France the war would only just be beginning when Russian seapower and its influence in South Asia were destroyed" is a penetrating appraisal of the position of any dominating power (or concert of powers) on the continent vis-à-vis Russia. Following the destruction of German military power as a result of World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty powers found themselves faced with the same basic problem.

17. Russia and the Social Revolution

Like the article "A Polish Proclamation," contained in Chapter 8 of this work, the article forming this chapter was originally published in the organ of the German Social Democratic Workers Party, the Leipzig *Volksstaat.* It appeared originally in the number of 21 April 1875 of the *Volksstaat.* It was later, in 1894, republished by Engels in the little book *Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat" (1871-1875),* Berlin, Verlag der Expedition des *Vorwärts,* 1894, on pages 47 to 60, and was

preceded by a short introduction in which Engels explained the genesis of the article. In this introduction Engels said:

"The following lines were written on the occasion of a polemic into which I was drawn with a certain Mr. Peter Nikitich Tkachoff. In an article in the Russian journal *Wperod* appearing in London I had occasion to mention the name of this gentleman in passing, but in such a manner that I incurred his esteemed enmity. Mr. Tkachoff promptly published an 'Open Letter to Mr. Friedrich Engels in Zurich, 1874' in which he charged me with a number of misstatements, and then, in contrast to my own crass ignorance, presented the world with his opinion of the state of affairs and the chances of a social revolution in Russia. The form and content of this concoction bear the customary Bakunin stamp. Since it appeared in German, I took the trouble to reply in the *Volksstaat*. I reprint here that part of the article which is concerned mainly with the social conditions in Russia as they have developed since 1861, the time of the so-called emancipation of the serfs."

In the reprinted version of 1894 this essay was followed by a postscript which is contained in Chapter 21 of this book.

18. Letter on the Economic Development of Russia

Unlike almost all other writings of Marx and Engels on Russia, this letter had a relatively wide circulation among Russian emigrés and even Russian intellectuals within the Czarist empire. In an article, written in 1894, Engels explains the occasion on which it was written. (This article is published as Chapter 21 of this book. See esp. pp. 236-237.) In the issue of October 1877 of the Russian journal *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, the Narodnik N. K. Mikhailovsky had published an article "Karl Marx Before the Tribunal of Mr. Zhukovsky" (pp. 321-356) in which he stated that in Marx's view Russia had first to dissolve the communal property of the Russian peasants and plunge into capitalism in order to attain socialism later. The letter here published is Marx's reply to this article. However, Marx never sent the letter off. After his death Engels communicated it to Vera Zasulich in Geneva who, in turn published it on pp. 215-218 of the May 1884 issue (not as Engels erroneously states in 1886) of *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*. According to Danielson, the letter later appeared in Russia itself in the Moscow magazine *Iuridicheskii Vestnik*. There appeared also two German translations of that letter—which had originally been written in French—one in the Zürich *Sozialdemokrat* of 3 June 1887, and another in the same year in the New York *Volkszeitung*. Finally, the French

original was published as an appendix to the French edition of N. F. Danielson's (Nicolai-on) work, *Histoire du développement économique de la Russie depuis l'affranchissement des serfs* (Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1902, pp. 506-509), and this appendix was reprinted in *Le Mouvement Socialiste,* Vol. IV, No. 93 of 24 May 1902, pp. 968-972. The German translation was again reprinted in *Sozialistische Monatshefte,* Volume 50 (1918/I) pp. 397-400.

The letter appeared also in English translation. It can be found in an article entitled "A Letter on Russia" in *The New International,* volume I, number 4 (November 1934), pp. 110-111.

The version in this volume is a translation of the French original, as it appeared in *Le Mouvement Socialiste.*

The letter, although often published and republished, has apparently not received the attention it deserves. Its significance consists not so much in its analysis of Russian social conditions and trends, but rather in the expression Marx himself gives in it of his conception of the "materialistic conception of history." The letter lends full support to the statement by Karl Korsch that "Marx and Engels never considered their new principle of economic and social research as more than a new scientific approach to a strictly empirical investigation of the historical development of the modern capitalistic mode of production." And that "even where Marx departs from that purely critical position, he does not lay down any general propositions as to the essential nature of all society but merely describes the particular conditions and developmental tendencies inherent in the historical form of contemporary bourgeois society." (*Karl Marx,* London: Chapman & Hall, 1938, pp. 167 and 168.) It should, therefore, cure all those who talk of Marx's materialist conception of history as "economic determinism" or as a social philosophy rather than a principle of social research. But alas, old superstitions die out slowly!

19. Letter on the Russian Village Community

Of all the selections contained in this volume this letter is the only item which is not a faithful translation or reimpression of an original manuscript, article, or letter of Marx or Engels, but represents a composite piece which was put together by us from several drafts and sketches made by Marx. The history of the origin of this letter has been told by D. Ryazanoff in his Introduction to a section, entitled "Vera Zasulič und Karl Marx" in *Marx-Engels Archiv,* volume I, Frankfurt, n.d. [1926], pages 309-314.

In February 1881 Vera Zasulich had written the following letter to Karl Marx in London.

"16. February 1881
Geneva
Rue de Lausanne N° 49
L'Imprimerie Polonaise"

"Esteemed Comrade,

"You are not unaware that your *Capital* enjoys great popularity in Russia. In spite of the confiscation of the Russian edition, the few copies which have escaped are read and reread by the mass of more or less educated people of our country. Serious men study it. But you are probably unaware of the role which your *Capital* plays in our discussions of the agrarian question in Russia and our village community. You know better than anyone else how urgent this problem is in Russia. You know what Chernyshevsky thought of it. Our progressive magazines, as, for example, the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski,* continue to develop his ideas. But, in my opinion, this problem is of vital importance, above all, for our socialist party. On one or another of your opinions on this question, depends even the personal fate of our revolutionary socialists. One of the two answers is that this village community, if freed from the immoderate exigencies of the fisk, the payments to arbitrary landlords and administrators, is capable of developing in a socialist path, that is, of organizing stepwise its production, and the distribution of its products on a socialist basis; in this case the revolutionary socialist must sacrifice all his powers to the freeing and further developing of the community.

"If, on the contrary, the community is fated to perish, the socialist as such has no alternative open, but to devote himself to more or less ill-founded calculations, in order to find out in how many decades the land of the Russian peasant will pass from his hands into those of the bourgeoisie, and in how many centuries Russian capitalism will attain perhaps a development similar to that of Western Europe. They will thus have to limit their propaganda to the city workers who will continually be flooded by a mass of peasants, which as a consequence of the dissolution of the village community, will be thrown on the streets of the large cities in search of a wage.

"In recent times we hear often that the village community is an archaic form which history, scientific socialism, in one word, all theory which is above questioning, condemns to perdition. The people who preach this call themselves your special disciples: 'Marcsists' [sic!]. The strongest of their arguments is often: 'Marx says so!'

"They are confronted with the objection, 'But how do you derive it from his *Capital?* He does not deal in it with the agrarian problem and does not speak of Russia!'

" 'He would have said so, if he had talked of our country' is the answer of your somewhat rash disciples. Thus you understand, Comrade, how profoundly your opinion on this question interests us, and what a great service you would render us, if you expounded your ideas on the possible destiny of our village community, and on the theory of the historical necessity for all countries of the world to pass through all phases of capitalist production.

"I take the liberty to ask you, Comrade, in the name of my friends, to be good enough to render us this service.

"If time does not permit you to expound your ideas on these questions in a more or less detailed fashion, be at least kind enough to do it in form of a letter which I ask you to permit me to translate and to publish in Russia.

With my dutiful greetings, I am, Comrade, your
Vera Zasoulich

"My address: Imprimerie polonaise, Rue de Lausanne N° 49, Geneva."

Marx took considerable trouble to write an extended reply to this letter. He made several drafts dealing with various aspects of the village community in general, the Indo-European community, and the Russian village community in particular. All in all four drafts, all written in French, have been preserved, which were found in 1911 by Ryazanoff among the papers of her father which Marx's daughter Laura Lafargue was preserving. Ryazanoff deciphered the drafts and published them on pages 318 to 340 of the first volume of the *Marx-Engels Archiv*. The text of this chapter is a composite of the four drafts. We have attempted to include in it all the ideas expressed by Marx and have omitted only those passages which differ merely verbally. Since the third and fourth drafts are more highly elaborated than the first and second, we have "worked backwards." That is, we began with the later drafts and included only those passages from the earlier ones for which no counterparts or no adequate ones existed in drafts III and IV. Thus, although the text in this chapter is not a piece which was actually written in this form by Marx, each paragraph stems from his pen and only passages which are insignificant or repetitive have been omitted.

For those readers who are interested in comparing our edited version with the original as published by Ryazanoff, we include the following collation (the page and line references in parentheses refer to volume I of the *Marx-Engels Archiv*). The first section of the article is from draft III (page 335, line 12 from top to page 338, line 15 from bottom); the second section is from draft II (page 331, line 10 from top to page

332, line 13 from bottom); the third section is also from draft II (page 332, line 9 from bottom to page 334, line 16 from top); the fourth section is from draft I (page 324, last line to page 325, line 10 from top, then page 327, line 3 from top to page 329, line 21 from top, but the passages in lines 19 to 4 from bottom of page 328 and in lines 3 to 15 from top of page 329 have been omitted as repetitive).

The final version of the letter which Marx actually sent off to Vera Zasulich contains only a short paragraph on the Russian village community; the rest of the letter is concerned with an interpretation of certain passages in *Capital*. This letter was also reprinted by Ryazanoff on pages 341 to 342 of the first volume of the *Marx-Engels Archiv*. The text of this letter is as follows:

"8 March 1881
41, Maitland Park Road, London, N.W."

"Dear Comrade,

"A sickness of nerves which has attacked me periodically for the last ten years has prevented me from replying earlier to your letter of February 16th. I regret that I cannot send you a succinct statement, which could be published, on the question which you have honored me with putting before me. Several months ago I have promised a piece on this very subject to the St. Petersburg Committee. However I hope that a few lines will suffice to leave you in no doubt about the misunderstanding of my so-called theory.

"Analyzing the genesis of capitalist production I say:

" 'At the bottom of the capitalist system is, therefore, the radical separation of the producer from the means of production . . . The basis of this whole evolution is the *expropriation of the peasants* . . . It has been accomplished in a final form only in England . . . but *all the other countries of Western Europe* are going through the same movement.' (*Le Capital,* French edition, p. 315.)

"The 'historical necessity' of this movement is thus explicitly restricted to the *countries of Western Europe*. The reason for this restriction is indicated in the following passage in chapter XXXII:

" '*Private property,* based on personal labor . . . becomes supplanted by *private capitalist property,* based on the exploitation of the labor of someone else, on the wage-system' (*op. cit.,* p. 340).

"In this Western movement we have to deal, therefore, with the *transformation of one form of private property into another form of private property*. In the case of the Russian peasants, on the contrary, one would have to *transform their communal property into private property*.

"The analysis presented in *Capital* thus gives reasons neither for nor against the vitality of the village community, but the special study which I have made of it, and for which I have searched for materials in original sources, has convinced me that this community is the strategic point of

social regeneration in Russia. But before it can function as such, it is necessary to eliminate first the pernicious influences which attack it from all sides, and then to assure it of normal conditions for a spontaneous development.

I have the honor, dear Comrade, to be
very faithfully yours,
Karl Marx."

The original of this letter was found only in 1923 in the papers of Paul Axelrod which were preserved in the archives of the German Social Democratic Party in Berlin. It was first published, in the original French, with a facsimile in *Materialy po istorii russkogo revolutsionogo dvizheniya,* volume II *(Iz arkhiva P. B. Akselroda),* Berlin, 1924. Another reprint of the French version, also with a facsimile, is contained in the article by Maximilien Rubel, "Karl Marx et le socialisme populiste russe," *La revue socialiste,* Nouvelle série, No. 11 (May 1947), pp. 554-557. A German translation of the letter is contained in the article by B. Nikolaevsky, "Marx und das russische Problem," *Die Gesellschaft,* volume I, no. 4 (July 1924), pages 361 to 362.

Two curious circumstances attach to this letter. The first is that Marx only quotes from the French translation (rather than the Russian translation or the German original) of *Capital.* The second is that the letter of Marx, whose opinion had been declared by Zasulich to be so important for Russian socialists, had been completely forgotten by Vera Zasulich, George Plekhanov, and Paul Axelrod. When Ryazanoff in 1911, after he had discovered the drafts, asked these three persons whether they remembered the receipt of a letter from Marx and its contents, he received only negative answers. This curious lapse of memory has been commented on by Ryazanoff and Rubel, who both express their surprise at it. Rubel even attempts to explain it, by saying, in essence, that since the Zasulich-Plekhanov-Axelrod group soon after the receipt of this letter became adherents of Marxian socialism, the ideas of the master were appropriated by them so fully that they could afford to forget where they had learned them first.

We are not satisfied with this explanation, but this is not the place to enter into a discussion on the psychology of forgetting. It seems possible to explain this lapse of memory much more simply. Zasulich had asked Marx what attitude in his opinion the Russian socialists should take toward the village community. Marx does not really answer this question in the letter he actually sent. He states that certain passages in *Capital* are not applicable to, or were not intended to be descriptive of Russian present and future trends of development. But

his statement of what he believed to be the role and chances of the Russian community could hardly be stated in vaguer and more ambiguous terms. Zasulich and her friends could not make any use of this passage in their discussions with the pretended Russian "Marxists." But less than a year later they got a statement from Marx on the same subject which was much more forthright and precise—the preface to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, which is printed in Chapter 20 of this book—and in 1884 they became acquainted with Marx's letter to Mikhailovsky which is reprinted in Chapter 18. What is more natural than that they should regard these clear statements as sources of inspiration and should forget the vague, colorless paragraph in Marx's letter of 8 March 1881?

The other problem, of the differences between the German and the French editions with respect to the passages quoted is of smaller psychological, but much greater historical interest. One of the chief points that Marx makes is that his analysis in *Capital* is not applicable to Russia because he limited it explicitly to Western European development. He quotes from the French edition (*Le Capital,* par Karl Marx. Traduction de M. J. Roy, entièrement revisée par l'auteur. Paris: Librairie du Progrès, n.d. [1873]). The corresponding passage (which is found on p. 315 of the French edition) is stated in different, more general, terms in the first and second German editions:

"In the history of the process of separation, those moments are historically epoch-making, when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of production and subsistence, and hurled as free and 'unattached' proletarians on the labor market. The expropriation of the workers from the soil is the basis of the whole process. Thus we must analyze it first. This history, in different countries, assumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at different periods. In England alone, which we take as our example, has it the classic form." (*Das Kapital,* first edition, Hamburg, 1867, page 701; second edition, Hamburg, 1872, pages 744 to 745.)

In the third and fourth German editions and the Engish translations this passage appears with only small verbal changes (see, for example, *Capital* [trans. by Ernest Unterman], Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1906, vol. I, page 787). The only version, therefore, in which this development is explicitly assigned to Western Europe is the French translation.

Some students of Marx have seen in the contrast between the French and other versions a contradiction or inconsistency in Marx's thought. We believe this interpretation to be wrong, and again appeal to the

letter on the economic development of Russia, from which it becomes quite plain that Marx disbelieved in a "mechanical" theory of historical development, according to which the history of a more advanced country is a precise and necessary example for the future history of a less developed one. But it is unfortunate that Engels, in editing the third German edition of Marx's *Capital,* shortly after Marx's death, did not replace this passage by the more explicit one from the French translation of 1873. This might have avoided some confusion among European socialists in all countries, but notably in Russia.

20. *The Communist Manifesto in Russian*

This essay is the preface to the second Russian edition of *The Communist Manifesto* which was published in Geneva in 1882. The first Russian edition of the *Manifesto,* in the translation of Michael Bakunin appeared in 1870, and not as Marx and Engels erroneously say "in the early sixties." In the Preface to the German edition of *The Communist Manifesto* of 1890, which, in the main, consists of a retranslation of Marx's and Engels's preface to the Russian version of 1882, Engels wrote the following: "Since I wrote the above yet another German edition of the Manifesto has become necessary. Besides, certain things have happened in the history of that document which it may be well to record. A second Russian translation by Vera Zasulich appeared at Geneva in 1882. The preface to that edition was written jointly by Marx and myself. Unfortunately, I have mislaid the original German, and shall have to retranslate from the Russian version. Naturally the text will not improve in the process! Still, here is what we wrote under the date of 21 January 1882."

Then Engels reproduces his retranslation of the text of the preface to the Russian edition. This preface became well known among Russian Socialdemocrats, since, for a long time, it constituted almost the only explicit published statement by Marx and Engels on the prospective trends of Russian social developments, and since the translator of the *Manifesto,* George Plekhanov—and not Vera Zasulich, as Engels states erroneously—was a leading member of the Russian socialist movement.

For a long time only the Russian translation and retranslations of the Russian version were available. Engels's preface to the German edition of 1890 also was republished several times.

In 1922 D. Ryazanoff, at that time Director of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow published (in Russian) the second edition of his *The Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which not only contained the text of the *Manifesto* with extensive com-

mentaries by Ryazanoff, but also all the more important prefaces and several other items. This book, which originally was destined to be the *editio princeps* of the *Manifesto* was translated entirely or in parts into several languages. For example, there appeared a French translation by J. Molitor under the title: K. Marx-F. Engels, *Manifeste du Parti Communiste,* . . . Avant-propos de Bracke . . . Introduction historique de D. Riazanof, Paris: Alfred Costes, 1934. The 1882 preface is reprinted in this volume on pp. 44 to 46. Similarly, in Germany H. Duncker edited a small book in the series *Elementarbücher des Kommunismus.* Volume I in this series is entitled Marx/Engels, *Das Kommunistische Manifest,* Berlin: Internationaler Arbeiter-Verlag (editions of 1920, 1923, 1924, 1927, 1929 and 1931). In the edition of 1931, the preface to the Russian translation of the Manifesto of 1882 in Engels' retranslation appears on pages 15-17. Finally, there appeared an English translation of Ryazanoff's book. In the United States it had as its publisher the firm of International Publishers of New York who brought out the translation in 1930. Shortly thereafter Ryazanoff was removed from his position as Director of the Marx-Engels Institute, the victim of a Stalinist purge. International Publishers never reprinted the work, in spite of its obvious scholarly value, and it has become exceedingly scarce.

Up to 1948 all editions of the *Communist Manifesto* which contained the text of the preface to the Russian edition of 1882 had versions based on the Russian original or on Engels' retranslation of it. But the original manuscript has apparently not been lost and was unearthed in the archives of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. This manuscript apparently comes from the papers of Plekhanov or one of his associates, who formed the nucleus of the Russian socialist emigré group in Geneva in the early 1880's. A facsimile of the preface in Engels's handwriting, containing one or two corrections by Marx, and carrying the date "London, 21 January, 1882," and the signatures of both Marx and Engels has been included in the edition celebrating the 100th anniversary of the first publication of the *Communist Manifesto.* This book, which bears the title, K. Marx y F. Engels, *Manifest Kommunisticheskoi Partii,* was published in 1948 in Moscow by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.

The German original of the preface to the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1882 is apparently scheduled to be published in the near future by the Dietz-Verlag in Berlin. This was reported in a news dispatch by Martin S. Ochs "Marx and Engels Works Revised

Under East Germans' Book Purge" in the *New York Times* of March 15, 1952. In the *New York Times* of March 25, there appeared a letter to the editor by Alexander Trachtenberg, in which the manner of Mr. Ochs's reporting was criticized, and in which the writer points out that "an English translation of this preface . . . has been available in the United States for some twenty years." Mr. Trachtenberg, however, does not say either that this translation appeared in the above mentioned volume by Ryazanoff, or that this English version is almost unobtainable because International Publishers withdrew the book from the market after Ryazanoff was purged.

The text in this volume is a translation from the German original, as represented by the photographic facsimile reproduced in the 100th anniversary edition of the *Manifesto* published in Moscow in 1948. This text deviates in terminology, but not in the ideas expressed, from the translation made by Eden and Cedar Paul from the Russian version of the 1882 preface which can be found on pages 263 to 265 in Ryazanoff's *The Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,* New York: International Publishers, 1930.

21. Russia and the Social Revolution Reconsidered

As was mentioned in the bibliographical note to Chapter 17, this essay was written in 1894. It was first printed on pages 61 to 72 of the book *Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat" (1871-1875),* Berlin, 1894, and formed a postscript to the essay which Engels had written nineteen years earlier on the problem of the social revolution in Russia. This postscript contains, among other things, a summing up of the evolution of Marx's and Engels' thought on internal, social and political developments in Russia and on Russian foreign policy. Several of the documents published in this volume are mentioned there and their interrelation to one another explained. We believe that this essay, not only because of its composition shortly before Engels' death, but also because of its character as a summary, forms an appropriate conclusion to this volume. That Engels himself considered this postscript to be a summary of his and Marx's views on Russian development seems clear from remarks he makes in the general introduction to his collection of essays on international questions from the *Volksstaat.* Engels says there:

"The last essay, 'Russia and the Social Revolution' (1875) which also appeared as a separate pamphlet could not be reprinted again without a more or less extensive postscript. All Russians interested in the economic

development of their country express concern about the future of the Russian village community. The letter by Marx which I cite [see Chapter 18 of this volume] has received the most conflicting interpretations among Russian socialists. Even to this day I have been asked by several Russians within and outside Russia to publish an opinion on this problem. I have strenuously refused, since I know only too well how limited is my knowledge of the detailed economic situation in Russia. How can I finish the editing of the third volume of *Capital* and, on the side, plough through the truly monumental literature, which, in Marx's words, constitutes the last stocktaking of the old Russia before its death? Well, the reprinting of 'Russia and the Social Revolution' is urgently desired and this makes it necessary for me to supplement that old essay by making an attempt at drawing some conclusions from a comparative historical investigation of recent economic conditions in Russia. These conclusions do not come out fully in favor of a great future for the Russian community, but they are an attempt to adduce reasons for the view that the coming disintegration of capitalist society in the West will also place Russia in a position in which it can shorten its now inevitable transition through the capitalist system." (*Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat,"* Berlin, 1894, page 7.)

It may be of interest, in this connection, to refer to one remark by Marx quoted in this essay concerning Alexander Herzen. Marx and Engels regarded Herzen as a Panslavist, a pseudo-socialist at best, and a man who as a former friend of Bakunin was, for that very reason, suspected. (Yet it is perhaps an irony of history that the first Russian translation of the *Communist Manifesto,* as Marx and Engels themselves state, appeared in a translation by Bakunin in the journal *Kolokol,* which was edited by Herzen in London.) But Marx had nothing but contempt for Herzen's romanticism. He calls him a *"belletriste,"* which we have rendered by the words "journalist" or "scribbler." Probably Marx used the word in a derogatory meaning. The reason for Marx's dislike of Herzen is perhaps best explained in the footnote to an appendix in the first German edition of *Capital* which Engels quotes in his article. This edition appeared in 1867. Herzen died in 1870. The note on Herzen is not contained in the second or any later German editions. That Marx did not change his mind about Herzen is clear from his letter to Mikhailovsky contained in Chapter 18, and from Engels' remark in his postscript to "Russia and the Social Revolution." But although Marx was willing to denounce an opponent while this opponent was alive and could defend himself, he scorned to insult him after his death. This is another point in which Marx differed radically from the Stalinist communists of our day who pretend to be the keepers of his thought and teachings.

INDEX

(This is an index of names only. Persons who are mentioned only in passing or about whom no specific statements are made are not listed)

Aberdeen, George Gordon, 4th Earl of (1784-1860), British statesman, 128, 154, 155, 156, 161, 168, 179, 182, 258, 263, 269

Aksakoff, Ivan Segeievich (1813-1886), Russian writer and Panslavist, 18, 119

Alexander I (1777-1825), Emperor of Russia, 11, 16, 36, 37-41, 42, 106, 122, 193

Alexander II (1818-1881), Emperor of Russia, 48, 84, 109, 193, 230, 272

Alexander III (1845-1894), Emperor of Russia, 18

Aveling, Edward (1851-1898), English socialist and physician, 247

Aveling, Eleanor Marx (1856-1898), 13, 247, 259

Axelrod, Paul Borisovich (1850-1923), Russian socialist, 279

Bailey, Thomas A., 265, 268

Bakunin, Michael (1814-1876), Russian revolutionary and anarchist, 68, 80, 82, 83, 210, 227, 229, 273, 281, 284

Bienstock, Gregory, 20

Bismarck, Otto von (1815-1898), German chancellor, 48, 50, 53, 114, 116

Bourbon, French royal family, 63, 150

Brown, John Porter (1814-1872), American diplomat and orientalist, 172, 267

Brunnov, Philipp Ivanovich (1797-1875), Russian statesman and soldier, 155, 264

Bykhovsky, Bernard E., 266

Catherine II (1729-1796), Empress of Russia, 7, 13, 26, 30-36, 38, 39, 47, 102, 106, 140, 141, 193, 214, 244

Charlemagne (742-814), Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 72, 168

Charles X (1757-1836), King of the French, 41, 104, 160, 167

Charles XII (1682-1718), King of Sweden, 28, 196

Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich (1828-1889), Russian social scientist, 230-232, 237, 239, 276

Clarendon, George William, 4th Earl of (1800-1870), British statesman, 128, 255, 263, 269

Dana, Charles A. (1819-1897), American writer and journalist, 248, 249-250

Danielson, N. F. (1844-1918), Russian economist and socialist, 274, 275

Danilevsky, Nicolai Iakovlevich (1822-1885), Russian agronomist and Panslavist, 9, 10

Delacour, Edmond (1805-1868), French diplomat, 129, 171

Denis, Hector (1842-1913), Belgian economist and socialist, 252

Diebitch, Ivan Ivanovich, Count of (1785-1831), Russian general, 42, 78, 123

Dolgoruki, Feodor Ivanovich (1792-1856), Russian statesman and soldier, 193-194

Drouyn de l'Huys, Edmond (1805-1881), French statesman, 162, 182

Dundas, Sir James (1785-1862), British admiral, 121, 140, 154
Duvergier de Hauranne, Prosper (1798-1881), French politician and writer, 150

Engels, Friedrich (1820-1895), 7-23, 215, 235, 240, 242-245, 246-247, 251, 252, 253, 254-256, 259, 260, 269, 270, 272-273, 274-275, 281, 282-283, 284

Frederick II, the Great (1712-1786), King of Prussia, 30, 32, 33, 112
Frederick William II (1744-1797), King of Prussia, 34, 113
Frederick William III (1770-1840), King of Prussia, 39
Frederick William IV (1795-1861), King of Prussia, 44
Fuad Effendi (1815-1869), Turkish statesman, 121, 139

Gaj, Ljudevit (1809-1872), Croatian statesman and writer, 62, 86
Garaschanin, Iliya (1812-1874), Serbian statesman, 127, 165, 166
Giers, Nicolai Karlovich, Baron von (1820-1895), Russian foreign minister, 26
Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898), British Prime Minister, 33, 51, 188
Gortchakov, Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich (1795-1861), Russian general and statesman, 26, 47, 170, 171, 191, 194
Guelich, Gustav von (1791-1847), German historian, 30
Gurowski, Anton Adam (1805-1860), Polish writer and Panslavist, 10, 248-250

Hapsburg, Austrian Imperial family, 57, 58, 65, 66, 79, 132
Haxthausen, August F. L. M. von (1792-1866), German agricultural economist, 210, 216, 229, 237
Henderson, G. B., 257-258, 259
Hepner, Benoît P., 13
Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812-1870), Russian writer, 118, 208, 210, 229-230, 236-237, 284
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945), 16, 261, 271, 272

Ignatieff, Nicholas Pavlovich, Count (1832-1908), Russian diplomat and Panslavist, 18, 119
Ingraham, Duncan Nathaniel (1802-1891), American naval officer, 176, 267
Ivan I, Kalita (died 1341), Grand Duke of Vladimir, 12, 13, 14
Ivan III (1440-1505), Grand Duke of Muscovy, 12, 13, 15
Ivan IV, the Terrible (1530-1584), Czar of Muscovy, 15, 16

Jellachich, Joseph (1801-1859), Croatian general and statesman, 64, 66, 79, 80, 106
Joseph II (1741-1790), Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 31, 33

Karamsin, Nicolai Mikhailovich (1765-1826), Russian historian, 11, 106, 178
Katkoff, Michael Nikiforovich (1818-1887), Russian journalist and Panslavist, 18, 119
Kautsky, Karl (1854-1938), German socialist and writer, 32, 246, 256
Kisseleff, Paul Dimitrievich (1788-1872), Russian diplomat and statesman, 153, 192
Koestler, Arthur, 20
Korsch, Karl, 275
Kosciusko, Tadeusz Andrzei (1746-1817), Polish revolutionary leader, 78, 111
Kossuth, Louis (1802-1894), Hungarian statesman and revolutionary leader, 56, 66, 76
Koszta, Martin, 173, 176, 267
Kretov, F. D., 242

Lafargue, Laura Marx (1846-1911), 253, 277

Lafargue, Paul (1842-1911), French socialist and writer, 253, 255
Lassalle, Ferdinand (1825-1864), German socialist leader, 116, 246, 247, 251, 269, 270
Lelewel, Joachim (1786-1861), Polish historian, 92
Lenin, Vladimir Ilya Ulyanow (1870-1924), 16, 21, 22
Leopold II (1747-1792), Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 34
Liebknecht, Wilhelm (1826-1900), German socialist leader, 252, 253, 254, 256
Lieven, Kristofer Andreievich, Prince of (1774-1839), Russian diplomat, 26, 41, 42, 159, 161, 162, 168
Louis XIV (1638-1715), King of France, 30, 144, 149
Louis Philippe (1773-1850), King of the French, 161, 270
Lubomirski, Polish noble family, 58, 82
Luders, D. I., Russian general, 170, 191

Marriott, J. A. R., 261
Marx, Karl (1818-1883), 7-23, 25, 43, 104, 176, 177, 216, 230-231, 235, 236-238, 240, 244, 246, 247-251, 252-254, 255, 259, 260, 261, 262-284
Maurer, Georg Ludwig von (1790-1872), German historian, 211, 219
Mayer, Gustav (1871-1948), German socialist and historian, 246, 247, 250-251, 252
Mazarin, Jules (1602-1661), French Cardinal, 147, 261
Mazour, Anatol G., 16
Mehring, Franz (1846-1919), German socialist and historian, 246-247, 251, 270
Mentchikoff, Alexander Sergeievich, Prince of (1787-1869), Russian diplomat and statesman, 121, 138, 139, 155, 156, 166, 170, 258, 261, 263-264
Metternich, Clemens, Prince (1773-1859), Austrian chancellor, 44, 58-60, 87, 88, 160
Mikhailovsky, N. K. (1842-1904), Russian sociologist and writer, 274, 280, 284
Miklosich, Franz von (1813-1891), Austrian philologist, 30, 86
Moltke, Helmut Carl Bernhard, Count von (1800-1891), German general, 43, 53
Moore, Barrington, 20

Nachimoff, P. S. (1800-1856), Russian admiral, 170, 171
Napoleon I, Bonaparte (1769-1821), Emperor of the French, 7, 8, 16, 35-39, 42, 76, 78, 106, 122, 144, 150, 196-197, 202, 204, 272
Napoleon III [Charles Louis Napoleon], Bonaparte (1808-1873), Emperor of the French, 45, 48, 67, 99, 100, 113, 116, 128-129, 150, 155, 156, 179, 187, 189, 192, 204, 261, 263, 264, 270, 273
Nesselrode, Karl Robert (1780-1862), Russian diplomat and chancellor, 26, 42, 105, 157, 159, 161, 162, 164, 170, 177, 264
Nicholas I (1796-1855), Emperor of Russia, 42, 44-46, 83, 104, 105, 113, 122, 140, 141, 165, 167, 170, 179, 191-194, 238, 258, 261, 263, 264, 267, 271, 272
Nicolaevsky, B., 279

Ochs, Martin S., 282-283
Olmsted, Frederick Law (1822-1903), American landscape architect and writer, 248-249
Omer Pasha (1806-1871), Turkish general, 170, 171, 179, 184-185
Owen, Robert (1771-1858), British socialist, 233-234

Palacky, Frantisek (1798-1876), Czech historian and politician, 62, 64, 79, 86
Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 1st Viscount (1784-1865), British Prime Minister, 43, 45, 95, 128, 137, 152, 156, 177, 179, 258, 269-270
Paskievich, Ivan Fedorovich, Count

(1782-1856), Russian field marshal, 78, 105, 186, 191, 194
Paul I (1754-1801), Emperor of Russia, 36, 106
Peter I, the Great (1672-1725), Emperor of Russia, 13, 15, 29, 30, 31, 34, 106-107, 112, 136, 141, 167, 193, 207, 244, 254
Peter III (1728-1762), Emperor of Russia, 32, 214
Plekhanov, Georgy Valentinovich (1857-1918), Russian socialist and writer, 231, 235, 242, 279, 281, 282
Pozzo di Borgo, Carlo Andrea (1764-1842), Russian diplomat and statesman, 11, 26, 42, 106, 160, 161, 162, 164, 168, 177, 178, 268
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865), French socialist and philosopher, 96, 118, 252

Radetzky, Joseph, Count of (1766-1858), Austrian field marshal, 89, 106
Raglan, Fitzroy James Henry Somerset, 1st Baron of (1788-1855), British field marshal, 184, 189, 198, 200
Rauch, Georg von, 15
Reshid Pasha, Mustafa Mehmed (1802-1858), Turkish grand vizier, 139, 165, 166, 172, 258
Rosdolsky, Roman, 247
Rose, Hugh Henry, Baron Strathnairn (1801-1885), British soldier, 121, 156
Rubel, Maximilien, 279
Russell, John Russell, first Earl (1792-1878), British Prime Minister, 150, 155
Ryazanoff, David B. (1870-1942), Russian historian and Marxologist, 10, 13, 243-245, 247-248, 250, 252, 253, 255, 260, 275, 277, 278, 279, 281-282, 283

Schwarz, Solomon J., 20
Soliman I (1494-1566), Sultan of Turkey, 76, 144
Stalin, Joseph Vissarionovich, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 242-243, 271
Stenzel, Gustav A. (1792-1854), German historian and politician, 91
Stratford de Redcliffe, Stratford Canning, Viscount (1786-1880), British diplomat, 129, 165, 171, 258, 262
Sumner, B. H., 15

Temperley, Harold (1879-1939), British historian, 259, 263, 264, 269
Thiers, Louis (1797-1877), French statesman, 150, 257
Thomas, Benjamin P., 268
Thugut, Johann Amadeus, Baron of (1736-1818), Austrian diplomat and statesman, 166-167
Tkatchoff, Peter Nikitich (1844-1886), Russian socialist and writer, 205-206, 208, 210-214, 229, 230, 273
Toynbee, Arnold, 266
Trachtenberg, Alexander, 283

Urquhart, David (1805-1877), British diplomat and writer, 43, 137, 258, 262, 269

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of (1769-1852), British general and Prime Minister, 39, 160, 186, 202, 273
Wemyss, Webster, 257
Windischgraetz, Alfred, Prince of (1787-1862), Austrian field marshal, 57, 64, 66, 79, 83, 89, 106
Wipper, R. J., Russian historian, 16

Yugov, Aaron, 20

Zasulich, Vera (1851-1919), Russian socialist leader, 22, 274, 275, 276-277, 278, 279-280, 281
Zhukovsky, Iulii (1822-1907), Russian writer, 216, 236, 274
Zinoviev, Grigory Evseevich (1883-1936), Russian socialist leader, 245-246

ALSO PUBLISHED BY THE FREE PRESS

A Study of Power

World Politics and Personal Insecurity, by Harold D. Lasswell

Political Power, by Charles E. Merriam

Power and Conscience, by T. V. Smith

Three classics of American social science, complete and unabridged in a one volume edition for the convenience of the reader interested in obtaining a clear statement on power and its relation to political life. Taken together these works represent one of the most complete and considered analyses of politics ever written in America. 1048 pages. *$6.00*

Personality and Political Crisis

Edited by Alfred H. Stanton and Stewart E. Perry

New perspectives from psychiatry and social science for the study of war and politics. *Propaganda and Mass Insecurity* by Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychiatric Aspects of Morale* by Harry Stack Sullivan, *Personality and Social Structure* by Talcott Parsons, *From Morality to Morale* by David Riesman, *Psychological Warfare, Intelligence and Insight* by Renzo Sereno, *The Concept of National Character* by Ralph Linton, *Anti-Nazis: Criteria of Differentiation* by David M. Levy, *Psychological Aspects of International Relations* by Otto Klineberg.

The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell

This volume includes complete and unabridged, *Psychopathology and Politics, Politics, Who Gets What, When, How,* and a new book, *Democratic Character.* The writings of Lasswell have given a fundamental impetus to the study of politics in the full complex of society. Lasswell, trained in law, economics, political science and sociology, combined these studies with the insights of psychoanalysis. The result of this systematization has been a broader approach to the political process through the stimulation of empirical research.

Essays on Freedom and Power

By Lord Acton

"Acton, together with Tocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt, is one of the few nineteenth century historians who today deserve and attract wide attention, not for the result of their research but for their reflections on the meaning of history and the ethics of politics. Of the three he has perhaps the most to say to our generation."—Hans Kohn in the *New York Times*

THE FREE PRESS, GLENCOE, ILLINOIS